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This thesis takes as its focus several works in the late period of Philip Roth’s writing and 
examines the way in which these particular texts address issues of American national 
experience since the Depression. In particular, this study looks at Roth’s assessment of a 
distinctly modern liberal vision that came to prominence during the 1930s and was to 
dominate American political and cultural life until the late 1960s. In thus covering the 
wider historical sweep of these novels, the research will draw attention to the way in 
which such broader matters of American cultural and political life intersect with more 
local issues of Jewish-American subjectivity and literary style that have been explored 
recurrently throughout Roth’s greater body of fiction. This study thus aims to show how 
the more recent ‘historical turn’ in Roth’s novelistic focus is in fact consistent with 
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 This thesis locates and explores a historical thematic within Philip Roth’s later 
period of writing that puts into sharper relief certain issues of literary style and Jewish-
American cultural identity that have marked his overall body of work. In particular, I 
will pay attention to the manner in which Roth’s fiction appears to take a certain 
‘historical turn’ of direction in the novels of what has been dubbed the American trilogy: 
American Pastoral, I Married a Communist and The Human Stain. The main body of 
my thesis will discuss how this relatively loose bound collection of novels, tied together 
by the narrative persona of Nathan Zuckerman, explores the interaction between the 
private lives of its protagonists and certain significant moments in American public life 
since World War Two. Through the addition of a concluding chapter, I will also 
examine how the historical themes that the American trilogy explores are developed in 
two subsequent novels: The Plot against America and Exit Ghost. Although the works 
chosen for this study present a broader historical canvas than much of Roth’s other 
work, I wish to argue that these novels in fact offer a clear sense of continuity with some 
of the presiding issues of literary style and cultural identity that have dominated his 
literary career prior to the publication of American Pastoral in 1997. In this way, I hope 
to demonstrate how his later fiction enables us to understand in much greater detail 
Roth’s relationship to the American cultural scene within which he has emerged and 
developed as a writer.  
 
Roth and the American Liberal Tradition 
 
 Each of the five novels that this thesis examines focuses upon a different 
historical episode in American history, spanning a total period of about seventy years 
from Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s to the Presidential re-election of 
George W. Bush in 2004. Specifically, these texts examine various moments of crisis 
within the liberal brand of American political idealism that emerged under Roosevelt, 
and which was to dominate national life during the Depression, World War Two and 
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throughout the early post-war period prior to the sixties. This particularly modern form 
of liberal politics derived its influence from certain “progressive” beliefs that had been 
gaining prominence in America in the early part of the twentieth century, and which 
helped to distinguish it in many areas from laissez-faire ideas about the capitalist market 
and competitive individualism that had motivated nineteenth century liberalism. As 
opposed to the notion of “society as a collection of atomized individuals freely pursuing 
their self-interest” (Thompson, 12-13) that influenced classic liberal concepts of political 
and economic freedom, progressive thought advanced ideas about the corporatist 
structure of modern American society in which individual members “were 
intersubjectively related to the public around them” (14). According to such a viewpoint, 
the wide collection of groups and individuals who constituted the American citizenry 
were no longer deemed as independent social agents whose lives were relatively 
separate from each other, but were instead considered to be far more inter-dependent on 
each other’s actions. In light of this new understanding about the civic ties that forged 
the nation together into a formidable collective, progressives argued that a greater 
amount of centralised state management of social and economic relations between 
American citizens would ensure a wider level of democratic parity within the 
increasingly complex fabric of modern capitalist society. Michael Thompson, for 
example, has discussed how the broadly defined “Progressive movement” of the early 
twentieth century helped to supply later liberal thought with an overall “vision of 
democratic life that emphasised association, cooperation, the centrality of the state for 
achieving broader public ends, and the need to fuse the economy to standards of the 
public good” (10). Similarly, Richard Pells has argued that “Progressives invented the 
language and set forth the goals that future movements for social change [in America] 
would naturally inherit” (1973, 10). Although he stresses the disunities and failures that 
plagued the coalition of political campaigns and intellectual ideas which sprung up 
during what has been labelled the Progressive Era, Pells underlines the overall 
achievement of such movements in influencing the later New Deal blueprint for a 
“cooperative commonwealth of government, labor, and business” (21).  
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 The emergence of this innovative approach to notions of economy and 
democratic citizenry within American liberalism took full effect during the New Deal. 
As Terry Cooney explains, the New Deal put into place certain defensive measures 
against the “harsher implications” of capitalist individualism, thereby enshrining the 
progressive belief “that in a modern society individuals had only a partial control over 
their fate” (1995, 50). Elsewhere, Michael Szalay describes such attempts to curb the 
potentially damaging effects of unfettered and unregulated capitalism on individual 
American citizens as the Federal State’s inauguration of “a system of exchange 
essentially compensatory for human experience” (2). The New Deal thus set out, amid 
the catastrophe of the Great Depression, to use the levers of government to harness and 
organise what was increasingly being viewed as a rogue and unforgiving capitalist 
economy. It presented itself as the guardian of what Roosevelt called an “economic 
morality” (Second Inaugural Address, paragraph 11) that would provide for and protect 
the material welfare of all Americans, and not just the interests of a relative few:  
 
In every land there are always at work forces that drive men apart and forces that draw men together. In 
our personal ambitions we are individualists. But in our seeking for economic and political progress as a 
nation, we all go up, or else we all go down, as one people (“Second Inaugural Address, paragraph 34) 
 
 I will discuss the origins and later developments of this liberal ideal in much 
greater detail in the chapters that follow. Suffice at this stage to note that the claims of 
the New Deal and its later incarnations within American liberalism gave expression to 
decidedly populist and egalitarian ideas of national co-operation and unity. This marked 
a particularly inclusive celebration of American nationalism, according to which the 
country’s many diverse regions, economic sectors and ethnic groups were seen to be 
united in collective harmony by the democratic pursuit of mutually beneficial 
opportunities (economic or otherwise) for self-advancement. Wendy Wall, for instance, 
argues that the Roosevelt period saw the birth of the modern idea of a unifying 
“American Way.” Wall explains that, although this concept of national cohesion has 
been subject to much contested claims in later history, it found a particularly pointed 
definition during the New Deal as “the ability of diverse individuals to live together 
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harmoniously” (Wall, 7). The progressive liberal values that prevailed during the 
Depression and went on to dominate American life until the mid-sixties were thus based 
upon certain universalising democratic notions of a common and inclusive national 
culture. Todd Gitlin, for instance, has referred to the universal assumptions underlying 
modern liberal ideas as stemming from “a belief in progress through the unfolding of a 
humanity present – at least potentially – in every human being” (1995, 85). In the 
chapters that follow, this idea of the universal participation of all Americans within the 
progressive spirit of nationhood – as opposed to the competitive breed of social and 
cultural atomisation that was lionised by nineteenth century liberal beliefs – will play a 
significant role in my discussions on modern liberalism and how it has been put under 
considerable strain since the sixties. In particular, I will examine Roth’s divided 
relationship to notions of a shared ‘American-ness’ within liberal ideology as one whose 
American subjectivity is also inflected by his distinctive origins as an ethnic Jew. 
 
 The Rooseveltian model of modern American liberalism that I have been 
sketching here is deeply tied to certain Enlightenment values about mankind’s ability to 
shape its own environment and direct historical forces along rationally controlled lines. 
Pells, for instance, has mentioned how the Progressive Era saw the rise of a new 
sensibility in American political thought, which moved away from a laissez-faire faith in 
the ‘natural’ progress guaranteed by the invisible hand of the market and toward the 
knowledge that “men had to rely increasingly on planning, efficiency, and expertise in 
controlling the rate and direction of [socio-economic] change” (1973, 9). This appeal to 
rational action is directly linked to the notion of universality that I have mentioned 
above. Progressive liberal efforts to successfully steer economic, social and cultural 
forces toward reasonably sought after ends are predicated upon certain assumptions 
about the common aspirations and values that exist among the American masses. Of 
course, Rooseveltian liberalism, as my chapters will indicate, is highly fused by notions 
of pragmatism, conflict and compromise that make it far less mechanically linear or 
cohesive than my last remark might suggest. At the same time, modern liberal belief in 
America has managed to find a certain degree of momentum from what Anthony 
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Hutchinson terms its “invocation of an ever-improving future that appeal[s] to an 
Enlightenment-rooted faith in reason and progress” (68).  
 
 In the novels chosen for the present study, Roth explores how various historical 
inconsistencies and contradictions have worked to tear asunder the liberal-progressive 
narrative that prevailed in America at mid-century. These texts almost mythically evoke 
a sort of epic liberal epoch in which it appeared that American history was being steered 
along highly compassionate and moral lines toward an ever-increasingly benign vision 
of the future. This thesis will explore how, within these particular Roth works, certain 
experiences of historical reversal bring despair and confusion to the heightened sense of 
collective national optimism that was generated by this once dominant liberal vision. I 
will look at the way the novels in question examine certain drastic transformations to the 
American political and cultural landscape, and how such changes have brought into 
doubt the important idea of commonality and citizenry that glues together the 
Rooseveltian liberal ideal. By reading these later Roth novels in this historicist fashion, I 
will suggest how they help to situate his oeuvre within a catastrophic narrative of 
national disillusionment and cultural fragmentation in post-war America.  
   
 In a self-interview that he conducted following the publication of The Great 
American Novel, Roth provides us with an early insight into how this wider national 
narrative of defeated liberal optimism has informed his writing. He pays particular 
attention to the challenges brought by the “demythologizing decade” (Reading Myself 
and Others, 81) of the sixties to the tradition of American political idealism that had 
appeared to find its apotheosis in the liberalism of Roosevelt. Roth argues that the events 
of this period gave rise to a situation in which much of “what was imagined to be 
indestructible, impermeable, in the very nature of American things, yielded and 
collapsed overnight” (81). What emerged powerfully for Roth from the sixties was “a 
counter-history, or counter-mythology” (82) that split the post-war American experience 
in two, creating what he describes as a: “struggle between the benign national myth of 
itself that a great power prefers to perpetuate, and the relentlessly insidious, very nearly 
 10
demonic reality (like the kind we had known in the sixties) that will not give an inch in 
behalf of that idealized mythology” (82-83). This calamitous experience of reversal in 
the “myth” of America as a bastion of progressive liberal values is repeatedly traced 
through archetypal images of postlapsarian chaos and disunity in the novels of the 
American trilogy and The Plot against America. In different ways, each of the main 
characters in these works finds himself displaced from the democratic endowments of a 
clearly defined narrative of American historical possibility, through which he has 
fashioned a heroic idealisation of his own life as an emancipated subject. As part of 
these experiences of humbling and loss, each protagonist is cast into the horrifying 
contingency and mutability of a chaotic “counter-history.” In these particular Roth texts, 
varying forms of cultural and psychic dissonance are brought about by clashes between 
the liberal idea of a universally shared experience of historical progress in America and 
“the terrifyingly provisional nature of everything” (The Human Stain, 336) that 
comprises: “the history that isn’t yet history, the history that the clock is now ticking off, 
the history proliferating as I write, accruing a minute at a time” (335). In a similar vein 
to this, Zuckerman describes the social and political unrest of the sixties in American 
Pastoral as an embodiment of “the indigenous American berserk” (86) that shatters the 
happy and ordered procession of events in the Swede’s idyllic experience of early post-
war America, in which “[e]verything always added up to something whole” (191). 
Likewise, for Philip in The Plot against America, “the unfolding of” certain 
“unforeseen” (113) catastrophes within the novel has the harrowing effect of disturbing 
the secure and peaceful sense of historical belonging that he and his Jewish family feels 
toward the predominantly Gentile nation under Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
 
The Challenges of Writing about Post-war American “reality” 
   
 The horrifying realisations made by characters in these novels that their lives are 
no longer clearly mapped within a triumphal myth of American progress, but are instead 
subject to the inchoate tangle of “unforeseen” events, can be understood in relation to a 
highly problematic experience of the ‘real’ within Roth’s overall body of literature. In an 
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important and much cited essay that he wrote at the beginning of his career, entitled 
“Writing American Fiction,” Roth outlines the difficulty for post-war writers in America 
to engage with a “social world [that] has ceased to be as suitable or as manageable a 
subject as it once may have been” (Reading Myself and Others, 114-5). Writing in 1960, 
he explains how the contemporary American author grapples “to understand, describe, 
and then make credible much of American reality … [t]he actuality is continually 
outdoing our talents, and the culture tosses up figures almost daily that are the envy of 
any novelist” (110). This confused sense of an experiential and extra-literary world that 
no longer conforms to any recognisable sense of “reality,” but which is instead 
populated by phenomena whose already fictive or “unreal-seeming” (123) qualities pose 
a serious challenge to the creative talents of the literary author, has been crucial to the 
development of Roth’s aesthetic and worldview. Throughout much of what follows in 
my introduction, I will suggest how this difficult experience of the ‘real’ in post-war 
American life has posed several problems in relation to ideas of authorship and literary 
style within Roth’s writing. Furthermore, as my succeeding chapters will illustrate, the 
postlapsarian view of America’s displacement from a liberal ideal of common civic 
purpose into a diabolical state of cultural disharmony in Roth’s later work provides a 
useful historical context in which to better understand this disorienting experience of an 
“American reality” that is no longer “manageable” or discernible in palpably ‘real’ 
terms.  
   
 In “Writing American Fiction,” Roth bemoans the impact that “the writer’s loss 
of the community - of what is outside himself - as subject” (120) has had upon post-war 
American writing. He explains how such an experience of social and cultural alienation 
has lead, in certain cases, to a sort of “literary onanism” (120) in which “[t]he writer 
thrusts before our eyes … personality, in all its separateness and specialness” (119). 
While he accepts that “the mystery of personality may be nothing less than a writer’s 
ultimate concern” (119), Roth is concerned by this solipsistic and self-enclosed tendency 
in contemporary American writing, in which “the self can only be celebrated as it is 
excluded from society” (123). Unimpressed by the experiences of “joy” and “solace” 
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that certain writers find in a notion of the “self imagined as the only seemingly real thing 
in an unreal-seeming environment” (123), Roth invokes the need for the contemporary 
author to uphold the increasingly difficult task of carrying out “an imaginative assault 
upon the American experience” (113). In doing so, he suggests that literary artists should 
explore how the alienated condition of the authorial self is inescapably bound-up with 
and shaped by the “unreal” landscape of post-war cultural life, rather than as an 
“inviolable” and “powerful” (123) source of opposition to it. In its efforts to thus chart 
the difficult relationship between the writer of fiction and national public life in the post-
war period, “Writing American Fiction” can be viewed in light of Roth’s interest in 
literary realism as an aesthetic form that allows the author to develop a particular insight 
into the state of existing social and cultural conditions. Throughout the remainder of this 
introduction, I wish to examine how the strange and perplexing form of American 
“reality” that his essay charts has contributed significantly to certain complexities and 
divisions in Roth’s development as a writer of realist prose. However, before discussing 
this subject further, I wish to draw on the work of two highly noted literary scholars in 
order to highlight what I mean by my rather generalised statement about the relationship 
of realism to wider issues of historical significance.  
 
Of course, I am fully aware that “realism” is a constantly evolving and much 
contested generic literary term, the social and political relevance of which can vary 
greatly according to how it is defined and used. For example, Eric Auerbach’s broad 
definition of realism as a mimetic form that has “developed in increasingly rich terms, in 
keeping with the constantly changing and expanding reality of modern life” (554), 
encompasses many variances in method and style. He discusses differing formal 
categories of realism, ranging between the “thoroughly historistic” (480) modes of 
Stendhal and Balzac, Flaubert’s “aesthetic realism” (512), the “materialistic psychology” 
(512) of Zola’s naturalism, and Woolf’s modernist style of “unipersonal subjectivism” 
(536). Significantly in terms of my discussion on Roth and realism, Auerbach locates in 
the tradition of writing begun by Stendhal and Balzac an acute sense of engagement 
between the realist novel and historical experience: “the serious realism of modern times 
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cannot represent man otherwise than as embedded in a total reality, political, social, and 
economic, which is concrete and constantly evolving” (463). Whereas Auerbach sees 
this ‘‘historistic’’ style as one among a number of approaches within the realist tradition 
of the novel, George Lukacs argues that such a mode of writing is, in fact, the exclusive 
domain of realism. Unlike Auerbach, Lukacs carries out an outright attack on the rise of 
naturalism and experimental modernism for what he claims are the separate ways in 
which they have undermined the rich historical and political significance contained 
within the realist traditions of French and Russian literature. Lukacs argues that the 
European realist novel of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suitably explores 
“the concept of the complete human personality” (7) through its complex dramatisation 
of “the indissoluble connection between man as a private individual and man as a social 
being, as a member of a community” (8). As a Marxist intellectual who is interested in 
how the novel examines the many contradictions and conflicts of life under capitalism, 
Lukacs does not consider this notion of the “complete human personality” to be a static 
or naturalised entity, but as symptomatic of a particularly dense arrangement of 
historical forces which are – despite being grounded in very much real and objective 
conditions – always subject to fluctuation and change. Lukacs decries how both the 
“exclusive introspection” of certain modernist experimentations in style and the 
“exclusive extraversion” of naturalist writing have managed to “equally impoverish and 
distort [this complex historical] reality” (6). By contrast, he argues that the realist novel 
achieves a vision of “completeness” and “objective typicality” (6) by dramatising the 
historically changing, dialectical processes through which man relates to society.   
  
 In separate ways, each of these scholars helps to establish a broadly defined 
sense of how particular realist authors have attempted to portray historical life as both 
“concrete and constantly evolving” (Auerbach); “objective” and yet continually in a 
stage of dialectical process (Lukacs). Auerbach and Lukacs, therefore, confidently 
affirm the strengths of literary realism as a form that responds in malleable fashion to the 
continual changes in modern society. However, Roth is writing within a post-war 
American context in which the ability of the realist author to wield control over and give 
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aesthetic shape to the constantly modulating content of an “unreal-seeming 
environment” is brought under considerable pressure. Yet despite his sense of living in 
such a perplexing and apparently unreal world, Roth began his career in Goodbye, 
Columbus, Letting Go and When She Was Good by conforming to the conventions of 
this broad concept of a realist tradition that seeks to address and take measure of the 
milieu or environment in which the author writes. These early literary attempts to 
encompass and come to terms with social experience exist in clear tension with the 
contemporary American lives that they are trying to portray. In the novella “Goodbye, 
Columbus,” for example, Neil Klugman’s portrait of the Patimkin household reveals a 
banal suburban landscape that is inhabited by dull and flattened ciphers, and which 
continually refuses to disclose any sense of the rich and complex social life that his 
choice of narrative form might ordinarily expect to achieve. Discussing these fissures 
between a somewhat “unreal” subject matter and realistic style in Roth’s early works, 
Donald Kartiganer argues that the lives explored within these texts provide the author 
with a means “of measuring and in some measure breaking through the traditional 
novelistic form that has brought them to life” (89). Yet although subject to a strain in 
these works that will become even more pronounced during subsequent developments in 
his writing, I would suggest that the realist imperative to address the ever-changing 
phenomena of contemporary America life persists throughout Roth’s body of literature. 
As my argument develops, I will indicate how the problematic notion of reality that Roth 
outlines as being peculiar to his American cultural surroundings continues to demand 
close scrutiny in his fiction. Even though his attempts to write about American life in a 
conventional realist manner are constantly defied and confounded by its already fictive 
or unreal qualities, Roth remains deeply interested in the wider world of ‘real’ social 
forces and experiences. What this highly self-reflexive form of “realism” explores is an 
unrelenting aesthetic conflict in which the literary impulse to carry out an “imaginative 
assault” on aspects of ‘real’ life are forever in collision with an “actuality [that] is 
continually outdoing our talents” to transform it into a “credible” fiction.   
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 What I have been trying to establish as Roth’s somewhat compromised efforts to 
remain loyal to a certain tradition of politically and socially engaged realism is thrown 
into sharp contrast with a countervailing tendency in his writing toward a style of 
literature that asserts the absolute aesthetic autonomy of the writer and his work over the 
external phenomena of ‘real’ life. Roth’s work explores how the literary realist quest to 
develop a certain verisimilar reproduction of life as it exists beyond the written page 
becomes somewhat thwarted in a cultural environment where “reality” appears to adopt 
its own varying modes of the “unreal.” In a situation where our understanding and 
knowledge of actual experience has become thus increasingly unstable and 
impoverished, Roth’s novels make the suggestion that literature itself might work as a 
rich and necessary surrogate for reality. There are countless examples in his work where 
the art of fiction is lionised as an expansive and heightened imaginative means by which 
to speculate upon what are, in strictly epistemological terms, the otherwise unfathomable 
phenomena of ‘real’ life. In The Ghost Writer, for instance, Zuckerman ponders how he 
has creatively altered or reinvented the actual events to which he has been merely a 
partial witness: “what do I know, other than what I can imagine?” (129). Similarly, in 
The Counterlife, after having learned about his brother, Henry’s decision to undergo life-
threatening heart surgery in order to regain his sexual potency and resume an extra-
marital affair, Zuckerman seeks to unlock what he calls “the real wisdom of that 
predicament” (41) through the stratagems of writing. Consulting his detailed notes on 
the conversations that he has had with Henry about the affair and the possible 
implications of the proposed bypass operation, Zuckerman is described in his authorial 
role as: “straining more and more after an idea that would release those old notes from 
their raw factuality and transform them into a puzzle for his imagination to solve” (41-
42). In this way, fiction, for both Zuckerman and Roth, works as “the means to 
imaginative release, to the exposure, revelation, and invention of life” (The Anatomy 
Lesson, 424). Outside of this fictional process, according to Zuckerman, our factual 
knowledge of what actually occurs remains desperately impaired. 
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 The notion of fiction in Roth’s work as an “obsessive reinvention of the real,” in 
which “what-could-be … always [has] to top what-is” (The Counterlife, 247), is invoked 
by the high-formalist school of literary modernism that grew out of the American 
academic field of New Criticism. What this school of thought claims is that the creative 
structures inherent to literature furnish their own unique mode of knowledge or 
experience, autonomous from any epistemological formulations of a reality existing 
beyond the work of art itself. According to this argument, textual meaning is not shaped 
by matters of historical or authorial context, but derives solely from the internal aesthetic 
arrangements of literary form. Cleanth Brooks, one of the founders of New Criticism, 
has argued that literature is predicated upon “being an experience rather than any mere 
statement about experience or any mere abstraction from experience” (The Well 
Wrought Urn, 1365). As I will outline in greater detail in my next chapter on I Married a 
Communist, Roth’s creative development was significantly influenced by certain New 
Critical ideas about form and tradition that dominated the field of academic literary 
thought in America during the early post-war period. I will discuss how New Criticism 
opposed itself directly to what it saw as the narrow political content of certain types of 
realist and, in particular, naturalist prose in America. This school of thought was bred by 
what Roth himself called a “salvationist literary ethos” (Reading Myself and Others, 71), 
according to which well-honed works of literature furnish an exclusive understanding of 
mankind’s fundamental predicament that transcends the mutable and discordant 
phenomena of actual social life. In Roth’s fiction, this almost pious search for new 
understandings and heightened revelations about life involves the author’s struggle to 
impose some sort of aesthetic order or design upon the mundane “facts” of existence:  
“to wield the whip over the facts to make real life amazing” (The Facts, 7). 
   
 Particularly relevant to the present study, the collection of nine Zuckerman books 
– of which the American trilogy and Exit Ghost comprise almost half – continually 
examines how Roth’s aesthetic is informed by this exalted notion of literary form. In the 
first of these novels, The Ghost Writer, the young Zuckerman undertakes a literary 
pilgrimage to the home of E.I. Lonoff, a renowned Jewish-American author who lives 
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and writes in self-imposed isolation from the day to day world of social existence. This 
ascetic style of living is central to Lonoff’s ideal of literature as a “gruelling, exalted, 
transcendent calling” (The Ghost Writer, 4) that takes place at a disinterested remove 
from the prosaic and non-literary concerns of the self and wider society. Foregoing all 
notions of corporeal pleasure or distraction for the more elevated rituals of writing, the 
elder artist appears to have ceased to live as a material subject in the ‘real’ world. As he 
declares to Zuckerman: “my ‘self’ … happens not to exist in the everyday sense of the 
word” (30). Lonoff’s high-aesthetic sense of purpose thus reflects aspects of Roth’s 
statement in The Facts about his New Critical induction into the hallowed realm of 
serious literature: “I was educated to believe that the independent reality of the fiction is 
all there is of importance and that writers should remain in the shadows” (4).  
 
In The Ghost Writer and throughout the rest of the Zuckerman novels, this 
venerable notion of literary fiction as “transcendent” of ‘real’ life is something that 
Roth’s protagonist both aspires to achieve and yet fails to successfully uphold. Despite 
the declared “love for the bluntness, the scrupulosity, the severity, the estrangement … 
the relentless winnowing out of the babyish, preening, insatiable self” (The Ghost 
Writer, 41) that Zuckerman discovers in Lonoff’s dedication to art, he himself is unable 
to discard as superfluous the claims that aspects of his personal life and social 
predicament make upon his writing. I will examine key facets of this important conflict 
below by introducing examples of the difficulty with which Zuckerman has had to 
defend his artistic prerogative to modulate the actual experiences of both himself and 
others against countervailing accusations that he is committing “a ridiculous travesty of 
the facts” (The Counterlife, 226). I will also look at how his somewhat chastened efforts 
to locate himself among a coterie of “superior artist[s]” who “are able to loosen and 
make ambiguous their connection to real life through the imposition of talent” (210) find 
a connection with equally conflicted notions of cultural identity for Zuckerman. 
Describing fiction writing as a process that “sweep[s] away the limits on life” (235), 
Zuckerman seeks to escape the narrow confines of his own biographical circumstances 
and reinvent for himself a more expansive and liberating sense of origin or identity 
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through literature. However, this notion of authorial autonomy and individual self-
authorship that Zuckerman elicits from formalist principles about literature is brought 
into considerable friction with certain external or pre-authored notions of cultural 
origins, most particularly those associated with his Jewish upbringing.  
   
 Ross Posnock argues that the rarefied ideal of literary autonomy championed by 
American New Critics is defended and upheld throughout Roth’s work. Determined to 
dismiss “pigeonholing critics who would anchor him [Roth] to his historical 
coordinates” (2006, xiii), Posnock argues that “Roth embraces a modernism of 
Promethean heroism,” in which the primacy of the “individual author” (50) over the 
deterministic bent of literary historicism and fixed notions of identity politics is clearly 
emphasised. In arguing thus, he adds that, in his “flaunted insouciance about the sanctity 
of the real” (xvi), Roth has shown an “irreverent attitude toward realism” (xviii). Other 
critics, however, have shown how traces of a realist aesthetic remain ingrained in Roth’s 
fiction, even as it is drawn to the greater range of stylistic experimentation associated 
with literary modernism and, in some arguments, postmodernism. Bernard Rodgers, for 
example, reads Roth’s early writing in terms of its formal reaction to the unruly 
experience of American reality after World War Two. He has traced a development in 
Roth’s work from a form of “traditional realism with a moral emphasis” in the first three 
publications, to more “Kafkaesque tales which vividly convey the confluence of the real 
and the fantastic in the quotidian” (10) of contemporary life. This development has not 
resulted in an abandonment or rejection of realist fiction for Rodgers, but signals instead 
a gradual expansion of the bounds of “traditional realism” in works such as The Breast 
and My Life as a Man. For Debra Shostak, Roth’s formal style moves forward and back 
across what she sees as the three main developmental stages of the novel form: 
conventional realism, modernist experimentation and postmodernist playfulness. She 
argues that the “credibility” of his verisimilar “stance in relation to ‘the world’” (188) 
remains consistent in Roth’s use of all three modes. In contrast to Posnock, Shostak 
asserts that “Roth has striven for verisimilitude even in his most metafictionally playful 
moments” (188) as a postmodern stylist. In a slightly different spirit, Stephen Wade has 
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attempted to show how Roth’s attachment to “experimental modernism” takes place 
alongside and is enmeshed with a literary tradition of “didactic realism” (15). According 
to Wade, this “didactic element, the need to explain to oneself and therefore to extend a 
process of reasoning and interrogation to the reader” (23), has persisted in Roth’s work 
through the many tensions that he establishes between “the private self” (22) and 
broader politico-cultural forces in post-war American life. Like Shostak, Wade is keen 
to stress that, even as Roth’s fiction moves beyond modernism toward postmodernist 
metafiction, the “didactic” desire to understand the (authorial) self in relation to broader 
social phenomena remains of foremost importance within his work. 
   
 As I already hinted, and will discuss at greater length later on in a more extensive 
treatment of Roth’s critical heritage, this question of the relative status of realism is 
central to how readers have tried to relate his work to wider American social and cultural 
experiences. According to many critics, Roth’s persistent interrogation of the 
relationship between the fictive and the ‘real’ has produced a movement away from his 
earlier efforts to emulate traditional realism and toward the more interiorised, self-
reflexive literary concerns with form and voice that are often characteristic of high-
modernism and postmodernism. In the pages that follow, I will indicate how modernist-
formalist notions about the sovereign autonomy of literature are challenged in Roth’s 
fiction by the peculiar manner in which aspects of ‘real’ life impose an external 
influence upon the private realm of the author’s imagination. The particular novels 
studied in this thesis help to make clear how these significant creative tensions in Roth’s 
work have stemmed from his interaction with the contingent and chaotic reality of the 
post-war American scene in which he writes.  
 
The “intractable” Stuff of ‘Real’ Life 
 
 In an argument that shares clear parallels with those of American New Critics, 
T.S. Eliot has explained how a disciplined commitment to the nuanced practices of high-
literary form allows the author to achieve a creative mastery over the “objective 
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correlative” of his artistic content.1 In contrast with Eliot’s argument, Roth’s idea of a 
somewhat improbable or self-fictionalising American reality somewhat corrodes such a 
vaunted notion of the literary author who imposes his own unique thumb-print upon the 
otherwise inert subject material of his work. In one sense, fiction is heralded in Roth’s 
work as a means “to claim, exploit, enlarge, and reconstruct” (The Anatomy Lesson, 323) 
what is given as ‘real.’ However, the challenge “to invent as presumptuously as real life” 
(The Ghost Writer, 87) that Zuckerman and Roth’s other fictional surrogates continually 
face helps to compromise this heroic concept of the author as undeniable master of his 
work. For example, in My life as a Man, Peter Tarnopol’s determination “to find in 
everyday experience the same sense of the difficult and the deadly earnest that informed 
the novels I admired most” (194) meets comic frustration with a married life that reflects 
“something serialized on afternoon TV” (101). Tarnopol’s repeatedly failed efforts to 
find within literature a mode of existence that might transcend the decidedly low-brow 
squalor of his domestic situation finds further examination through the plight of the 
literary author in Zuckerman Unbound. In this novel, Zuckerman’s efforts to engage 
with and write about contemporary American life in the sixties are made difficult by the 
endless barrage of implausible fictions that are evolving from the “stupendous vrai” 
(230) of a “haywire country” (221) in which, he informs us, “many … had gone berserk” 
(138). In particular, Zuckerman’s position as literary author faces various challenges 
from the proliferation of competing fictions that are produced about both himself and his 
work by the ‘‘haywire’’ responses of a mass readership to his bestseller, Carnovsky. 
Thrust instantly into the role of celebrity by the salacious sexual content of this 
particular novel – a thinly veiled reference to Roth’s own Portnoy’s Complaint – 
Zuckerman is bombarded by the steadfast claims and ribald suggestions of a public 
determined to confuse the libidinal adventures of his protagonist with the ‘real’ life of 
the author: “[t]hey had mistaken impersonation for confession and were calling out to a 
character who lived in a book” (140). Having once “believed everything Aristotle taught 
                                                 
1 In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot discusses how the work of serious literature is defined by 
the writer’s “continual surrender of himself” to the objective and immutable standards of canonical literary 
form, which take absolute precedence over questions of biographical or historical content: “[t]he progress 
of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality” (1094). 
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me about [how] literature” (199) imitates experience in order to move and affect its 
audience in a certain controlled way, Zuckerman is left dumbfounded by the manner in 
which his own life and writing are now made subject to the (authorial) manipulations of 
his readers: “Aristotle ... didn’t mention anything about the theater of the ridiculous in 
which I am now a leading character – because of literature” (199-200).  
   
 The contingent and self-generating fictions assumed by extra-literary experience 
in Roth’s work thus serve as examples of an obdurate ‘real’ in contemporary American 
culture, which challenges the modernist-formalist ideal of literature as something that 
transforms and heightens our experience of the world. Yet, such difficult obstacles to 
literary authorship also function as key forces of antagonism, against which Roth’s 
various author-protagonists continue to pit their struggle to impose a uniquely aesthetic 
design upon life. This difficult and highly antagonistic sense of extra-literary experience 
is suggestive of what Peter Tarnopol yearned for as the experience of “intractability” 
central to the writing of “serious fiction” (My life as a Man, 195). Tarnopol’s anguished 
sense of married life as having all “the intractability of soap opera” (195) – rather than 
providing him with a desired for “intractable existence” that “take[s] place at an 
appropriately lofty moral altitude, an elevation somewhere, say, between The Brothers 
Karamazov and The Wings of the Dove” (195) – epitomises the manner in which 
actuality and literature clash in Roth’s work. The circumstances of married existence fail 
to match what Tarnopol calls “[m]y model of reality, deduced from reading the masters” 
(194) of canonical literature. As a result of the gross disparity between his literary 
“model of reality” and the less exalted aspects of his domestic environment, Tarnopol’s 
attempts “to introduce the story [of his marriage] into a work of fiction” are subject to 
repeatedly exasperated attempts at “transform[ing] low actuality into high art” (208). It 
is this experience of an “intractable” conflict between ‘life’ and ‘art’ as rival modes of 
authorship that, paradoxically, both frustrates and engenders the narrative quest to 
reinvent what is ‘real’ in Roth’s fiction.  
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 Tarnopol’s troubled experience with a reality that is unwilling to be translated 
into elevated literary terms finds added resonance in the recurring accusations made 
against Zuckerman for stealing from or cannibalising the lives of both himself and others 
in his writing. Zuckerman is constantly faced by impeaching declarations against his 
position as author over claims that he has betrayed or distorted ‘real’ life for the 
purposes of fiction. For example in The Counterlife, Henry accuses his brother of being 
“a pure cannibal” (238) in his insatiable desire to appropriate as material and then 
contort into fiction the intimate details of other people’s private existence: “[e]veryone 
buried and mummified in that verbal lava, including finally himself – nothing 
straightforward, unvarnished, directly alive, nothing faced up to as it actually is” (232). 
It is against such assured notions of what life “actually is” that Zuckerman is made to 
continually re-assert the highly speculative purpose of fiction as a means of exploring 
“what-could-be” (The Counterlife, 247). Yet in constantly having to wage this argument 
about the power of literature to transcend actual life and transform it into something 
new, Zuckerman’s writing is ironically drawn back upon the moral and aesthetic 
implications of its relationship to the “facts.” Furthermore, in having to challenge and 
dispel the multitude of fictions about himself that are spawned by Carnovsky, 
Zuckerman is forced to go back over the very subject of personal biography from which 
he has sought release through the creative act of writing literature. In this fashion, 
Zuckerman’s biographical self – similar to the case of Tarnopol’s domestic life – 
functions as yet another aspect of lived reality that is being revised and authored in a 
manner which is beyond his authorial control as a literary artist. This constantly 
evolving and fictive sense of extra-literary reality in Roth’s fiction thus works to 
undermine any absolutist notion of the author’s creative autonomy from and mastery 
over ‘real’ life experiences.   
 
The Conflict with Jewish Origins 
 
              Roth’s fiction can be thus said to develop out of a paradoxical conflict in which 
literature both engages with and borrows from the strangely “intractable” experience of 
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reality peculiar to post-war American life, while at the same time trying to gain a 
formalist aesthetic distance from and mastery over the same. In one sense, this is a 
situation that involves a certain collapsing of the distance that makes distinguishable life 
from literature; fact from fiction; biography from literary authorship. Yet at the same 
time, this peculiar admixture of opposites is also fused by a distinct sense of separation 
and antagonism between the ‘real’ and the imaginary that is essential to Roth’s fiction. 
As Maria in The Counterlife suggests, the extra-literary modes and expressions of ‘real’ 
life that seriously challenge his creative efforts to re-conceive the facts as fiction are 
also, paradoxically, what mobilise Zuckerman’s art into action in the first place: 
“[y]ou’re just dying … for a collision, a clash – anything as long as there’s enough 
antagonism to get the story smoking and everything exploding in the wrathful philippics 
that you adore” (316). Nowhere is this sense in which “[o]pposition determines your 
direction” (The Counterlife, 188) more evident than in the treatment of Jewish-American 
subjectivity in Roth’s novels. In particular, the Zuckerman Bound collection explores the 
personal and literary travails faced by Zuckerman as a result of damning accusations 
made against his fictional portrayal of Jewish family and community life. In The Ghost 
Writer, for example, Zuckerman is compelled to defend the integrity of his art in 
response to the anxieties expressed by both his father and a local Rabbi over how his 
portrayal of Jews might confirm certain anti-Semitic stereotypes among a Gentile 
readership. It is against this backdrop of rebuke from his own father and others over a 
perceived ‘‘betrayal’’ (69) of ethnic loyalties that Zuckerman makes his literary 
pilgrimage to the home of Lonoff, in an attempt to gain from “the great man” (3) of 
letters an alternative source of paternal advocacy for his art: “I had come … to submit 
myself for candidacy as nothing less than E. I. Lonoff’s spiritual son” (7).  
 
 What Lonoff and his writing represent for Zuckerman is a proven example of 
how literature can take as its subject the parochial life of a Jewish community and 
illuminate upon the heightened experiences of a common humanity that lay therein:  
   
The typical hero of a Lonoff story … some ten years after Hitler, seemed to say something new and 
wrenching to Gentiles about Jews, and to Jews about themselves, and to readers and writers of that 
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recuperative decade generally about the ambiguities of prudence and the anxieties of disorder, about life-
hunger, life-bargains, and life-terror in their most elementary manifestations (10)  
   
Lonoff’s artistic ingenuity lies for Zuckerman in how he extrapolates from his Jewish 
subject matter a clear sense of “life” in all its “elementary manifestations.” Zuckerman 
appeals to this laudatory notion of fiction as a means of expanding upon the otherwise 
narrow limits of ‘real’ life in an attempt to defend his literary appropriation of characters 
and stories from the localised existence of his Newark upbringing. This aesthetic 
argument is one that Roth himself had made in response to various criticisms – closely 
similar to those aimed at Zuckerman – against the portrayal of Jews in his early fiction:  
   
I had informed on the Jews. I had told the Gentiles what apparently it would otherwise have been possible 
to keep secret from them: that the perils of human nature afflict the members of our minority (Reading 
Myself and Others, 146)  
   
By identifying with a “history of novelists infuriating fellow countrymen and friends” 
(The Ghost Writer, 79), Zuckerman aligns himself with a notion of literary tradition and 
culture that far exceeds the regional ethnic concerns of his father and Rabbi Wapter in 
the novel. Like Lonoff, he sees the art of fiction as a means of transcending the 
particular and transforming it into an expression of something more profound and 
immutable. Yet despite his youthful desire to abandon the restrictions of family and 
home for the (self-) liberating experience of art, the demanding burden of origins placed 
upon him by his Jewish father is something that Zuckerman cannot easily surmount 
without a huge amount of personal guilt and suffering: “[i]t wasn’t Flaubert’s father or 
Joyce’s father who had impugned me for my recklessness – it was my own” (80). In The 
Ghost Writer, and throughout the novels that follow it, Roth explores how the notion of 
the literary artist as one whom, like Lonoff, lives and works at a distant remove from the 
insular purview of his community is made difficult for Zuckerman by these damning 
accusations of betrayal and disloyalty. The debate over the Jewish subject matter of his 
early fiction is similar to how other external notions of reality impinge upon 
Zuckerman’s efforts to creatively reinvent what is given or ‘real.’ In attempting to 
defend his artistic method against the scandalised and irate reactions of certain Jewish 
 25
readers, Zuckerman’s writing is brought uncannily back to the very site of ethnic origins 
from which he had sought an escape through literature in the first place.  
   
 This particular form of confrontation with ‘real’ life is re-enacted throughout 
Roth’s body of literature by characters who, in attempting to discover a greater sense of 
cultural belonging beyond their particular background as Jews, are brought into conflict 
with varying recalcitrant notions of Jewish historical specificity and ethnic exclusivity. 
For example, Alex Portnoy attempts to liberate himself from what he sees as the 
burdensome “saga of the suffering Jews” by defiantly exclaiming to his father: “stick 
your suffering heritage up your suffering ass - I happen also to be a human being!” 
(Portnoy’s Complaint, 76). However, as his struggles throughout the novel make 
evident, Portnoy’s claim to a deracinated and universal humanist notion of subjectivity is 
crippled by the sense of social restriction and psychological inhibition that has been 
ingrained in him by his Jewish upbringing. His frustrated efforts to escape his Jewish 
parents and author the self anew find a correlate with ideas of literary authorship in the 
case of Zuckerman. The latter’s resistance to the Zionist arguments about Jewish tribal 
allegiance to which his brother Henry has become enthralled in The Counterlife is 
contrasted with his own inability to blanch himself of his sense of ethnic marginality and 
difference while living in England alongside his new lover, Maria. In this novel, 
Zuckerman is at pains to prioritise the imaginative play of narrative (self-) reinvention 
over the idea of a Jewish historical imperative to which Henry and his new cohort of 
zealots have committed themselves. However, he soon discovers that his attempt to 
remodel his life and transplant himself among the remnants of the old landed elite of 
England is doomed to bitter strife and division over his growing sense of exclusion, as a 
Jew, from his new environment. While he suggests to her the “possib[ility] that neither 
of us can control this old, old stuff” (309) of historical prejudice and acute cultural 
differences, Maria lambastes what she sees as Zuckerman’s paranoid notion of an 
“International Gentile Conspiracy” (304) for being a form of dogma about Jewish 
ethnicity that is no less outrageous to her than Henry’s Zionism. What this episode from 
The Counterlife adequately displays is the extent to which Zuckerman has retained and 
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internalised the exclusive sense of Jewish ethnic belonging that censorious figures such 
as his father and Judge Wapter had previously expressed in opposition to his youthful 
ideas about literature and self-transformation.  
   
 Roth himself has argued that, despite the anger and frustrations which it aroused, 
the early “conflict with my Jewish critics was as valuable a struggle as I could have had 
at the outset of my career” (Reading Myself and Others, 72). He discusses “the irritant” 
that such an “attentive audience … provides … by its collective (therefore simplistic) 
sense of the writer” and “the uses it wants to make of selective, disconnected elements 
of his work” (73). Such narrow perceptions of Roth’s literature threaten to undermine 
any sense of the sovereignty by which the literary artist and his work exist in isolation 
from the world of social attachments and allegiances. Yet according to Roth, this 
outraged Jewish audience have also served as a useful form of “antagonistic opposition,” 
helping to re-invigorate his already charged sense of resistance to the influences of the 
greater world beyond literature: “the amiable irritant is useful insomuch as it arouses 
whatever is stubborn, elusive, or even defiant in the writer’s nature, whatever resents 
being easily digested” (73). This paradoxical experience of Jewish subjectivity as both 
“irritant” and inspiration within Roth’s writing is suitably demonstrated by Zuckerman’s 
ongoing aesthetic and personal plight. Like Roth, Zuckerman can never fully abandon 
the charges that he has betrayed his Jewish origins. Nor can he find a simple form of 
rapprochement with his inherited ethnic identity. Like other experiences of the ‘real’ in 
his writing, he is both attached to and separated from the concept of a Jewish origin; it is 
what both frustrates and stimulates, in cyclical and self-perpetuating fashion, his 
determination to broaden the boundaries of ‘real’ life within fiction. In each chapter that 
follows, I will discuss further how this conflicted experience of Jewish origins in Roth’s 
work calls into question New Critical ideas about how literature transcends its 
immediate or particular social context. In addition, I will examine how the complex 
Jewish-American experiences of Roth’s characters also make problematic the 




As the disagreements over Zuckerman’s fictional depiction of Jews suggest, the 
rejection of paternal wisdom or law is necessary to creative acts of (self-) authorship for 
Roth. Like Zuckerman, characters such as Portnoy, David Kepesh of The Professor of 
Desire, “Philip Roth” in The Plot against America and Marcus Messner of the recently 
published Indignation are typically defined by their longing for self-liberation from a 
home life ruled by the smothering protections and proscriptive warnings of Jewish 
parents, most notably fathers. In The Ghost Writer, Zuckerman attempts to replace his 
father with a surrogate in the form of Lonoff, thereby substituting his “unliterary 
origins” as the son of second generation, lower middle-class Jewish-Americans for the 
more “transcendent calling” (3) that he discovers in a certain high-literary tradition of 
writing. Yet the need to counter accusations that he has betrayed his Jewish family in his 
fiction means that Zuckerman is unable to achieve the level of poise and self-
transcendence that is displayed by the reclusive literary master, Lonoff. As a result, his 
fiction not only involves a perceived betrayal of his Jewish father, but it is also at odds 
with Lonoff’s concept of literature as existing at a distant remove from ‘real’ life. As 
one who has thus broken ranks with both his actual father and his surrogate, Lonoff, 
Zuckerman is to some degree free of any weighted sense of an external origin acting 
upon and directing his art. At the same time, he is somewhat bereft of any clear starting 
point or fixed cultural tradition from which his writing might draw some source of 
authority. Yet instead of it being a question of either simply adhering to or rejecting their 
guiding influences, it is possible to view Zuckerman’s disputations with both his father 
and Lonoff as involving two distinct, yet related moments of antagonism to which his 
fiction obsessively returns. He is continually drawn back toward these paternal figures 
that he has in different ways disowned, in an attempt to understand the aesthetic and 
personal implications of his conflicts with them. Like the notion of an “amiable irritant” 
or “intractable” reality that I have already discussed, the Jewish father in particular 
stands as an obstacle to the activity of literary authorship for Zuckerman, while at the 
same time providing a vital source of opposition from which all of his efforts to reinvent 
notions of the ‘real’ or origin emerge. As Roth spells out in “Writing and the Powers that 
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Be,” his resistance to or severance with the “attachments” that had formed his early life 
has provided a paradoxical basis (origin) for his art: “I have greatly refashioned my 
attachments through the effort of testing them, and over the years have developed my 
strongest attachment to the test itself” (Reading Myself and Others, 9).  
 
Trauma and the Experience of American History 
 
 The unexpected displacement of characters in Roth’s later fiction from an 
assured and purposeful sense of American historical progress into a bewildering 
knowledge of the ‘real’ as chaotic and uncertain can be read in the context of recent 
studies on the psychological experience of trauma. Trauma has been discussed by 
various scholars as a psychological experience of shock in response to an event of 
colossal misfortune, the magnitude of which exceeds the survivor’s capacity to fully 
comprehend what has occurred. For example, Cathy Caruth defines trauma as: “the 
confrontation with an event that, in its unexpectedness or horror, cannot be placed within 
the schemes of prior knowledge” (1995, 153). Elsewhere, Shoshana Felman has 
described it in terms of “a horror or illness whose effects explode any capacity for 
explanation or rationalization” (4). According to Dori Laub, the insensible experience of 
trauma marks “an event that has not yet come into existence, in spite of the 
overwhelming and compelling nature of the reality of its occurrence” (57). Caruth also 
describes how this sense of temporal dislocation functions within traumatic memory. 
She explains that, as a result of the paradoxical “inaccessibility of its occurrence” (1995, 
8), the moment of trauma is constantly re-visited by and repeated for the victim, in an 
effort to make its difficult “reality” fully known to consciousness: “trauma is not 
locatable in the simple violent or original event in an individual’s past, but rather in the 
way that its very unassimilated nature - the way that it was precisely not known in the 
first instance - returns to haunt the survivor later on” (1996, 4). Although the trauma 
belatedly makes itself known to the traumatised through these disjunctive moments of 
recall, the full horror of the original event can never be absorbed within the limits of 
consciousness. Trauma, therefore, takes the paradoxical form of an event that is never 
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fully experienced or made real to its victim, yet which, in its overwhelming insistence to 
become known, is subject to endless instances of haunting repetition: “[w]hile the 
trauma uncannily returns in actual life, its reality continues to elude the subject who 
lives in its grip and unwittingly undergoes its ceaseless repetitions and re-enactments” 
(Felman and Laub, 68-9).  
 
 Not only does the de-stabilising effect of trauma have drastic psychological 
repercussions, but it also throws into chaos the survivor’s efforts to recoup the past 
within some coherent form of narrative representation. As Laub suggests: “[t]he 
traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality … 
outside the range of comprehension, of recounting and of mastery” (69). Felman attests 
to a similar notion of trauma as an unruly and ceaselessly mutating experience that 
outstrips conventional modes of narrative understanding. She explains how the 
recounting of trauma involves an act of “testimony [that] seems to be composed of bits 
and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not yet 
settled into understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as knowledge 
nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames of reference” (5). 
Trauma, according to Felman, finds expression in testimonial recollections which 
convey the sense of an event that “has no ending, attained no closure, and therefore, as 
far as its survivors are concerned, continues into the present and is current in every 
respect” (69). The acts of testimony by which traumatic memories are explored, 
therefore, make known the poverty of their own narrative efforts to possess the 
overbearingly horrific event. As Caruth explains, it is only through the “paradoxical … 
transmission of a gap” (1995, 156) that trauma narratives can open “the space for a 
testimony that can speak beyond what is already understood” (1995, 155).  
  
 This idea of trauma as an actual occurrence that is impossible to fully know and 
yet which continues to make its delayed and incomplete presence known to the victim is 
resonant of Roth’s struggle to grasp a sense of what is ‘real’ in his writing. In the novels 
that I have chosen to read for this thesis, various experiences of reversal brought to the 
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liberal narrative of American progress are dramatised as moments of inconceivable or 
“unreal” trauma which have left Roth’s characters stranded within a world that has 
become radically estranged and incomprehensible to them. Such instances of 
“unforeseen” shock within American historical experience are closely associated with 
the manner in which ethnicity functions in Roth’s work. Determined to bury all 
wounded knowledge of their suffering ethnic (or racial, as in the case of The Human 
Stain’s Coleman Silk) ancestry, Roth’s protagonists in these novels discover for 
themselves a more liberating sense of American cultural identity through certain 
universalising creeds of political progressivism. Yet as an “irritant” that constantly 
returns and refuses to go away, these characters are belatedly confronted by the injurious 
and self-dividing experiences of marginalised origins from which they have sought 
flight. In Roth’s later novels, the painful history of ethnic exclusion in America thus 
takes the form of a re-visited trauma that had been repressed within a progressive-liberal 
ideal of common national identity. Such forgotten traumatic experience is explored by 
Roth in each text in terms of how its delayed effects impact detrimentally upon the myth 
of national cohesion and togetherness that had prevailed in America at mid-century.  
 
Writing as a Movement between Death and Desire 
   
              Roth’s interest in trauma as an overwhelming experience of pain and self-
division is directly linked to the relationship between desire and modes of authorship in 
his fiction. Uncontrollable eruptions of rage and libidinal yearning are closely paralleled 
in his work as emotional responses to traumatic experiences of vulnerability, loss and 
death. Portnoy’s unrelenting anger over the various social fears and ethical prohibitions 
– “[t]he watch-its and the be-carefuls!” (34) – that have been imprinted on him by his 
Jewish parents, for example, finds an expression in his manic search for sexual 
satisfaction. This nexus of rage and sexual hunger functions for Portnoy as his means of 
trying – albeit failing – to overcome the irremediable and recurring sense of traumatic 
lack associated with his Jewish origins. Explaining to Dr. Spielvogel how he has 
attempted to escape the moral and psychological restrictions of his childhood through 
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illicit acts of masturbation and sex, Portnoy describes his penis as his “[b]attering ram to 
freedom” (33). Phallic desire is therefore linked to a yearning for complete authorship 
over the self that stems from Portnoy’s gaping sense of incompletion or self-division as 
an American Jew. In Sabbath’s Theater, Mickey Sabbath’s insatiable compulsion for 
erotic encounters operates as a reflex to the traumatic experiences of death that have 
punctuated his life. Described as having “clear[ed] a space in the world where he could 
exist as antagonistically as he liked” (444), Sabbath’s sexual instincts, like those of 
Portnoy, are correlated with his angered defiance towards the prurient inhibitions of 
society. Furthermore, by linking Sabbath’s sexual adventures to his instinct for 
irreverent and transgressing forms of theatrical improvisation, this novel provides a 
useful example of how aesthetic authorship and erotic longing are connected in Roth’s 
fiction as a means of dealing with the limitations imposed on life by trauma and loss.  
   
 The case of Zuckerman provides the best example of how writing and desire 
operate in mutuality for Roth. As I have suggested above, the resistant obstacles and 
competing fictions that face Zuckerman and threaten to undermine his role as author 
function as aspects of a traumatised cultural reality in Roth’s work. Zuckerman’s 
constant struggle to dominate and imaginatively reconstruct ‘real’ life is pitted against 
the crippling possibility that his writing might be made passive or obedient to external 
notions of reality or fact. This conflict with outside influences and forces at the heart of 
Zuckerman’s notion of literary invention is represented in erotic terms as a struggle for 
potency over impotence. Describing Henry’s “impotence … [as being] like an artist’s 
artistic life drying up for good” (35), Zuckerman explores this struggle between literary 
authorship – as an erotically charged mode of reinventing what is ‘real’ about the self 
and others – and the impotent and passive acceptance of already determined “facts” in 
The Counterlife. Having learned that the failing libido caused by Henry’s heart 
medication has brought about an abrupt and tormenting end to a secret affair with his 
dental assistant, Zuckerman contemplates how: “[i]mpotence … has cut him off from the 
simplest form of distance from his predictable life … without the potency he feels 
condemned to an ironclad life wherein all issues are settled” (30). With his erotic desire 
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to escape the “predictable life” of marriage, home and children vanquished, Henry has 
“been thrown back on his talent for the prosaic, precisely what he’d been boxed in by all 
his life” (35). Having read the draft of Nathan’s fictional account of his affair, Henry is 
outraged by the suggestion that his sexual infidelity might be construed in self-
transformative terms as a “way out of his life or as an escape from the facts” (234). 
Henry does not claim to share with his brother the same notion of the erotic as a means 
of self-reinvention. Instead, he is made content by: “living with the facts – instead of 
trying to alter the facts, taking the facts and letting them inundate him” (234). Having 
eventually given up “chasing erotic daydreams,” Henry comes to see such flights of 
“fantasy” as indicative of the “[e]xaggeration, falsification, [and] rampant caricature” 
(235) by which Nathan has mendaciously betrayed the “facts” for fiction. As with 
Portnoy and Sabbath, therefore, Zuckerman many efforts to imaginatively enlarge “the 
limits on life” and transform his own existence are connected to notions of libidinal 
potency. What I have earlier referred to as Zuckerman’s persistent need to collide with 
and antagonise competing or “irritant” notions of the ‘real’ in his fiction pairs together 
erotic desire with aggressive rage in a manner that is also shared by both Portnoy and 
Sabbath. This enraged need of the author to oppose and gain dominance over others in 
order to impose his artistic signature upon life finds expression through Zuckerman’s 
various outbursts against those, particularly his father, who had tried to set limits for him 
as a young man. 
   
 This idea of the relationship between trauma, desire and writing in Roth’s fiction 
finds a useful form of explication in the narratological theory of Peter Brooks. Brooks 
describes “desire as that which is initiatory of narrative, motivates and energizes its 
reading, and animates the combinatory play of sense-making” (48). Taking his model of 
desire from Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Brooks sets out to explore the 
narratological implications of what he calls “the paradoxical logic of Freud’s essay: that 
Eros is subtended by the death instinct, the drive of living matter to return to the 
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quiescence of the inorganic, a state prior to life” (51).2 According to this view, desire or 
Eros is initiated as a psychological response to the knowledge of (and unconscious 
longing for) non-being: Thanatos. However, the erotic desire to overcome death is never 
satisfied, but is continually informed by a contradictory experience of Thanatos. In this 
sense, Eros and Thanatos are paradoxically opposed and interdependent at the same 
time; the death drive is that which both initiates and threatens to vanquish desire. 
Drawing from this Freudian model, Brooks sees the yearning for consummation within 
desire as marking a movement toward its own completion or death. He describes this as 
a notion of “desire whose lack of satisfaction gives death as the only alternative, but 
whose satisfaction would also be death” (58). This longing for satisfaction or expiration 
within desire, according to Brooks, finds its correlate in the narrative urge toward 
meaning: “[i]f the motor of narrative is desire, totalizing, building ever-larger units of 
meaning, the ultimate determinants of meaning lie at the end, and narrative desire is 
ultimately, inexorably, desire for the end” (52). He goes on to argue that the paradoxical 
relationship between Eros and Thanatos is characterised by “the contradictory desire of 
narrative, driving toward the end which would be both its destruction and its meaning” 
(58). Brooks suggests that “with the possibility of total realization of desire, the self 
encounters the impossibility of desiring, because to desire becomes … the choice of 
death of that same self” (51). Any “totalizing” order of signification, therefore, would 
involve the self-annihilation of desire/narrative. As a result, the productive antagonism 
between death and desire in narrative does not find “the end.” Instead, it leads to an un-
ending “process of desiring and dying” (53).  
   
For Roth, Eros and Thanatos are closely commingled in a way that reflects 
Brooks’ understanding of the Freudian dynamics of narrative. As I have already 
discussed, Zuckerman’s determination to re-imagine the ‘real’ within literature is 
                                                 
2 In “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” Freud outlines a line of distinction and productive anatgonism 
between what he calls “two kinds of instincts: those which seek to lead what is living to death, and others, 
the sexual instincts, which are perpetually attempting and achieving a renewal of life” (252). He explores 
in an expansive and probing manner how the longing for inertia or death – “to restore an earlier state of 
things” (266) – informs, to different degrees, both of these contradictory instincts. 
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defined by an oscillating interplay between conflicting experiences of potency (Eros) 
and impotence (Thanatos). Similarly, Portnoy’s libidinal yearning to define the self 
outside of the restrictive cultural, moral and psychological boundaries set by his Jewish 
background is shadowed by the threat of castration. Also, for Sabbath the twin erotic 
joys of theatricality and sex are constantly made transient by his heightened awareness 
of death. Brooks describes narrative as “the thrust of a desire that never can quite speak 
its name – never can quite come to the point – but that insist upon speaking over and 
over again its movement toward that name” (61). In ways that closely mirror this 
statement, Zuckerman is driven by an indefatigable urge to conquer and re-possess the 
“facts” within fiction that finds neither completion nor exhaustion. He is forced to 
constantly wage conflict with resistant and crude notions of the ‘real’ that threaten to 
render him impotent as a literary author, while at the same time restraining – or being 
restrained in – his desire for a form of complete authorial dominance (absolute potency) 
which might bring his fictional assault upon actual life to a finality (death). It is this 
relentless struggle between libidinal joy and anguished frustration that propels 
Zuckerman’s artistic ambition. By contrast, the notion of the “pastoral” (322) as a site of 
uncomplicated erotic fulfilment in The Counterlife, devoid of the thanatological 
complications of desire, comes to represent a deadening form of stasis and sterility for 
Zuckerman. Described by him as “the perfectly safe, charmingly simple and satisfying 
environment that is desire’s homeland,” he explains how the pastoral “cannot admit 
contradiction or conflict” (The Counterlife, 322). It is against such an idyllic notion of 
fulfilment and completion that Zuckerman’s literary re-invention of the ‘real’ is 
characterised in terms of an inexorable and irreconcilable conflict between Eros and 
Thanatos.  
   
The paradoxical structure of narrative desire in Roth’s fiction helps to explain 
what I have earlier referred to as its contradictory sense of being both attached to and, at 
the same time, separated from ‘real’ life. Although his various characters seek an 
erotic/aesthetic release from the determining “facts” of their lives, they are never able to 
fully transcend the limits and entrapments of such prescribed notions of reality. Instead 
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of a complete separation from and mastery over the facts, Zuckerman undertakes what 
he calls a literary “impersonation” (The Counterlife, 320) of ‘real’ life. In The 
Counterlife, he develops upon this idea of fiction and impersonation by contrasting it 
with the “pastoral” innocence of “being oneself” (319). Zuckerman insists that artifice 
and disguise lay at the heart of all notions of “natural being,” explaining to Maria that 
the idea of living a “real, authentic, or genuine life” has, for him, “all the aspects of a 
hallucination” (320). Such claims to “an irreducible self,” according to Zuckerman, 
merely involve their own form of pretence and impersonation: “pretending that it isn’t a 
performance but you” (320). As one of his many artistic disguises, Zuckerman gives 
voice to Roth’s notion of literature as an expansive and endless erotic pursuit of a reality 
that can never be fully re-claimed, other than as an improvised fiction. This notion of 
improvisation or impersonation runs straight through Roth’s idea of fiction as a means of 
reinventing the ‘real.’ It suggests a kind of amplification or “exaggeration” – to use 
Henry’s term of indictment against his brother – of lives and events, which involves a 
contradictory mixture of fidelity to and distortion of the facts.  
   
Describing himself as “a theater and nothing more than a theater,” Zuckerman 
adopts multiple forms of “imposturing” (The Counterlife, 321) disguise as a means of 
exploring the fictional possibilities of an otherwise incomprehensible ‘real.’ Yet at the 
same time, his inability to satisfy or nullify the erotic pursuit of narrative meaning 
creates a sort of prison out of desire/fiction. Zuckerman’s chastening ordeal of physical 
pain and literary paralysis in The Anatomy Lesson provides a telling example of how 
fiction serves as both an erotic form of liberation from determinate concepts of reality, 
while also involving a thanatological experience of futility and impotence. Having 
sought in fiction the means “to spring myself from everything that had held me captive 
as a boy” (368), Zuckerman finds himself, at aged forty, trapped in a labyrinthine series 
of narrative improvisations which have left him painfully divorced from any sense of a 
‘real’ existence outside of literature. As Roth’s third person voice explains: “[o]nly 
gradually [for Zuckerman] did the perfecting of a writer’s iron will begin to feel like the 
evasion of experience, and the means to imaginative release … like the sternest form of 
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incarceration” (424-5). Zuckerman is thus left pining for an existence outside of the 
prison house of fiction:  
   
I want an active connection to life and I want it now. I want an active connection to myself. I’m sick of 
channeling everything into writing. I want the real thing, the thing in the raw, and not for the writing but 
for itself (442)  
   
Yet despite his anguish over how literature has abstracted him from “the real thing[s]” of 
life, Zuckerman is unable to free himself of the desire to transform the “facts” into 
fiction. To do so would require that he locate himself at a fixed point of stasis or pastoral 
harmony, in which his longing for the ‘real’ might be brought to a fulfilling end (death).  
 
Like the ‘real’ which it yearns after, the interminable mode of desire that is 
Zuckerman’s “narrative factory” (The Counterlife, 264) involves a composite of 
corporeal, material experience and imaginary chimera. In one sense, his particular form 
of narrative desire is consigned to the “unreal” mode of the fictional imagination, in 
which life is never experienced “in the raw.” Conversely, Zuckerman remains tied to the 
bodily site of desire by his persistent, yet unfulfilled, longing to capture and subjugate 
the ‘real’ within fiction. His writing thus returns him to the locus of the embodied and 
biographical self from which he had originally sought escape through art. As a result of 
this contradictory situation, literature has left Zuckerman both agonisingly divorced 
from and yet, in equal measure, frustratingly attached to notions of the self and reality; 
an impersonation of life in which the distance between fact and fiction is simultaneously 
both widened and collapsed. Unable to resolve these self-divisions by finding “an active 
connection to life” outside of literature, Zuckerman anguishes over the fact that he is 
“[c]hained to my dwarf drama till I die” (The Anatomy Lesson, 399). Described as being 
unable “to escape the corpus that was his” (505) at the end of The Anatomy Lesson, 
Zuckerman remains hopelessly tied to this conflict between wanting a life “[w]ith real 
teeth in it” (504) and his own eviscerated body of writing. Unlike Lonoff, who appeared 
to live and write in separation from corporeal and worldly distractions, Zuckerman’s 
personal desires and torments are thus firmly at odds with his efforts to find some 
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immutable literary understanding of life beyond the narrow confines of the embodied 
and historically rooted self.  
 
Exile from and Return to the ‘Real’ World in the American Trilogy 
 
In a paean to Lonoff, Zuckerman dedicates himself to an ascetic life of self-
discipline in the American trilogy and Exit Ghost by living in exile from the greater 
world that exists beyond the pages of literature. Through this “experiment in radical 
seclusion” (The Human Stain, 44), he seeks to remove himself from the torturous 
contradictions that have marked the relationship between erotic desire and thanatological 
frustration in his life and work, as made painfully evident in The Anatomy Lesson. In I 
Married a Communist, he explains how his isolated retreat in the Berkshire Mountains 
operates as the lofty site from which he has transcended, a la Lonoff, “the agitation of 
the autobiographical” (72). Leaving behind the various entanglements that have 
characterised his combative engagement with the ‘real’ world beyond his writing, 
Zuckerman has retreated to what he calls:  
   
The place where you are stripped back to essentials … to decontaminate and dissolve yourself of the 
striving.  The place where you disrobe, molt it all, the uniforms you’ve worn and the costumes you’ve 
gotten into, where you shed your batteredness and your resentment, your appeasement of the world and 
your defiance of the world, your manipulation of the world and its manhandling of you (72)    
   
Having been made impotent by prostate surgery, Zuckerman thus withdraws from the 
tumult of desire and the manic improvisations of the self that shaped his ordeals in 
previous novels. As my chapters will illustrate, this involves a certain abandonment of 
the self as a bodily and desiring being in the later Zuckerman texts. By paying attention 
to the biographies of others in the novels of the American trilogy, Zuckerman attempts 
to commit an act of self-erasure whereby he seems to disappear as a character from the 
body of the text. In thus extricating himself from the narrative, he seeks to move beyond 
the anguishes of his “dwarf drama” and focus upon the wider historical events that have 
shaped the lives of his protagonists in these novels.  
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However, Zuckerman never fully vanishes as a subject in the American trilogy. 
Instead, his own particular experiences of trauma and longing are merely relocated 
within or displaced through the histories of his leading characters in these novels. By 
focusing upon particular ethnic or racial subjects whose lives are victim to various 
moments of trauma in the liberal narrative of post-war American history, Zuckerman 
finds a means of exploring how his own personal struggles partake of the wider national 
experience. This relationship between Zuckerman as a narrator who is apparently 
removed from events in the text and his various protagonists in the American trilogy can 
be understood in terms of the role of trauma witness. According to Dori Laub, the 
incomprehensible experience of trauma can only begin to be made sensible to the victim 
through the acknowledgment or corroborative testimony of a witness: “[t]he testimony 
to the trauma thus includes its hearer, who is, so to speak, the blank screen on which the 
event comes to be inscribed for the first time” (57). As she makes clear, this role of 
witness is never passive, but one in which the onlooker or auditor is made to share in the 
horror of the event being witnessed: “the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and 
a co-owner of the traumatic event … he comes to partially experience trauma in 
himself” (57). Cathy Caruth expounds further upon this notion of an active relationship 
between victim and witness. She suggests that in bearing testimony to another’s 
experience of inexpressible pain, the witness can find a means of confronting the horrific 
moments of unacknowledged or unassimilated trauma which have plagued his or her 
own life: “one’s own trauma is tied up with the trauma of another … trauma may lead, 
therefore, to the encounter with another, through the very possibility and surprise of 
listening to another’s wound” (1996, 8). In this way, both victim and witness come to 
perceive a mutual sense of overwhelming torment, which before this moment of shared 
recognition had appeared entirely incommunicable to both the self and others. In the 
novels of the American trilogy, Zuckerman assumes the position of onlooker or witness 
to the wounded lives of the Swede, Ira and Murray Ringold, and Coleman Silk. Through 
this role, he finds a narrative means of rehearsing the various personal conflicts and 
traumas that he has sought to abandon in later life. In this way, Zuckerman is both 
hidden and exposed in these texts. On one hand, he acts as a disinterested literary 
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aesthete in the mould of Lonoff, impotent and removed from the narrative desire to 
engage with matters of the self and ‘real’ life as they exist outside of literature and 
writing. On the other hand, he provides a decidedly corporeal presence in these works as 
the author who is stimulated by a narrative urge to understand the as yet still 
unregistered experiences of trauma that he shares with others. 
   
Interestingly, Zuckerman’s determination to conceal his own story within the 
traumatic lives of other characters in the American trilogy marks a similar form of the 
“exhibitionism in hiding” (The Counterlife, 210) that had earlier been attributed to his 
writing. This sense of how the authorial self is exhibited through the fiction writer’s 
impersonation of others can be understood in relation to notions of dialogism, as put 
forth in the arguments of Volosinov and Bakhtin. As a Marxist linguistic theory, 
dialogism argues that signs are always “constructed between socially organised persons 
in the process of their interaction” (Volosinov, 21). Language is thus never innocently 
neutral or self-integrated, but is instead shaped by an “inner dialectical quality” (23). All 
forms of utterance are, therefore, inflected by the hidden presence of other alien and 
antagonising voices: “the speaker’s intentions … [are] populated – overpopulated – with 
the [contrary] intentions of others” (Bakhtin, 294). Leaving aside their Marxist analysis 
of social relations for one moment, Bakhtin and Volosinov have both provided an 
interesting reading of how the dialogic interaction between competing speakers and 
viewpoints finds adequate dramatisation within the many novelistic uses of indirect 
discourse. According to both theorists, indirect discourse allows the dominant narrative 
or authorial voice in the novel to be made vulnerable to the challenges of other opposing 
speakers. In the earlier novels that I have discussed, Zuckerman employs certain forms 
of impersonated or indirect speech that work dialogically in both confirming and 
undermining his authorial dominance over ‘real’ lives and events. Through various acts 
of ventriloquism, he internalises within his own narrative speech the many voices of 
protest and rebuke that have railed against his efforts to transform the “facts” into 
fiction. Yet ironically, such dramatisation of the dialogical tensions between him and 
others over the relationship of fiction to reality involves yet a further narrative re-
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inscription of ‘real’ people by Zuckerman. In this circular fashion, his writing is both 
given license and subject to restraint by the dialogically opposing voices that he 
assimilates into his fiction. 
   
In The Counterlife, Zuckerman elaborates upon how his role as a ventriloquist of 
other voices and positions defines the versatile range and expansive reach of his 
imagination: “I have … a variety of impersonations I can do, and not only of myself – a 
troupe of players that I have internalized, a permanent company of actors that I can call 
upon when a self is required, an evolving stock of pieces and parts that forms my 
repertoire” (321). This cacophonous display of imitated voices appears somewhat muted 
by his determination in the American trilogy to “disrobe” from the many “costumes” 
that he has worn. However, Zuckerman’s desire to inhabit and explore other lives 
through fictional acts of impersonation has not been fully outlived in these works. 
Somewhat paradoxically, by submerging his biographical story within the lives of his 
protagonists in the American trilogy, Zuckerman continues to carry out a form of 
narrative disguise in which his earlier preoccupations with the harried conflicts of the 
self continue to be made evident. In the process of apparently muting the tendency 
toward narrative self-obsession that he demonstrated in The Counterlife and blending his 
voice with those of others, Zuckerman affects a style of indirect speech that Bakhtin and 
Volosinov called “quasi-direct discourse.” In quasi-direct speech, two distinct and often 
antagonistic voices – usually narrator and protagonist – appear as conflated within a 
singular narrative perspective. This is a feigned act of synthesis, through which two 
separate viewpoints would seem to have been harmonised and shorn of any dialogical 
tension. Yet what appears on a cosmetic level as a self-integrated narrative voice is made 
subject to disruption and fracture by the double register of its two distinct speakers, each 
of which interrogates the other’s position as author or narrator. Therefore, in quasi-direct 
discourse “[w]e perceive the author’s accents and intonations being interrupted by these 
value judgments of another person” (Volosinov, 155). In my reading of the American 
trilogy, I will look at how Zuckerman’s own voice – apparently no longer preoccupied 
by the problems of the self – identifies with and comes to resemble the perspective of 
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each particular protagonist about whom he is writing. However, this quasi-direct mode 
of self-effacement involves a contradictory form of engrossed self-exploration, whereby 
Zuckerman uses the lives of his subjects in these works as means of performing 
narrative variations on his own unfinished sense of biographical trauma. Whereas he 
claims to have silenced his particular brand of “narrative mania” (The Counterlife, 309) 
in these novels, Zuckerman in fact continues to invent lives and disguises with which he 
can place his own existence in dialogical tension.  
     
The “dwarf drama” and the Great Stage of ‘History’ 
 
Throughout this introduction, I have been trying to establish a sense in which the 
difficult relationship between the fictive and the ‘real’ in Roth’s work is situated by 
particular historical experiences in some of his later novels. It is important to note, 
however, the manner in which the literary author’s efforts to reinvent the self and reality 
in Roth’s earlier fiction has often existed in tension with the limiting “facts” outlined by 
certain positivist or ideological notions of ‘History.’ In The Counterlife, for example, 
Henry accuses his brother of a “narcissistic” (104) literary obsession with “non-
historical personal problems” (104-5). Such narrow self-interest appears to Henry as the 
“unspeakably puny” (105) concerns of Zuckerman’s “inner landscape” as a writer, 
which compares poorly to his own muscular concept of “an outer landscape, a nation, a 
world!” (140). Yet despite Zuckerman’s clear assertion that “[i]f you get out of yourself 
you can’t be a writer” (The Anatomy Lesson, 399), he is also troubled by the way in 
which he has failed to relate the “inner landscape” of his literary imagination to broader 
experiences of cultural life. Zuckerman’s desperate struggle in The Anatomy Lesson 
emphasises certain aspects of what Roth might call the contemporary American writer’s 
tendency toward “literary onanism.” Although he explains in this novel how “the 
personal ingredient is what gets you going” (399) as an author, Zuckerman has become 
hopelessly divorced from any larger concept of life “in the raw” beyond his introverted 
world of the self, writing, desire and pain. Hopelessly imprisoned within both his own 
afflicted body and that of his equally suffering fiction, he is led to conclude that: “if you 
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hang on to the personal ingredient any longer you’ll disappear right up your asshole” 
(399). In an effort to escape this imprisoning realm of the self and/as fiction, Zuckerman 
seeks to access some knowledge of “the world of massive historical pain” through his 
sexual encounter with Jaga, an émigré from Communist Poland. However, he is 
ultimately unable to trade his own “dwarf drama” for a grander sense of “writing at the 
very heart of the upheaval” of Jaga’s history: “Dante got out of hell easier than you’ll 
escape Zuckerman-Carnovsky” (399). In The Prague Orgy, Zuckerman continues to 
seek a release “from the narrative encasing me … the ever-recurring story that’s at once 
your invention and the invention of you” (568-9) by placing himself within Soviet 
occupied Czechoslovakia, where everyday cultural life would appear to have far greater 
historical resonance than in America. Yet despite the apparent “cultural eminence” (569) 
of his mission to rescue the confiscated short stories of a Holocaust survivor and bring 
them back for publication to America, his experiences in Prague are merely witness to 
the frustrating ways in which yet “[a]nother assault upon a world of significance 
degenerat[es] into a personal fiasco” (568). As a result of this comical “fiasco,” 
Zuckerman is forced to finally realise that he cannot find a means of transcending the 
complex meshing of self, body, text and desire which has characterised his struggles as 
both a man and writer: “one’s story isn’t a skin to be shed – it’s inescapable, one’s body 
and blood” (568).  
   
This thesis claims that the difficulty with grand narratives of ‘History’ in Roth is 
itself the product of a peculiar historical experience of the ‘real’ in post-war America. As 
Zuckerman tells Henry, in an effort to get his brother to return to his family in America 
and leave behind the militant Zionist fantasies that he is enacting in Israel: “[h]istory 
doesn’t have to be made the way a mechanic makes a car – one can play a role in history 
without its having to be obvious, even to oneself” (The Counterlife, 146). Roth’s fiction, 
both before and throughout his ‘historical’ novels, adopts this approach to contemporary 
American history as something that takes place on the complex level of private 
existence, rather than finding abstraction in broad-sweeping narrative terms. In “Writing 
and the Powers that Be,” Roth suggests how this sense of an “outer” public realm that is 
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experienced in terms of a highly personal and imaginative “inner landscape” functions 
for him. This essay discusses perhaps his most explicit literary engagement with matters 
of national politics and history in the satire on Nixon, Our Gang. Despite its somewhat 
pointed political theme, however, Roth insists that he was concerned in this novel with 
distinctly literary “problems of representation, rather than bringing about [a] change [in] 
or ‘making a statement’” (Reading Myself and Others, 12) on American public life. As 
this essay makes clear, Roth is interested in how the very much ‘real’ phenomena of 
national political life and Jewish cultural identity that intersect with his work are 
experienced by him in terms of a challenge to the internal workings of the literary 
imagination: “whatever serious acts of rebelliousness I may have engaged in as a 
novelist have been directed far more at my own imagination’s system of constraints and 
habits of expression than at the powers that vie for control in the world” (12). This thesis 
argues that the blurring of the boundaries between “reality” and fiction in Roth’s work 
involves a certain inter-penetration of the author’s private imagination with the “outer 
landscape” of larger social and historical phenomena in post-war American life. The 
selection of later novels that I am discussing contribute to questions about the 
relationship between Roth and history by providing a greater sense of the ‘real’/‘unreal’ 
exterior world of American history that has been, heretofore, largely dealt with in his 
work as an internal “system of constraints” upon the literary author’s imagination.  
   
The Critical Heritage 
 
              The main monographic surveys written prior to the publication of American 
Pastoral do acknowledge and discuss how the boundary between the inner-imaginary 
world of the author and the public scene in which he writes is constantly blurred and 
transgressed in Roth’s fiction. Bernard Rodgers has mentioned that while Roth’s 
fictional development was shaped by a concern “with exploring the self, he would also 
try to portray the effect of the fantastic nature of contemporary reality on that self’s 
private life” (18). Yet although he acknowledges the sense of an “incredible and 
disordered public” (153) realm in which Roth’s “representative Americans” (9) act, 
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Rodgers is more interested in how the difficult “private experience[s]” of these 
characters test and re-define the bounds of literary realism than in any broader treatment 
of what has shaped their contemporary environment. Elsewhere, Hermione Lee contends 
that Roth’s fiction is “conscientiously caught between ‘out there’ … and ‘in here’” (49) 
in its efforts to relate the private world of the authorial imagination to the strange 
experience of American public life after World War Two. However, like Rodgers before 
her, Lee’s quite useful insight into how the overlapping connection between these 
separate spheres of the imaginary and the ‘real’ have shaped Roth’s literature offers no 
real significant insight into what actual events or forces may be characterising the 
“bizarre and alien” sense of America as “Kafkaesque” (49) in his work. Baumgarten and 
Gottfried lay claim to a greater sense of how “the traumatic events of Western culture 
since World War Two press insistently upon Roth’s characters” (9). Yet although these 
commentators refer in passing to the Depression, the Holocaust, McCarthyism and the 
Vietnam War as significant features in the lives of Roth’s characters, their discussions 
on the (“traumatic”) impact of such important historical episodes on the literary texts are 
scarce and negligible.  
 
By contrast to those cited above, a certain historical line of criticism is indeed 
provided by Steven Milowitz. His general argument suggests that Roth’s fiction 
“employs a style that inverts the conditions of the Holocaust world” (52). Milowitz 
describes certain irresolvable contradictions between epistemological uncertainty and 
inventive possibility in Roth’s fiction in terms of a “humanism of ambiguity … a 
bulwark against the antihumanism of ideology” (51). Significantly, Milowitz suggests 
that the experience of American reality in Roth’s fiction, where “[t]he world feels so 
estranged” for his characters, acts as “an echo, a remainder, a result, and a reminder of 
the Holocaust” (163). In this way, he claims that the countervailing forces of traumatic 
dread (Thanatos) and creative possibility (Eros) which mark the ambiguous and 
uncertain experience of the ‘real’ in Roth’s writing result not so much from any 
singularly American context, but from a submerged knowledge of the Holocaust. For 
Stephen Wade, much like the others that I have thus far mentioned, Roth’s writing 
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explores “the rift between man and the materiality, the thingness of his environment … 
seeking to locate a sense of identity in that angst” (21). Wade is particularly interested in 
how this sense of alienation from the ‘real’ in Roth has been developed by a “relation to 
the dual traditions of didactic realism and experimental modernism” (15). However, his 
view of Roth’s fiction as “a place of inner dialogues with a wider, incomprehensible 
world and with inner confusion and uncertainty” (21) places greater stress upon the 
“interior alienness of the narrator” (22) as a particularly modernist and postmodernist 
literary phenomenon than upon any “didactic” realist sense of an exterior world outside 
of the “inward-looking, ego identity” (21).  
   
             The publication of the American trilogy has done little to improve this 
reluctance among literary scholars toward providing a more detailed historical reading of 
Roth. Insisting that “[t]he Roth canvas is vertical, in portrait mode, not horizontal, in 
[historical] landscape” (2007, 146), Mark Shechner has argued that the post-war history 
upon which the American trilogy draws is “merely backstory” (143) or a “prop” (145). 
Ross Posnock cites the attacks upon agitprop literature in I Married a Communist and 
identity politics in The Human Stain as evidence that Roth’s ongoing assault against the 
“antihumanism” (2006, 50) of those who would carry out a “redirection of scholarship 
from author to context” (51) is upheld in his later work. David Brauner argues that 
Roth’s American trilogy establishes an “ideological conflict between pastoral 
Utopianism … and anti-pastoral humanism” (2007, 157). Yet in his determination to 
outline Roth’s defiance towards the more utopian political credos of certain characters in 
these novels, Brauner fails to examine any way in which the author’s “anti-pastoral 
humanism” might itself be situated by particular historical coordinates or experiences. In 
this sense, he would appear to see Roth’s engagement with recent American history in 
such texts as being primarily interested in placing a certain concept of “humanism” at 
odds with narrow historical or ideological definitions of subjectivity. 
 
Debra Shostak takes a somewhat different approach. She reads the American 
trilogy as a new shift away from the “will to self-invention” evident in earlier 
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Zuckerman novels and “toward an unprecedentedly deterministic conception of history 
as the context for American subjectivity” (234). In ways that resonate with my own 
argument, she outlines how these novels are set within a postlapsarian American 
environment, where a sense of what is ‘real’ or determining events and lives remains 
elusive to both Roth’s protagonists and his narrator, Zuckerman. According to Shostak, 
related acts of narrative authorship and self-reinvention in these novels undergo a 
difficult struggle between willed individual intention/desire and a determining or 
counter-manipulating experience of “the chaos that is American history” (266). Yet 
whereas she provides a keen insight into the narrative dynamics and aesthetic 
implications of this struggle between “determinism” and “autonomy” (230), Shostak’s 
assessment of the particular post-war context through which this postlapsarian narrative 
is dramatised in Roth’s fiction is markedly barren. In her useful attempt to illustrate how 
a paradigmatic view of ‘fallen’ history is related to and makes problematic acts of 
narration and self-authorship in the American trilogy, Shostak tends to glide over 
specific issues of the recent American past that are dealt with by Roth. Elaine Safer 
would also appear to embrace the notion of a ‘historical turn’ within Roth’s more recent 
fiction by comparing “earlier works, which were focused on characters’ private 
concerns,” with later novels that “more clearly develop a social context” (2006, 3). 
However, she argues that the historical episodes which Roth treats in these later works 
are not subject to a serious consideration of the American past, but rather serve as 
suitable backdrops for the author’s overriding stylistic concern with “mingling … tragic 
and comic” (70) effects. Elsewhere, Derek Parker Royal claims that the American 
trilogy sees Roth leaving behind the “solipsistic exercises in bellybutton gazing” (2005, 
187) of The Anatomy Lesson and The Counterlife by “writ[ing] the individual subject 
into the fabric of history” (186). Yet despite his claim that each of these novels 
“illustrates that identity is not only a product of, but also hostage to, the many social, 
political, and cultural forces that surround it” (186), Royal provides little more 
assessment of such historical issues than pointing out how I Married a Communist and 
American Pastoral signal “the ambiguity underlying the American project.” (202).  
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In marked contrast to other critics, Anthony Hutchinson has provided a detailed 
historicist analysis of the American trilogy. Most tellingly, his argument that Roth’s 
triumvirate of novels explore the “‘betrayal’ … of a specific midcentury expression of 
American liberalism” (167) finds striking correspondence with my own interest in the 
political context of these works. Hutchinson describes this betrayed idea of liberal 
politics and culture as a “‘paleoliberalism’ … that was both anti-McCarthy and 
unambiguously anticommunist” (167). According to him, Roth’s trilogy explores how 
this heroic intellectual and political ideal of modern liberalism, with its “unapologetic 
commitment to the idea of America,” has been: “squeezed to the margins of American 
life by the end of the century as a result of the rise of neoconservatism and the cultural 
left” (167). While my own thesis does follow a similar line of enquiry, there are highly 
important divergences between both of our arguments. In particular, I would question 
Hutchinson’s contention that “a political position can be consistently traced in these late 
novels of Philip Roth” (167). He suggests that Roth is unequivocally loyal to the 
“‘majoritarian’ liberalism of the midcentury ‘proud decades’ of American life,” where 
the “emphasis” was upon “the relationship of the individual to the republic or broader 
national collective rather than any ethnic subgroup” (167). As I have been suggesting, 
this corrosion of the greater liberal-national ideal in the second half of the twentieth 
century is indeed registered in terms of a catastrophic trauma in Roth’s fiction. However, 
my thesis will explore how such “paleoliberalism” is presented by Roth as containing 
internally the very germ or repressed trauma that helps to bring about its own decline. I 
will argue that this heightened notion of American liberalism commits certain acts of 
self-betrayal in Roth’s novels, as well as suffering at the hands of its detractors on the 
Left and Right. My localised readings of the texts within the American trilogy will 
explore further the differences between my own argument and that of Hutchinson. I wish 
to draw attention to how the latter sees these novels as loyal to or supportive of a notion 
of ‘paleo-liberal’ origins, which he locates in the voice of certain authoritative ‘paternal’ 
figures within both I Married a Communist and American Pastoral. My own argument 
will insist that such issues of paternity and origin find a greater degree of sundering and 
ambivalence in Roth’s work than is allowed by Hutchinson. Furthermore, this problem 
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of origins and fatherhood is linked inextricably to questions of literary authorship for 
Roth. Such a key issue in his writing is negligibly sidelined by Hutchinson, who fails to 
adequately treat the relationship of Zuckerman, as the self-exiled artist, to the broader 




As I have already intimated, the main body of this thesis will consist of three 
rather lengthy chapters that deal with each novel in the American trilogy. Instead of 
treating these texts in order of their publication dates, my chapters will reflect the 
chronological sequence of events in post-war American life that are covered by Roth’s 
trilogy. In the first chapter, I will discuss how I Married a Communist deals with 
significant shifts and modulations in liberal political and cultural thought during the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two. Taking place against a backdrop of 
McCarthyism, this novel concentrates its attention on how post-war liberalism began to 
move away from some of the leftist influences of the Popular Front alliance that thrived 
during the 1930s and toward a greater political acceptance of existing socio-economic 
conditions in America. This renegotiation of the liberal agenda involved a precarious 
balance between opposing hard-line leftist elements that were considered sympathetic 
toward Soviet totalitarianism, while at the same time upholding a progressive ethos that 
was equally set against the politics of the virulently anti-Communist American Right. By 
inserting itself into this historical context, Roth’s novel explores some important 
inconsistencies and contradictions within the newly defined form of liberal 
progressivism that emerged after the war. Most importantly, I will examine how I 
Married a Communist challenges the particular form of literary historicism that was 
used to support the reconstructed liberal arguments of scholars such as Lionel Trilling 
and Philip Rahv.  
 
My second chapter will look at how American Pastoral deals with the various 
crises within post-war liberalism that emerged during the 1960s. Through the family 
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tragedy of his protagonist, Seymour “the Swede” Levov, Roth re-traces the manner in 
which the prevailing centrist or “consensus” ideal of liberalism that shaped American 
life after World War Two became torn asunder by newly emerging forms of leftist 
radicalism and right-wing conservatism during the sixties. The relationship between 
history and trauma in Roth’s work is particularly pronounced in American Pastoral, 
signalling the huge impact of the sixties in shattering the Rooseveltian spirit of collective 
progress that had developed during the New Deal and which continued to guide the 
reconstructed, anti-Stalinist liberalism of the post-war years. Through the pseudo-
authorial presence of Zuckerman in this novel, Roth explores the relationship between 
the traumatised national experience of the sixties and the various conflicts that have, 
paradoxically, both impeded and given impetus to his efforts to engage himself as a 
literary artist with American public life.  
 
The break-up of American progressive notions of national unity that was 
precipitated by events in the sixties finds further attention in The Human Stain, which 
provides the focus for my third chapter. I will examine how the fortunes of Roth’s 
protagonist in this novel, Coleman Silk, become entangled in a cruelly ironic conflict 
between an older social phenomenon of racial passing and contemporary modes of 
identity politics. An African-American subject who had decided at an early age to 
secretly passing as white in order to escape the inequalities of race in mid-century 
America, Coleman is later accused of being a racially prejudiced white male within the 
heightened atmosphere of political correctness that prevailed at the end of the twentieth 
century. Juxtaposing passing and identity politics thus as two historically divided ways 
of viewing race, Roth examines how universalising liberal concepts of cultural 
commonality and collective progress have been eroded by certain post-sixties’ ideas 
about America as a society that is sharply divided along lines of race, gender and 
sexuality. Through his narration of Coleman’s story, Zuckerman re-traces the ongoing 
conflicts in his own life between the ethnically defined concept of subjectivity attached 
to his experience as a Jewish-American and his aspiration to re-define himself as a 
writer within a broader and more deracinated notion of cultural tradition. In my reading 
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of The Human Stain, I will examine how the conflict between Zuckerman’s lifelong 
efforts to emulate Lonoff’s impersonal mode of literary style and his inescapable sense 
of ethnic belonging contributes to the fierce debates over cultural canonicity that arose 
from the emergence of identity politics.  
 
In my final and concluding chapter, I will examine how The Plot against 
America and Exit Ghost treat of certain moments of symbolic ‘beginnings’ and ‘endings’ 
within modern American liberalism; episodes which somewhat book-end the historical 
periods that are treated in the novels of the American trilogy. The Plot against America 
provides an interesting look back at the exalted origins of the modern liberal dream of 
nationhood that is subject to so much pressure and conflict from events in the American 
trilogy. This novel provides a counterfactual history in which Roosevelt is defeated in 
the 1940 Presidential Election by the isolationist and Nazi sympathiser Charles 
Lindbergh. Roth examines the consequences faced by his fictionalised Jewish family in 
the text, once the social and cultural benefits of their New Deal sense of belonging to 
America is placed under threat by this “unforeseen” change in national history. What my 
discussion will indicate is how Roth returns to and reinvents the “facts” of the Roosevelt 
era in order to highlight the precarious foundations of its triumphal notions of social 
progress and cultural unity. In addition, I wish to show how the trauma of events that see 
a tearing apart of the secure and peaceful world of family and home for Roth’s child 
narrator, “Philip Roth,” is directly linked to the early development of the literary artist in 
The Plot against America. In Exit Ghost, Zuckerman is openly reacquainted with the 
conflicted experiences of the self that he had partially managed to mute or contain in the 
American trilogy. By emerging out of isolation and re-entering into the fray of social life 
in New York, he is once more subject to the various aspects of desire and anguish that 
had been bred by his prior engagements with American “reality.” What Exit Ghost 
suitably demonstrates, I will argue, is the manner in which Zuckerman’s tortured 
conflict with a national scene that seems out of joint and difficult to comprehend 
remains undiminished, despite the many years in which he has tried to find refuge from 
such an agonising sense of trauma. While this final instalment in the Zuckerman series 
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returns us somewhat to the “dwarf drama” that was obfuscated by matters of greater 
national and historical significance in the American trilogy, Roth uses the backdrop of 
the Bush/Kerry election of 2004 to remind us how the personal ordeals of the authorial 
self in his fiction are related to the increasingly disillusioning decline of the progressive 






































“Redface”: Exploring Issues of Liberal Politics and Literary Style in I Married a 
Communist 
 
This chapter will explore how I Married a Communist dramatises the impact 
upon American intellectual culture, particularly literary criticism, of certain upheavals 
within liberal political thought immediately following World War Two. In outlining this 
argument, I will first of all examine how the dominant school of liberal theorists and 
literary scholars in this period, known historically as the ‘New York Intellectuals,’3 
undertook a paradigmatic shift away from certain left-leaning approaches to politics and 
culture that had found strong currency within American liberalism during the more 
radicalised era of the Depression. As Anthony Hutchinson has explained, the 
encouragement by the Soviet Union of a global ‘Popular Front’ alliance against fascism 
between the Communist Party and its ‘fellow travelling’ sympathisers found a 
particularly strong appeal within American liberalism amid the socio-economic travails 
of the Depression. He describes how members of this loose coalition found a common 
form of identification with “the widely deployed term ‘progressive’” (67) during the 
1930s.4  Yet by the end of World War Two, revelations in America of the catastrophic 
effects of European totalitarianism led those among the New York group of liberals who 
had previously advanced the influence of leftist ideas upon intellectual and literary 
culture to undertake a serious reconsideration of their arguments. In particular, the New 
York critics began to reassess the entire philosophical and moral bases for their recent 
support of leftist concepts, amid fears that their own ideas of historical progress had in 
                                                 
3 This collective name has been used by commentators such as Jumonville, Wilford and Wald to describe 
a diverse group of liberal thinkers that were based in New York in the early Cold War period. Although 
different and often opposing in their ideas, members of this milieu are usually defined by their shared 
concern with how American intellectual and cultural life might be utilised in the service of liberal political 
values. The grouping largely consisted of a close circle of critics and friends who worked alongside each 
other in establishing, editing and contributing to such journals as Partisan Review and Commentary. 
4 Hutchinson explains how the Popular Front alliance in America during the 1930s achieved a particular 
level of appeal and success as a result of The New Deal, which, he explains: “undoubtedly helped foster a 
climate within which the complex attachment of a large section of the 1930s left-liberal intellectual 
community to Stalin’s Soviet Union was made possible” (65). He stresses that the Popular Front idea took 
hold not only as a result of a “drift to the left among centrists,” but as a result of the US Communist 
Party’s “move to the center under the new Comintern policy” (68) which had sought out a form of 
rapprochement with fellow travelling supporters of the Soviet cause in common action against the rise of 
fascism worldwide. 
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some ways leant support to Stalinism. Horrified by the human costs of totalitarianism in 
the Soviet Union and elsewhere, many different intellectual voices within American 
liberalism began to respond to what they saw as an urgent need to “refine our motives 
and ask what might lie behind our good impulses” (Trilling, 220).  
 
Roth’s novel inserts itself into this particular historical context by charting the 
sudden decline in post-war America of a radical form of left-liberal progressivism, 
whose widening popular appeal during the Depression had reached a climax with 
American military victory in World War Two. As the novel’s ostensible protagonist, Ira 
Ringold serves as chief ideologue for Popular Front notions of socialism as the dream of 
the American “common man” in I Married a Communist. Ira is the voice and public 
persona of the radio programme The Free and the Brave, a show dedicated to valorising 
leftist ideas of social and economic equality by presenting them as harmonious with 
historically resonant concepts of American freedom and democracy. By appropriating 
various heroic figures and symbols that constitute his popular knowledge of American 
history, and re-inscribing them within a broader leftist framework, Ira projects a self-
image as monumental defender of the oppressed. However, despite such an attempt at 
self-inscription into the mythic lore of the American past, Ira does not get to tell his own 
story in I Married a Communist. It is through his older brother, Murray Ringold, and his 
former protégé in political activism, Nathan Zuckerman, that Ira’s biography is 
reconstructed. The narrative unfolds many years after the death of the pseudonymous 
“Iron Man” (35), when Zuckerman reunites with Murray, his former high-school English 
teacher and the person through whom he first befriended Ira. A chance encounter while 
the 90 year old Murray is attending a course on Shakespeare at a nearby college to 
Zuckerman’s isolated home in the Berkshire Mountains results in a lengthy, six night 
transmission of the missing parts of his brother’s story to his former pupil and now 
celebrated writer, who, in turn, supplements the narrative with memories of his 
adolescent friendship with Ira. 
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Both of these voices provide a critical mediation of the aggrandised self-image 
that Ira projected as a popular radio star and propagandist for the Communist Party. By 
standing in judgment of Ira’s highly emotional and purblind attachment to notions of 
political utopia, Roth’s two narrators appear to share in key post-war liberal criticisms of 
the greatly popularised culture and politics of the Left during the New Deal and World 
War Two. However, Ira’s tragic story as a disgraced Communist party member during 
the era of McCarthyism should be seen as one that intimately involves the complicated 
personal lives and progressive political hopes of both Murray and Zuckerman. It is 
possible to read in their narrative reconstructions of Ira’s biography a sense of how each 
man has struggled separately to understand and come to terms with his own experience 
of post-war American history, not least because of how McCarthyism turned its attention 
toward both of them. Although Murray and Zuckerman clearly illustrate the ideological 
naiveté of Ira’s continued commitment to Popular Front politics following the war, they 
each pay witness to the despondency involved in their own sense of displacement from a 
progressive vision of America in this period. Both are presented in the novel as 
attempting to make sense of a world in which the viability of the progressive models of 
moral, intellectual and cultural understanding that they were once committed to are cast 
into serious doubt. By looking at the separate ways in which both narrators have had to 
modulate their political relationship to American social and cultural life, I will examine 
how some of the tensions within the reconstructed version of liberalism that emerged 
after World War Two are explored in Roth’s novel. Significantly, I will discuss how I 
Married a Communist, as a literary text, explores certain contradictions and limitations 
involved in post-war liberal arguments about the political function of American 
literature.  
  
Refining Motives: Anti-Stalinist Liberal Thought in Post-war America 
 
Across their varying arguments, the wide and diverse group known as the New 
York Intellectuals undertook a highly self-conscious and scrupulous reassessment of the 
theoretical and moral foundations of liberal politics in the early post-war years. 
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Determined to distance themselves from authoritarian leftist notions of progress, these 
thinkers began to reject what they saw as intransigent forms of political ideology. For 
the New York Intellectuals, ideology became a sort of watch-word for totalitarianism; a 
mechanical form of thought that reduces the complexities of the human experience to a 
flattened cipher, expendable to the exigencies of an uncompromising vision of social 
perfection.5 In contrast to the rigid principles of historical progress through which Soviet 
totalitarianism found its justification, liberal intellectuals after the war began to 
articulate certain non-linear and ahistorical notions about the fundamentally complex 
and imperfect condition of human life. By holding to a more humanist-centred and anti-
teleological viewpoint that emphasised the resistance of mankind’s “eternal dilemmas” 
(Pells, 1985 125) to the aggressive theory of historical development put forth by 
Stalinism, the New York Intellectuals began to develop various positions of moral 
ambiguity toward their own hitherto commitments to progressive notions of social 
change. In doing so, they were calling into question the very theoretical assumptions 
about how “the future might redeem the present” (Cooney, 1986 220) that had 
underpinned the alliance of leftists and liberals during the Depression era.  
 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s thesis on the ironic discrepancies between well-intended 
principles of progressive reform and mankind’s inherent proclivity to betray or corrupt 
such ideals was to have a distinct influence upon these efforts to modulate the bases of 
liberal belief in the post-war era. Seeing in strictly positivist ideas of social progress a 
dangerous Rousseauist faith in mankind’s fundamental innocence and perfectibility, 
Niebuhr put forth an anti-teleological idea of human corruptibility that drew upon a 
concept of ‘Original Sin.’ In The Irony of American History, he notes how an unchecked 
belief in the progressive potential of American democracy has, at different stages of the 
past, paved the way for a perverse tendency toward violence and despotism. In locating 
what he sees as this tragic sense of historical irony, Niebuhr argues that “Modern man’s 
confidence in his virtue [has] caused an equally unequivocal rejection of the Christian 
                                                 
5 As Neil Jumonville explains, post-war liberals did not hold to “the Marxist definition of ideology as false 
consciousness,” but saw it as “utopian rather than practical, passionately committed to an ideal rather than 
rationally analytical” (109). 
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idea of the ambiguity of human virtue” (3). By being thus aware of “the inherent 
limitation in the ability of men and women to control history” (Schaub, 10), Niebuhr 
envisaged a more self-conscious and cautious liberal approach to reforming the social 
and moral relations that exist between people. His postlapsarian idea of innate human 
failing calls for a more mature liberalism that is shorn of its past naiveties, and which 
would carry “responsibilities which involve unavoidable guilt” (Niebuhr, 36).  
 
A leading light among the New York Intellectuals, Lionel Trilling discusses a 
similarly “ironic and tragic” notion of human “corruption” (221) that makes problematic 
the good faith of American liberals in ideas of political and social reform: “[s]ome 
paradox of our natures leads us, when once we have made our fellow men the objects of 
our enlightened interest, to go on to make them the objects of our pity, then of our 
wisdom, ultimately of our coercion” (221-2). In ways that resemble Niebuhr’s argument, 
Trilling’s notion of “moral realism” – what he calls “the perception of the dangers of the 
moral life itself” (219) – makes ambiguous the potential for an outright progressive 
transformation of society. Some commentators are keen to point out how rational ideas 
about improving American society continued to form the basis of the reconstructed 
liberal philosophy of Trilling and others after World War Two, despite the manner in 
which Niebuhr’s quasi-religious argument about innate human corruption challenged the 
secular Enlightenment belief in mankind’s ability to rationally shape historical 
conditions.6 Yet due to the great spectre of totalitarian ideology that loomed over their 
ideas and writings, a distinctly moral and humanistic impulse to qualify previously held 
notions of rational thought and political system pervaded the arguments of most of these 
liberal thinkers. Although hopes for a measure of historical progress through a reasoned 
understanding and redefinition of social relations continued to hold currency among 
                                                 
6 For example, Terry Cooney outlines how more left-leaning liberals among the Partisan Review coterie 
opposed what they saw as “the contemporary flight from rationality and from the critical traditions built 
up over two hundred years,” as evident in the “mystical or anti-scientific thought” (1986, 192) of Niebuhr. 
Cooney claims that, although not sharing in the efforts to uphold a leftist sensibility which were made by 
such people as Irving Howe and Sidney Hook in the post-war years, “Trilling came firmly down on the 
side of a more sensitive historical criticism” that argued “for a more inclusive and more balanced rational 
philosophy, not for the rejection of rationalism” (220). 
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liberals in the post-war age, the reaction to totalitarianism led many to heed a similar 
warning to that of Niebuhr against the moral limitations and violent irrationalism of the 
human spirit. In this way, ideas about improving social conditions among post-war 
liberals became tempered by an overriding awareness of man’s intractably ‘fallen’ 
nature, leading them to adopt a “tragic outlook” which “suspected that we could not 
control the various aspects of our lives – through reform or good intentions” 
(Jumonville, 124-5).7  
 
The dominant currents of liberal thought after the war came to insist upon a form 
of political praxis that – as Niebuhr’s idea of guilt and Trilling’s “moral realism” 
suggested – favoured notions of a pragmatic or ‘realistic’ compromise with existing 
socio-economic structures over the militant and utopian illusions fostered by ideology. 
For example, in The End of Ideology, Daniel Bell criticised the violence of the 
revolutionary “chiliast [who] is neither in the world nor of it” (281). In turn, he called 
for such naivety to be superseded by the sober judgment of the liberal pragmatist, who, 
being of the world, realises the necessity for a less than perfect form of compromise 
between political ideals and existing social conditions.8 Similarly, in Arthur 
Schlesinger’s The Vital Center, this idea of compromise was valorised for how it 
engendered a vibrantly contested middle-ground that is free from the political dangers of 
ideological extremes, and yet at the same time facilitates a cautiously modified and 
gradualist liberal approach to changing social and economic conditions. Rejecting an 
                                                 
7 Jumonville provides an interesting insight into the correlations between the arguments of Niebuhr and 
Trilling by arguing that: “Niebuhr’s The Irony of American History (1952) introduced the concepts of 
irony, tragedy, and complexity into historical analysis at the same time that Trilling announced the need 
for complexity and nuance in critical analysis” (125). He claims that Trilling’s moral concepts of 
“complexity and ambiguity were allied to a tragic sense of life” that was “fundamentally conservative, for 
it acknowledged the extent to which society was unable to control itself” (124). Despite his claim that 
Trilling held steady to the values of rational thinking, Cooney asserts that his argument of “moral realism” 
brought into disarray any radical notion of historical progress: “If many others in moving away from 
Marxism had clung to an ‘optimism of progress,’ Trilling called into doubt even the sustaining hope that 
progress was possible” (1986, 220). As the main text of my argument will indicate below, Schaub 
provides the most broad sweeping condemnation of what he calls “the conservative critique from within 
liberalism” (11) supplied by the “moral ahistoricism” (12) of men like Trilling and Niebuhr.  
8 Quoting Lord Acton, Bell states that: “[c]ompromise is the ‘soul if not the whole of politics … and 
progress is along diagonals’” (298).  
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older “liberalism [that] had long been almost inextricably identified with a picture of 
man as perfectible” (viii), Schlesinger argued that “[s]o long as society stays free … it 
will continue in a state of tension, breeding contradiction, breeding strife” (225). This 
“fundamental resistance to formula and closed system … [and] essential concern with 
openness and possibility” (Cooney, 1986 221) among liberal intellectuals found 
expression in the fluid and democratically contestable notion of consensus that 
dominated American social, political and economic values in the period after World War 
Two. I will deal at greater length with the idea of a post-war “liberal consensus” 
regarding the Keynesian structures of American democratic capitalism in the historical 
outline to my next chapter on American Pastoral. Suffice at this stage to indicate that, by 
recognising only the level of “contradiction” or “strife” that may be permitted within the 
broader compromises of America’s “vital center,” many among the New York 
Intellectuals maintained a certain aloofness from more divisive and ideologically toned 
issues of social and economic inequality.  
 
Alan Wald has suggested that the “self-proclaimed repudiation of Marxism by 
many [liberal intellectuals] must be understood as … a rationalization for the continued 
dominance of bourgeois society to which they had become reconciled” (230). Like 
Wald, Schaub argues that the moral imperative for a “reform of the expectations of 
reform” (22) brought about a shift in the focus of American liberalism away from 
concerns with transforming material conditions and toward a scrupulous analysis of the 
human capacities and motivations for effecting such changes. He claims that the impact 
which people like Trilling and Niebuhr had on progressive liberal thinking “was to lift 
the possibilities for change out of the realm of material cause and situate them within the 
workings of a mystical human nature” (22). According to this argument, post-war 
liberals abandoned the materialist historicism of the Left by developing more 
transhistorical ideas about mankind’s morally complex and tragically limited 
predicament.9 This particular form of liberal humanism laid claim to a notion of 
                                                 
9 Schaub’s indictment of what he sees as post-war liberal conservatism finds some support in the 
arguments of Jumonville and Cooney. Of course, the separate voices among the New York Intellectuals 
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disinterested and objective reasoning that was held in contrast to the stifling purview of 
those committed to a systematically formulated and strictly materialist understanding of 
society. New York liberals after the war saw themselves as guardians of a detached 
intellectual approach to the universal dilemmas of ‘Man’ and ‘Society,’ which steered 
clear of the irrational emotiveness and violence that they attributed to revolutionary 
demands for an immediate overhaul of existing social conditions.10 In this fashion, 
reason and sober intellectual judgment became valued in their own right as bastions 
against the emotional and violent atrophy of rational thought that took place within 
‘chiliastic’ ideologies. Yet this determination to purify notions of rational argument and 
political reasoning of any contaminating sense of intellectual narrowness meant that 
these liberal thinkers became somewhat disengaged from the material and ideological 
conflicts that continued to take place within American society.11  
                                                                                                                                                
should not be conveniently subsumed under a simple rubric of de-radicalised liberalism. Schaub himself is 
careful to explain how he is tracing a “dominant trend” (23) among post-war liberals, to which he places 
men like Sidney Hook and John Dewey as an exception. Cooney and Jumonville both pay recognition to 
the differences between the left-leaning and more conservative writers among the New York Intellectuals. 
Yet in spite of such ostensible differences, both commentators have also mapped a broad convergence of 
political direction among these thinkers. Tracing the development of an anti-Stalinist position within 
Partisan Review in the late thirties, Cooney has discussed the problems for maintaining a Marxist line of 
argument among its editors, Philip Rahv and William Phillips, that would avoid the totalising effects of 
ideological dogma: “simplifications of Marxism into stiff doctrine moved the Partisan Review 
intellectuals to insist so emphatically on the fluid and open nature of a Marxist approach that the whole 
idea of radical system was threatened” (1986, 160). Neil Jumonville distinguishes between what he calls 
the dissenters and affirmers (in relation to the American cultural and political mainstream of the post-war 
liberal consensus) among the New York Intellectuals. However, his survey illustrates the ultimate failure 
of the dissenters’ attempts to straddle the awkward ground between leftism and anti-ideological ideas: “the 
task for the left wing of the New York group was to carve out a respectable position somewhere between 
rejecting Communist ideological absolutism and accepting a conservative pragmatic world without any 
ideology whatever” (143).  
10 For example, Irving Howe has argued that the continuance of liberal political and cultural dissent in 
America relies upon the scrupulous discipline and vigour of the independent minded intellectual: “[t]he 
most glorious vision of the intellectual life is still that which is loosely called humanist: the idea of a mind 
committed yet dispassionate, ready to stand alone, curious, eager, sceptical” (“This Age of Conformity,” 
345). More so than most other post-war liberals, Howe attempted to hold faith with “the liberal-radical 
vision of the good society” (“This Age of Conformity, 335). However, his opposition to the Stalinist 
“religion of History” (“Authoritarians on the Left, 303) and other such “belief[s] in the ‘unqualified 
goodness of man’” (“This age of Conformity,” 335) led him to share with his contemporaries a position of 
detached and sophisticated intellectual reflection that went far in qualifying any previous reformist 
impulses he may have had for engaging with socio-material conflicts on a level of leftist political 
commitment.  
11 In support of this argument, Hugh Wilford has suggested that the “idea of the detached, autonomous 
dissident” which found strong appeal among the New York Intellectuals bred among them a sense of 
“practical ineffectuality” (244) in dealing with the alleviation of social and economic inequalities. 
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Post-war liberal critics were not only concerned with the corrupting influence of 
ideology in American political and intellectual life, but they saw in a growing mass 
culture a comparable tendency to reduce the complexities of the human experience to 
facile reproductions. The experience of European totalitarianism evidenced for this 
intellectual milieu how mass cultural spectacles and myths had facilitated fascist and 
Stalinist propaganda. Described by Neil Jumonville as a two front “struggle against 
kitsch and Khrushchev” (165), the arguments of people like Clement Greenberg and 
Dwight MacDonald came to champion notions of intellectual probity and high-cultural 
tradition as important bulwarks against the reductive and violent simplifications of mass 
ideologies.12 Yet, in appealing to notions of intellectual scrutiny and sophisticated 
cultural expression as means of safeguarding American social life against any incipient 
slide toward totalitarianism, liberal thinkers in this period avowed a disinterested and 
elitist view of culture and thought that ran somewhat counter to their ostensible position 
as reformists who were engaged by the social and political needs of the masses.13  
 
This highly valued idea of ‘Culture’ as something that is detached from ideology 
and superior to the whims of popular taste finds expression in the literary criticism of 
post-war liberal critics. Below, I will discuss how Lionel Trilling and Philip Rahv each 
borrowed from a particular literary branch of high-modernist aestheticism in order to 
                                                                                                                                                
Jumonville has also contributed to this discussion, remarking upon how the New York liberals “were more 
driven by their intellectual responsibilities to rationalism, tolerance, and freedom of enquiry than to their 
political dedication to the concepts of socialism, equality, social justice, and planning” (47). 
12 In “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Greenberg argues that: “[t]he encouragement of kitsch is merely another 
of the inexpensive ways in which totalitarian regimes seek to ingratiate themselves with their subjects. 
Since these regimes cannot raise the cultural level of the masses … they will flatter the masses by bringing 
all culture down to their level” (47). MacDonald shares with Greenberg an anxiety about how high 
cultural standards and traditions are being eroded by the incursions of what he calls both “Masscult” and 
“Midcult” into most aspects American public life. Like MacDonald, Greenberg appeals to notions of an 
avant-garde cultural “elite as a countermovement to both Masscult and Midcult” (70).  
13 Schaub states that: “The changed relationship of radical thought to the masses or the working class 
appears most conservatively in postwar liberalism as the need to preserve high culture from the 
degradations of mass culture” (17). Jumonville has argued that the New York Intellectuals’ general view 
of the habits and pastimes of the masses as “a dangerous undermining of free intellectual culture” (185) 
failed to provide any materialist understanding of the relationship between popular culture and socio-
economic experience.  
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develop a new model for the American novel that would effectively articulate the 
complex humanist perspective by which they opposed ideology and mass culture. This 
involved an idea of the verisimilar “function of the novel as social history” (Schaub, 25) 
in so much as it reflected the manifold layers of tensions and moral ambiguities that 
comprised the post-war liberal idea of an embattled or ‘fallen’ human condition.14 In 
attempting to articulate their elaborate notions about social conditions and the human 
potential for transforming them, liberal scholars embraced certain notions of nuanced 
literary style as a way of wresting American literature from what they argued was the 
leftist dominance of naturalist political fiction. They found in naturalism a popular form 
that too easily loaned itself to the positivist ideas of what Trilling called an “American 
metaphysic, [in which] reality is always material reality, hard, resistant, unformed, 
impenetrable, and unpleasant” (13). As opposed to what they saw as the decidedly 
empirical and determinist understanding of historical experience expressed within the 
content of naturalist literature, these literary critics turned to more sophisticated ideas of 
literary form in order to articulate their anti-ideological views on the moral complexities 
of life. 
 
By thus opposing leftist naturalism with an alternative political aesthetic that was 
based on notions of highly developed style, the literary critics among the New York 
Intellectuals found striking connections with the politically conservative modernist ideas 
expressed within the American school of New Criticism. This New Critic valorisation of 
aesthetic form is exemplified by Cleanth Brooks’ argument that, in its deployment of 
“ambiguity,” “paradox,” and “irony” (The Well Wrought Urn, 1355), the literary artefact 
“will always show itself as deflected away from a positive, straightforward formulation” 
(1363). In contrast to the liberal political motivations of the New York school, the New 
                                                 
14 Schaub states that: “Trilling, Rahv, and Howe insisted upon defining the novel as a picture of the social 
world because they themselves wished to sustain a relation that might modify that world” (Schaub, 30). 
Similarly, Terry Cooney asserts that: “the Partisan Review critics maintained as a central article of faith 
that however much attention was given to strictly artistic considerations, literature must also be examined 
within a social context” (1986, 157-8). According to Neil Jumonville, the New York Intellectuals’ attitude 
to literature marked: “a holistic approach … that discouraged distinctions between literature and politics, 
or art and social policy” (9). 
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Critics ardently refuted any suggestion that extraneous matters of history or politics were 
relevant to the internal structure of the literary work. For them, any such critical 
attention to content was seen as positivist and motivated by biased sectional interests. 
Thus viewing the literary artifice as an object that exists at a disinterested remove from 
its social or authorial context, the various New Critical writers shared a sense of what 
John Crowe Ransom called: “the autonomy of the work itself as existing for its own 
right” (1115).15 Yet while the New Critics did speak against the idea of literature 
referring to anything in the ‘prosaic’ or ‘non-literary’ world of politics, history and 
authorial biography, they did claim for it a vision of “the unity of experience … [that] 
triumphs over the apparently contradictory and conflicting elements of experience by 
unifying them into a new pattern” (The Well Wrought Urn, 1365). This singularly 
aesthetic process is described elsewhere by Ransom as that where the “poet perpetuates 
in his poem an order of existence which in actual life is constantly crumbling beneath his 
touch” (1117). Mark Jancovitch has argued that this transcendent and immutable sense 
of an aesthetic order existing outside of quotidian life did in fact serve a particular 
political vision. According to Jancovitch, the aesthetic principles of the New Critics 
involved a politics of form that distinguished it from the obsessions with content shared 
among the naturalist school of left-leaning writers in America. He suggests that the 
literary arguments of New Critics evoked a Southern conservative ideal of order that 
stood opposed to the chaotic dislocations and materialist ideologies of industrialised 
modernity in the north of the country. Jancovitch explains that, according to the 
detached modernist perspectives of the Southern critics, “literature was a form of social 
criticism against bourgeois society” (20). In ways that find clear resonance with what I 
have been outlining as the theoretical foundations of the broadened liberal hostility to 
Stalinism after the war, Jancovitch goes on to explain how: “the Southern preoccupation 
with Original Sin … acknowledged the complex historical and material conditions of 
                                                 
15 In “The Presenr Function of Criticism,” to cite another example, Allen Tate makes a similar claim about 
“the special, unique, and complete knowledge which the great forms of literature affords us” (8).  
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human existence, and rejected abstract and ideal solutions which failed to take these 
conditions into account” (17).16  
 
As I have mentioned, the New York liberal critics openly expressed a 
fundamental interest in the social and political role of the novel that ostensibly stood at 
odds with New Criticism. However, they also developed a formalist attitude similar to 
people like Brooks and Ransom in so much as they saw high-literary form as offering an 
“order of existence” that would act as a redemptive model of life against the ideological 
and cultural degradations of mass modernity. As a result of the “contradictions inherent 
in their dual commitment to aestheticism and engagement” (Wilford, 92), the New York 
Intellectuals placed certain limitations upon the role that progressive ideas about 
material social conditions could continue to perform within the American novel. This 
considered interest in the modulating effects of novelistic form upon the more positivist 
aspects of social and historical content mirrors the careful reconsideration of political 
methods and moral intentions among liberals in this period. These critics were engrossed 
by theories of method and form in their approach to both political action and literature, 
largely deflecting their attention away from any direct involvement with more 
substantial ideas or issues of socio-material content. Instead, materialist approaches to 
politics and culture were deemed by liberals in this period to be the crude ideological 
hallmark of the unreconstructed political Left and unsophisticated writers of naturalist 
fiction.  
 
Over the following number of pages, I wish to briefly outline the difficulties with 
which Lionel Trilling and Philip Rahv each put forth arguments for a novelistic model 
that would hold in place “the excesses of aestheticism by instilling literature with a 
respect for social ideas” (Cooney, 1986 75).17 Trilling’s notion of a need for “moral 
                                                 
16 “This way of thinking,” according to Jancovitch, “led the South to value organic ways of thinking which 
sought to place contradictory elements in ‘harmonious,’ ‘balanced,’ or ‘stable’ relationships” (17).   
17 Cooney goes on to indicate the instability that originates in this attempt to wed modernist stylistics to 
radical politics: “Synthesis could not be achieved by reversing the one-sided emphasis of aestheticism and 
rushing to the opposite extreme – a preoccupation with social concerns and immediate politics at the 
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realism” at the heart of liberal politics is predicated upon his idea of how social relations 
are shaped by a process of continual conflict and transformation. As opposed to strictly 
materialist conceptions of “reality” as “hard” and “resistant,” Trilling suggests that 
“culture is nothing if not a dialectic” (9). Such a nuanced understanding of cultural life is 
mapped, according to Trilling, through the imaginative labours of “certain artists who 
contain a large part of the dialectic within themselves, their meaning and power lying in 
their contradictions” (9). By “contain[ing] within themselves … the very essence of the 
culture,” he argues that such artists “do not submit to serve the ends of any one 
ideological group or tendency” (9). Trilling gives particular praise to the achievements 
of European high-literary tradition, seeing in its complex and imaginative treatment of 
social manners a means of exploring the dialectical formations of cultural life: “[f]or our 
time the most effective agent of the moral imagination has been the novel of the last two 
hundred years” (222). For Trilling, therefore, the fluid and intricate sense of a “moral 
imagination” that lies at the heart of American liberalism finds suitable expression in the 
great literature of the past. By contrast, he sees the American naturalist fiction of the first 
half of the twentieth century as bereft of such novelistic ingenuity. In “Manners, Morals, 
and The Novel,” Trilling castigates writers like Parrington, Dreiser and Farrell for being 
purveyors of low-brow and ideological depictions of “material reality.” The popularity 
of this naturalist writing, according to Trilling, has impaired the development of an 
American tradition of writing that might be worthy of the European novel. What he 
wishes to encourage is a re-thinking of the American novel that will abandon the 
influences of leftist ideology for the greater aesthetic reaches of a literary model which 
is more suitably liberal in its political and moral outlook.  
 
Yet by invoking formalist criticisms of naturalist content in fiction, Trilling’s 
argument threatens to jettison what Schaub described as the “positivist (mimetic) 
expectation of external and social detail” (31) central to the politically themed literature 
                                                                                                                                                
expense of artistic quality. This was the position of the ‘leftists’ who were leading proletarian literature 
astray” (1986, 76).  
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of the left-liberal variety.18 The tensions in Trilling’s argument between questions of 
progressive political content and more disinterested or ‘ahistorical’ matters of literary 
style are evident in “The Meaning of a Literary Idea.” In this essay, Trilling attempts to 
establish a role for political ideas within literary content that is compatible with his 
modernist influenced concept of form. Seeking to distance himself from the ‘apolitical’ 
formalism of the New Critics, he states: “say what we will about the ‘purely’ literary, the 
purely aesthetic values, we as readers know that we demand of our literature some of the 
virtues which define a successful work of systematic thought” (290). He goes on to 
argue that: “[i]deas … are not only not hostile to the creative process, as some think, but 
are virtually inevitable to it” (293). Trilling’s flexible and imaginative concept of “moral 
realism” encourages what he calls an “intimate relationship between literature and ideas” 
that stands in stark contrast with the agit-style fictions of the left in which political 
concepts “tend to deteriorate into ideology” (286). By arguing for ideas in literature that 
do not “make the attempt at a formulated solution,” he stresses that writers should 
exercise a “negative capability … [a] willingness to remain in uncertainties, mysteries, 
and doubts” as a means to “seeing the full force and complexity of their subject matter” 
(298-9). Trilling thus argues in opposition to the New Critics by suggesting that high-
literary form can be made serviceable to liberal principles of political thought and 
action. However, a clear tension exists between Trilling’s insistence upon the continuing 
historicist value of fiction and his determination to wrest “reality” and political ideas 
from naturalism by subjecting them to the complex modulations of literary expression. 
In many ways, his suggestion that “[t]he novel … is a perpetual quest for reality” (212) 
echoes Ransom’s notion of an “order of existence” peculiar to literature which redeems 
a superlative vision of life against other prosaic and positivist modes of explicating 
experience. Such a comparison lends credence to Brooks’ claim in “The Formalist 
Critics” that “Trilling is really much closer to the so-called ‘new critics’ than he is 
aware” (1370). 
 
                                                 
18 According to Jumonville, Trilling’s literary criticism was “attempt[ing] to draw a responsible line … 
between the dangers of culture with too little social and political content (such as the New Critics), and 
culture with too much political or visionary content” (124). 
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Philip Rahv attempted to fashion a new vision of the American novel that would 
remain grounded in socio-political concerns, but which would provide “the aesthetic 
rendering of experience” (“The Cult of Experience,” 24) necessary to wrest literature 
from the ideological dogma of the left. In “Paleface and Redskin,” he discusses the need 
for such a balance between social content and aesthetic form in American fiction by 
outlining the problems inherent to the existing literary heritage: 
 
The fact is that the creative mind in America is fragmented and one-sided. For the process of polarization 
has produced a dichotomy between experience and consciousness – a dissociation between energy and 
sensibility, between conduct and theories of conduct, between life conceived as an opportunity and life 
conceived as a discipline (1) 
 
Rahv ascribes the term “paleface” to a “high-brow” tradition of moral and intellectual 
“consciousness,” “as [evidenced] in the case of Hawthorne and James” (2). The 
“redskin” is one in the line of Whitman, whose predilection for “experience” makes him 
a “‘low-brow,’ not because he is badly educated … but because his reactions are 
primarily emotional, spontaneous, and lacking in personal culture” (2). Making a 
connection between European tradition and “paleface” writing, Rahv underlines how 
this “high-brow” style appeals to the detached aesthetic sensibility of modernist-
formalism. By contrast, the “redskin writer in America is a purely indigenous 
phenomenon” (4), who, by working within a “primacy of experience” and “relative 
immunity from abstraction” (“The Cult of Experience,” 34), falls far short of the 
impersonal commitment to tradition and form that modernist critics like Eliot advocated. 
For Rahv, the “national literature suffers from the ills of a split personality” that can 
only be cured by a synthesis of both traditions in American writing.  
 
This call for balance between both styles finds political expedience in an 
environment in which “the redskins are in command of the situation” (“Paleface and 
Redskin,” 4). This particular incarnation of the “redskin” is to be found, for Rahv, in the 
naturalist fiction of the Left. Like Trilling, he calls into question the intellectual and 
aesthetic merits of a leftist literature that has concerned itself with “popular political 
creeds” and the demands of “semiliterate audiences” (4). “Unable to relate himself in 
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any significant manner to the cultural heritage” (4), the “redskin” writer of popular front 
fiction is seen by Rahv as part of a broader ideological attempt to hijack culture by the 
Left.19 Similar to Trilling, Rahv sees in the high-literary or “paleface” sense of tradition 
a necessary bulwark against “flat reproductions of life” (3). At the same time, he wants 
to distance himself from “a fetishistic attitude toward tradition” (5) that has resulted in 
comparably “truncated works of art … products of cultivation that remain abstract 
because they fall short on evidence drawn from the sensuous and material world” (3). In 
thus trying to synthesise the dichotomous strands of American literary tradition, Rahv 
seeks to maintain, like Trilling, a balance between a sense of political (positivist) content 
and the aesthetic form emerging from “that new-fashioned sense of irony which at once 
expresses and modulates the conflicts in modern belief” (“The Cult of Experience,” 24). 
 
The Dialogical Interaction between Narrators in I Married a Communist 
 
When reading the text of I Married a Communist, the extrinsic compatibility 
between both Nathan and Murray’s narrative viewpoints is clearly evident. Words such 
as “error,” “loss,” “revenge” and “betrayal” infiltrate the speech of both men, denoting a 
somewhat fallen or tragedian view of history that contrasts with the positivist linearity of 
Ira’s utopian rhetoric. This is a form of historicism which has analogues, as I have 
outlined, with aspects of the New York Intellectuals’ attitudes toward ideology. Yet, 
despite this narrative mimicry in which both men appear to share the view articulated by 
Zuckerman that “[t]here’s only error … [at] the heart of the world” (319), there is a an 
important distinction in how such a form of epistemological and moral uncertainty 
informs their efforts to make narrative sense of events over the past fifty years. 
Zuckerman has effectively withdrawn himself from the stage of human history by 
retreating into hermetic isolation, away from the conflicts and frustrations that have 
marked his desire for a narrative engagement with ‘real’ life in previous novels. He has 
thus sought a reprieve from the interplay of potency and impotence – “your 
                                                 
19 In “Proletarian Literature: a Political Autopsy,” Rahv states that: “Virtually all the theorists of 
proletarian culture are fetishists of ideology, which they naively equate with and substitute for culture” 
(13). 
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manipulation of the world and its manhandling of you” (72) – that has characterised his 
efforts to imprint his narrative authorship on the external world of “facts” in the past. By 
contrast, Murray is more representative of people like Trilling in the way that he seeks to 
redeem a distinctly liberal form of moral and political insight from the confusion and 
sense of “error” posed by events in post-war American life. In attempting to illustrate 
this distinction between himself and Murray, Zuckerman juxtaposes his own 
unwillingness to explicate his worldly experiences with the older man’s continued 
efforts to extract some intellectual meaning from the broader historical events that he has 
lived through: 
 
that the puzzle continued to puzzle him, that clarification remained a vital need – more than surprised me: 
a sense of error settled over me, bordering on shame, for living to myself and keeping everything at such a 
distance. But then the sense of error vanished. There were no more difficulties I wished to create (151). 
  
By focusing on such differences between both of their narrative approaches in the novel, 
I will examine how the more confused and reticent Zuckerman provides a foil to 
Murray’s declarative moral thesis - resonant of New York Intellectual positions after the 
war - on history and human actions.  
 
Before going on to discuss the text in greater detail, it is important to mention 
how critical responses to I Married a Communist have so far failed to fully probe this 
tension between the two narrators. Although framed by Zuckerman’s voice, Murray 
Ringold’s account of Ira’s life is afforded a greater deal of space in the novel than the 
room allocated to his former pupil’s narrative. As a result, Murray’s particular 
interpretation of events assumes a certain position of authorial centrality that appears to 
go unquestioned by some readers of Roth’s novel. Derek Parker Royal criticises the 
novel for “its relatively uncomplicated use of first-person narration” (2005, 116). He 
argues that this narrative strategy “stands in stark contrast to the ambiguous disclosures 
found in its companions” (116) within Roth’s American trilogy. Debra Shostak, by 
contrast, manages to point out: “that Murray has an auditor, that this is a literally 
dialogic situation, in which the meaning of the story emerges from the interaction 
between speaker and listener” (250). Despite this appeal to Bakhtinian dialogism, 
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however, Shostak does not discuss any sense of disunity in the narrative relationship 
between Murray and Zuckerman. Instead, she argues that “Zuckerman’s absolute fidelity 
to Murray’s viewpoint” leaves the latter as “the authority in the text” (251). For Shostak, 
the novel is largely concerned with the “dialogic situation” between Nathan and Ira, and 
the way this narrative relationship engenders a crippling sense of self-division in 
Zuckerman: “Nathan’s own retrospective view becomes central in the novel, because he 
can be seen as simply a less extreme and distorted version of Ira – like Murray, more 
rational and less violent, yet equally caught up in the dream of America” (251).  
 
While my argument will address the ambivalence of Zuckerman’s continued 
affection for his old mentor Ira, I also intend to focus upon something that Shostak 
appears to omit: the way in which Nathan’s continued fascination with Ira makes him 
less “like Murray” at key stages of the novel. I would argue that by concentrating on 
how Zuckerman, as auditor, pays deference to “Murray’s commanding presence” as the 
voice of “unquestioned truth in this book,” Shostak fails to explore how Nathan’s “long 
silences” (Shostak, 250) can be read in dialogic terms. Nathan’s relative silence acts not 
only as a register of attentiveness and reverence toward Murray as speaker. It is also 
marked, at stages, by a sense of fatigue and incredulity with the clear tone of conviction 
expressed by his former school teacher’s tendency toward “pedagogical crescendo” (I 
Married a Communist, 262) in explaining events. This more subtle dialogic interplay 
between two apparently mutual viewpoints emerges once the novel is read with 
Bakhtin’s idea of “quasi-direct discourse” in mind. Shostak’s assumed notion of 
“fidelity” between Murray and Zuckerman’s narratives, I would argue, fails to address 
the frictions that inhabit the superficial level of harmony between separate voices in 
“quasi-direct” style. By contrast, my argument will underline the narrative dissonance 
that emerges from the manner in which these separate speakers interact within Roth’s 
novel. In this spirit, my chapter will develop in two separate sections which aim to 
demonstrate Murray and Zuckerman’s dialogically contrasting approaches to 






Murray’s narrative is delivered with a similar sense of the “masculine authority 
uncorrected by piety” (2) that was integral to his inspiring performances as Zuckerman’s 
boyhood English teacher. Central to Murray’s pedagogic style is the value it places upon 
what he once emphasised to his pupils as “[c]ri-ti-cal think-ing (2). Presented by Murray 
to the youthful Zuckerman and his class mates as “the ultimate subversion” (2), “critical 
thinking” is intended to offer them access to decidedly masculine notions of independent 
thought and intellectual dissent. Zuckerman recalls how the “flinty fullness” (4) of 
Murray’s speech, for which there was “no invisible line of propriety” (24), de-mystified 
high rhetoric and complex intellectual ideas for his young pupils. In many ways, 
Murray’s discursive style as Nathan’s teacher might be said to embody the synthesis 
“between conduct and theories of conduct” that Rahv had outlined as lacking in the 
American cultural tradition. Recalling the first time he spoke with both Ringold brothers 
together, Zuckerman tells of how each of them spoke to him with an emotional energy 
and vernacular ruggedness that appeared to blur the usual distinctions between matters 
of ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultural significance: 
 
You could stir together anything and everything: sports, politics, history, literature, reckless opionating, 
polemical quotation, idealistic sentiment, moral rectitude ... There was something marvellously bracing 
about it, a different and dangerous world, demanding, straightforward, aggressive, freed from the need to 
please (24)  
 
However, the rhetorical conjunction of popular (“redskin”) and intellectual (“paleface”) 
styles in which “[y]ou could stir together anything and everything” that had marked 
Murray’s performances as Zuckerman’s teacher has undergone distinct modifications on 
their re-union. Having once demonstrated to his students how complex ideas could be 
made appealing by infusing them with a Whitmanesque charge of “visceral spontaneity” 
(1), Murray’s speech now clearly outlines a sense of the very “dissociation between 
energy and [intellectual] sensibility” that Rahv had originally flagged as a problem 
within American culture. Murray is eager to distance himself from any earlier affiliation 
that he might have shown with the Popular Front sentiments of Ira by delivering to 
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Nathan a narrative interpretation of the post-war American experience in which his idea 
of “critical thinking” becomes inimical to the emotionally charged and popularised 
speech that he associates with his brother’s Communist propaganda. Ira’s emotive 
rhetoric is described by Murray as part of a broader degeneration of American civic life 
at the hands of simplistic ideologies and mass cultural discourses. In opposition to this 
perceived decline in intellectual and cultural modes of expression, Murray lays claim to 
a language of detached criticism that abstracts itself from the bold “visceral” appeal to 
popular sentiment that had shaped his original rhetorical style. After so many years, the 
combative sense of “freed[om] from the need to please” that Murray inculcated in others 
has been recast in the form of a temperate mode of independent reasoning; “critical 
thinking” in all its objective and high-cultural purity.  
 
Described by Zuckerman as having attained a state “that is close to being totally 
dispassionate” (77), the aged Murray appears to be almost disembodied of private forms 
of longing (Eros) or anguish (Thanatos) in the text. In this regard, he seems to exist at an 
absolute remove from the more corporeal matters of personal desire and frustration 
which, as I will highlight, define both Ira and Zuckerman’s engagements with the greater 
events of American history in the novel. This separation of mind from body – 
“sensibility” from “energy” – that occurs in Murray’s life during the period of years 
since he was Zuckerman’s teacher is reflective, I would suggest, of post-war liberal 
tendencies to value the virtues of independent intellectual criticism over their prior sense 
of political commitment to the material concerns and popular aspirations of the 
American masses. Like Trilling and others, Murray articulates an anti-ideological liberal 
philosophy which seeks, at all times, to keep intact its own pristine sense of moral and 
intellectual foundations by distancing itself completely from the “chiliastic” fervour of 
Ira and his Communist Party mentor, Johnny O’Day.  
  
In citing the case of Ira’s wife, Eve, and her complicity with the anti-Communist 
hearings against her husband, Murray explains how she was promptly dismissed as “just 
more of that flabby mass that is life” by the forces of ideological zeal, once they had 
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extracted from her that which “advances the righteous cause” (261). In contrast to the 
aggressive manner in which ideology tends to discard the relevance of individual 
experiences and motivations as surplus to its moral or historical imperatives, Murray is 
determined to outline the significant influence of such emotional and psychological 
impulses in shaping events and lives. In this way, he shares the Niebuhrian viewpoint – 
current among many disillusioned liberals in the early Cold War period – that stresses 
the ironic sense in which coherent ideologies of rational progress find great disparities 
with the highly flawed and complex basis of human behaviour. In support of this thesis, 
Murray explains elsewhere his view of how life assumes certain aspects of farce and 
irrationality, which function to discredit any teleological notion of a rational principle 
organising the movement of history: 
  
Maybe, despite ideology, politics, and history, a genuine catastrophe is always personal bathos at the core. 
Life can’t be impugned for any failure to trivialize people. You have to take your hat off to life for the 
techniques at its disposal to strip a man of his significance and empty him totally of his pride (3) 
 
Like Niebuhr and Trilling, therefore, Murray’s numerous reflections in the text provide a 
keen awareness of how mankind’s tragic – or tragi-comic in this instance – predicament 
cannot be successfully redeemed or reformed by grandiose ideologies of historical 
progress.  
 
Yet despite his pretensions to holding a critical evaluation of history that places 
him beyond the delusions of ideology, Murray also comes to despair of a situation in 
which his much-vaunted intellectual ideals struggle to find a purchase on cultural life. 
Discussing the mass spectacle of anti-Communism, he states that: “I think of the 
McCarthy era as inaugurating the postwar triumph of gossip as the unifying credo of the 
world’s oldest democratic republic ... the first flowering of the American unthinking that 
is now everywhere” (284). Murray’s own experience as a suspected Communist makes 
evident this sense of the banality and intellectual inscrutability of McCarthyism. He 
explains how he had tried to find in his and Ira’s accuser, Bryden Grant, something 
“more to him than a politician with a personal vendetta finding in the national obsession 
the means to settle a score” (9). Referring to how “it was still my wont in those days to 
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try to be reasonable about the unreasonable and to look for the complexity in simple 
things,” Murray concludes that he was “mak[ing] demands upon my intelligence where 
none were really necessary” (9). Despite the ostensible appeal to moral and historical 
authority in Grant’s mission to extricate the influence of Communism from American 
politics and culture, Murray realises from the experience that: 
 
 
Pettiness and vapidity can come on the grand scale too. What could be more unwavering than pettiness 
and vapidity? ... You don’t need a developed view of life to be fond of power (9-10) 
  
For Murray, the sense of moral righteousness that Grant evoked in protecting American 
democracy against Communist influences acted as a shallow means of concealing his 
personal urge to vilify others and achieve public acclaim. The post-war liberal view of 
how ideology appeals to irrational and violent human impulses to control and coerce 
others finds clear resonance in Murray’s assessment of McCarthyism as a means of 
expiating personal ambitions on the “grand scale” of history. As a clear sighted liberal 
with an apparent lack of political illusions or distempered emotions, Murray inhabits a 
fluid space of open intellectual curiosity – a “vital center” – in which all ideological 
rigidities and mass cultural simplifications are subject to disavowal. Yet in illustrating 
how recent American history has been shaped by personal “pettiness” and anti-
intellectual “vapidity,” he also heralds a sort of apocalyptic entelechy of the 
unreasonable against which his “developed view of life” struggles to redeem any greater 
understanding of cultural experience.  
 
Just as he argues that Bryden Grant finds vengeful pleasure in the moral crusade 
of anti-Communism, Murray describes his brother’s utopian political vision as Ira’s 
means of sublimating an unconscious reserve of personal anger and aggression. In 
outlining this connection between volatile passions and the convictions of ideology, 
Murray explains to Nathan how it is possible to: “indoctrinate an adult who is not too 
skilled in brainwork with the intellectual glamour of Big Sweeping Ideas, inculcate a 
man of limited intelligence, an excitable type who is as angry as Ira” (60). Ira’s wife, 
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Eve, and “her [many] projects to deodorize life and make it palatable” (179) present 
Murray with another frustrating example of one whose personal longing for a sense of 
moral perfection has made her readily available to such forms of “embitterment and not 
thinking” (60). Her “actress’s utopia of let’s pretend” (179) has stripped Eve of the 
faculty for “critical thinking” that marks Murray’s idea of an intelligent, complex and, 
thereby, moral subject. Puzzling over what aspects of personality lay beneath Eve’s 
glittering Hollywood persona, Murray describes her as being “caught in her own 
impersonation” (157) and displaying a “dazzlement [that] has a logic all its own” (54). 
Having appeared to merge with the caricature of the victimised heroine that she 
repeatedly played as a silent movie star, Eve’s obsession with her own innocence 
manifests itself in a perpetual pursuit for self-exculpation from guilt. As a result, she is 
made susceptible to utopian fantasies of purity and perfection that fail to recognise the 
postlapsarian sense of “error” and moral culpability that Murray’s complex liberal 
philosophy articulates.  
 
In contrast to those whom he describes as ideologically motivated by their 
emotions and individual pathologies, Murray purports to hold a critically reflective 
distance from events in his narrative. As Zuckerman explains, Murray appears to have 
disinvested himself of personal emotions and attained a somewhat transcendent “state of 
ardorlessness,” by which he tries “to tell his story without too much error” (77). Through 
his despondent reaction to the malaise of “unthinking” into which the nation has 
declined, he demonstrates an anxiety about the mass cultural degradation of certain high 
standards of culture and thought that adequately reflects liberal intellectual positions in 
the post-war period. In attempting to “slough off many of the illusions” (Niebuhr, 36) of 
ideology in his narrative interpretation of events, Murray sees himself as the paragon of 
dispassionate critical rigour and a certain complex way of thinking that, according to 
him, provides an intellectual and moral bulwark against the gross delusions of those 
around him. In this sense, Murray views the abasement of critical and cultural values in 
American life from a disinterested intellectual height that claims to be free from the 
emotional prejudice and ideological purview associated with Ira’s “overheated 
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relationship to everything” (16); an eschatological vantage point of intellectual 
excellence to where the ‘fallen’ culture may, eventually, be returned and restored.  
 
This appeal to a transcendent notion of high-culture finds expression in Murray’s 
idea of himself as one of “the few of us still engrossed by literature’s scrutiny of things” 
(185). Throughout his narrative, he borrows references from various canonical texts, 
particularly those of Shakespeare, as a means of explicating his intellectual and moral 
thesis of history. In this way, Murray echoes people like Trilling and Rahv in so much as 
he finds in the literary past a means of redeeming some meaningful cultural perspective 
from the numerous dislocating experiences within modern American life. Much like the 
poetic voice in Eliot’s “The Waste Land,” Murray hopes that these allusions will work to 
incorporate the world of moral uncertainty and debased intellectual values that he 
describes into an immutable cultural order: “These fragments I have shored against my 
ruins” (“The Waste Land,” Line 430). This formalist-modernist view of “literature … 
[a]s a primary reality” (278) is set in opposition to Ira’s Popular Front aesthetics. 
According to Murray, Ira is one of those “cheap propagandists, against which the only 
laws are aesthetic, laws of literary taste” (272). However, Murray’s narrative 
inadvertently provides some interesting insights into the tensions and instabilities of his 
confident sense of himself as a dissenting voice of intellectual and literary authority 
within this appalling environment of cultural decline in America. As the following 
number of pages will make clear, Roth’s novel dramatises the difficulties that Murray 
faces in trying to maintain an objective and dispassionate sense of “critical thinking” 
about certain past events in which he, too, has been emotionally involved. Furthermore, I 
will look at how Murray is unable to find in his intimate knowledge of canonical literary 
texts an adequate means of understanding and overcoming certain pivotal experiences of 
emotional chaos and intellectual bewilderment that have deeply scarred his personal life. 
 
Murray argues against ideological simplifications of existence by suggesting that 
“normal life … is made up of twenty thousand little compromises every day” (263). Yet 
despite this sense of his intimate awareness of life’s ultimate complexities and 
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contradictions, he presents a version of himself that somewhat “resist[s] the tyranny of 
compromise” (318) to which others are made subject in the novel. For example, when 
Zuckerman asks him how he was affected by six years of expulsion from his job as a 
public school teacher, following the anti-Communist hearings that were brought against 
him, Murray replies: “I don’t think it took anything out of me” (14). Throughout the 
novel, Murray is reluctant to admit any sign of the emotional distress that he may have 
suffered at the hands of wider historical forces. He explains how his determination to 
continue working, despite being demoted from his position as a school teacher to a job 
as a vacuum salesman, enabled him to achieve “a better outlook on life” (13). When 
asked by Zuckerman whether such optimism would have been possible had he never 
been re-instated as a teacher, Murray insists: 
 
I think I would have made a fair living. I think I would have survived intact. I might have had some 
regrets. But I don’t think I would have been affected temperamentally (13). 
 
In contrast with his claim that being expelled from teaching had left no indelible mark 
on his own life, Murray recounts to Nathan how this “distressed” Ira: “I’d go as far as to 
say it ruined him” (15). Murray’s “critical thinking” is based upon a negation of the 
emotional surfeit and irrational violence that underpin Ira’s utopian politics. Zuckerman 
describes how “all that coherence of his” gave an impression of Murray as “an 
essentialist, that his character wasn’t contingent, that wherever he’d found himself, even 
selling vacuum cleaners, he’d managed to find his dignity” (16). Zuckerman elaborates 
upon the stark differences in temperament between both brothers by suggesting that 
Murray was, in effect: “Ira with a practical, clear, well-defined social goal, Ira without 
the heroically exaggerated ambitions, without that passionate, overheated relationship to 
everything, Ira unblurred by impulse and the argument with everything” (16). 
 
The “state of ardorlessness” through which Murray appears to have overcome the 
emotional vagaries of the self resembles the heightened level of disinterested tranquillity 
that Zuckerman aspires to achieve by withdrawing into exile from social existence and 
“receding from the agitation of the autobiographical” (72). By abandoning any 
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involvement in daily social life, Zuckerman has sought “to decontaminate and absolve” 
himself “from the striving” (72) that had previously marked his own particular 
“argument with everything.” However, Murray appears to have achieved this detached 
position in relation to certain historical events to which he, too, has been participant. 
Nowhere does he appear to have been pulled apart by the emotional demands of what 
Zuckerman calls “your batteredness and your resentment, your appeasement of the 
world and your defiance of the world” (72). Murray thus stands both in and above the 
events that he narrates. He highlights the intellectual poverty and emotional turmoil that 
have shaped recent history, while at the same time appearing immune to such forms of 
“unthinking.” Unlike Ira and, it would appear, Zuckerman, “critical thinking,” as a 
corrective to the flaws of a fallen human condition, has achieved its apotheosis in 
Murray. As Zuckerman reflects: “[i]n Murray Ringold, I thought, human dissatisfaction 
has met its match” (77-8). However, the neat narrative conclusions that Murray makes 
about past events, particularly as they becomes framed by Zuckerman, are shown to 
contain evidence of his own personal experiences of “dissatisfaction.” As a result, 
certain gaps emerge in Murray’s objective notion of “critical thinking,” which bear 
witness to his own emotional entanglement in the compromises and contradictions that 
he sees as illustrative of the wider American experience after World War Two.  
 
Throughout the novel, Ira succumbs to various moments of extreme emotional 
outrage and uncontrollable aggression, by which he appears to lose all sense of the 
rational objectivity that his ideological outlook presumes. According to Murray, these 
volatile outbursts mark a horrifying return of certain unconscious instincts for rage and 
violence that originate in Ira’s emotionally distraught childhood, suffered at the hands of 
an aggressive father. Murray explains how the high-pitched tendency toward 
unreasonable levels of anger never quite left his brother, despite the sense of a 
“civilizing path” (294) that his socialist idealism furnished for him. He describes Ira’s 
commitment to the progressive vision of the Communist Party as merely a shallow 
means of sublimating such wayward aggression:   
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All that endless outraged rhetoric. Going on and on when what this huge man really wanted to do was to 
lash out. The talk was the way to blunt those desires (122-3). 
 
Murray informs Zuckerman about Ira’s vengeful plans to kill Eve, following her betrayal 
of him to his accusers as a Communist Party member. As Murray explains, despite all of 
“the civilizing accommodations” and sense of “moral correction” (123) inherent to his 
Marxist political philosophy, the violence and brutality associated with Ira’s 
“uncorrected first self” (297) found continued expression through this intense 
form of retributive rage. The manner in which Ira was “returned to the violence where it 
had all begun” (297) by Eve’s act of betrayal can be read in terms of the psychological 
experience of trauma. The violence and emotional disequilibrium pervading Ira’s 
turbulent childhood acts as a trauma that he had attempted to repress or leave behind: 
“Ira’s whole life was an attempt to defuse the violent impulse” (292). Yet despite his 
efforts to find an ordered and impersonal vision of life through certain universalising 
ideals about the emancipation of the American “common man,” Ira is persistently forced 
to re-visit and repeat the horrific emotional turmoil that had characterised his difficult 
past. As I have discussed in the introductory chapter, the varying incarnations of desire 
as rage and sexual appetite in Roth’s fiction function as corollaries to the thanatological 
experience of a lack or incompletion within traumatic experience. The “residue of a 
very, very old disappointment” (180) arising from Ira’s troubled past produces in him a 
desire for self-integration and coherence, the repeated frustration of which results in his 
many enraged outbursts. The periodical re-surfacing of certain types of volatile 
behaviour from beneath his rational veneer as a Communist ideologue indicates the 
delayed impact of an overwhelmingly traumatic sense of origins, which, for Ira, remains 
inexplicable and yet inescapable at the same time.  
 
Not only does Ira’s sense of traumatic incompletion find expression in recurring 
moments of rage, but it also fuels his desire for the domestic security of a home and 
family with Eve. Murray describes how such a privatised or “bourgeois” (281) form of 
longing conflicted with Ira’s commitment to the collectivist cause of Communism: 
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The personal kept bursting out of Ira, militant and single-minded though he would try to be … The 
contradictions were indisputable. The personal openness and the Communist secrecy. The home life and 
the party. The need for a child, the desire for a family – should a party member with his aspirations care 
about having a child like that? (83) 
 
Such personal conflicts have made Ira ideologically unsound, unsuitable for the rigorous 
commitment to abstract thought and rational action that is exemplified by his 
Communist Party mentor, Johnny O’Day. As Zuckerman remarks, Ira did not have “a 
heart without dichotomies, a heart like the enviably narrow O’Day’s, unequivocal, ready 
to renounce everyone and everything except the revolution” (238). Murray concurs with 
this idea, criticising O’Day for being completely blind to “the failure of purity” (289) in 
human affairs: “[n]ever in his life had O’Day been this with this one, and that with that 
one, and a third person with somebody else” (289). However, Murray’s somewhat 
idealised concept of himself as an un-blinkered and highly rational intellectual would 
also seem to situate him beyond what he calls “the fickleness of all creatures” (289). As 
a somewhat coherent and emotionally controlled individual, he appears to share with 
O’Day a determination to exempt himself from “the unique markings of the species, the 
thousand and one dualities that twist its nature into the human knot” (280). Murray’s 
personal abhorrence for the multiple and irreconcilable impositions that the emotionally 
charged Ira “demanded from himself” (319) would therefore seem to highlight his 
outright disgust with those very “human” inconsistencies which he sees as anathema to 
ideology.  
 
In thus presenting himself as the cool and detached arbiter of events, Murray is 
placed at a careful distance from the traumatic fissures that comprise what Zuckerman 
labels “the sanity of an expansive, disorderly existence” (232). Murray describes Ira’s 
Communist ideology as a form of sublimated violence; a “civilizing path into life” (294) 
that helped him to progress from the harshness of their upbringing under an aggressive 
father. Yet despite having shared the same background as Ira, the adult Murray is 
reluctant to disclose any sense of a comparable trauma that might lay beneath his own 
“civilizing path … [of] books, college, teaching school” (294). However, Murray does 
suggest that Ira’s repressed instincts for violence are “no rarity,” but indicative of a 
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broader phenomenon of “[m]en trying not to be violent” (298). This comment helps to 
re-focus our attention back on to the undisclosed subject of his own experiences of 
personal anguish and how they have engendered his desire for a sense of completion and 
clarity in life. By doing so, Murray’s narrative begs the question as to what less coherent 
or irrational impulse may lay beneath his own “civilizing path” of “critical thinking.” 
 
I have already indicated how Murray shares with people like Niebuhr and 
Trilling a willingness to stave off the influence of irrational and destructive forces upon 
his life by remaining vigilantly steadfast to the practice of “critical thinking.” However, 
as I wish to suggest, Murray’s mode of intellectual reasoning is more closely related to 
certain destabilising forms of unreason and personal desire than he is prepared to admit. 
There are moments within Murray’s narrative in which his self-appointed position as the 
disinterested educator and sober voice of reason is informed by a contradictory tone of 
emotional disquiet. For example, vain attempts by him and his wife, Doris, to counsel 
Ira upon the bitter disappointments and angry confrontations that arose from his 
marriage to Eve produce within Murray a certain level of emotional frustration. 
Reflecting upon these situations, he tells Zuckerman how he “would get unsettled by the 
irrational, particularly when it emanated from my brother” (85). Murray admits that “I 
was an intense fellow myself in those days” and stresses how, in setting Ira along a path 
of reasoned thinking, “I was more vehement than I should have been” (85). Such 
moments suggest how Ira’s volatile temperament had the effect of unnerving Murray’s 
calm and reasoned tone. The latter’s unflagging efforts to be “reasonable about the 
unreasonable” thus demonstrate, at times, an uncompromising and distempered desire to 
bleed life of its irrational emotions. By contrast, Doris finds matters of human desire and 
vulnerability far less repugnant than her husband. She makes various interesting remarks 
upon how Murray had tried to cajole Ira into “do[ing] what you have wanted him to do 
all along” (251) by persuading his brother to abandon his unreasonable delusions about 
life. Yet despite such suggestions that Murray has tried to brow-beat others into seeing 
matters in the same precise and objective manner that he himself pertains to uphold, he 
is keen to show how he “didn’t really overstate the case” (85) in arguing with Ira. As is 
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evident in the advice that he gives to his daughter on “the problem of impassioned 
speech” (76-7), Murray claims to have domesticated his personal emotions by means of 
a rational intellect: 
 
It’s not being angry that’s important, it’s being angry about the right things. I told her, Look at it from the 
Darwinian perspective. Anger is to make you effective (77) 
 
As the novel draws to a conclusion, however, Murray reluctantly reveals 
evidence of how his “civilizing path” away from what he sees as the moral and 
intellectual disorder that characterised not only his upbringing, but wider American 
history since World War Two, is marked by a sense of reversal. This crisis within 
Murray’s acutely moral idea of liberal intellectualism is intertwined with the 
irrepressible experiences of irrational violence that lay at the centre of Ira’s life. The 
sense of a shared trauma among both Ringold men is made evident when Murray reveals 
to Zuckerman how Ira’s desire to kill Eve recalled a hidden act of murder that his 
brother had committed as a young man. Murray admits to Zuckerman of his own 
complicity with this earlier crime. He explains how he had helped to conceal such a 
dreadful incident in the greater hope of affecting some kind of moral reform upon Ira’s 
violent tendencies. Yet this sense of liberal good-faith in the effectiveness of persuasive 
reasoning and moral rehabilitation is traumatically shattered by the shocking evidence of 
Ira’s unmodified potential for homicide, following the publication of Eve’s memoir:   
 
I was defeated. I’d spent a lifetime teaching myself to be reasonable in the face of the unreasonable, 
teaching what I liked to call vigilant matter-of-factness, teaching myself and teaching my daughter and 
trying to teach my brother. And I’d failed. Un-Iraing Ira was impossible. Being reasonable in the face of 
the unreasonable was impossible (303-4)                                          
 
Murray confesses to Zuckerman his failure to “discharge my obligation to humanity” 
(301) by helping to cover up his brother’s crime. Ira’s later intentions to kill again 
suggest that a profound sense of moral failure and guilt has thus far gone unmentioned in 
Murray’s narrative claim to have been untarnished by life’s propensity for “error.” As a 
result of this unsolicited (re-)emergence of a concealed trauma at the centre of Murray’s 
virtuous notion of “critical thinking,” he, too, is shown to be somewhat debilitated by the 
 82
vertiginous moral and intellectual void that recent American history has presented to 
him. Just like Ira and Zuckerman, therefore, Murray has also failed to maintain an 
“intact” sense of himself. 
 
Murray’s formalist idea of literature as a mode of experience that retrieves some 
aesthetic pattern of cohesion from the disunities and chaos of modern historical 
experience is made vulnerable by the impact of this repeating trauma. In his confession 
to Zuckerman of Ira’s homicidal act, he explains how he had expected “the 
Dostoyevskian reality … to kick in” (300). Murray had thought that, like Raskolnikov in 
Crime and Punishment, Ira would experience a sense of moral guilt followed by some 
experience of atonement for committing murder. Yet although “Raskolnikov … reflects 
all his life on his cold-bloodedness,” Ira the “action machine” (300) undergoes no 
anguished reflection over his deed. Instead, his impulse toward violence remains part of 
an “uncorrected first self” which is heedless of his many efforts to “resurrect his life, his 
bending backward to stand up straight” (300-01). However, despite the lack of any 
remission for Ira of his “original sin” of murder, Murray is determined to find in 
literature a means by which to redeem some ethical understanding from the traumatic 
sense of guilt and sorrow that he himself suffers as a result of his brother’s actions.  
 
As on several other occasions throughout his story, Murray appeals to 
Shakespeare in order to frame the sense of emotional and moral uncertainty that he 
experiences in relation to events. He tells Zuckerman that the disorienting sense of shock 
he experienced on realising how Ira’s murderous potential had remained undiminished 
after so many years found expression for him in a line from Twelfth Night: “[a]nd thus 
the whirligig of time brings in his revenges” (302). Murray describes how “I couldn’t get 
that line out of my head” (302). By an almost incantatory repetition of “those ten words, 
the phonetic webbing, the blanket omniscience,” he tells Zuckerman, “I felt I was being 
asphyxiated inside Shakespeare” (302). In many ways, Murray’s recourse to a specific 
literary quotation in this case is symptomatic of the trauma victim’s pathology in so 
much as he is repeatedly trying to make known or sensible the precise nature of the 
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bewildering event through his obsessive repetition of Shakespeare’s line. However, there 
is also a sense here of how the traumatic moment is continually being repressed by the 
way in which he finds refuge “inside Shakespeare” from the full horror of its 
overwhelming impact. In a fashion that recalls his earlier teaching style during the 
1940s, Murray undertakes to diagram the phonetic stresses of this line for Zuckerman. 
Although he is attempting to emphasise the heightened tragedian quality of his despair 
by referring to Twelfth Night, there is a sense in which his formalist attention to 
Shakespeare’s finely constructed sentence has shielded Murray from the direct 
significance of the traumatic event that that he is attempting to understand. By thus 
immuring his experiences in the “blanket omniscience” and “phonetic webbing” of 
Shakespeare’s words, the literary formalist Murray attempts to discover in the perfectly 
constructed artifice a means of transcending the particular and fragmentary elements of 
‘real’ life. In this way, he seeks to re-locate his sense of personal “error” and moral 
failing within the broader, universal “order of things” that is furnished for him by 
canonical works of literature. Yet by using a particularly close reading of Twelfth Night 
as a means by which to find self-protection from the unbearable sorrow that he faces as a 
result of Ira’s actions, Murray merely buries an experience that will return to haunt him 
later on. It is this very lack or inassimilable quality within traumatic experience that 
renders vulnerable his formalist idea of the high-literary text as a “primary reality” 
which provides a redeeming sense of unity and meaning to the turbulence and self-
dividing aspects of life outside of literature.  
 
Murray’s narrative withholds, until last, the revelation of an even greater trauma 
that further problematises his elevated position as the moral and intellectual voice of 
reason in the novel. He explains to Zuckerman his guilt over the death of his wife, Doris, 
who was killed by a thief on her way home from work in Newark. Murray blames the 
murder upon his own refusal to leave the old Jewish neighbourhood of Newark, despite 
its transformation into a crime-ridden wasteland and a site of violent racial antagonism. 
Having remained living and teaching in an increasingly dangerous city out of a 
stringently ethical sense of pedagogical commitment to “the disadvantaged of Newark,” 
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Murray explains how Doris’s death marks “the price [paid] for my civic virtue” (317). 
This grossly misdirected sense of moral obligation has taught him that: 
 
When you loosen yourself, as I tried to, from all the obvious delusions – religion, ideology, Communism – 
you’re still left with the myth of your own goodness. Which is the final delusion. And the one to which I 
sacrificed Doris (317-8) 
 
In these passages, Murray appears to gradually confront the crippling realisation that you 
cannot “loosen yourself” from the forms of error and self-deception that he locates in 
other lives, such as those of Ira and Eve. The rigorous intellectual approach with which 
he has attempted to carve out for himself a certain perspective of “moral realism” has 
produced its own blinkered philosophy. As a result of such a purblind attitude toward his 
own “goodness” as a man of intellectual and ethical self-discipline, Murray has failed to 
circumvent what Trilling called “the dangers of the moral life itself.”  
 
Zuckerman is amazed by the final instalment to Murray’s story, wondering 
sorrowfully: “[w]hy hadn’t he told me about Doris earlier?” (318). Contemplating how 
“[t]his too happened to him,” he realises that the elder Ringold brother’s life has been 
“committed to a constructive course that is now an illusion, to formulations and 
solutions that will no longer wash” (318). Armed with this new knowledge, Zuckerman 
elaborates upon the fact that:  
 
You control betrayal on one side and you wind up betraying somewhere else. Because it’s not a static 
system. Because it’s alive. Because everything that lives is in movement. Because purity is petrifaction. 
Because purity is a lie. Because unless you’re an ascetic paragon like Johnny O’Day and Jesus Christ, 
you’re urged on by five hundred things (318).  
 
The various acts of (self-)betrayal that have haunted Murray’s personal history function 
as the absent trauma around which his life-long search, undiminished at the age of 90, 
for an intelligible and moral explanation of events has been constructed. His deferred 
admission to a sense of overwhelming remorse over certain tragic events suggests how 
such unassimilated moments of trauma continue to make a delayed impact upon him, 
despite his various attempts to rationalise such difficulties out of existence. For 
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Zuckerman, Murray’s narrative search for exactitude and clarity is thus ruptured by an 
equal sense of the irrationality and incoherence by which his former teacher has been 
defining the post-war American experience:  
 
We could have sat on my deck for six hundred nights before I heard the entire story of how Murray 
Ringold … had failed to elude the turmoil of his time and place and ended up no less a historical casualty 
than his brother. This was the existence that America had worked out for him – and that he’d worked out 
for himself by thinking, by taking his revenge on his father by cri-ti-cal think-ing, by being reasonable in 
the face of no reason (318) 
 
Zuckerman suggests here that the “entire story” of Murray’s life can never be fully 
known or made subject to clear moral assessment in the way that his old school teacher 
has been seeking to explain events throughout the novel. Unlike Murray’s idea of how 
literature redeems a certain liberal-moral purpose from life’s many fluctuations and 
contingencies, Zuckerman is more intimately aware of how his own writing has involved 
a complicated and, at times, painful sense of “betrayal” and “error” in its efforts to 
understand what is ‘real’ about the self and others.  
 
As the two men begin to part at the novel’s close, Murray’s voice once more 
enters the narrative. In an effort to deflect attention away from the recently 
acknowledged gaps in his sense of pedagogical or intellectual authority, he directs the 
narrative focus back toward his critical appraisal of Ira’s emotional flaws. He re-iterates 
to Zuckerman how Ira was “a man perpetually hungering after his life … he could never 
construct one that fit” (319). However, when he begins to summate that “one’s errors 
always rise to the surface,” Zuckerman interjects, in an effort to acknowledge how this 
judgement also embraces both his and Murray’s experiences: 
 
“It’s all error,” I said. “Isn’t that what you’ve been telling me? There’s only error. There’s the heart of the 
world. Nobody finds his life. That is life.” (319).  
 
Zuckerman indicates here how both he and Murray also share in the sense of failure and 
loss that characterised Ira’s suffering. By declaring that “[n]obody finds his life,” 
Zuckerman suggests that we lack any fixed sense of a ‘real’ or origin upon which to 
anchor our various narrative efforts to understand experience. As I will discuss in greater 
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depth in the next section, Zuckerman has sought refuge from the various personal and 
professional agonies caused by this traumatic knowledge of life by undertaking a form 
of self-imposed isolation from the world of ‘real’ people and things. Yet as one who still 
seeks to garner some moral lesson from “the turmoil of his time and place,” Murray 
remarks to Zuckerman: “I’m surprised to see you out of the world like this” (320). He 
warns his former pupil against the allure of exile and isolation from the greater historical 
scene: “[b]eware the utopia of the shack in the woods, the oasis defense against rage and 
grief” (315). Yet as his revelations about Doris indicate, Murray has sought in “critical 
thinking” his own form of refuge, designed to keep at bay his “rage and grief” at her 
loss. His particular brand of intellectualism acts as his own utopia, isolating him from 





Unlike Murray, Zuckerman can in no way lay claim to have “remain[ed] intact” 
throughout his adult existence. Rather, like Ira, Zuckerman has undergone the many 
fractious ordeals of “a man perpetually hungering after his life.” However, having 
escaped to a secluded mountain-top cabin, he now lives at a safe distance from the 
confusion and suffering that his efforts to transform ‘real’ life into fiction had caused in 
earlier novels. Determined not to examine the traumatic wounds that have led him to live 
in exile from day to day social existence, Zuckerman declines to elaborate upon his 
personal history in I Married a Communist: 
 
my seclusion is not the story here. It is not a story in any way. I came here because I don’t want a story 
any longer. I’ve had my story (71) 
 
Similar to Murray, Zuckerman seeks to control the manner in which the unruliness of the 
“personal ke[eps] bursting out” of his narrative account by affecting a certain heightened 
distance from the story that he relates about Ira. Disavowing what he sees as the 
complicated drama of his private life, Zuckerman seeks to embody the role of the 
literary master, emptied of the personal in his detached commitment to the production of 
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high-literature. By thus quieting the self in this novel and its companions within the 
American trilogy, Zuckerman attempts to move his fictional subject away from the 
difficult personal history that dominated the Zuckerman Bound books and The 
Counterlife. His withdrawal into this disciplined form of private living is reminiscent of 
the ascetic ideal once personified by E.I. Lonoff, the literary master to whose home a 
younger Zuckerman had made pilgrimage in The Ghost Writer. Explaining to another 
character in American Pastoral how his decision to live alone has allowed him to 
become dedicated to the vocation of “[t]he single-minded writer,” Zuckerman recalls his 
visit to Lonoff in the earlier novel:  
 
I met a famous writer when I was just starting out. Nobody mentions him much anymore, his sense of 
virtue is too narrow for readers now, but he was revered back then. Lived like a hermit. Reclusion looked 
awfully austere to a kid. He maintained it solved his problems. Now it solves mine (American Pastoral, 
63).  
 
As my introduction suggests, this is a notion of authorial anonymity by which 
Zuckerman seeks to immunise both his work and personal life against the “contaminant” 
(The Human Stain, 42) of erotic desire and its attendant thanatological complications. In 
doing so, he attempts to remove himself as a corporeal and desiring presence within his 
fiction. Yet despite the aged Zuckerman’s sexual impotence, notable aspects of personal 
desire and anguish do keep “bursting out” of the narrative that he delivers in I Married a 
Communist. 
 
Zuckerman tells us how his decision to “lose contact with history” contrasts 
greatly with Murray, who holds the sense of narrative conviction and stamina necessary 
to: “for hours on end, work to regain possession of it” (262). Yet by assuming a certain 
level of the “cooling” disinterestedness that Murray evinces, Zuckerman is able to re-
direct his narrative focus onto the problems of historical subjectivities other than his own 
in I Married a Communist. Paradoxically, in the very moment of personal detachment 
from history, Zuckerman finds a narrative point of re-entry into the events of the recent 
American past via the personal trials of first Ira, then Murray. This narrative strategy can 
be understood in relation to the notion of the trauma witness. By witnessing how both 
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Murray and Ira have each seen their contrasting progressive visions of America 
defeated, Zuckerman is able to re-visit the sense of disillusionment that has resulted in 
his own self-imposed exile from the world. While the drama of Zuckerman’s turbulent 
adulthood as the embattled author goes unspoken in I Married a Communist, a sense of 
the biographical development of both the man and writer can be reconstructed from the 
account of his early involvement in the life of Ira. In recalling his friendship with Ira, 
Zuckerman reveals how he, too, in a fashion similar yet also different to both Ringold 
brothers, became affected by a growing realisation that certain progressive ideas about 
American historical potential, highly persuasive to his adolescent imagination following 
victory in World War Two, were no longer tenable.  
 
Zuckerman’s friendship with Ira marked a highly important stage in his 
maturation from adolescence into manhood and literary authorship. His early fascination 
for the “common man” (38) hero that Ira appears to embody is described as the result of 
an “idealism” that “was fed … by novels about heroic Americans who fought against 
tyranny and injustice, champions of liberty for America and for all mankind” (25). 
Having begun his political tutelage under the rhetorical bombast of Howard Fast’s 
Citizen Tom Paine, Zuckerman describes how Norman Corwin’s radio play, On a Note 
of Triumph, inspired in him a heroic reaction toward World War Two as being a victory 
for the “little man” over tyranny: “the revolution that confirmed the reality of the myth 
of a national character to be partaken of by all” (38). Zuckerman, who begins to write 
plays about working class struggles in emulation of Corwin, recalls his adolescent 
obsession with a literature whose emotional vitality and popular sentiments marked it as 
“redskin” in the same manner as Rahv saw 1930s Popular Front fiction: “Whitman 
claimed America for the roughs, Norman Corwin claimed it for the little man” (38). 
Describing this leftist surge of national euphoria in the immediate post-war period as 
expressive of a “popular culture [that] was sufficiently connected to the last century to 
be susceptible still to a little language,” Zuckerman explains how this spirit of political 
idealism fostered for him a triumphal sense of the collective national experience: 
“America had been scaled down and personalized … that was the enchantment not only 
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of Norman Corwin but of the times” (39). 
 
Nowhere is this epic sense of American history more “personalized” for the 
young Zuckerman than through his friendship with Ira. Quoting lines from Tom Paine’s 
“Common Sense” that are also re-used in Fast’s novel, Ira leaps straight from the 
politically inspired fiction that the young Zuckerman had been so enthralled by: “the 
America that was my inheritance manifested itself in the form of Ira Ringold” (189). By 
befriending Ira and serving as a sort of political protégé to him, Zuckerman finds himself 
immersed in a national “inheritance” whose universalising ideals of freedom and liberty 
offer him a new sense of identity beyond the residual marginalia of his ethnic 
community. This mytho-heroic idea of American origins that transcend differences such 
as region, class, race and ethnicity finds repeated expression in each of the novels within 
Roth’s later Zuckerman trilogy. Yet despite how being Jewish and American appears to 
be made compatible by the “common man” ideology that the young Zuckerman 
embraces, a certain clash between ethnic and national affiliations still exists for him in I 
Married a Communist: “I was a Jewish child, no two ways about that, but I didn’t care to 
partake of the Jewish character … I wanted to partake of the national character” (39). 
This sense of a divided sense of cultural belonging is dramatised by the competing 
notions of loyalty that he begins to feel toward both his father and Ira, who is described 
as the first of many paternal surrogates that influence the young writer’s development. I 
will return to this difficult issue of Zuckerman’s Jewish heritage and his desire to 
abandon such origins later in my argument. I will suggest that, as an unregistered trauma 
of social marginality, Zuckerman’s Jewish experience continues to demand some belated 
form of recognition from him. As an inerasable trauma, therefore, he is unable to fully to 
disown his familial heritage for the deracinated notion of an American cultural identity 
that he discovers through Ira.  
 
Zuckerman’s development as an avid student of a distinctly “redskin” style of 
American literature begins to decline alongside his interest in Ira’s political tutelage. The 
aggression with which Ira attempts to enforce his sense of ideological coherence upon 
 90
situations leads Zuckerman to realise how the aesthetic possibilities associated with such 
a political doctrine may be limited. While he recalls “memories of how I used to gorge 
myself on his words” (89), Zuckerman eventually becomes exasperated with the “sheer 
repetition” and “redundancy of that rhetoric” (216) issued forth by Ira. Eager to explore 
fresh cultural and aesthetic territories, Zuckerman’s growing irritation with Ira’s speech 
is described as part of the same expansive process of discovery that had earlier marked 
his departure from the world of his Jewish family into that of national politics: “[t]he 
tearing away from my father, the straining of filial affection prompted by my infatuation 
with Ira, was now being replicated in my disillusionment with him” (194). The moment 
at which he feels “so savagely bored by him [Ira]” (216) coincides with Zuckerman’s 
departure to university, where he describes being “transformed into a descendant not just 
of my family but of the past, an heir to a culture even grander than my neighborhood’s” 
(218). Under the guidance of a new mentor, Leo Glucksman, Zuckerman becomes 
exposed to a distinctly “paleface” notion of artistic style that conflicts with the 
ideological interest in political content that had so characterised his “redskin” literary 
influences. Leo warns Zuckerman of the cultural dangers posed to art and expression by 
the “common man” ideology of Corwin, Fast and Ira: “[t]he workingman will conquer 
us all – out of his mindlessness will flow the slop that is this philistine country’s cultural 
destiny” (218). In contrast to what he sees as the cheap propagandist tenor of political 
literature, Glucksman valorises art’s “task … to impart the nuance, to elucidate the 
complication, to imply the contradiction” (223).  
 
Much inspired by the Southern New Critics, Leo holds to a formalist belief that 
rigorously opposes ideological evaluations of the political and social function of literary 
content: “[t]he militant introduces a faith, a big belief that will change the world, and the 
artist introduces a product that has no place in that world” (224). In contrast to Ira, Leo 
endorses another type of militancy by exhorting Zuckerman to “fight for the word” (218) 
and uphold the elite exemption of serious literature from what he sees as the banal 
ideological concerns of naturalist fiction. This view of disinterested literary form is one 
that has close parallels with Murray’s criticism of ideology and mass culture. However, 
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whereas Murray is a liberal in the mould of Trilling, Leo is a committed New Critic who 
stands firmly against any notion of historicist content within literature. As his own 
narrative strategy in I Married a Communist indicates, this idea of high-aesthetic 
tradition – first introduced to him by Leo and later exemplified by Lonoff – is one that 
has continued to shape Zuckerman’s efforts to write fiction. Yet despite the influence 
that such a rarefied notion of literature plays throughout the Zuckerman novels, he is 
never fully able to renounce or master his social and biographical experiences in the 
name of a higher aesthetic purpose. As I will demonstrate over the following number of 
pages, the various conflicts and erotic entanglements involved in his life as a writer have 
left Zuckerman incapable of adhering to Leo’s formalist credo of the artist as one who 
must achieve: “aesthetic mastery over everything that drives you to write in the first 
place – your outrage, your politics, your grief, your love!” (219). 
 
The development of Zuckerman’s literary imagination that is traced in I Married 
a Communist does involve a certain rejection of his early enthusiasm for the epic history 
of the American “common man” and the palpable sense of a social ‘real’ that it located 
in experiences of labour and class. Yet despite Ira’s waning tutelary influence and the 
emergence of Leo as a new and exciting pedagogical inspiration, the youthful 
Zuckerman does not undergo a clean break with the “redskin” culture of the Left in I 
Married a Communist. Following the harsh indictment handed out to one of his Popular 
Front style plays by Leo, Zuckerman pays a visit to Ira’s inspiring tutor in Marxist 
politics, Johnny O’Day. In an effort to successfully gain knowledge of leftist ideas that 
would not be as vulnerable to the many contradictions or charged by the same degree of 
emotional volatility that he came to find deplorable in Ira’s political rhetoric, Zuckerman 
enlists as a disciple of this committed Communist ideologue. As a man “who is without 
all that stuff pulling Ira in twenty directions” (235), O’Day leads an exemplary life of 
harrowing self-abnegation that has allowed him to remove all the emotional and 
personal barriers that marked Ringold’s conflicted efforts to serve the Marxist 
revolutionary cause. Zuckerman describes how the uncompromised unity between 
O’Day’s personal life and his political ideas about social conditions expressed itself in a 
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“speech [that] was a pretext for nothing else … it appeared to rise from the core of his 
brain that is experience” (231). In the consistent and unambiguous “tang of the real” 
(231) inflecting O’Day’s words, Zuckerman believes that he has discovered a source of 
political and aesthetic expression that was somewhat lacking in Ira’s speech. Inspired by 
the ascetic form of self-denial by which O’Day lives, Zuckerman determines to renounce 
the personal, “bourgeois” influences of his family home and the literary education that 
he has recently begun under Leo. In an earnest commitment to the cause of American 
workers, he declares: “I would be nothing but the instrument of their will … nothing but 
rectitude” (235).  
 
Yet despite his enthusiasm for emulating O’Day’s disciplined commitment to 
political activism, Zuckerman is unable to affect a similar feat of self-abandonment to 
“the hypercharged medium that is history” (236). As I have already suggested, the 
“rectitude” demanded by O’Day’s mono-linear vision of world revolution is one which 
aggressively dismisses the sense of contingency that both Zuckerman and Murray have 
come to realise is attendant upon life’s various forms of “betrayal” and “error.” In terms 
of his literary ambitions, Zuckerman is made acutely aware that language and writing do 
not, as O’Day’s ideological rhetoric might suggest, summon the ‘real’ in any immediate 
sense. For example, in his attempt to incorporate O’Day’s political ideas and “argot” 
(229) into a play, he realise that the Popular Front language which he so aspired to 
emulate was not fully consummate with its inflexible notion of ‘real’ historical 
conditions: “I wanted to write about things that seemed important … [but] what with the 
words at my disposal then, I instantly transformed everything into agitprop anyway, thus 
losing within seconds whatever was important about the important and immediate about 
the immediate” (229). As a result of this growing awareness, Zuckerman soon abandons 
the historical fantasies about “[t]he fight for American equality” (234) that he briefly 
held while under the political instruction of O’Day.  
 
In I Married a Communist, Zuckerman and Murray both cast indicting judgments 
on the aesthetic limitations involved in O’Day’s militant sense of engagement with “the 
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real thing” (236) of material historical necessity. As a result, the text appears to support 
a notion of fiction, somewhat borrowed from Leo’s formalist argument, as independent 
and free from any such narrow political interests. However, this antinomy between the 
formalist notion of aesthetic autonomy and leftist ideas about how art should reflect a 
certain picture of social life is not upheld in any neat either/or fashion by Roth’s novel. 
Instead, there exists a continuing tension between the claim that fiction writing exists in 
separation from the ‘real’ world and the manner in which external social forces influence 
literary creativity in I Married a Communist. As my introductory chapter has illustrated, 
this complex inter-mediation between the realms of the aesthetic and the ‘real’ is 
something that has overwhelmingly influenced Roth’s body of work. In many ways, I 
Married a Communist explores the origins of how this fraught relationship between 
exterior ‘reality’ and the internal imagination of the author have shaped the development 
of the writer (Zuckerman) as a young man. As I will discuss below, what this particular 
dynamic between world and text produces is a peculiar synthesis of “redskin” and 
“paleface” styles that Roth himself describes as “redface” (Reading Myself and Others, 
77). 
  
Various commentators have discussed how tensions between ideological faith 
and independent aesthetic expression operate within I Married a Communist. Such 
critics have tended to see the novel’s critique of leftist ideology as lending authority to 
Leo’s formalist idea that “the particularising impulse is literature … is not to simplify” 
(223). For example, James Wood has discussed Roth’s treatment of leftist politics in this 
novel as “a lesson about how ideology flattens character” (1998, 40). Yet for Wood, 
Roth’s pointed efforts to deliver such a “lesson” involve an ironically “strange 
squandering of a novel” (40). He suggests that Roth’s decision to make this argument 
about how the formal qualities of literature resist the rehearsed jargon of propaganda 
“cannot be done without flattening the novel; it is like using an orchestra to prove that 
the oboist was off-key” (40). A little less damning than Wood’s judgment of Roth’s 
“failure as a novelist of politics” (42), Mark Shechner shares a similar evaluation of the 
novel’s aesthetic opposition to the “canned history” (2003, 178) of Communist ideology. 
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He alludes to the novel’s treatment of “Leftists … as victims of their own agitprop 
vocabularies and dogmatic temperaments” (176). He argues that Roth’s aesthetic 
opposition to such ideological simplicities is grounded in the novel’s complex tragedian 
structure, as furnished by Murray’s Shakespearian analysis of events. In similar fashion, 
David Brauner lends novelistic authority to “Murray’s Aristotlean analysis of his 
brother’s ‘catastrophe,’” dismissing what he sees as Zuckerman’s more sympathetic 
portrayal of Ira as biased by a “Whitmanesque enthusiasm for the America of his 
childhood” (2007, 154). For Shechner and Brauner, therefore, Roth’s text makes a clear 
choice between “paleface” (Aristotlean) notions of artistic form over the more visceral 
and emotive aspects of Ira’s “redskin” (Whitmanesque) approach to culture. 
 
Perhaps most interesting in this field of critical attention is Ross Posnock’s 
reading of I Married a Communist within the context of “literary intellectuals in 
midcentury America … [who were] dismayed by the coarsening of taste on the Stalinist 
Left” (2006, 51). He discusses the manner in which “Leo offers a stern and needed 
corrective to Nathan’s tutelage under Ira” (51). Posnock suggests that this new phase in 
the young Zuckerman’s aesthetic development can be read in light of Roth’s overall 
commitment to a high-modernist notion of literary form and tradition. He argues that 
Roth’s complete body of fiction demonstrates the continuing “vitality” of the “postwar 
romance and religion” (51) of “[o]ppositional high modernism” (50), as articulated by 
Leo and Murray in I Married a Communist. According to Posnock, Zuckerman accepts 
Leo’s command to forfeit political and ethnic loyalties for the more transcendent calling 
of high literature. Zuckerman himself appears to signal as much in the novel. Following 
his introduction to the hallowed world of literary tradition by Leo, Zuckerman explains 
how: “my attachment to Ira – as to my mother, my father, my brother, even to the place 
where I’d grown up – was, I believed, thoroughly sundered” (221). However, this 
apparent confidence in his ability to discard the formative influences of his past for the 
greater cultural riches of literary history is critically re-evaluated by the now aged 
Zuckerman, who comes to see such youthful ambition as evidence of someone who was: 
“young and impudent and leaping with joy to discover all the intelligence tucked away 
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on this planet, he is apt to exaggerate the importance of the churning new reality and to 
deprecate as unimportant everything else” (221). Yet despite such qualifying remarks in 
the text, Posnock is keen to emphasise how Zuckerman’s disavowal of Ira and O’Day 
marks the young aspiring writer’s coming into awareness of the modernist-formalist 
separation – as already outlined to him by Leo – of the artist’s work from any crude or 
positivist notions of social reality. He goes on to argue that this development in 
Zuckerman’s artistic awareness is reflected by the manner in which political ideologies 
and ethnic loyalties give way in Roth’s fiction to creative forms of literary invention and 
self-transformation.  
 
The modernist-formalist urge to overcome the obstacles that social existence 
places in the path of autonomous literary creativity does indeed have a strong and 
guiding influence in Roth’s fiction. However, I would suggest that this aesthetic 
principle is divided by certain less elevated and extra-literary matters that also come to 
demand Zuckerman’s attention, both in I Married a Communist and elsewhere. As 
Zuckerman himself hints in explaining his reasons for living in isolation, it is not just 
“your manipulation of the world” as literary author, but also “its manhandling of you” 
that has shaped his life and writing up to this point. Zuckerman’s divided sense of 
heritage between the politically charged literature that inspired him in adolescence and 
the high-literary or “paleface” tradition that he later discovers is made evident by his 
recollections of listening to Norman Corwin’s On a Note of Triumph over the radio, 
following American victory in World War Two: “I wouldn’t care to judge today if 
something I loved as much as I loved On a Note of Triumph was or was not art; it 
provided me with my first sense of the conjuring power of art” (38). Having shed 
himself of his adolescent illusions about the American “common man,” Zuckerman is no 
longer buoyed by the sense in which “[y]ou flood into history and history floods into 
you” (39) that he first felt on listening to On a Note of Triumph. Yet he does not accede 
to Leo’s more elitist distinction between “art” and mass cultural propaganda in assessing 
the “conjuring power” that is released by Corwin’s “redskin” aesthetic. In this sense, I 
would argue, Zuckerman does not completely endorse the formalist mode of 
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aestheticism that informs both Murray and Leo’s brands of literary scholarship. Instead, 
as my reading of previous novels has suggested, the ever multiplying and self-
“conjuring” fictions that circulate what is known as ‘real’ constantly make difficult 
Zuckerman’s efforts to manipulate the facts or reality into some type of well-wrought 
aesthetic form.  
 
 In contrast to both O’Day’s rigorous notion of the ‘real’ and Leo’s exalted idea 
of literature as existing beyond the concerns of quotidian reality, Zuckerman locates in 
Ira’s emotionally charged and flawed use of Communist rhetoric aspects of the blurred 
distinctions between fact and fiction that have informed his own (and Roth’s) 
development as a writer. As I have already mentioned, O’Day speaks in a language that 
entertains no sense of dissonance with his ideological notion of the world: “words shot 
through with will, nothing inflated, no wasted energy” (231). In Ira’s rhetoric, by 
contrast, everything is “inflated” and coloured by an excess of emotional “energy.” This 
is particularly evident in Ira’s role as a ventriloquist whose imitations add a new level of 
meaning and creative intensity to the ‘authentic’ speech of others, least of all O’Day’s. 
As the famous radio impersonator of Abraham Lincoln, Ira assumes a patchwork of 
various voices, distilling them into his own brand of agit-prop: “[the] union membership 
loved their stalwart autodidact’s irresistible ventriloquism, his mishmash of 
Ringoldisms, O’Dayisms, Marxisms, and Lincolnisms” (45). The austere pretensions 
made by O’Day to an understanding of the historical ‘real’ find a level of artifice and 
distortion in Ira’s ventriloquist style. As a result, O’Day sees Ira as a “phony” whose life 
as a New York radio star and marriage to famed actress Eve render him “[t]otally the 
creature of the bourgeoisie” (288). At one stage of the novel, Ira attempts to reconcile 
the contradictions between his “bourgeois” life as a public persona and his self-image as 
an average “working stiff” (50) by retreating to his shack in industrial Zinc Town. Yet 
Ira is ultimately unable to reconnect with his “first big immersion in brute life” (51) as a 
miner there. Instead, he merely manages to impersonate the life of someone who has to 
endure this rugged and regional existence of working class struggle. As Zuckerman 
highlights at various stages of the novel, the gross disparity between Ira’s actual life as a 
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New York media star and the nostalgic attachment that he holds for his past situation as 
a struggling worker is clearly evidenced by his exaggerated style of political rhetoric: 
“Ira continued to speak of the record plant and the union meetings in the charismatic 
tone of his fellow workers, talked as though he still went off to work there every 
morning” (43).  
 
 Ira’s considerable penchant for mimicry and ventriloquism infuriates O’Day, 
who claims that his great act of deception as a “traitor” to the Communist cause 
originated in the fact that he was: “[a]lways impersonating and never the real thing … 
[h]e throws off one disguise and becomes something else” (288). The relationship 
between impersonation and betrayal in O’Day’s assessment of Ira’s politics reflects 
certain key aspects of Roth’s literary aesthetic. In contrast to O’Day’s ascetic 
commitment to “the real thing” of historical necessity, Ira somewhat mimics the role of 
the class conscious worker in a way that finds resonance with the various forms of 
creative (self-) transformation that have characterised Zuckerman’s embattled life as a 
writer and a man: “the uniforms you’ve worn and the costumes you’ve gotten into” (I 
Married a Communist, 72). Ira’s pretensions to an authentic level of “workingman’s 
argot” (37) – the speech of “someone rough and scarred by experience” (49) – are 
marked by obvious flaws for Zuckerman. Yet in many ways, the very sense of 
contradiction and emotional surfeit by which Ira “betrays” or exaggeratedly 
impersonates O’Day appeals greatly to Nathan. Recalling how he “loved when Ira 
repeated the lingo that rough union guys used among themselves” (42), Zuckerman 
suggests the extent to which he found in his friend’s speech an early example of the 
heightened and emotional amplification of ‘real’ life that has characterised his own 
highly charged desire to transform the given facts into fiction. 
 
In addition to the fascination that he shows for Ira’s ventriloquist speech, the 
biting vitriol of Eve’s daughter, Sylphid, provides Zuckerman with a pleasing example 
of how language can be used to heighten reality for comic purposes. Having been 
entertained by Sylphid’s slanderous remarks about other guests while attending a party 
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at Eve and Ira’s home as an adolescent, the aged Zuckerman reflects how: “I’d had no 
idea how very tame I was, how eager to please, until I saw how eager Sylphid was to 
antagonize, no idea how much freedom there was to enjoy once egoism unleashed itself 
from the restraint of social fear” (131). Zuckerman’s reaction to Sylphid’s performance 
contrasts starkly with Murray’s sober and moralistic indictment of public gossip as a 
form of betrayal that develops from the “pleasure of dominating others, of destroying 
people who are your enemies” (262). Like Sylphid’s speech, Zuckerman’s fiction is 
itself motivated by a certain desire to “dominate others,” in so much as he seeks to 
appropriate from and transform their actual lives for the purposes of his art. For 
example, the “caricatured detail” and “amused contempt” (131) evident in Sylphid’s 
verbal display of disdain for guests at the party also calls to mind Henry’s accusation in 
The Counterlife that his brother’s use of other people’s stories for his fiction involved 
certain mendacious forms of “[e]xaggeration, falsification, [and] rampant caricature” 
(235). As in the case of Ira, Sylphid’s sardonic mode of embellishing ‘real’ life is 
infused by an emotional “egoism” that has “unleashed itself” from the sense of moral 
rectitude involved in the contrasting ideas of people like O’Day, Leo and Murray. From 
a reflective distance of many years, the aged Zuckerman thus locates in Ira and 
Sylphid’s caricaturing acts of impersonation and lampoon evidence of the blurred 
boundaries between authenticity and artifice that will come to define his own writing.  
 
Zuckerman’s creative eagerness to absorb aspects of the bold egoism and raging 
desire evident in Sylphid and Ira’s mimicry of ‘real’ life recalls remarks that Roth made 
earlier in his career concerning Rahv’s notions of “paleface” and “redskin.” In the self-
interview that he published after writing The Great American Novel, Roth addresses a 
division in his work between the influence of “a salvationist literary ethos” (Reading 
Myself and Others, 71) derived from “New Critics sitting on their cans at Kenyon” (72) 
and a “redskin” predilection for “coarseness, recklessness, and vulgar, aggressive 
clowning” (75). This crude “redskin” sensibility was marked by a degree of hostility for 
what he calls the “heroic literary integrity” (72) that was assigned to “paleface” notions 
of literature in the early post-war period. Roth’s fascination with the literary significance 
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of “the low-minded and their vulgarity” (74) finds evidence not just in Sylphid’s comic 
and rambunctious style of gossiping or in the depiction of Ira as an inflated caricature of 
the political revolutionary, but elsewhere throughout his fiction. For example, the young 
Kepesh’s love for the puerile and irreverent comic performances of Herbert Baratsky in 
The Professor of Desire are noted as an early source of creative interest that will be later 
nourished by more high-minded, yet equally absurdist, artists like Kafka. Similarly, 
young Philip in The Plot against America is enthralled by his cousin, Alvin’s stories of 
“man’s avarice, his zealousness, his unbounded vitality and staggering arrogance” (48), 
much to the moral disapproval of his parents. Roth’s ongoing fascination with the 
linguistic performance of “the aggressive, the crude, and the obscene” (Reading Myself 
and Others, 76) finds yet another comic example in Mickey Sabbath’s fondness for the 
dirty jokes told by a gas station owner in his otherwise decorous small-town of 
Madamaska Falls.  
 
 Roth explains in his essay how the “seemingly inimical realms” (76) of 
“paleface” and “redskin” are “reconciled” in his work in a manner that is “not in anyway 
necessarily congenial” to Rahv’s call for a synthesis between both conflicting styles:  
 
For what this “reconciliation” often comes down to is a feeling of being fundamentally ill at ease in, and 
at odds with, both worlds, although, one hopes, ill at ease with style, alert to the inexhaustible number of 
intriguing postures that the awkward may assume in public, and the strange means that the uneasy come 
upon to express themselves (77) 
 
As I have already mentioned, Roth plays with Rahv’s coinage by using the term 
“redface” to describe the writer who “sympathizes equally with both parties in their 
disdain for the other and … re-enacts the argument in the body of his own work” (77). I 
have tried to show how Zuckerman’s literary development is characterised by this sense 
of an “awkward,” yet aesthetically enriching, conflict between Leo’s “paleface” 
formalism and a “redskin” fascination with the “crude” and “obscene” aspects of 
contemporary life. Unlike the earnest sensibility of Popular Front art, Zuckerman’s 
writing is engaged by an American ‘real’ which is increasingly contorted and amplified 
by the array of improbable fictions that it both produces and solicits. It is this particular 
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sense of “redskin” familiarity with a lower and discordant level of reality in Roth’s 
fiction that resists the formalist desire to redeem some elevated cultural understanding 
from the unremarkable and prosaic “facts” of life. Whereas John Crowe Ransom had 
discussed how the poet creates a crystalline “order of existence which in actual life is 
constantly crumbling beneath his touch,” the relationship between art and reality is 
somewhat more sullied for Roth. In his fiction, notions of authorial mastery and the 
well-wrought literary edifice are constantly undermined by the external demands of a 
more anarchic or “crumbling” experience of actuality.  
 
I have alluded before to how Murray’s brand of dispassionate reasoning and 
high-literary scholarship is denuded of the more “visceral” aspects of Ira’s impassioned 
political engagement with the world. This “cool” level of disinterestedness is reflective 
of how the commitment to intellectual and literary high-culture among post-war liberal 
thinkers witnessed a relative disengagement from the material issues of American social 
life: a sort of distancing of culture and thought from the social body. As a result of the 
highly charged manner in which he has set out to transform the facts into fiction 
throughout his career, however, Zuckerman has been unable to gain a proper sense of 
emotional distance from the ‘real’ life matters about which he has sought to write. In 
other words, Zuckerman has been unable to achieve in his work a clear formalist line of 
separation between the literary and the non-literary, the fictional and the 
autobiographical. Unlike detached and disinterested figures such as Murray, Leo and 
Lonoff, writing fiction has involved for him an unrelenting erotic engagement of the 
authorial self with the coarse and unruly aspects of extra-literary existence. His 
“redface” approach to the “awkward” relationship between “crude” life and high-art, 
therefore, has made him far more present as a corporeal and erotically driven subject 
within his own fiction. Although he has attempted to overcome these fraught divisions in 
his life and art by withdrawing from the greater world beyond writing, the 
autobiographical reflections that are weaved through his story of Ira indicate the extent 
to which such long lasting personal conflicts remain of fresh interest to Zuckerman. 
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In the essay cited above, Roth elaborates upon his own social background as one 
among many “redskin[s]” in post-war America originating “from the semiliterate and 
semiassimilated reaches of urban Jewish society,” whose engagement with the 
“paleface” domain of high-culture helped to produce the “miscegenation” of the 
“redface.” (76) In earlier novels, as I have shown, Zuckerman’s Jewish heritage 
provided a considerable source of conflict with his expressed desire to write fiction that 
transcends the specific boundaries of socio-historical experience and identity. However, 
the repeating cycle of departure from and return toward the site of origins in these works 
is something that has been somewhat quelled by his determination to escape such 
autobiographical conflicts in the American trilogy. Instead, the somewhat muted sense 
of desire and anguish involved in Zuckerman’s efforts to overcome the limitations of his 
family background are transferred onto the plights of various Jewish characters in I 
Married a Communist, all of whom attempt to pass themselves off as deracinated 
subjects. 
 
This particular Roth novel is populated by Jewish figures – Zuckerman, Murray, 
Ira, Eve and Leo – who all seek, in various ways, to associate themselves with a more 
expansive notion of cultural belonging, reaching far beyond their more localised and 
marginal ethnic beginnings. For example, Murray and Leo identify with a sacral notion 
of high-culture, which provides them with a means of transcending their particular social 
predicament as American Jews. Elsewhere, Ira seeks to identify himself with the 
suffering masses of the world through the universalising language of his “common man” 
ideology. However, the uncontrollable rage that shatters Ira’s “civilizing path” of 
political idealism is traced back somewhat to his status as a self-divided Jew. As one 
whose aggressive temperament was partially conditioned by his marginal experience as 
a Jewish boy growing up in the Italian section of Newark, there are various moments in 
Roth’s novel where Ira reacts violently to incidents of anti-Semitism. Not least of these 
occurs during World War Two, when Ira dispenses a brutal and near fatal beating to a 
fellow army private who calls him a “kike” (99). His inability to overcome the injurious 
experience of ethnic marginality suggests a sense of the shared trauma by which Ira and 
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Zuckerman have been unable to emulate the self-coherent form of identity that 
characters like O’Day and Leo appear to embody. Zuckerman even suggests, at one 
stage, that the undivided attention given to the revolutionary cause of the worker by 
O’Day may well result from his status as a non-Jew: 
 
Because he wasn’t a Jew? Because he was a goy? Because, as Ira told me, O’Day had been raised in a 
Catholic orphanage? Was that why he could be so thoroughly, so ruthlessly, so visibly living nothing but 
the bare, bare bones? (236) 
 
O’Day’s social background as not only a “goy,” but as an orphan also, has freed him 
from the turbulent self-divisions caused by Zuckerman’s conflicts with his Jewish father. 
The clinical sense of self-cohesion attributed here to O’Day’s non-Jewish heritage finds 
further evidence in Eve’s determined act of disguising herself as a Gentile. Changing her 
name from Eva Fromkin to Eve Frame, she hides her ethnic background so as to 
reinvent herself as a Hollywood movie star. However, the Jewish origins that have been 
erased by Eve’s act of impersonation find a form of uncanny return in her anti-Semitic 
outbursts, particularly as they are directed at Doris. Seeing in Doris a traumatic reminder 
of the abject Jewish self that she has sought to abandon, Eve subjects her to a 
particularly harsh tirade of abuse at one stage of the novel. As Murray explains to 
Zuckerman, Eve’s disgust with Doris was a classic expression of “that aversion she had 
for the Jew who was insufficiently disguised” (53). Although an extreme case, Eve is 
thus part of a broader phenomenon of Jewish characters who attempt to overcome the 
trauma of their marginalised cultural origins in I Married a Communist. Such individual 
examples find a deep resonance with Zuckerman as someone who has been left scarred 
by the conflicts of allegiance between his Jewish upbringing and the wider cultural 
influences to which he has been exposed in later life. Like Ira and, to a certain extent, 
Eve, Zuckerman has been left painfully divided by the fact that he has been unable to 
achieve in his fiction any lasting form of disguise or self-reinvention by which he might 
fully abandon his conflicted sense of ethnic origins.  
 
Zuckerman explains in I Married a Communist how his breaking ranks with the 
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cultural confines of Jewish family life involved the search for a replacement father or 
origin; what he calls “this genealogy that isn’t genetic” (217). He refers to influential 
figures such as Ira, Leo and O’Day as “surrogate father[s]” to whom he had made 
himself “eminently adoptable” (106) at different stages of his development from 
adolescence into manhood. However, each of these “surrogate” figures was also to 
become subject to his disavowal. He describes “the men to whom I apprenticed myself, 
from Paine and Fast and Corwin to Murray and Ira and beyond” as “the adopted parents 
who also, each in his turn, had to be cast off along with their legacy” (217). As a result 
of these repeated acts of figural patricide, Zuckerman has been cut loose from the 
cultural and narrative authority of his various “fathers” and entered into “the orphanhood 
that is total, which is manhood” (217). It is this experience of “orphanhood” that defines 
Zuckerman’s maturation not only into “manhood,” but as a writer also. As an orphan, he 
is no longer fathered or authored by any pre-existing origin, but instead inhabits (and is 
inhabited by) an ensemble of conflicting voices, each of which permeates and 
undermines the others’ sense of authority. Zuckerman elaborates upon the stylistic effect 
that this receptive attitude to a multitude of different exterior influences has had on his 
writing. Describing himself as “merely an ear in search of a word,” he suggests that “the 
book of my life is a book of voices” (222). The varying and conflicting styles that 
constitute this “one long speech that I’ve been listening to” illustrate its lack of any fixed 
authorial centre: 
 
The rhetoric is sometimes original, sometimes pleasurable, sometimes pasteboard crap (the speech of the 
incognito), sometimes maniacal, sometimes matter-of-fact, and sometimes like the sharp prick of a needle, 
and I have been hearing it for as long as I can remember: how to think, how not to think; how to behave, 
how not to behave … what is rapturous, what is murderous, what is laudable, what is shallow, what is 
sinister, what is shit, and how to remain pure in soul (222) 
 
This passage works as a useful typology of Roth’s polyphonic or dialogic range. It 
suggests the manner in which Zuckerman both inscribes and loans a certain authority to 
various external voices (as exemplified by Leo and O’Day’s contrasting dictates about 
“how to remain pure in soul”), while at the same time seeking to subsume such outside 
influences under the control of his own authorial imagination. 
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I would argue, therefore, that the above cited passage demonstrates a typical 
Rothian sense of dialogical struggle between externally intruding voices and the internal 
workings of the literary imagination. However, it is feasible that such a moment in the 
text might also be used to support the arguments of those scholars who have located in 
Roth’s writing a certain development toward a postmodern aesthetic. Patrick O’Donnell, 
for example, discusses what he sees are the important connection between the figure of 
the father and the postmodern strain in Roth’s writing. In his reading of My Life as a 
Man, he describes how Roth’s fiction is a testament to “the notion that the self as the 
‘subject of writing’ is multiple and unauthorised, lacking a ‘real’ father who will provide 
the proper evidence regarding the origins and validity of the self” (153). In I Married a 
Communist, Zuckerman’s various acts of filial defiance toward his various fathers could 
be construed in similar terms as having cut him and his art completely loose from any 
authoring sense of a referent or origin. However, in contrast with this wholly de-centred 
viewpoint, I would argue that the many paternal influences which Zuckerman has “cast 
off” continue to exact a certain residual authority over his fiction. By explaining that “I 
have greatly refashioned my attachments through the effort of testing them,” Roth has 
reminded us how those aspects of the ‘real’ or origin which his fiction is set in 
opposition to are also, strangely, the invaluable source of antagonism or “irritant” that 
releases his creative energies. Despite the aged Zuckerman’s pretensions toward 
emulating Lonoff, he is not an isolate aesthete who creates at some heightened remove 
from the influence of greater social forces and cultural authorities which brush against 
and threaten to impede his position as the redoubtable author. Rather, his fiction relies 
upon a necessary tension with those various external voices that are telling him “how to 
think, how not to think; how to behave, how not to behave.” In one sense, the various 
moments of rupture that he experiences between himself and the many figures that have 
influenced and guided him in the past afford Zuckerman the creative freedom of 
becoming his own author. At the same time, such moments of sundering with those who 
have ‘fathered’ him also perform as unfinished acts of traumatic departure, which he is 
forced to repeatedly re-visit and make sense of in his fiction. In this way, Roth is not 
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endorsing some postmodern notion of a complete break from an origin or referent, in 
which the self and reality are open to the limitless play of textual reinvention. Instead, he 
is more interested in exploring the productive tensions fostered by a troubled experience 
of origins that never attain absolute authority over him, and yet which cannot be 
completely discarded by Zuckerman in his determination to become his own author.   
 
Much like in The Ghost Writer, the liberating act of filial rejection that 
symbolically ushers Zuckerman into the world of ideas, language and literature beyond 
his familial surroundings is attended by a contrasting sense of guilt and loss in I Married 
a Communist. Referring again to the various “paternal surrogate[s]” to whom he 
“apprenticed” himself, Zuckerman explains how “by taking instruction from these men, 
I seemed to … be selling my father short” (106). The break with his father is described 
by him as his first of many acts of “betrayal” (106), instigating his fall from a coherent 
notion of origin and home into the corruptive experience of “error” that has defined both 
his and Murray’s adult lives: “all my mistakes in life had flowed from that precipitate 
departure of mine” (107). In a sense, Zuckerman indicates here how his first significant 
transgression of paternal authority involved a trauma that he has continued to rehearse 
and repeat later in life. The painfully self-dividing effects of his erotic desire for 
authorial (self-) mastery, which Zuckerman has attempted to “keep at bay” in I Married 
a Communist, have effectively stemmed from these many “betrayals” and “mistakes.” 
Yet such anguished experiences of pain and loss (impotence) are also described by him 
as necessary for his development into the virile potency of manhood and fiction writing: 
“[i]f it weren’t for my mistakes I’d still be at home sitting on the front stoop” (107). 
Unlike Brownie, the simple and hard working shop assistant that he meets in Zinc Town 
as a young man, Zuckerman is unwilling and unable “to play only the role of himself” 
(207). By rejecting his various paternal figures, he has dismissed any possibility that he 
might achieve the seamless connection with an original or ‘authentic’ sense of self that 
Brownie appears to enjoy: 
 
He wanted life to repeat and repeat itself, and I wanted to break out … What would it be like to have that 
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passion to break out vanish from my life? What must it be like to be Brownie? (207)  
 
This “passion to break out” underlines the link between erotic longing and the 
Zuckerman’s interest in reinventing life through fiction. Yet such a self-liberating 
concept of desire and writing as a means of overcoming notions of the father, origin or 
‘real’ contains a thanatological experience of unfulfilled yearning in so much as 
Zuckerman is never able to find his home or a suitable “role” for himself elsewhere. 
Instead, as a result of his inexorable longing to revise notions of the self and reality 
through fiction, he has become, like Ira, a “man perpetually hungering after his life.”  
 
 Zuckerman’s stoical effort to “disrobe” from his endless variation of fictional 
“costumes” in I Married a Communist marks an attempt to renounce his desire for self-
reinvention and embrace, like Brownie, the imperative “to play only the role of himself.” 
Yet unlike Lonoff, he is unable to restore any original or coherent sense of himself by 
abandoning all claims to corporeal desire and becoming the ghost-like and detached 
writer. His story of the life of Ira is highly coloured by autobiographical reminiscences 
that suggest Zuckerman’s continued narrative appetite to re-explore his fractured sense 
of origins as a man and writer. In this fashion, he remains physically present as a 
desiring narrative subject/author in the text. I have already indicated certain ways in 
which Zuckerman’s emotional relationship as a writer to the wider world existing 
beyond fiction shares parallels with Ira’s “overheated” political ambitions to transform 
the historical conditions of the American working class. Ira’s many bitter 
disappointments arise out of the fact that his grasp over the actual material forces driving 
American history only ever comes in the form of second hand impersonations and 
“never [as] the real thing.” As a result of this frustrating lack of knowledge of what is 
‘real’ in terms of socio-economic relations and class experience in America, Ira is 
unable to gain a sense of control over or impose a particular leftist political vision upon 
his historical moment. Similarly, Zuckerman has been scarred by his many battles as an 
author to comprehend and gain some controlled measure of an increasingly unwieldy 
sense of American reality. This searing conflict with ‘real’ life marks a considerable 
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fracturing of “the excited feelings of community” (39) and the distinctly palpable sense 
of American history that the adolescent Zuckerman had experienced through Ira and 
“redskin” political culture. Yet despite the anguishing experiences of disillusionment 
and “betrayal” that are involved in Zuckerman’s growing realisation that the progressive 
vision of American life which he finds embodied in Ira is not quite ‘real’ or sustainable, 
he also begins to derive from such an experience a keen awareness of how fiction does 
not have to satisfy some political or epistemological notion of fidelity to the “facts.” 
Questions of betrayal or feigned authenticity run straight to the heart of the 
contradictions and emotional conflicts which eventually tear Ira’s life apart. While such 
problems are mirrored in Zuckerman’s life, they are also central to the erotic mode of 
impersonating or falsifying “reality” that characterises his art. 
 
As I have argued, Murray’s story pretends toward a far more measured and 
dispassionate reflection of events than is evidenced by Zuckerman’s insights into the 
personal conflicts and emotional disarray that has characterised his experience of post-
war American life. Murray’s brand of “critical thinking” and moral deduction is 
reflective of post-war liberal efforts to understand American social reality in certain 
disinterested intellectual and literary terms. However, as his delayed expressions of 
anguish and guilt over events suggest, he is no more able than Zuckerman to gain a 
perspective of heightened remove from the personal experiences that have marked his 
involvement with American history. As Zuckerman points out, Murray’s deep lying 
emotional investment in particular traumatic events within his narrative reveals a certain 
betrayal of his impersonal or disembodied values of intellectual reasoning and high-
literary formalism. In this way, Roth’s novel calls into question the philosophical and, in 
particular, literary assumptions of post-war liberal scholars like Trilling and Rahv. For 
Roth, Trilling’s “moral realism” and Rahv’s concept of “synthesis” between “redskin” 
and “paleface” styles are representative of the all too neat literary models for examining 
American historical experience that were fashioned by anti-Stalinist liberal critics after 
the war. By contrast, his self-divided and emotionally charged form of “redface” 
literature is born of what he sees as the turbulent interaction between the greater world 
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of external “facts” and the inner machinations of the private authorial imagination in 
post-war American life. In recalling his early enthusiasm for the “enchantment” of 
writers like Corwin, Zuckerman describes the triumphant and overpowering sense in 
which “redskin” culture seemed to suggest a harmony between national life and the 
private existence of the individual citizen: “[y]ou flood into America and America 
floods into you” (39). As I have suggested, neither he nor Murray offer any validation 
for this style of Popular Front culture. Yet whereas Murray has sought to stake out an 
absolute distance between Ira’s leftist thinking and his own political and literary ideas, 
Zuckerman has continued to examine the peculiar and antagonising ways in which the 
world of ‘real’ social events and circumstances “floods into” both his writing and 
personal life.   
 
 In considerable contrast to my own argument, Anthony Hutchinson’s reading of I 
Married a Communist suggests that Roth’s sympathies lie clearly with the “chastened 
liberalism” (110) of Murray. Much like others who I have earlier mentioned, Hutchinson 
contends that it is “Murray Ringold whose influence seems the most profound” (108) in 
the text. He explains that this is due to the “lasting effect” (108) of Murray’s 
pedagogical influence on Zuckerman, even after other inspirational figures like Leo, 
O’Day and Ira outlive their usefulness as his mentors. In particular, Hutchinson stresses 
that the older man’s advice to Zuckerman “about the repercussions of effective 
withdrawal from human society” (108) places into sharp relief Murray’s own continued 
efforts to make political and moral sense of the historical period through which both of 
them have lived. However, Hutchinson fails to fully explore the origins of Zuckerman’s 
ascetic renunciation of the greater social world, either as they are explored in I Married 
a Communist or made evident in earlier Roth novels. In addition, he in no way registers 
the stark ambivalences of this form of “effective withdrawal.” As I have discussed at 
repeated stages throughout this chapter, Zuckerman’s keen, yet troubled, engagement 
with broader issues of history and the self is still palpably discernible in a text where he 
claims to have abandoned such an anguishing preoccupation. Hutchinson’s refusal to 
examine deeper into Zuckerman’s conflicted role as both autobiographical subject and 
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self-effacing author in I Married a Communist is blind, I would suggest, to the manner 
in which Nathan judges the disinterested notions of intellectualism and literature upon 


























“The disruption of the anticipated American future”: the Sixties and the Shattering 
End of the Age of Liberal Consensus in American Pastoral20 
   
In this chapter, I aim to discuss the manner in which American Pastoral re-
explores the fraught divisions in American life that arose from the radical outbursts of 
political protest and social unrest in the 1960s. As Roth’s narrator, Zuckerman, 
succinctly puts it, by way of explaining the broader historical focus for the story of 
Seymour “the Swede” Levov that he reconstructs: “I am thinking of the sixties and of 
the disorder occasioned by the Vietnam War” (88). Throughout the novel, the political 
and cultural rebellions of the sixties are depicted as a “disorder” that has been inflicted 
upon a more serene and “pastoral” experience of early post-war America. Significant to 
this treatment of the sixties as affecting a violent and horrific discontinuity with a more 
harmonious era is how it might inform any political attitude within Roth’s text toward 
the New Left and counterculture that emerged during this period. As an important 
context to my reading of this novel, I will outline how the cultural and social battles of 
this turbulent era have been replayed and made serviceable by both the Right and its left-
liberal opponents in contemporary American politics. As Peter Collier and David 
Horowitz have remarked, “the Sixties is still the undead decade” in American public 
life: “[f]ar from being yesterday’s news, as it should be, it is still the white sound of our 
intellectual life, decanting its poisonous old wine into new bottles, fomenting our culture 
wars, and picking the scabs off the angry social wounds that have been with us now for a 
generation” (1).  
 
As my brief historical outline will suggest, such ongoing divisions in America 
can be understood in light of how the sixties brought about a major breakdown in the 
political, economic and cultural values of what has been termed the age of “liberal 
consensus.” The pragmatic compromises that concepts of a “vital center” or “end of 
ideology” brought to American liberalism found expression through the notion of a 
viable national consensus of aims and values among different political, social and 
                                                 
20 Quotation taken from American Pastoral, page 85. 
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cultural groups in the post-war period. This atmosphere of accord was grounded by an 
overriding liberal faith in the mutually beneficial co-existence of established New Deal 
structures with the rapid expansion of American capitalism following the war. In a 
period that saw an unparalleled spread of prosperity among American citizens, problems 
of scarcity began to be considered as either already solved or gradually solvable by what 
had become largely considered as a well balanced economic and political system: a 
harmonious blend of progressive approaches to collective welfare with the more 
acquisitive and individualistic values of capitalism. Operating upon what Paul Lyons 
refers to as “the assumption … that economic matters had been resolved” (5), this 
climate of liberal compromise heralded a glorious form of democratic capitalism that 
appeared to have the liberating potential to meet the material needs of all citizens. As 
Lyons states, this brief age of consensus was built upon a determined faith in:  
   
the uniquely liberating and democratizing qualities of U.S. capitalism … [which,] through its productive 
capacity, makes radical challenges moot, with harmony, or at least countervailing interests, built upon a 
widening, thickening American middle ( 33)  
   
The palpable evidence for a rapidly “thickening American middle” during this period 
helped to foster a heightened sense of national unity and self-belief. America’s fluid 
system of democratic capitalism appeared to inaugurate a sort of “common man” 
paradise, the fruits of which the whole nation could collectively partake in and rejoice 
over. For example, Roland Marchand argues that, as “[c]lass barrier … seemed to 
disappear” within the “snowballing trend toward economic democratization and a 
classless culture” in this period, there developed a sense in which “disparate groups and 
values seemed to fuse into a composite national culture” (143). Similarly, Todd Gitlin 
argues that “a new basis for national unity” was derived from the post-war surge in 
affluence among the American masses: “[f]or the majority, any class resentment yielded 
to gratitude for a system that delivered goods, or enough of the goods to warrant the 
gratitude” (1995, 65). Upholding the Rooseveltian spirit of the New Deal, the economic 
and social benefits of consensus were thus inextricably tied to notions of a harmonious 
cultural commonwealth shared among America’s diverse, and often previously divided, 
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groups of people and interests. Yet as I will discuss below in more detail, events of the 
sixties uncovered the many tensions and contradictions that lurked within this somewhat 
idealised notion of an American people who were united by commonly held experiences, 
values and aspirations.  
   
This chapter will discuss the manner in which American Pastoral treats the 
various conflicts of the sixties in terms of an “undead” experience of rupture or trauma 
within American public consciousness, the divisive effects of which are continually re-
visited within contemporary political and cultural life. Specifically, Roth explores the 
radical upheavals of the period in terms of the paradoxical structure of an unhealed 
trauma in the lives of both the novel’s narrator, Nathan Zuckerman, and its protagonist, 
the Swede. In what I will later discuss as its “quasi-direct” manipulation of narrative 
perspective and tone, Roth presents a nostalgic view of the early post-war period in 
America as a time of innocence, before the divisive events of the sixties began to unfold. 
Although not to be confused as a viewpoint to which the novelist himself (or his 
dialogically inscribed narrator, for that matter) fundamentally adheres, this pre-sixties 
moment is presented in mythic terms as having promised a new American Eden for the 
early lives of both the Swede and Zuckerman in American Pastoral. Describing it as 
“the greatest moment of collective inebriation in American history” (40) Zuckerman 
evokes the overriding spirit of cultural unity and unencumbered social progress that 
came to define the immediate post-war period. The apparent lack of contradictions or 
obstacles in this purposeful march of national history is embodied most fully in the 
figure of the Swede in Roth’s novel. Unburdened by any notion of self-division or 
historical constraint, the Swede represents the American Adam whose life of unbounded 
achievement and joy is nourished by a sense of idyllic harmony between the various 
economic, cultural and familial aspects of his existence.  
 
It is against this utopian vision of America as a site of pastoral fulfilment and 
tranquillity that various forms of New Left and countercultural rebellion are introduced 
as shocking and inassimilable experiences of trauma by Roth. This sense of traumatic 
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rupture is crystallised by the explosive impact of his daughter, Merry’s act of political 
terrorism on the life of the Swede. As a militant sixties’ dissident who rails against the 
injustices of national political and cultural life, Merry interrupts the “upward, unbroken 
trajectory” (122) of her family’s steady ascent, over three generations, to the epic heights 
of American success. She refuses to play the role of the happy “child for whom America 
was to be heaven itself” (122), thereby dismantling the Swede’s ordered notion of his 
place within the providential design of American life. By contrast, she introduces her 
father to “the fury, the violence, and the desperation of … the indigenous American 
berserk” (86), which defies the static unities and sense of unhindered progress within his 
pastoral world: “[h]e took the kid out of real time and she put him right back in” (68). As 
I will examine in greater detail below, the sudden disruption that his daughter’s political 
terrorism brings to the Swede’s life of pastoral contentment and success takes the form 
of an unregistered trauma that he can neither fully own nor abandon. Merry’s bomb acts 
as the inerasable – yet un-inscribable at the same time – event which fractures his 
cohesive idea of self and place. Throughout the novel, the Swede is shown to suffer 
displacement from his secure and predictable idea of life by the sudden impact of 
moments of traumatic recall. The self-divisive effect of these horrific memories is 
contrasted with his nostalgia for a life of pastoral unity and bliss, as experienced by him 
prior to Merry’s radical disaffection from the world of family and home. No matter how 
hard he tries to keep intact or wilfully restore his coherent sense of life in which 
“[e]verything always added up to something whole” (191), the Swede is ultimately faced 
by the realisation that “[h]e could never root out the unexpected thing” (176); the 
unpredictable and disjunctive incidence of the repeating traumatic event that, like 
Merry’s bomb itself, blows apart his idyllic sense of oneness.  
   
Aftershock: the Continuing Fallout of the Sixties in American Political and Cultural Life  
   
The ethos of liberal consensus that prevailed in most aspects of American 
political and cultural life after the war was teeming with many tensions and 
contradictions, which would begin to unravel and eventually become exposed during the 
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internecine conflicts of the sixties. One important inconsistency within this discourse is 
that which exists between its countervailing movements toward open-endedness and 
closure; debate and compromise; difference and homogeneity. Despite their disavowal 
of Marxist ideas, the broader coterie of liberal intellectuals who supported the post-war 
consensus still held to a steady notion of rational progress that pre-figured an end to 
class strife by means of an efficiently organised and virulent American capitalism. In 
this way, the “end of ideology” philosophy that was widely shared among liberals in this 
period sought to disarm what it considered the utopian idea of social levelling involved 
in militant class politics, while at the same time envisioning an alternative “end” to the 
socio-economic conflicts that had inspired the liberal fascination with Marxism during 
the Depression. Deep tensions existed between this progressive trajectory within 
consensus liberalism and its overriding sense of pragmatic and anti-utopian compromise 
with existing socio-economic conditions. In particular, certain notions about the highly 
complex condition of human existence that liberal intellectuals set in opposition to the 
lifeless machinations of ideology appeared to be undermined by the mass cultural 
ramifications of prosperity in post-war America. For example, in “Art and Fortune,” 
Lionel Trilling voices concerns with what he sees as a prevailing “ideal of security” in 
post-war society, by which “the conflict of capital and labour is at present a contest for 
the possession of the goods of a single way of life, and not a cultural struggle” (261). 
Trilling expresses here an anxiety over how increased mass prosperity is giving rise to 
the stifling and static form of “a single way of life” in post-war America, thereby 
flattening out the sense of “culture [a]s nothing if not a dialectic” that underpins his 
political and cultural idea of “moral realism.”  
 
Such concern with cultural homogeneity and conformity – usually ascribed to 
totalitarian regimes by post-war liberal intellectuals – epitomises a fundamental 
contradiction within liberalism in this period. As I have suggested in my previous 
chapter, the impulse among post-war liberals for locating certain contradictions and 
conflicts within human experience was somewhat restricted by their unwillingness to 
countenance particular forms of political and economic antagonism, for danger that they 
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might be associated with extremist ideological viewpoints existing outside of the “vital 
center” of American liberalism. In this sense, consensus liberalism evoked an idea of 
pluralistic conflict and open-ended debate that was heavily circumscribed by the centrist 
notion of compromise that it endorsed. In particular, the “end of ideology” sensibility 
foreclosed any serious discussions on class and other potentially divisive social issues 
like race and gender by declaring them disruptive to the socio-economic and cultural 
achievements of the liberal consensus. The marginalising of such forms of social 
division and grievance from within the liberal consensus ideal, therefore, merely helped 
to foster a growing sense of cultural homogeneity and repressive conformity in post-war 
American life, which found biting criticism in works such as David Riesman’s The 
Lonely Crowd and William Whyte’s The Organization Man.21 
   
The New Left radicals of the sixties sought to reject what they saw as the various 
flaws and restrictions of consensus. At first, they did so in the name of a more idealistic 
and impatient form of progressive liberalism, as spelled out by the appeal for a 
“participatory democracy” in the Students for a Democratic Society’s “Port Huron 
Statement.” Paul Lyons, for instance, has remarked how: “[t]he New Left had been built, 
despite its ambivalences, on traditional liberal, Democratic visions of ‘the people’ 
against ‘the interests’” (70). However, this initial growth of idealism was to radicalise 
further into a utopian and apocalyptic politics of militant revolution among many within 
                                                 
21 The room afforded for this historical outline in my argument does not allow for a detailed discussion of 
these works. However, they are suitably introduced and studied in the following monographs: The 
Twilight of the Middle Class by Andrew Hoborek; The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age by Richard 
Pells; Dr. Strangelove’s America by Margot Henriksen. In particular, Hoborek provides an interesting 
example of how anxieties about conformity and cultural uniformity in the 1950s can be read in relation to 
the largely ignored experience of class in this period. Reading works by Riesman, Mills and others, 
Hoborek discusses how these sociological tracts have been viewed in terms of their shared “existential 
narrative of conflict between the individual and society” (11). He wishes to argue, however, that the 
“existential” dilemma outlined by such works can be read in terms of a “discourse of constrained agency 
[that] is best understood as a product of the transition from small-property ownership to white-collar 
employment as the basis of middle-class status” (8) during this period. In arguing thus, Hoborek marks out 
the significant material changes underlying the language of anxiety and conformity in the post-war era. 
According to him, such widespread unease and uncertainty about the material and cultural benefits which 
seemed to accrue during the age of consensus tells the story of: “the middle class’s loss of its historical 
control over property, which in a capitalist economy rendered it vulnerable as a class to future losses of 
income and security” (9).  
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the youth movement, as the decade grew and the Vietnam War escalated. According to 
certain critics, this turn toward “near-millenial expectations” (Isserman and Kazin, 349) 
within the New Left witnessed the complete abandonment of a more mature tradition of 
intellectual thought and pragmatic progressivism, associated with the Rooseveltian 
values of the liberal consensus. Paul Berman has described this shift in radical intentions 
during the sixties as the “SDS’s backsliding into left-wing authoritarianism” (78). 
Equally, Lyons stresses “that by the late 1960s, the movements of the Left had turned 
away from liberal ameliorative reforms and embraced a fully utopian set of visions” 
(206). In many regards, the New Left mobilised the kind of ideological rhetoric that had 
earlier been rejected by the New York Intellectuals. Some commentators have been keen 
to describe how such radical positions evoked distinctly individualist and emotive styles 
of libertarianism that often ran contradictory to their overall left-wing and collectivist 
visions. These militant strands of the New Left are thus often seen as sharing in the same 
pathology as Bell’s “chiliast,” in so much as their members are viewed as highly 
impassioned individuals whose extremist ideologies have distanced them greatly from 
the wider public whom they putatively claim to serve. As part of this overall criticism, 
the utopian factions of the New Left have also been charged with a flagrant lack of 
appreciation for the values of collective organisation and rational praxis that had 
sustained progressive politics prior to the sixties. George Packer, to cite one example, 
has argued that for the dissident youth of the period:  
   
Reason itself became the enemy. Reason strangled feeling, gave oppression cover, blighted the natural 
goodness of youth. And the political expression of reason, modern liberalism’s use of government in the 
shaping of national life, was discredited. It had led directly, inevitably, to the war in Vietnam (232)  
   
In similar fashion, Isserman and Kazin have explained that, while “earlier generations of 
radicals had derided capitalism as an anarchic, irrational system,” the New Left “radicals 
scorned the system because it was too rational, based on a soul-destroying set of 
technological and bureaucratic imperatives that stifled individual expression” (351).  
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The critics that I have cited in the previous paragraph tend to excoriate the New 
Left for rejecting the gradualist approach within modern American liberalism and 
adhering to impossible revolutionary fantasies which lacked any practical means of 
implementation. Such judgments are typical of a more traditionalist type of left-liberal 
critique that shares in Irving Howe’s original indictment of the New Left. According to 
the dismayed Howe, the radicals of the sixties merely managed to develop “extreme 
postures” and an overall “style” of “moral rectitude,” which desperately failed to 
culminate in “a politics of common action” (“New Styles in Leftism,” 43-45). In a 
similar vein to Howe, Richard Rorty despairs over how the sixties “saw the beginning of 
the end of a tradition of leftist reformism which dated back to the Progressive Era” 
(1998, 55). In his argument, Rorty extols the older virtues of “the Deweyan, pragmatic, 
participatory Left” over the impractical and destructive fantasies of “the spectatorial Left 
which has taken its place” (1998, 38).22 Paul Lyons also argues that the New Left’s 
attacks on the notion of “system” or “establishment” meant that it “failed abysmally in 
becoming a credible, institutional force” (219). For Howe, Lyons, Rorty and others, the 
New Left has provided a serious challenge to the very legitimacy of the political 
methods by which liberalism had achieved systematic economic and institutional change 
prior to the sixties. As George Packer, reflecting on events in this period, states: 
“[l]iberalism, the impulse that ran through American politics from the years of reform in 
the 1890s and the New Deal to the Great Society of the mid-1960s, had crashed in 
flames” (256). Although the commentators that I have drawn upon tend to acknowledge 
the “finally unsuccessful compromises of the postwar years” (Lyons, 16), they see in the 
Rooseveltian example a usable tradition of left-liberal politics that contrasts favourably 
with the New Left’s failure to reconstruct any viably alternative model of social and 
economic reform.  
   
                                                 
22 Rorty uses this term “spectatorial Left” to explain the legacy of the sixties on left-liberal politics in 
America. It describes, according to him, a form of left wing politics that abstracts itself into absolutist 
moral or ideological visions, which refuse to find compromise with the more complex and pragmatic 
requirements of day to day political engagement. 
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The radical opposition to orthodoxy – particularly in relation to race, gender and 
sexual orientation – among the New Left and counterculture has been credited by many 
with helping to dismantle any pre-existing notions of a monolithic American culture. In 
this regard, the sixties has been deemed by many as paving the way for the markedly 
greater acceptance of diverse and marginal experiences within American public life that 
has found expression in contemporary forms of identity politics and political 
correctness. Yet while the more diverse and fragmented view of cultural experience 
nurtured by post-sixties’ identity politics may be lauded as radical and liberating by 
some, it has also been accused of weakening the sense of national togetherness upon 
which older liberal values of common progress were predicated. Various left-liberal 
critics have railed against the limited sense of empowerment and liberation that has 
recently been granted to disparate and localised notions of cultural belonging within 
America by the still active remnants of the New Left. In particular, these commentators 
argue that this New Left-style politics of cultural identity fails to address the socio-
economic conditions that have shaped the experiences of inequality and marginality for 
many disenfranchised groups in America. According to such arguments, the 
fundamental structures of material wealth and re-distribution within American society 
require practical institutional reform, the kind of which has been discredited by the anti-
establishment rhetoric of sixties’ radicals. Tracing its origins back to the New Left’s 
“spectatorial” mode of utopian abstraction and disengagement from complex socio-
material politics, Rorty has stated that in the exclusively cultural domain of identity 
politics:  
   
The concern to do what the Sixties called ‘naming the system’ takes precedence over reforming the laws 
… the cultural Left does not think much about what the alternatives to a market economy might be, or 
about how to combine political freedom with centralized economic decision making (1998, 79)  
   
Echoing this view, Isserman and Kazin have argued that the “important victory” through 
which “[r]adicals and liberals … transformed the public language and imagery of race” 
in the sixties has been made hollow by a “puzzled, if not indifferent silence” (355) 
toward the relationship between class and racial disadvantage. They argue that, precisely 
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as a result of the lessening in publicly sanctioned racism since the sixties, “racial 
inequality has become primarily a question of access to wealth and secure employment” 
(355) rather than being based exclusively upon cultural prejudice. According to this 
more traditionalist left-liberal viewpoint, what Rorty calls the “cultural Left” adds to the 
New Left’s original attack on the Rooseveltian model of social progress by the manner 
in which it “denies a shared politics, a belief in a potentially common, American 
interest” (Lyons, 133). Lyons argues that the quietude within identity politics toward 
more overreaching, cross-sectional issues of poverty and institutional 
disenfranchisement “insure[s] that the truly disadvantaged will remain marginalized” 
(121). Todd Gitlin has made a similar claim. He lambastes the cultural Left for the 
manner in which it contributes to the “exhaustion of that core belief shared by 
Americanism and by the historic ideals of the Left: a belief in progress through the 
unfolding of a humanity present – at least potentially – in every human being” (1995, 
85). For Gitlin, identity politics involves a postmodern ghettoising of cultural 
differences, against which the “claim to progress through [a common cultural] 
understanding is billed as the instrument of white, Western, male domination” (85).  
   
The liberal consensus model that was fractured by the radical politics of the 
sixties found itself vulnerable to a further point of attack from the birth of a New Right 
in the same period. While it found a significant point of attack in denouncing what it saw 
as the social irresponsibility and moral laxities of the New Left and counterculture, this 
new conservatism shared with radical sixties’ dissidents a sense of impatience with the 
post-war politics of consensus. The brand of political conservatism that emerged out of 
the sixties sought to dismantle the liberal approaches to government, economy and 
society which had prevailed in America since Roosevelt. The New Right were to 
advocate a free market libertarianism that expresses disdain for what it deems to be 
unnecessary and meddlesome government intervention in the socio-economic relations 
between American citizens. As Michael Thompson suggests, this new conservative turn 
in American politics marked a “return to the basic doctrines of the ‘old liberalism’” that 
existed prior to the rise of progressive thinking and the implementation of the New Deal: 
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“to the emphasis on individual autonomy, a hostility to the state, and the reordering of 
social life enshrining the market mechanism as the institutional and ethical manifestation 
of human liberty” (16). Believing in the inherently fair and self-remedial structures of 
capitalism, such a laissez-faire approach to economic affairs opposed the Rooseveltian 
liberal promise of a balanced market system that would ensure a degree of material 
security for all American citizens. Lyons explains how the turbulence caused by the 
sixties witnessed a moment of opportunity for this right-wing ideology:  
   
When the liberal consensus fell apart … there was room for a conservative resurgence. The New Right 
could now engage in its own assault on the welfare state in the belief that free markets and competition 
would open up greater areas for human liberty (71)  
   
As a result of their shared attack upon consensus politics, some commentators have 
suggested that the New Left assault on what it came to see as the stifling and 
irredeemably corrupt post-war “system” or “establishment” lent itself to attacks made by 
a re-invigorated Right against the tenets of modern American liberalism. For example, 
while Isserman and Kazin have emphasised that “New Leftists succeeded in exposing 
the bankrupt policies of the liberal state,” they also point out how “that very success 
activated right-wing critics of liberalism who championed a ‘counterculture’ of their 
own” (357). Elsewhere, Lyons has argued that, “[d]espite their enormous differences, 
both New Left and New Right movements sharpened the contradiction between 
individual and group” in their contrasting visions of an ideal American society based 
upon unfettered individualism, begging the question: “how does doing your own thing 
differ from a free-market, laissez-faire individualism?” (16-17). In similar fashion, 
Rebecca Klatch argues that “an affinity for values such as individual freedom, the 
impulse against bureaucracy and big government, the question of centralized authority, 
and the embrace of decentralization and local control are common to both left and right” 
(9), as they became re-defined in the sixties.  
   
Although sharing a similar disdain for “corporate liberalism” (Lyons, 5), the 
New Right and the New Left that emerged from the sixties have since become engaged 
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in ideologically toned battles over issues of American cultural identity and tradition. By 
viewing the sixties in catastrophic terms as a period of turbulent social upheaval and 
moral disarray, the New Right appeals to a sentimentalised view of cultural innocence 
and civic cohesion that, it believes, existed in America prior to this divisive decade. Eric 
Foner has pointed out that “[a]s the country turned more conservative [in succeeding 
years], the sixties came to be blamed for every ill, real and imagined, of American 
society, from crime, drug abuse, and teenage pregnancy to a decline of respect for 
authority” (305). Collier and Horowitz, two repentant former radicals from the sixties 
who became neoconservative ideologues, argue that the New Left’s “utopian fantasy of 
‘social justice’ … had laid siege to the values, institutions, styles and traditions that had 
made up the natural order of things in America for their parents and their parents’ 
parents” (3). It is this persisting sense of horror with the radical cultural changes effected 
by the sixties that shapes the Right’s idealisation of certain conservative notions of 
social authority and moral orthodoxy within contemporary America. Such a distinctly 
cultural outlook has had far-reaching political usages in helping to strengthen the Right’s 
attack upon what it sees as the gross failures of Rooseveltian liberalism. Discussing the 
triumph of Reaganism in the ’80s, Isserman and Kazin have mentioned how: “the 
conservative victors found it politically convenient to lump together the vestiges of New 
Deal-Great Society liberalism with the memory of the New Left to justify reversing both 
the social legislation and the ‘moral permissiveness’ associated with the sixties” (353). 
Similarly, Lyons has stressed how the right sees the liberal welfare state as having 
“created and expanded the underclass,” which has, in turn, “paid the heaviest price” for 
the “cultural climate of hedonism and irresponsibility” created by “the radical and 
countercultural assaults on traditional values” (Lyons, 116). According to George 
Packer, right-wing ideologues believe that Roosevelt’s welfare model for “government 
has destroyed true community in the name of a forced community of taxation and 
entitlement” (372). He argues that the New Right’s insistence upon the economic and 
cultural benefits of notions of individual self-help and private moral conscience has 
helped “to reject the main insight of twentieth century American politics, that the federal 
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government must intervene to alleviate suffering where people can’t help themselves” 
(372).  
 
In contrast to what it sees as the Federal patronage of liberal politics, the Right 
has thus managed to project its own distinct vision of civic society that extols the virtues 
of individualism, local community and moral self-discipline: “a morning in America, 
based upon the small town, the frontier, the idealized family” (Lyons, 17). On first 
glance, there appear to be obvious contradictions to the aggressive way in which 
conservatives have sought to completely strip apart the structures enshrining egalitarian 
New Deal principles of a collective commonwealth, while at the same time extolling an 
alternative populist notion of cultural order and public morality. Lyons, for instance, has 
mentioned how the New Right’s concept of political economy “tend[s] toward a 
libertarianism that exists in tension with their longings for family and community and 
their nostalgia for a politics that might successfully articulate a notion of the public 
interest” (198). Yet as Thompson points out, the Right’s particular evocation of 
conservative cultural and moral values in recent American life is entirely consonant with 
their libertarian notions of economic individualism. For example, he discusses how 
“economic conservatives” and “religious conservatives” are drawn together by a 
“mutual interest in the reduction or complete annihilation of the power of the state and 
its ability to intervene in the affairs of civil society, whether this is in terms of the 
market or school prayer” (24). Both economy and culture, in this regard, take on aspects 
of a retrenched form of private living within the prevailing conservative mindset of 
recent years.23  
 
                                                 
23 For example, Thompson argues that the “new provincialism” (19) of suburban life in contemporary 
America has developed alongside this conservative impulse toward socio-economic atomisation, in which 
the individual citizen has completely withdrawn from all sense of participation in what Rooseveltian 
liberal politics would consider the greater public good: “The new conservatism therefore not only 
possesses an economic agenda to expand the power and influence of capital, but it also gives room to the 
provincial and antiliberal traditions and sectors of American society that are firmly based in homogenized 
suburban enclaves that emphasize ‘family values’ and domesticity and that thrive on the notion of 
isolation, especially from urban areas” (20). This blissful sense of “isolation” from the non-homogenised 
“urban areas,” according to Thompson, provides a comfortable screen for middle-class individuals from 
the social inequality suffered by minority and class groups in American.   
 123
Elsewhere, Philip Green provides an interesting exploration of the ways in which 
conservative economic principles of individualism and inequality have successfully 
managed to mobilise support among the American masses. He argues that the failure of 
liberals since the sixties to adequately address the shortcomings of “an economy that 
worsens the position of all but the well off” (33) has seen the increasingly disempowered 
(white) working class in America find a distinctly ‘cultural’ form of compensation in 
conservative attacks on notions of multiculturalism and gender equality. As a result of 
the way in which these issues of marginal identity have been associated by the Right 
with the elitist intellectualism of liberalism and its patronising attitude toward the 
common masses, Green suggests, many among the America’s poorer classes have: 
“succumbed to the symbolic rewards of conservatism, its attacks on ‘liberal elites’ and 
other class enemies” (34). As Green suggests, the significant transition in attitudes 
toward the Federal State’s role in public and economic life that has taken place since the 
late sixties has been helped, in large part, by the way in which the left-liberal agenda for 
social progress has been split from within by the more separatist aspects of identity 
politics. Gitlin attempts to make clear how the weakening of liberal notions of a shared 
cultural tradition by post-sixties cultural politics has meant that: “the idea of a common 
America, if there was to be one at all, was ceded, by default, to the Right” (1995, 73). 
The language of progressive freedoms that was once the domain of left-liberals, he 
argues, has now been adopted by the free market economic vision of the right:  
 
Today it is the Right that speaks a language of commonalities. Its rhetoric of global markets and global 
freedoms has something of the old universalist ring. To be on the Left, meanwhile, is to doubt that one can 
speak of humanity at all (84) 
   
Paradise Lost: Re-membering an Era of Epic Origins 
       
In the opening pages of American Pastoral, Zuckerman sets the scene for the 
almost paradisiacal experience of America in which both he and the Swede grew up. 
This moment of epic beginnings is defined by Zuckerman’s fond memories of his 
childhood in the Jewish section of Newark. These recollections evoke a heightened 
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moment of historical opportunity for the inhabitants of this marginal ethnic enclave to 
assimilate themselves completely into the wider American culture. Zuckerman outlines 
the ways in which the progressive idealism that abounded in the period during and 
immediately following World War Two had allowed his family and neighbours to trade 
their previous experiences as socially marginalised Jews for full membership in what 
Wendy Wall describes as a “unifying national ideology” (6). The youthful Swede, 
whose outstanding athletic achievements marked him out as an inspiring paragon of 
American success, performs as the mythic hero in this narrative of symbolic passage into 
national life for Zuckerman’s Jewish community. Zuckerman explains that as a “Jewish 
kid aspiring to be an all-American kid during the patriotic war years,” his and the 
neighbourhood’s joint “hope seemed to converge in the marvelous body of the Swede … 
this gifted boy’s unsurpassable style” (19-20). Through the sporting triumphs of the 
Swede, the Newark Jews experienced “the happy release into a Swedian innocence” (4). 
There are, however, certain familiar parallels here with the individual experiences of 
characters in other Roth novels who seek to identify themselves with a greater notion of 
cultural belonging beyond that of their more narrow sense of Jewish origins. The 
euphoric instance of liberation and historical transformation for Zuckerman’s ethnic 
community in the early passages of American Pastoral is, as in the personal ordeals of 
Alexander Portnoy, tempered by a sense of unfinished trauma associated with a more 
difficult past in which Jews were left to struggle on the margins of mainstream 
American life. Described as both a “symbol of hope” and “an instrument of history” (5), 
the youthful Swede provided what Zuckerman describes as a powerful, yet “delusionary 
kind of sustenance” through which: “our families could forget the way things work and 
make an athletic performance the repository of all their hopes … [p]rimarily, they could 
forget the war” (4). Through the “Swede and his unconscious oneness with America” 
(20), destructive experiences of war, poverty and anti-Semitism – “the way things 
actually work” – that have scarred Zuckerman’s Jewish neighbourhood in the past are 
comfortably forgotten. Over the course of this chapter, I will examine how the trauma of 
historical exclusion from the wider culture, which seems to be erased by this significant 
moment for American Jews of renewal and reinvention as fully assimilated members of 
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the national polity, is in fact never fully finished or healed in Roth’s novel. Despite the 
apparent “oneness with America” that defines the “pastoral” sense of peaceful unity and 
fertile hope in the young lives of Zuckerman and the Swede, they are reluctantly forced 
to acknowledge in later life their divided heritage as Jewish-Americans.       
 
In an address which he writes for, but does not deliver at his 50th high-school 
reunion, Zuckerman develops a greater sense of the particular national experience in 
which this mythic narrative of Jewish acculturation is situated. In this speech, 
Zuckerman deploys certain stock images of the vastly increased sense of socio-economic 
opportunity and national cultural unity that came to popularly define the post-war era of 
liberal consensus. He recalls an overriding spirit of American historical progress during 
this period, in which prevailed a distinctly palpable sense that the nation was collectively 
escaping from the hardships of the past and moving toward a much improved future. Of 
particular note is the way in which these remarkable benefits of American life had a 
decidedly favourable impact upon the Jews of Zuckerman’s generation: 
   
Around us nothing was lifeless. Sacrifice and constraint were over. The Depression had disappeared. 
Everything was in motion. The lid was off. Americans were to start over again, en masse, everyone in it 
together (40)  
   
The sense of historical grievance – inherent in the experience of “being battered” during 
The Depression, the horrors of World War Two and “a generalized mistrust of the 
Gentile world” (41) – that had previously wounded the lives of Zuckerman and the 
Swede’s Jewish parents are nowhere evidenced within this utopian image of new 
American beginnings. According to Zuckerman’s somewhat sentimental reflections, 
post-war America proffered a life-world in which older forms of social division and 
dissatisfaction were kept in check by the euphoria of national optimism and togetherness 
that abounded: “the upsurge of energy was contagious” (40). He goes on to explain how 
kernel liberal values of rationalised balances, reasoned gradualism and democratic 
tolerance helped to underwrite the incredible sense of belonging to this progressive 
American narrative among the Jewish families of Newark. For example, the 
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“undercurrent of anxiety” which lay dormant in memories of the Depression was stifled 
by an unerring faith in the rational belief that hard work would bring about a steady 
improvement of historical conditions:  
   
The place was bright with industriousness. There was a big belief in life and we were steered relentlessly 
in the direction of success: a better existence was going to be ours (41)  
   
The assured and propitious sense of collective unity that defined the historical moment 
in which he spent his adolescence is also defined for Zuckerman by its peaceful level of 
generational harmony. Much contrasted with the fierce generational divide that would 
come to mark the later conflicts of the sixties, Zuckerman recalls with affection a time in 
which the “unflagging illusions about our perfectibility” held by parents was matched by 
a reluctance to “roam very far from the permissible” (42) among the young. Such a 
portrait of familial and social cohesion provides an idyllic contrast to Merry’s violent 
fury against her parents in the novel. It also invokes the cosy and contained world of 
Jewish family origins with which Zuckerman himself would be later in conflict as an 
aspiring literary artist. Zuckerman’s speech, therefore, can be understood as a reflection 
upon innocent childhood origins where everything appeared cohesive and secure in its 
assigned place. However, it is important to note how this is a self-consciously mythic 
outline of Zuckerman’s early sense of familial and national belonging; a pastoral sphere 
in which the rage and desire that will later drive his authorial efforts to reinvent the 
established “facts” is glaringly missing.   
   
It is the adult Swede, as Zuckerman reconstructs him, who has striven to keep 
fully intact this innocent setting of pastoral unities. The Swede embodies in person the 
liberal consensus spirit of compromise between contending voices and interests which 
Zuckerman’s speech evokes. For example, in dealing with the burgeoning radicalism of 
his daughter, the Swede insists upon keeping open a rational dialogue with Merry, 
despite the extremities to which her language veers: “[t]he important thing is not to 
abandon her and not to capitulate to her, and to keep talking even if you have to say the 
same thing over and over and over” (103). Insisting upon a liberal balance between 
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tolerance and restraint, the Swede personifies the consensus idea of the “vital center” in 
his attempts to resolve, with force of reason, the political differences between himself 
and Merry. As I will discuss at greater length later on, the Swede articulates a view of 
industrial production at his glove factory that enshrines consensus ideas about the 
mutual beneficence of labour and capital in post-war America. The Newark Maid plant 
provides an oddly “pastoral” setting in which the opposing interests of the toiling 
workforce and capitalist owner appear perfectly harmonised. This consensus liberal ideal 
of an organised and mutually beneficial balance between different and often contending 
social forces finds another expression in the Swede’s uncomplicated sense of being both 
Jewish and American. Refusing to see the relevance to his own life of past tensions 
between Jews and Gentiles, the Swede points toward “the realities of the post-war world, 
where people can live in harmony, all sorts of people live side by side no matter what 
their origins” (311). Through such mythic evocations of consensus values, Roth’s novel 
establishes the pastoral landscape of the Swede’s America. By containing ideological 
extremes within a harmonious balance of opposing forces, this liberal idyll appears 
blissfully shorn of any impeding experiences of social marginality or historical 
grievance.  
   
Merry’s bomb acts as the gaping lack or un-reclaimable trauma that has exiled 
the Swede from this American Eden. He is cast from a world in which he “felt himself to 
add up, add up exactly to one” (191), and thrust into the chaos caused by the anticipation 
of “[t]he unexpected thing [that] would be waiting there unseen, for the rest of his life 
ripening, just a millimeter behind everything else” (176). While his daughter moves 
further toward extreme ideological opposition to the Vietnam War, the Swede remains 
trapped within the increasingly impoverished limits of his notion of liberal dialogue and 
compromise. As his brother Jerry tells him, the Swede’s unfailing sense of “[t]olerant 
respect for every position” signals nothing more than a liberal myth of conflict-free 
consensus that render him helpless in attempting to prevent or even conceptualise 
Merry’s act of political violence:  
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Sure, it’s ‘liberal’ – I know, a liberal father. But what does that mean? What is at the center of it? Always 
holding things together. And look where the fuck it’s got you! (279)  
   
The novel is punctuated by many moments in which the Swede’s “vital center” 
philosophy of “holding things together” in pastoral unity is confronted by a crippling 
sense of traumatic dissonance. Yet in spite of such insistent reminders of the 
overwhelming trauma that now lies at the centre of his life, the Swede continues to 
summon forth a fairytale narrative of self, family and home in which the horror of 
Merry’s bomb remains notably absent. Despite his various efforts to rationally explain 
the origin of his daughter’s actions, he is ultimately unable to understand or locate the 
source of her profound unhappiness with him and the liberal “establishment” version of 
America that he represents. The novel offers little more than a sense of his complete 
incomprehension toward the outcome of events: “[n]one of this could possibly be” (241). 
Arrested by the disorienting shock of what has occurred, the Swede continues to 
rehearse the dreadful event without ever fully making it pass into conscious experience. 
Unable to comprehend the “counterpastoral” (86) disorder wreaked by Merry and her 
New Left cohort, he struggles throughout the novel to reassert the completed and 
unbroken totality of his pre-sixties life, in which the “fluctuations [were] predictable, the 
combat containable, [and] the surprises satisfying” (413). However, this desire to restore 
his life of simple assurances and self-contained borders is made frustrated by the 
inexpressible sense of horror and chaos that attends Merry’s act of terrorism: “[h]e had 
seen the way that it is, seen out beyond … to all there is that cannot be bounded” (418). 
In this fashion, the Swede is torn apart by the paradoxical experience of a trauma that 
demands understanding and yet which exceeds his impoverished attempts to 
comprehend or articulate it.  
Critical Reactions to American Pastoral 
 
Robert Cohen has asked whether, “in portraying the ’6os as an aberrational tear 
in the American fabric, the writer may be hitting the nostalgia button a bit too hard” 
(19). Similarly, Michael Wood has remarked upon the novel’s “attachment to the 
romance of ordinariness” (8) in its heroic portrayal of the Swede, while Robert Boyers 
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has discussed how “Roth is most taken with his character’s desire to be ordinary, at ease 
in his place, … without any desire to tear through appearances or to rage against his own 
limitations” (37). According to such initial critical reactions, Roth’s novel recapitulates 
certain stock conservative clichés of the New Left as a diabolical or “aberrational” attack 
upon the sense of vibrant and rich cultural life that existed prior to the sixties. What this 
line of argument asserts is that American Pastoral upholds a sentimental ideal of 
tradition, family, work and social convention against the flimsy and violent political 
fantasies enacted by New Left agitators. Boyers has underlined how the conservative 
“tendency to reduce the movements of the ‘60s to an undifferentiated cartoon of 
adolescent rebellion is given new life in Roth’s novel” (41). Continuing in this vein, 
Edward Alexander has remarked upon how Merry “feeds her six-foot frame on every 
trendy New Left cliché” (184), while for Paul Gediman she represents “nothing more 
than the screaming face of chaos, the avatar of utter vandalism.” Todd Gitlin contributes 
further to this overall assessment by criticising “Roth’s failure to bring the sixties to life” 
(1997, 64). What renders “much of the story’s [historical] atmospherics redundant,” 
Gitlin explains, is the manner in which it contributes to a wider (postmodern) exhaustion 
of literary realism, largely conditioned by the fact that: “a sense of the real … is exactly 
what shook, rattled, rolled and eventually blew up in the sixties” (64).  
   
In detailing how his daughter’s radicalism and other such forces of turmoil have 
fractured the Swede’s idyll, American Pastoral does, in fact, adopt a certain superficial 
tone of pining for the sense of cultural cohesion that had prevailed in America prior to 
the sixties. Yet, I wish to argue that the Swede’s longing to return to a state of pre-
traumatic unity is continually disrupted in the novel by a sense of “all there is that 
cannot be bounded” by his pastoral myth of self, family and nation. In what follows, I 
will examine how various historical inconsistencies and experiences of discord that are 
repressed within the Swede’s nostalgic vision of the past find exploration through the 
critical filter that Zuckerman’s narrative presence brings to the text. Having himself 
witnessed and endured the tearing apart of his generation’s euphoric sense of national 
idealism in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, Zuckerman helps bring to the 
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novel’s attention certain marginal experiences of class, race and gender that were 
silenced by the Swede and America’s consensus narrative. Much like Merry’s bomb, 
these liminal experiences remain repressed within the Swede’s romantic yearning for the 
glowing American scene of his youth. However, through Zuckerman’s narrative 
mediation of the Swede’s perspective, such hidden traumas find particularly disruptive 
moments of uncanny return. In creating a subtle dialogic tension between his two sites of 
narrative consciousness – Zuckerman and the Swede – Roth thus manages to puncture 
holes within his novel’s ostensible tone of elegy for a more innocent American past.  
   
Some of the subsequent critical heritage has upheld the narrow view of American 
Pastoral as a straight forward lament for a lost notion of cohesive cultural origins.24 
Other commentaries, however, have gone further in locating a greater sense of unease in 
Roth’s novel toward the Swede and his ideal of America by exploring the important 
narrative relationship that the novel enacts between Zuckerman and his protagonist. 
Derek Parker Royal has criticised those who have “accused Roth in American Pastoral 
… of ‘softening’ his harsh edges and giving in to the myth of the American dream” 
(2001, 6). Instead, Royal explores the manner in which “Zuckerman creates his hero’s 
story not necessarily for the purpose of understanding the high school legend, but to 
understand himself” (14). Murray Baumgarten adds to this line of argument by 
suggesting that “the central insight of Nathan’s understanding … helps us comprehend 
and acknowledge the terrible cost of Levov’s success” (2002, 293). For both scholars, 
Zuckerman focuses upon the failed American idyll of the Swede in a way that serves to 
continue his (and Roth’s) ongoing examination of the limits of Jewish assimilation into 
the wider culture.25 Timothy Parrish also weighs in on this Jewish thematic within 
American Pastoral by suggesting that “Zuckerman … encases Swede’s story within his 
                                                 
24 Bonnie Lyons has argued that: “the pastoral, which is wittily and ironically deflated in The Counterlife, 
is here, like Swede himself, mourned as tragic loss” (2005b, 127). Similarly, Tom Wilhelmus remarks 
how: “Roth’s powerful exculpation of the Swede is remarkable especially considering the manner in 
which he has treated such persons in the past” (520-21). 
25 For example, Baumgarten explains how “Nathan confronts the complexities of his own American and 
Jewish experience” (2002, 291) through his narration of the life of the Swede. He goes on to argue that the 
“unfolding events of American Pastoral … reveal the tragic dimensions of the bargain Seymour has 
implicitly negotiated with American culture” (294).  
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own son-beset-by-father-and-Jews narrative” (2005b, 135). He argues that the Swede’s 
determination to reject his Jewish father and discover a completely new sense of himself 
in America represents an “exhaustion of identity” (147) within the post-ethnic dream of 
nationhood. Debra Shostak touches briefly upon the relationship between history and 
trauma that will be explored to much greater effect in my own study. She argues that the 
Swede’s pastoral life is “driven by its repressed moments of historical trauma” (242). 
Explaining that “the Swede’s fall is Zuckerman’s as well” (247), Shostak has outlined 
how the novel’s narrator locates in the story of his protagonist’s tragedy his own 
experience of displacement from a heightened sense of national origins.26 Each of these 
critics offers a useful way of looking at the narrative relationship between Zuckerman 
and the Swede as members of the same post-war generation of American Jews. Their 
arguments will, in certain ways, find some correlation in my own study’s examination of 
Roth’s dialogical narrative structure. However, I wish to go further by providing a 
greater sense of historical specificity with regards to how the distinct conflicts of the 
sixties inform Roth’s efforts to broach issues of ethnic subjectivity, national culture and 
narrative style in American Pastoral.  
   
More so than most, Sandra Kumamoto Stanley offers a more extensive 
awareness of the particular ideological foundations and weaknesses of the Swede’s 
pastoral sensibility. She discusses the prevailing post-war ideal of a liberal consensus 
and how its American exceptionalist notions of pastoral or Edenic renewal found 
expression in the “myth and symbol” school of national literary history, as exemplified 
by such seminal works as Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden and R.W.B. Lewis’s 
The American Adam. The Swede’s downfall, according to her, marks a coming apart of 
these post-war liberal notions of the American cultural heritage: “[c]onsensus – 
epitomized in the Swede’s yearning for oneness and sameness – has given way to 
theories of difference, rupturing a consensus ideology reflected in modernist visions of 
history and literary theory” (18). Stanley’s global ideological view of the liberal 
                                                 
26 “Nathan’s generation has been made impotent by their desires, by the image of America they thought 
they were recreating in their own lives, their choices circumscribed, unbeknownst to them, by a culture 
increasingly hostile to its own self-image” (249).  
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consensus narrative – particularly its literary branch of thought – and how it finds 
critical examination in American Pastoral is highly informative of the historical issues at 
stake in Roth’s novel. However, my own study aims to provide a more detailed and 
complex focus upon the marginal experiences that emerge from within the Swede’s 
containing notion of cultural consensus. In doing so, I wish to examine how Roth’s 
novel looks beyond Kumanoto’s suggestion that the sixties saw the giving way of a 
“modernist visions of history and literary theory” to postmodernist “theories of 
difference.” Furthermore, I will suggest, in ways that Kumamoto has failed to, how the 
crisis offset within American liberalism during the sixties finds links in American 
Pastoral with Roth’s own troubled relationship to notions of literary heritage.  
   
              Anthony Hutchinson provides, by far, the most detailed examination of “those 
questions pertaining to the postwar liberal political tradition under consideration” (116) 
in Roth’s novel. Writing in response to Norman Podhoretz’s review of Roth’s novel for 
Commentary, he sets out to challenge what he calls the former’s “eager[ness] to attach a 
particular type of neoconservative agenda to American Pastoral” (114). Hutchinson 
discusses how the Swede’s consensus ideal of balance and open tolerance, especially in 
terms of how it has debilitated him in dealing with his daughter’s extremist form of 
political dissent, is represented in the novel as “the ‘de-vitalized’ center of post-Vietnam 
American politics” (127). He suggests that, as a result of his inability to impose his 
paternal authority, “the Swede has come to occupy the type of moral no-man’s land 
many neoconservatives would later identify as the defining feature of mid-century 
liberalism” (127). However, Hutchinson insists that Roth’s attack on the “politics of 
disengagement” involved in this notion of “‘weak’ liberalism” (126) is not carried out in 
the name of neoconservativism. Instead, he argues that American Pastoral’s critique of 
liberal consensus orthodoxies finds its main source of expression in the “robust New 
Deal liberalism of the father” (126), as voiced by Lou Levov in the novel. According to 
Hutchinson, therefore, Roth’s text firmly claims allegiance to the older and more 
“‘strong’ liberalism” (126) of Lou. I would share with Hutchinson a resistance toward 
certain critical approaches, typified by Podhoretz, that attribute to American Pastoral a 
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neoconservative backlash against the naiveties and weaknesses of the liberal consensus. 
My own argument also tends to share with his a sense of how Roth is interested in the 
declining authority of Rooseveltian liberalism. However, I would diverge from 
Hutchinson by suggesting that the delusive pastoral innocence of the Swede’s consensus 
ideology finds its origin in the older liberal sentiments of his father. As the later sections 
to this chapter will discuss, stern values relating to notions of work, ethnicity and 
masculinity that have been handed down to him by Lou do find a form of weakening or 
emasculation in the hands of the Swede. Yet, I will suggest that the diminishing sense of 
patriarchal authority which is identifiable in the Swede’s “weak” liberal mindset can be 
traced back, paradoxically, to Lou’s virile presence in the text as the overbearing father. 
I wish to thus argue against Hutchinson’s highly gendered notion that Roth sees the 
Swede’s and, by implication, post-war American liberalism’s demise in simple terms of 
a lamentable decline in masculine authority. American Pastoral does not, as Hutchinson 
suggests, attempt to restore the symbolic authority of the father by castigating the 
“devitalized” masculinity of the son. Instead, Roth is interested in the limits of notions 
of paternity and origin that are embodied by Lou and his liberal political values, 
particularly as they are adopted and adapted by the Swede.  
 
Narrative Structure: Dialogism and Impersonation  
 
Zuckerman’s relationship to the Swede and his American world in the text can be 
understood in terms of the implications that pastoral notions of cohesion and plenitude 
have for issues of narrative and desire in Roth’s literature. As I have discussed in my 
introduction, Zuckerman explores in The Counterlife the notion of the pastoral as 
“desire’s homeland,” free of the conflicts between Eros and Thanatos that engender his 
many fictional variations on ‘real’ life. Described as “the desired object of all this 
asexual lovemaking” (5) within Zuckerman’s childhood community, the Swede 
represents this prelapsarian idea of gratified desire, exempt from thanatological 
complications or frustrations. In outlining the “asexual” character of the America of his 
youth, Zuckerman explains how “the mandatory turbulence born of need, appetite, 
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fantasy, longing and the fear of disgrace” within adolescence was kept in check by “an 
era when chastity was still ascendant, a national cause to be embraced by the young like 
freedom and democracy” (43). This temperate idea of desire – neutered of the volatile 
aspects of sexual longing evidenced elsewhere in Roth’s fiction – finds satisfactory 
expression in the contained limits and clear boundaries of a pastoral world that is 
innocent of loss or self-division. As with this cohesive notion of fully realised desire, 
narrative in the Swede’s idyllic scene finds a satisfactory plenum of the ‘real.’ Just as 
desire is extricated from any experiences of dissatisfaction or frustration in this mythic 
version of America, the pastoral landscape of the Swede is made evident by a language 
of signs that is impervious to contaminating notions of surplus or supplement: 
“[e]verything always added up to something whole” (191). Remembering the innocent 
relationship between words and objects that operated during his childhood in Newark, 
Zuckerman recalls “the unfiltered way meaning comes to children, just flowing off the 
surface of things” (43). This sense of the indivisible meaning legible on “the surface of 
things” is best demonstrated by the “special luminosity” (30) of the Swede’s heroic 
image. He is recalled by Zuckerman as an object of pure presence and immanent 
meaning, demonstrating “[n]o striving, no ambivalence, no doubleness – just the style, 
the natural physical refinement of a star” (20).  
   
Zuckerman’s narrative complicates the Swede’s pastoral of contented desire and 
unbounded fertility by exploring how trauma has subjected such notions of innocence 
and unity to a helpless state of impotent frustration. This sense of thwarted longing is 
evidenced by what happens to the Swede’s notion of language following the explosion 
of Merry’s bomb: “[h]e saw that everything you say says either more than you wanted it 
to say or less than you wanted it to say” (93). As with Zuckerman in earlier works, the 
Swede is made to realise that his desire to author or possess a sense of what is ‘real’ 
about himself and his world is made subject to hopeless uncertainty. The ostensible 
fidelity shown to the Swede’s pastoral sensibility in the novel is thus placed in tension 
with Zuckerman’s narrative awareness that its ideal of coherence and plenitude is 
inscribed by a “missing piece” (37). Although his account is propelled by a narrative 
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urge to “make the Swede whole and coherent” (37), Zuckerman reflects upon the 
propensity for error which inheres in the fact that our knowledge of ‘real’ lives and 
experiences contains a fundamental gap:  
   
The fact remains that getting people right is not what living is all about anyway. It’s getting them wrong 
that is living, getting them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on careful reconsideration, getting them 
wrong again (35)  
   
Explaining that he “was working with traces” of information only, the ‘real’ or “primary 
Swede” (76) remains somewhat of a mystery to Zuckerman throughout the text. Due to 
the paucity of known “facts,” he relies upon his imaginative prowess as a writer to 
author a credible biography for his protagonist. “[L]acking entirely the unique 
substantiality of the real thing” (76-77), Zuckerman explains, he “dreamed a realistic 
chronicle” (89) of the Swede’s life. Such a paradoxical statement of verisimilar intent 
captures Roth’s notion of how literature serves as a means of knowing the ‘real’ through 
an always “wrong,” yet incalculably variable process of narrative invention. It is only 
through his various novelistic speculations upon the hidden secrets or traumas in the 
Swede’s past that Zuckerman is able to make his protagonist ‘real,’ albeit in a way that 
remains decidedly incomplete. This narrative strategy is typical of Roth’s complex style 
of realist fiction that offers a rich and illuminative exploration upon actual life, while 
never quite achieving aesthetic mastery over “the real thing.”    
   
This strange admixture of dream and reality, fiction and fact in Roth’s work 
informs the tensions between nostalgic reverie and undisclosed traumatic experience that 
is interwoven throughout the narrative fabric of American Pastoral. In many ways, 
Zuckerman inhabits the Swede’s dreamful state of pastoral consciousness in order to 
examine what is “wrong” with or missing from its particularly simplistic and contented 
notion of life. Having re-united briefly with his boyhood hero over dinner in the mid 
’90s, Zuckerman is shocked by “how assured he [the Swede] seemed of everything 
commonplace he said, and how everything he said was suffused by his good nature” 
(23). Despite the sense of an uninterrupted life of success and happiness that appears 
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abundant in the aged Swede’s glimmering surfaces and gestures, Zuckerman – who, as 
yet, is uninformed about Merry and her bomb – seeks to unearth the “disorders” (37) 
that lay concealed behind these displays of innocent satisfaction. Insisting that “more 
was there than what I was looking at” (38), Zuckerman speculates upon the possible, yet 
hidden, experiences of loss and turmoil which might give lie to the Swede’s chimera of 
a: “life [that] had been most simple and most ordinary and therefore just great, right in 
the American grain” (31). In a way that recalls his many conflicts with the “unvarnished 
facts” in earlier novels, Zuckerman attempts in this particular situation to find an anchor 
for his artistic imagination by seeking to challenge and contravene what passes as ‘real’ 
within his protagonist’s seemingly perfect existence. However, their meeting mostly 
serves to arouse what Zuckerman calls “my professional impatience” (30) with a subject 
whose “simple and sincere … relationship to himself” (36) frustrates his authorial 
ambitions to imagine a more complex life for the Swede: “I kept waiting for him to lay 
bare something more than this pointed unobjectionableness, but all that rose to the 
surface was more surface” (23).    
   
Although the revelations about Merry’s terrorism are yet to be made when the 
two men meet, Zuckerman’s insistence that “there had to have been blight” (20) in the 
Swede’s seemingly perfect life is informed by his own personal experiences of loss. 
Highly aware that “[n]o one gets through unmarked by brooding, grief, confusion, and 
loss” (20), Zuckerman has also seen the dismantling of his childhood romance with 
America. He, like the Swede, has been banished from his American Eden and cast into 
an uncertain and ‘unreal’ world, mediated by narrative fictions that are always, in some 
way, “wrong.” Although he does not elaborate to any great extent in American Pastoral 
upon the personal and historical particulars that have precipitated this experience of loss, 
Zuckerman indicates how it is related to aging and a growing awareness of mortality; in 
the passage from a youthfully innocent relationship between the world and self toward 
old age and death, as evidenced by his experience with prostate cancer. Of course, this 
corruptive de-idealisation of what was once very much ‘real’ about life in post-war 
America is pivotal to Zuckerman’s (and Roth’s) notion of literary authorship as an 
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unceasing erotic quest for narrative mastery over the challenging and unruly “facts” of 
existence. However, Zuckerman now lives in isolated exile, away from the anguishing 
forms of “wear and tear” (64) that had characterised his literary engagements with ‘real’ 
life in previous novels. As he explains to the Swede’s brother, Jerry at their 50th high-
school reunion, his ascetic withdrawal from quotidian social existence has afforded him 
a means of “keep[ing] the shit at bay”:  
   
The pictures we have of one another. Layers and layers of misunderstanding. The picture we have of 
ourselves. Useless. Presumptuous. Completely cocked-up. Only we go ahead and we live by these 
pictures. ‘That’s what she is, that’s what he is, this is what I am. This is what happened, this is why it 
happened – ’ Enough. (64)  
   
As in I Married a Communist, Zuckerman is expressing here a certain longing to 
extricate himself from the endless “layers” of possible narrative disguises and meanings 
that had been so rampantly displayed in The Counterlife and elsewhere. This represents 
what Roth described in The Facts as a wish to “restore my experience to the original, 
prefictionalized factuality” (3). It is this yearning for an end to the many fraught 
conflicts of narrative and desire that makes memories of the Swede and his pastoral 
utopia somewhat appealing to Zuckerman. These recollections represent a lost notion of 
unified origins (“desire’s homeland”), in which what was once ‘real’ remained 
indivisible and impervious to dispute.    
   
As I have suggested, Zuckerman’s decision to retreat from the greater social 
world has been informed by the eviscerating effects of aging and sickness. Having 
suffered impotence as a result of cancer surgery, he has been relinquished of the erotic 
energy that had previously charged his many fictional assaults upon ‘real’ life. On 
learning during their meeting that both of them have suffered from the same illness, 
Zuckerman ponders to what extent the Swede might share with him a sense of being 
“deformed by the prospect of death” (30). However, the Swede plays down the effects of 
his cancer – which, unknown to his interlocutor, is terminal at the time of their meeting 
– and refutes the suggestion made by Zuckerman that he, too, might have suffered 
impotence following the removal of his prostate. Instead, he remains, even in old age, an 
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example of near youthful vigour and potency, leaving Zuckerman to conclude that “this 
big jeroboam of self-contentment really was in possession of all he ever had wanted” 
(29). Yet despite the sense of a rich and happy existence that the Swede appears to exude 
on their reunion, Zuckerman is adamant that both of them have been left somewhat at a 
loss by a shared intimation of mortality and vulnerability. It is this sense of 
thanatological devastation that, he believes, is being kept hidden by the Swede’s 
outward display of “self-contentment.” Amid his frustration in trying to prize open a 
sense of the Swede’s inner-turmoil, Zuckerman explains that “I couldn’t imagine him at 
all, having come down with my own strain of the Swede’s disorder: the inability to draw 
conclusions about anything but surfaces” (30). Zuckerman indicates here how both he 
and the Swede have suffered from the irretrievable loss of a referential origin, upon 
which their unified concept of life as children in post-war America was based. As a 
result, both men are left to trade only in “surfaces” that no longer guarantee access to a 
world that is definitively knowable or ‘real,’ but which instead involve a fictional 
masquerade or impersonation of reality that is always, ultimately, mutable and “wrong.”  
     
Zuckerman explains that his fictional strategy in reconstructing the life of the 
Swede involves the effort “to inhabit this person least like myself, [to] disappear into 
him” (74). By doing exactly this, he appears to vanish from the narrative at an early 
stage of the novel. Not only does he leave the text as a novelistic character, but 
Zuckerman’s narrative perspective appears to merge with the pastoral consciousness of 
the Swede. The conflation of separate viewpoints that results is indicative of the indirect 
(or dialogic) speech that Volosinov and Bakhtin have both labelled “quasi-direct 
discourse.” This subtle obfuscation of Zuckerman and the Swede’s voices is perhaps 
what has led various commentators to link the particular form of cultural nostalgia held 
by the novel’s protagonist directly to its narrator and, by extension, author. However, the 
elegiac aura that shrouds the novel should not be mistaken for an expression of 
Zuckerman or Roth’s ‘real’ voice, but rather seen in dialogic terms as an impersonation 
of the Swede’s. By facilitating a certain critical distance between each voice, this mode 
of ventriloquism allows Zuckerman to inhabit the Swede’s nostalgia for a lost pastoral 
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and explore the lacunae within its reified idea of presence. In contrast with the 
sentimentality that pervaded his high-school reunion, Zuckerman’s sets out to capture 
what he calls “the ultimate reunion story” (80) between the Swede’s self-referential 
surfaces and their concealed experiences of trauma; the post-war pastoral and the 
“indigenous American berserk” evoked by the ’60s.  
   
Much like the Swede himself, Zuckerman is unwilling or unable to articulate his 
overwhelmingly painful and incomprehensible experiences of personal loss in the novel. 
As the narrative informs us, the Swede represses any signs of the inner turmoil caused 
by Merry’s bomb through an outward impersonation of his former, unhinged self: 
“nothing to be done but respectably carry on the huge pretense of living as himself, with 
all the shame of masquerading as the ideal man” (174). In many ways, this stoic sense of 
“a performance over a ruin” (81) is mirrored by Zuckerman’s overall narrative strategy 
in the novel. By disappearing from the text and disguising himself within the Swede’s 
viewpoint, he manages to conceal the story of his own anguished despair with a world in 
which our narrative assertions about reality are always incomplete and subject to raging 
dispute. Yet this impersonating mode also involves an act of narrative self-exposure, by 
which Zuckerman is located as a corporeal and desiring presence within the narrative. In 
his efforts to imaginatively navigate his way through the manifold “layers” of grief and 
confusion that comprised the chaotic existence concealed beneath the Swede’s cohesive 
self-mythology, Zuckerman once more exercises his dormant, yet still somewhat potent, 
desire to impose his literary authorship on the contingent and transient facts of ‘real’ life. 
The dialogical tension between Zuckerman’s erotic presence and impotent sense of 
resignation in the novel can be explained in terms of the relationship of traumatised 
victim to trauma witness. By detailing what is for the Swede an inexplicable experience 
of trauma, Zuckerman attempts to make more familiar and recognisable his own 
comparable sense of life as wounded and incoherent. In this way, he is relocated in the 
text by evidence of his burning personal desire to understand the chaotic and “berserk” 
sense of reality in which he has also lived, despite his stated determination to remove 
himself from what has previously been such an agonising narrative pursuit. Perplexed by 
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his own narrative obsession to locate some hidden or deeper meaning in the ostensibly 
bland and uncomplicated figure of the Swede that he meets in the mid-90s, Zuckerman 
unwittingly reveals a sense of this unconscious desire for some form of self-
understanding in American Pastoral: “[w]hy the appetite to know this guy?” (38). 
Zuckerman tendency to “clutch at” (39) the Swede in the novel thus serves as a 
displaced means by which to make sense of his own, otherwise, inassimilable experience 
of personal trauma. 
   
The remaining sections in this chapter will outline how Roth’s novel re-explores 
certain repressed experiences within the Swede’s post-war utopia of national consensus. 
Zuckerman’s narrative works somewhat like Merry’s bomb in the way that it registers 
the impact of a trauma that explodes the Swede’s compact economy of the ‘real.’ The 
manner in which the novel brings to the surface aspects of the inconceivable horrors that 
the Swede seeks to bury or disown finds resonance in the rhetoric of Merry’s 
Weathermen Movement:  
   
We are against everything that is good and decent in honky America. We will loot and burn and destroy. 
We are the incubation of your mother’s nightmares (252)  
   
Significantly, Roth’s treatment of the marginal issues of labour, race and gender in the 
Swede’s pastoral narrative is consistent with certain of the political and cultural 
concerns of the sixties New Left and its later incarnations in post-sixties’ identity 
politics. Figures in the text such as Merry, Angela Davis and Rita Cohen all vocalise a 
political opposition to the Swede’s America in the name of these oppressed social 
groups. Furthermore, contrasts can be made between how Zuckerman and Merry have 
both sought self-liberation through their angry defiance of paternal authority. For 
example, Timothy Parrish reminds us how both Merry and Zuckerman “share as 
distinguishing character traits a relentless commitment to transformation and the desire 
to disrupt all pretensions to complacency” (2005b, 138). However, Zuckerman’s 
narrative does not offer a fully sympathetic hearing to the various New Left voices in the 
novel. Merry and the other figures of the militant left in the text are brought to life 
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through various worn-out ideological clichés. For example, Rita’s diatribe against what 
she sees as the evils of the Swede’s “paternal capitalism” (135) is fairly consistent with 
the latter’s description of her as a “kid with a head full of fantasies about the ‘working 
class’” (134). Merry’s political speech, at times, mirrors the pastoral language of her 
father in so much as it makes fantastical and utopian claims about what is ‘real.’ The 
rhetoric that she and other New Leftists articulate in the novel are described in terms of: 
“[t]he monotonous chant of the indoctrinated, ideologically armoured from head to foot 
… those whose turbulence can be caged only within the suffocating straitjacket of the 
most supercoherent of dreams” (245).  
 
Much like the Zionism of Mordecai Lipmann in The Counterlife, Johnny 
O’Day’s Marxist doctrine in I Married a Communist, and Delphine Le Roux’s political 
correctness in The Human Stain, both the pastoral and its “counterpastoral” (86) critique 
in this particular novel are weighted by equally “supercoherent” historical narratives. 
Such uncomplicated claims to ‘reality’ or ‘fact’ are anathema to Zuckerman’s statement 
that we are constantly “wrong” in our presumptions to knowledge about ‘real’ life. In 
reading Roth’s novel, I would argue that it gives expression to both the sentimental 
backward glance of conservatives and the year-zero iconoclasm of the New Left, 
without endorsing either cultural vision. Instead, Roth offers a more complex sense of 
the social conflicts in post-war America, before and after the sixties, which are elided by 
these simplistic visions of nostalgia and apocalypse. As my discussion on the historical 
context suggests, the notion of a culture war emerging from the sixties does not 
necessarily take place along the same battle lines as the economic and political divisions 
between the New Right and old-fashioned, New Deal liberalism. By focusing on the 
material relationship between class, race and gender in American Pastoral, Roth brings 
attention to certain socio-economic experience that are often obscured by the cultural 
debates between Left and Right since the sixties. Yet, this is not to say that American 
Pastoral uncovers some deep-rooted notion of a material historical referent. Instead, it 
traces the historical erosion of the sense of a ‘real’ that was once located by a narrative 
of material work. In what follows, I wish to make clear how the history of labour at the 
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Swede’s glove factory traces a major decline in the notion of a ‘real’ or authentic 
experience in post-war American life that finds obvious correlates with Zuckerman’s 
(and Roth’s) struggle to write about a reality that is always ungraspable or unknowable. 
Furthermore, I will discuss how the submerged experiences of class, race and gender 
that the text uncovers within the Swede’s idyllic world help to locate certain problems of 
artistic labour, masculinity and ethnic subjectivity that have characterised Zuckerman’s 
life and writing. 
   
Newark Maid Productions: Work as Pastoral Commodity  
   
Central to the Swede’s nostalgia for his lost pastoral is an idealised notion of the 
work practices carried out at his factory, Newark Maid. The history of Newark Maid – 
as authored by the Swede and his father, Lou – acts as a memorial to the patriarchal 
traditions of artisan glove production. It eulogises the values of skilled knowledge, hard 
work and responsible manhood, passed on from authoritative father to dutiful son. The 
Levov men are driven on by their proud knowledge of what makes a good glove and the 
understanding that it is only achieved if, according to Lou’s repeated platitude, “[y]ou 
work at it” (119). This is a materialist narrative that outlines with great affection how the 
transmission from father to son of skilled production knowledge has helped to reproduce 
a wider sense of patriarchal authority and social order. The cultural dislocations that take 
place within the sixties – generational revolt, racial tension and a general sense of 
national moral decline – are attributed in the novel, particularly by Lou, to a sudden 
decline in American industry and a subsequent erosion of the social values that are 
attached to work. In this way, the Newark Maid narrative of skilled labour and its 
antiquated traditions represents a material sense of what was cohesively ‘real’ and 
substantial in the lost cultural life-world for which the Swede pines in the novel.  
   
Certain critics, by confusing the narrative’s superficial tone of nostalgia for the 
past with the author’s viewpoint, have tended to read the novel’s treatment of glove 
making at Newark Maid as a paean to the Swede’s simple and uncontested virtues of 
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work, masculinity and tradition. Edward Alexander argues that “productive labor” 
carried out at Newark Maid is endowed with a greater material import by Roth than the 
utopian fantasies of Merry and her political allies: “[w]ork is real; idealistic sloganeering 
about exploitation of workers by profit hungry bosses is idle wind” (184). Elsewhere, 
Mark Shechner echoes the Swede’s highly romanticised view of the company’s earliest 
artisan workers by suggesting that “[t]his isn’t Marx’s alienated labor or Merry Levov’s 
exploited proletariat; these are people sewing together their very own lives” (2007, 144). 
However, Lou and the Swede’s particular idea of work as a material form of cultural 
reproduction is shadowed by the unregistered experience of trauma that is inflicted upon 
skilled artisan labour at the moment of its relocation within the factory system of 
Newark Maid. In keeping with his notion of pastoral unity, the Swede sees his factory as 
an industrial idyll in which the usual confrontations between the forces of capital and 
labour are elided. Over the following number of pages, I wish to show how the history 
of Newark Maid – from its origins in the ethnic artisan community of 1930’s Newark to 
the overseas workforce of its global expansion in the 1970’s – is primarily concerned 
with a motivation for capital that aggressively clashes with the Swede’s vocal passion 
for upholding the long and glorious tradition of skilled glove work. In Newark Maid’s 
energetic drive to appropriate labour for profit, the artisan traditions of glove making 
undergo a traumatic process of dislocation and emasculation that is unacknowledged by 
or ‘unreal’ to the Swede’s sentimental narrative of the work carried out at his plant. It is 
possible to read within the idealisation of particular work practices in American Pastoral 
examples of how this unspoken and hidden trauma is re-visited at certain stages, forming 
an antagonistic presence within the narrative’s ostensibly nostalgic direction.  
   
These tensions within the Swede’s reified idea of artisan customs are made 
evident during a particular scene where he visits the de-industrialised wasteland of 
Newark in the early ’70s. Recalled by the Swede as a once great powerhouse of 
industrial production, Newark has become a place of dereliction and social devastation. 
He describes the factories that have been evacuated and left to decay by the movement 
of production overseas as “[t]he Pyramids of Newark,” ruins of a lost civilisation: “[i]t 
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was Newark that was entombed there, a city that was not going to stir again” (219). It is 
from within this abject scene of urban decline that the Swede reminisces about an earlier 
time during which he escorted his father to the “Down Neck” area of Newark, where 
they paid visits to the homes of Italian glove makers whose produce was bought and sold 
by their then burgeoning business. These memories recall a world of rarefied craft and 
rich cultural tradition that has been entirely lost within the decay of post-sixties’ 
Newark. However, the Swede’s considerable affection for the customs and work 
practices of pre-industrialised craftsmanship contains certain glaring contradictions. As I 
will suggest below, the childhood memories of immigrant life in Down Neck that make 
up this scene are not simply nostalgic and restorative. Instead, such recollections involve 
a process of memory distortion that is in fact closely linked to the upheaval that has 
removed artisan work from the homes of independent producers and relocated it into the 
centralised factory system. In turn, this seismic transition in the modes of production is 
inextricably linked to the later stage of de-industrialisation, as a result of which Newark 
has become so lamentably ruinous.  
   
The weekly visits paid to the “eight, ten, twelve immigrant families” (221) who 
did piece work for Lou are coalesced into the timeless and uniform experience of 
childhood’s “vague memories” (220) by the adult Swede. These uncertain recollections 
find their pristine object in a sentimental portrait of an Italian artisan family, into which 
is distilled all labour history among Newark Maid’s earliest workers. This 
monumentalised setting of an Italian home is one in which the unique skills of family 
production are tied in with the transmission of particular forms of historical knowledge 
and customs. The Swede luxuriates in visceral memories of being fondly spoken to in a 
Neapolitan dialect while being taught “how to dip the crisp Italian bread in a pot of 
tomato sauce” (222). Adding to the dream-like atmosphere of these reminiscences, the 
narrative voice relates how the Swede “believed that he could remember sitting in his 
father’s lap while Lou Levov sampled a glass of the family’s homemade wine” (222). 
However, this ritual of cultural appreciation or “sampling” involves an important 
division of labour that runs counter to the prevailing narrative tone of nostalgic 
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harmony. It is explained that, as Lou drank wine, “a cutter said to be a hundred years old 
who was supposed to have made gloves for the queen of Italy smoothed the ends of a 
trank with half a dozen twists of his knife’s dull blade” (222). While the Swede – both as 
remembering adult and mesmerised child – fascinates over the relationship between 
skilled work and the sense of cultural reproduction that connects it to European 
antiquity, it is an unnamed other who carries out the physical act of labour. Divorced 
from its material context in this fashion, the cultural life attached to the cottage industry 
of artisan immigrants becomes anecdotal and invested with an unspecified idea of 
‘pastness’ by the Swede. The Italian immigrant past and its history of artisan work are 
thus transformed into a sentimental and de-materialised spectacle by the Swede. Such a 
reifying process is inextricably linked to the appropriation of labour that takes place in 
the relationship between the nascent industry of Newark Maid and its earliest glove 
producers. Throughout the novel, the adult Swede expresses his continuing love and 
respect for the older work practices of the skilled ethnic labourers that he encountered in 
the Down Neck area, boasting a sense of seamless continuity between this artisan 
tradition and the work carried out at his factory. Yet in the same instance, the material 
pressures exerted upon small scale production that are brought about by the growth of 
Newark Maid – its centralisation of the ownership of labour and capital – can be traced 
in the manner by which the Swede has re-appropriated as his own (nostalgic) property 
the cultural history of artisan producers.   
   
Significantly, the Swede’s recollections of the skilled work practices that he 
witnesses in Down Neck are far more exact and precise than his “vague memories” 
about life in the Italian home. At one particular stage, the narrative describes how his 
father had encouraged him to concentrate on the fine details of the work being carried 
out by immigrant craftsmen:  
   
Watch him, Seymour. See how small the skin is? The most difficult thing in the world to cut is a kidskin 
efficiently. Because its so small. But watch what he does. You’re watching a genius and you’re watching 
an artist (222)  
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Again, there is a division of labour involved here between the Swede’s role as spectator 
and the Italian immigrant whose work is being watched. Work is not so much a physical 
act or struggle for the eagerly watching Lou, but the spectacle of a heroically performing 
“genius” or “artist.” In the instruction to “watch what he does,” the Swede is not being 
taught necessarily how to make gloves, but to gaze upon the glove cutter’s work as 
something that he should understand in terms of a valuable intellectual or cultural 
commodity. In the pages following his memories of the Italian home, the Swede recalls 
the sheer litany of minutiae involved in the questions and answers sessions between 
himself and his father regarding the different technical stages of production. Through the 
fastidious attention to detail that dominates these conversations, Lou invokes in his son 
an obsession with understanding the specific processes involved in each stage of glove 
making. The attentive and dutiful Swede shows a great aptitude for reciting the 
knowledge that he has learned. However, both men’s obsessive attention to the details of 
how gloves are made is somewhat divorced from the material context of work itself, as 
carried out for them by others. Lou’s call for his son to gaze upon the Italian glove cutter 
at work is an injunction to mentally record and appropriate knowledge of the skilled 
practices involved. It is only by attaining such knowledge that he can ensure intellectual 
ownership over the labour that he buys and the product that is being produced.  
   
The financial value of this mode of intellectual property is highlighted by how 
the burgeoning success of Newark Maid in the ‘30s depended upon Lou’s first-hand 
knowledge of what constitutes a good skin and a well cut glove. By the later factory 
stage, Lou – situating his manager’s desk in the middle of the production floor – is ready 
at hand to fix sewing machines, while at the same time inspect the quality and economy 
of the glove cutters’ output. In the mid ’90s, the Swede laments the loss of such trade 
knowledge among those “business people” who know how to order and sell a glove, but 
who “don’t know the details on how to get it done” (27). While evincing a certain pride 
in his own familiarity with the practices and traditions of glove making, these 
excoriating remarks are primarily made by the Swede as an indictment of certain 
companies whose flagrant examples of misinformed purchasing have had palpable 
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effects upon their profits. The extent to which the labour of others becomes appropriated 
as a form of intellectual capital is made particularly evident by how workers themselves 
are made surplus to production requirements. The glorified image that the Swede 
conjures of immigrant Italian leather workers is undercut by the implications of his 
remark that of those “people from Naples who had been glovers in the old country” it 
was only “the best ... [who] wound up working in Newark Maid’s first home” (221). At 
a later stage of global capital, workers at Newark Maid are shown to be even more 
dispensable as manufacturing skills become transferable to cheaper manpower abroad. 
The Swede explains to Zuckerman in the early stages of the novel how he had “trained a 
lot of good people” in Porto Rico, “people who could give him what Newark Maid had 
demanded in quality going back to his father’s days” (27-8). The appropriation of artisan 
labour as intellectual property is the foundation not only of Newark Maid’s successful 
expansion, but of Lou and the Swede’s historical sense of themselves as hard working 
and direct producers, rather than the owners of capital. At the same time, this process 
also marks the genesis of Newark’s eventual ruin as a place of industrial production by 
turning artisan labour into a form of capital that can be purchased anywhere.    
   
The mode of cultural-intellectual appropriation that accompanies Newark Maid’s 
ownership of artisan labour is nowhere more evident than in the tour of the factory that 
the Swede gives to Rita Cohen. Unaware of Rita’s covert role as Merry’s political 
emissary, the Swede takes her through each stage of production in the process of making 
her a pair of perfect fitting gloves. Along the way, he extols the harmonious relationship 
between capitalised labour and artisan workmanship at Newark Maid. Yet although he 
attempts to present the factory as a monument to the antiquity of leather craft work, the 
various stages of assembly-line production that the Swede takes Rita through are witness 
to a fundamental sense of discontinuity with the artisan past. Throughout the tour, the 
sense of material-cultural tradition that he has learned to identify with glove making 
from his father is transformed by the Swede’s panegyric into a de-materialised object of 
nostalgic fantasy. What is dialogically expressed in this process of reification, I will 
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outline, is the sudden and traumatic decline of that very history of material practices 
which the Swede claims to perpetuate at Newark Maid.  
   
With great pride and affection, the Swede describes to Rita how his factory has 
maintained an uninterrupted connection with the ancient European traditions of glove 
making. “This cutting room is one of the last in this hemisphere,” he informs her, 
explaining that “[n]obody cuts gloves this way anymore ... except maybe in a little 
family-run shop in Naples or Grenoble” (127). Yet despite such claims to perpetuity, the 
colonisation of work and its traditions by capital at Newark Maid is evidenced in certain 
childhood memories that regularly punctuate the Swede’s tour of the factory. In one 
such moment, he recalls his boyhood fascination for “the old European cutters [who] 
came to work identically dressed in three-piece suits” (125). It is his undiminished sense 
of this giddy excitement that he experienced as a boy for artisan practices which has 
bolstered the adult Swede’s stern veneration for the past. At one stage, the narrative 
recalls the secret boyhood pleasure with which he “press[ed] the concavity of his cheek 
against the concavity of the wood” of the cutting table that had been “worked smooth 
over the year from all the animal skins stretched across it and pulled to length” (126). 
Elsewhere, we are told how “he liked to go and stand” upon the “blurry line of footprints 
worn into the wood floor where the men stood all day at the cutting tables” (126). The 
young Swede’s desire to feel with his own body the physical marks that years of labour 
have indented on the factory space reflects his early obsession with the material and 
corporeal aspects of work. However, it is not any intimate awareness of the physical 
hardships or material struggles of the work being done that so fascinates the Swede in 
such instances, but more so the abstracted and reified signs of its leftover traces. As I 
will further illustrate below, the labour of others serves in similar ways throughout the 
novel as an alluring fetish object to which the adult Swede continues to direct his child-
like sense of wonder and excitement.  
   
This sense of work as a play-thing for the Swede’s infantile pleasure finds 
contrast with the masculine sense of independence that he associates with artisan 
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production.  Once again recalling his time spent in the factory as a very young man, the 
narrative informs us how:  
   
Watching the cutters, he knew that they were the elite and that they knew it and the boss knew it. Though 
they considered themselves to be more aristocratic than anyone around, including the boss, a cutter’s 
working hand was proudly calloused from cutting with his big, heavy shears. Beneath those white shirts 
were arms and chests and shoulders full of a workingman’s strength - powerful they had to be, to pull and 
pull on leather all their lives, to squeeze out of every skin every inch of leather there was (126)           
   
This passage summons an appealing image of masculinity that firmly imprinted itself 
upon the young Swede. He tells Rita that the cutting room is “the place where he 
believed he’d grown from a boy into a man” (125). However, the Swede absorbs this 
spectacle of manhood at the very moment that artisan craftsmanship is being 
emasculated as manual factory labour. The shared but unspoken knowledge between 
factory owner and worker of the latter’s “elite” status is one that is qualified by the 
understanding of who is the actual “boss.” There is indicated here a momentous stage of 
transition in the mode of production, whereby glove making has gone from being the 
unique skill of independent producers to the mass produced output of the dependent 
wage worker. It is a traumatic shift that is unconsciously known by all involved – “they 
knew it and the boss knew it” – but which is never given outright acknowledgment. The 
celebration of the masculine qualities of cutting room work in the above passage 
suggests a déclassé movement of production from being a rarefied skill to an intensified 
labour, in which the economic imperative to make use of “every inch of leather there 
was” demands a brute sense of “workingman’s strength.” The calloused hands of the 
men tell of their struggle with “big, heavy shears” that contrast sharply with the “spud 
knife ... brought from Italy” (221) used by the domestic immigrant labourers that the 
Swede recalls from an earlier time. These physical hardships of factory work (note how 
the floor is worn by standing, whereas domestic production takes place in a more relaxed 
family atmosphere of cooking and homemade wine) go unrecorded by the Swede’s 
description of this form of labour as heroically masculine.  
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The emasculation of artisan work involved in Newark Maid’s expansion is 
underlined by the Swede’s recollections of Lou as the “insufferable boss” (118) who 
strove to ensure that production was kept to an optimum. Under Lou’s employment, 
workers are turned into incorrigible children who need the constant supervision of a 
stern father. He is described as having gone about with fastidious skill in uncovering 
anyone who was “cheating him on the yield” or “robbing him blind” (119). This 
infantilising process is hastened by Lou’s growing monopoly over the traditional 
practices of leather craft, according to which “fathers passed the secrets on to the son 
along with all the history and all the lore” (121). The Swede recalls how this mode of 
transmitting skilled knowledge was perpetuated by the fact that “old Italian cutters 
would train their sons and no one else” (121). Realising that “every word of every 
sentence uttered by him he had heard from his father’s mouth,” the Swede sees his 
narration of manufacturing processes to Rita in terms of this artisan code in which “the 
father as the authority was unopposed” (121). However, as factory “boss,” Lou has 
hegemony over the “secrets” and “lore” that once perpetuated the family-based customs 
of artisan work, precipitating a sudden decline in this father and son tradition.  
   
In the Swede’s narrative tour of the factory, therefore, artisan workers are shown 
as having been displaced from a position of patriarchal authority to one of wage 
dependence in which they no longer possess the material, intellectual or cultural 
property of their labour. This sense of dislocation is evidenced by the fact that it is the 
Swede who narrates all the various processes of production, their specialised techniques 
and connection to historical memory. An example of this division of labour between 
work processes and their ownership as narrated knowledge or cultural memory is made 
clear in the tour given to Rita by the relationship between the Swede and the old glove 
cutter, Harry. Described as “the Master”, Harry is the “oldest of them all” (125); the last 
of the sons of immigrant artisans who went to work at Newark Maid. As Harry works in 
silence, it is the Swede who excitedly parades to Rita the detailed intricacies of the task 
being carried out. Harry is described as “working at it with a ruler and shears all the time 
that the Swede was telling her just who this master was” (125). Having been himself 
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taught how to cut gloves from Harry, the Swede explains how the precious knowledge of 
this “demanding teacher” (128) was coveted by the young boys of the Newark 
immigrant neighbourhoods. Harry, we are told through the Swede’s paraphrase, declined 
such requests to learn from “the Master” as unprofitable and futile, considering “how 
much time and leather you’re going to destroy till you get to the point where you can 
make the minimum wage” (128). Absorbed into the Swede’s narrative voice, Harry’s 
story serves to foreground the rarefied value of his “Master” status, rather than highlight 
how the work that he carries out has been de-valued as a form of “minimum wage” 
labour. Harry is not only usurped as the patriarchal conveyor of knowledge, but his role 
as “Master” narrator of that historical displacement has also been appropriated by the 
Swede. Harry’s disempowerment as an inheritor (son) and transmitter (father) of 
knowledge in the patri-linear tradition of glove making is symbolised by his aural and 
oral impairments. Wearing “a hearing aid” (125), he is practically muted by the Swede’s 
garrulous urge to narrate the different stages of work for Rita. For example, it is the 
Swede, not Harry, who relays to Rita a tale about Harry’s father making a pair of gloves 
measured to fit the “tall man” of a visiting Barnum and Bailey circus. When the Swede 
turns to the worker for confirmation of the story’s events, we are told that “Harry 
nodded … without stopping his work” (128). The division of labour is made explicit 
here: while Harry toils, the Swede vocalises the family “lore” attached to his work.  
   
As I have tried to illustrate, the Swede’s narrative tour of Newark Maid reveals a 
system of labour capitalisation in which the material processes of skilled artisanship are 
abstracted and appropriated as an intellectual and cultural commodity by the factory 
owners. In many ways, the Swede’s descriptions of work at Newark Maid are less a 
pedagogical lesson in glove making than an instruction in how to acquire narrative-
intellectual ownership of the work processes involved. Having been made to work at 
each stage of glove making for six months by his father so that he can learn “the old-
fashioned way” (127), the Swede does have a somewhat primary experience of work 
itself. However, this fast-track induction into the artisan tradition has greater 
significance as part of the enduring education, instilled in him by Lou, through which he 
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will know his product as narrated knowledge rather than as material labour. In this way, 
the Swede is not just having a glove made for Rita as he shows her through the factory, 
but is also constructing a particular way of relating that process. What the Swede’s 
translation of work into anecdotal story telling and rarefied pedagogy achieves is to elide 
the material situation by which artisan production and its cultural traditions have been 
degraded by the factory system.  
   
This reification of material labour as nostalgic commodity is further symbolised 
by the emphasis that Lou’s puts upon the importance of “a good skin” (221) - knowing 
how to source, treat and cut one – in making leather gloves. Described at one stage as 
“lovingly kneading the kidskin between his fingertips” (221), Lou’s fascination with the 
materiality of his product finds metaphoric extension in his and, in particular, the 
Swede’s obsession with surfaces and forms of exteriority. As one who has an “inability 
to draw conclusions about anything but exteriors,” the Swede is described by Zuckerman 
as displaying no sense of an interior life or “substratum” (20) that might contradict his 
outward veneer of success and happiness. In as much as a “good skin” is essential to 
making quality leather gloves, therefore, it also finds significance in the Swede’s 
illustrious notions of family and business. This preoccupation with a perfected skin is 
exemplified by the Swede’s description of Dawn’s face-lift as the “heroic 
reconstruction,” which “[e]rased all that suffering” (298) caused by Merry’s bomb. 
Elsewhere, Rita carries out a tirade against what she sees as the Swede’s facade of sterile 
bourgeois norms: “all you really fucking care about is skin … what’s underneath, you 
don’t have a clue” (137).  Skins and surfaces, therefore, hold an important function in 
the Swede’s pastoral self-concept, in which life is made perfectible and certain traumas 
– “what’s underneath” – remain submerged. In this sense, the various material processes 
described in transforming a raw skin into a fine product act as a metaphor for the way 
that Newark Maid has re-moulded the traumatic contestations between work and capital 
into a cohesive and marketable narrative. In learning about the final stages of glove 
manufacturing, the Swede is taught by both of his parents how to detect the almost 
traceless occurrence of a “skipped stitch [that] can turn into an open seam” (223). This 
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desire for seamless continuity is reflected in the Swede’s narrative glorification of how 
traditional artisan values are upheld at Newark Maid. The metaphoric connection 
between the stitching of seams and the Swede’s pastoral narrative finds further extension 
in his explanation to Rita of the “precise calculation” of “an exactly measured amount of 
hidden stretch left in the width” (132), which ensures that the glove will fit perfectly. 
The Swede’s liberal-pastoral ideology of the “vital center” also contains a “hidden 
stretch,” by which it seeks to assimilate various forms of tension – whether it is the early 
radicalism of his daughter or the resistance of artisan tradition to factory labour – into its 
supple notion of balance and compromise. Yet having been made subject to various 
crippling setbacks by the novel’s end, the Swede begins to realise that he can no longer 
sustain this symbolic connection between the valued commodity that he sells and his 
perfectly packaged life: “only now did he look prepared to believe that manufacturing a 
superb ladies’ dress glove in quarter sizes did not guarantee the making of a life that 
would fit to perfection everyone he had loved” (421).  
   
The Swede’s translation of material work into narrative property is further 
significant in the way that it is linked to Zuckerman’s concern with writing as a form of 
artistic labour. In a review of American Pastoral for Time Magazine, R. Z. Sheppard has 
underlined what he sees as the connection between Roth’s detailed attention to the 
skilled production of leather gloves in the novel and his well-honed literary style:  
   
The one character who most resembles Roth is a quiet Master leather cutter, 40 years at Newark Maid, 
who lets his scissors do the talking. American Pastoral, too, fits like a glove (74)  
   
In Sheppard’s argument, there is no sense of the divide existing between work and who 
owns it – the root cause of why Harry, the “Master,” remains so “quiet” – in Roth’s 
novel. Ignoring the dialogic tension between narrator and protagonist, he treads a linear 
path between the Swede’s exalted notion of artisan labour and what he presumes to be 
Roth’s solemn idea of the literary artist as master craftsman. I would argue that Roth 
does draw certain important connections between the skilled customs of glove making 
and Zuckerman’s work as literary author in the novel. However, such parallels are not 
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based upon rarefied notions of craft and tradition, as espoused in the Swede’s mythic 
idea of the work that is carried out at Newark Maid. Instead, I would suggest that glove 
manufacturing and fiction writing in American Pastoral are both subject to a shared 
sense of displacement from inherited forms of knowledge and codes of practice. These 
discontinuities within both artisan and literary traditions are located in the novel by a 
certain crisis of the ‘real.’  
   
Just as the Swede’s pastoral narrative has transformed traditional notions of 
artisan labour into a de-materialised commodity, Zuckerman’s “realistic chronicle” of 
events is also somewhat denuded of “the substantiality of the real thing.” This absence 
of a sense of what is ‘real’ in both the Swede’s concept of glove making and 
Zuckerman’s literary narrative involves for each labour a certain traumatic break with 
past traditions. The ascetic isolation that Zuckerman has undertaken in the American 
trilogy is intended, he explains, as a means of escaping the personal and professional 
agonies caused by the way in which our narrative claims upon life are always “wrong” 
and subject to bitter dispute. Carried out in emulation of Lonoff, such capacity for self-
denial invokes a high-formalist notion of aesthetic tradition in which the writer’s 
personal removal from the experiences that he narrates allows for a degree of 
disinterested objectivity toward and mastery over his subject matter. In many ways, it is 
to this masterful notion of authorship that Sheppard’s description of Roth as craftsman 
appeals. However, although Zuckerman claims in American Pastoral that “[c]ertain 
problems have been taken out of my life” (63) by his determination to live alone in the 
woods as the un-distracted and “single-minded writer” (64), the various conflicts and 
crises which have previously marked his life as an author continue to find a form of 
scrutiny through his narrative detailing of the Swede’s story. By writing about how the 
Swede’s world of “supposedly robust things” (423) – such as his materialist concepts of 
work and masculinity – is made subject to a harrowing experience of traumatic 
“unreality” (134), Zuckerman finds a displaced means of exploring the aesthetic and 
autobiographical crises that have marked his own troubled relationship to the ‘real’ 
world. As my previous two chapters have indicated, Zuckerman’s “redface” style of 
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writing is at odds with both high-formalist (“paleface”) and more historically engaged 
realist (“redskin”) notions of literary tradition. Similar to the way in which the sense of a 
material connection to the past in the Swede’s narrative of work and industrial 
production is shorn of any ‘real’ foundations, Zuckerman’s splintered relationship to 
these somewhat competing traditions stems from his experience of a world in which any 
concrete notion of the “facts” is constantly made ungraspable and unreliable. The 
narrative of artisan labour as disinherited of its materialist sense of tradition by the 
Levov family business, therefore, proves a suitable example of how Zuckerman 
rehearses the agonising self-divisions caused by his own past struggles to wield authorial 
control over the incorrigible phenomena of ‘real’ life. In this sense, Roth’s fiction is not 
something that “fits like a glove,” either in American Pastoral or elsewhere, but instead 
calls attention to its creative tensions and flawed seams. In what follows, I will explore 
further this sense of a shared trauma of the ‘real’ in Zuckerman and the Swede’s lives by 
looking at ways in which both men’s efforts to reinvent their sense of origins have found 
resistance in the imposing demands of a Jewish father.   
   
Unassimilated Remainders: Racial and Ethnic Exclusion in the Swede’s Pastoral  
   
The hastened relocation of Newark’s thriving forms of industrial production to 
factories overseas provides an important context in the novel for the various social and 
cultural upheavals of the late sixties. Rather than discussing it as an aspect of the 
aggressive drive toward business expansion, Lou and the Swede make great efforts to 
explain this sudden dwindling in nascent production in terms of an “erosion of 
workmanship” (24) among the American labour force. Described by the Swede as a 
form “of work people don’t want to do anymore” (127), the decline of glove making in 
Newark is deemed by both him and, in particular, his father as having a ruinous effect 
upon the social binds of patriarchy and family. However, the pulling apart of the social 
discipline and cohesion wrought by values of “workmanship” can be viewed, as I have 
shown, in light of how the work of independent producers has been purchased and re-
defined by industries such as Newark Maid. By centralising the ownership of labour in 
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the person of the factory boss, Newark Maid’s rise to success has itself brought about a 
shift in the artisan concept of work as the highly valued property of the worker to one in 
which labour translates in terms of wages paid and nothing more. Ironically, the Swede 
complains to Rita about the charlatanism bred by this very notion of wage-work: 
“[t]oday our economy is such that people take a job here and if something comes along 
for another fifty cents an hour, they’re gone” (127).  
 
What is significant about this lamented decline in a disciplined work ethic is the 
manner in which it is associated with certain prejudicial images of race in the novel. 
According to Lou, the African-American workforce that has gradually replaced the 
remaining European immigrant workers at Newark Maid has helped to foster an 
environment in which “nobody is doing a day’s work and nobody is doing it right” 
(163). Described by the Swede as a “people who are careless” (218), his African-
American labour force represents what he sees as the ultimate degradation of artisan 
notions of pride in craftsmanship: “the beating we’re taking from black people who care 
nothing any longer about the quality of my product … people who’ve got me over a 
barrel because they know there’s nobody trainable left in Newark to replace them” 
(218). Yet despite the Swede’s accusations, Roth’s text suggests certain ways in which 
the African-American workers at Newark Maid are being exploited and debased as a 
source of cheap labour for Newark Maid; the only group “trainable” for an employment 
that has been gradually emasculated and disinherited of its artisan sense of 
“workmanship.” As a result of such dramatic changes in how work is valued, it is only 
the Swede who can still afford to indulge in nostalgia for glove making’s “long, long 
history” as the source of “a love and a legacy [necessary] to motivate somebody to stay 
in a business like this” (130).  
   
Lou and the Swede’s descriptions of race invoke some of the classic racial 
stereotypes of the slaveholding ideology of “paternalism.” As the dominant means for 
explaining and defending chattel slavery in nineteenth century America, the discourse of 
paternalism described African-American slaves as the hapless, indolent and childlike 
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charges of their more capable white owners. It claimed that, due to the passive and 
emasculated characteristics of the racial subject, slaveholders were morally obliged to 
act as patriarchal benefactors in providing for the material and spiritual welfare of their 
slaves.27 Totally severed from any ties to the patriarchal tradition of artisan glove 
making, African-American workers at Newark Maid are considered in childlike terms by 
both Lou and the Swede. As factory owner, Lou is cast as the Ur-father who provides for 
his dependent charges: “I don’t want you complaining to anybody but me, here at this 
desk isn’t just a boss, here is your ally, your buddy, your friend” (164). As in the 
paternalist construction of slavery, the property owner is presented here as a benevolent 
patron, rather than as the beneficiary of other people’s labour. The Swede underlines this 
idea of a moral relationship between factory owner and his African-American labour 
force by explaining how his initial reluctance to move production away from Newark 
following the race riots of the late sixties was derived from a sense “of duty to long-
standing employees, most of whom were black” (24). When discussing “the black 
forelady, Vicky” (161), he conjures a paternalist stereotype of the obedient and loyal 
African-American who evinces a complete sense of satisfaction with her assigned role in 
the racial power structure. The Swede’s sense of the benign relationship between himself 
and his African-American employees acts as a significant counter in the novel to 
Merry’s argument that “Newark’s just a black colony for my own father” (165). In 
support of this viewpoint, the Swede describes the “old and lasting relationship” 
between the Levov family and Vicky, whose “devotion to Newark Maid was no less 
than his” (162). This sense of shared vested interests between them both is epitomised 
                                                 
27 Peter Kolchin has provided a useful discussion on the development of this paternalist sensibility in the 
antebellum South among practitioners and defenders of slavery “who sought to demonstrate, both to 
themselves and to outside critics, its basic humaneness (and hence its defencsibility)” (94). According to 
Kolchin, paternalism gave rise to a particular form of rhetoric and thought, through which: “Masters saw 
their slaves not just as their laborers but also as their ‘people,’ inferior members of their extended 
households from whom they expected work and obedience but to whom they owed guidance and 
protection … They spoke frequently of their ‘love’ for their slaves, and although such assertions contained 
considerable hyperbole, they also expressed the very real conviction that there was more to slavery than 
profit and loss” (112). Elsewhere, Eugene Genovese offers a more succinct explanation of how 
“Paternalism defined the involuntary labor of the slaves as a legitimate return to their masters for 
protection and direction” (5). 
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by Vicky’s faithful decision to “not desert him” (162) during the Swede’s efforts to 
protect the factory from looting and destruction amid the race riots of ’67.  
   
This reassuring image of the loyal worker is contrasted with a more fearful 
notion of the African-American subject as an incorrigible and ungrateful child in the 
novel. Lou and the Swede’s horror at this perceived sense of childlike disgruntlement 
and petulant disobedience among their African-American employees recalls certain 
historical anxieties lurking within the benign paternalist myth of relations between 
slaveholder and slave.28 For instance, the Swede describes at one stage how: “the quality 
of the Newark Maid line began to fall off because of negligence and indifference on the 
part of his employees, a marked decline in workmanship that had the effect of sabotage 
even if he couldn’t call it that” (163). In this context, the African-American subject no 
longer fulfils the desirable image of the contented child, but acts as an unknown and 
potentially subversive quantity. The narrative’s description of the Newark riots in terms 
of cataclysmic racial insubordination provides a particularly heightened example of the 
anxieties that are caused by this contradiction within the paternalist stereotype. In his 
angry reaction to the riots, for example, Lou acts as the unappreciated and usurped father 
whose tireless sacrifices have served little purpose: “they took that city and now they are 
going to take that business and everything that I built up a day at a time, an inch at a 
time, and now they are going to leave it all in ruins!” (163-4). The disturbing 
ambivalence that Lou and the Swede experience in attempting to position their African-
American workers as either loyal employees or “careless” saboteurs is rooted in 
prejudicial notions of the racial subject as childlike and irresponsible. The decline in 
“workmanship” that the Swede cites as integral to the removal of Newark Maid’s 
production to overseas is cast in terms of certain stock clichés of a racial deficiency and 
                                                 
28 Kolchin also discusses how the varying degrees “in which Southern slaves resisted their thraldom” 
(155) helped to render vulnerable the paternalist romance of race relations during slavery. He explains 
how these rebellious acts varied in degree from daily acts of passive or “silent sabotage” (157) to less 
frequent moments of outright, physical resistance. As the main text of my argument suggests, these 
troubling and often unreadable (because “silent” or covert) forms of disloyalty to the slaveowner are 
reflected in the Swede and Lou’s growing frustrations with how their African-American employees in 
American Pastoral fail to uphold values of patriarchal authority and workmanship.   
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ineptitude that exists among his African-American workforce. Yet as I have shown, the 
process of decline in American manufacturing that the Levov’s bemoan is one that is 
instigated by Newark Maid’s appropriation of artisan labour. In this sense, African-
Americans do not subvert tradition or bring about a radical defilement of the masculine 
values of work and social responsibility in American Pastoral. By contrast, as non-
propertied and low-paid wage workers, they themselves have been infantilised by the 
paternalist language that Lou and the Swede use to describe the relationship between 
labour and capital ownership.   
   
              The apocalyptic sense of social and industrial devastation that accompanies the 
Newark riots in Roth’s novel mark a horrifying return of certain repressed traumas of 
racial and socio-economic disaffection that have been ignored by the Swede’s 
paternalist-pastoral outlook. What gives added significance to this experience of 
racial/worker unrest is the manner in which it speaks to the Swede’s own concealed 
trauma as a Jewish-American subject. The initial growth of capital within Newark Maid, 
as I have indicated, has involved an erosion of work traditions among Italian and 
German immigrants. This unexplored process of ethnic deracination is mirrored by the 
Swede’s own pastoral sense of American origins. Rejecting the language of vulnerable 
Jewish marginality that finds repeated expression through his father, the Swede sees 
himself as being “like some frontiersman of old” (310) in his desire to “own a piece of 
America” (315). He thus abandons any knowledge of Jewish social exclusion that he 
inherits from Lou, drawing a new and self-determining concept of identity from 
archetypal notions of America as a bountiful agrarian pastoral. Nowhere is this better 
exemplified for the Swede than in the mythic figure of Johnny Appleseed, with whom he 
comes to identify. Perhaps the most marked symbol of pastoral fertility in the novel, 
Appleseed represents for the Swede an exuberantly “happy American” who expresses 
his “spontaneous affection for the landscape” by scattering his “bag of seeds” (316) 
everywhere that he strides. In spite of his father’s warning that Old Rimrock “is a 
narrow, bigoted area” (309), the Swede is determined to embrace it as a fertile setting for 
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his scene of a pastoral America in which “there is no need for that resentment stuff from 
anybody” (311).  
   
Yet despite his compensatory idea of a post-ethnic America, the Swede is 
eventually forced to re-visit an older trauma of Jewish historical exclusion from the 
mainstream culture. A particularly notable example of the Swede’s growing sense of his 
Jewish ancestry occurs on the tour of Old Rimrock’s Revolutionary history that he is 
taken on by William Orcutt. As a man who knew “all too well just how far back he and 
his manners reached into the genteel past” (302), Orcutt’s august lineage marks out the 
limits of the Swede’s sense of American origins. Although he professes to not 
understand the “class sting” (301) that his Irish-American wife, Dawn, feels in the 
company of Orcutt, the Swede soon begins to show an awareness of the significant gap 
between both his and the other man’s genealogy: “[e]very rung into America for the 
Levovs there was another rung to attain; this guy was there” (306). The far-reaching 
extent of Orcutt’s “genteel” lineage underlines certain unexposed experiences of ethnic 
exclusion and resentment within the Swede’s apparent “unconscious oneness with 
America.” The Swede finds that, in the company of Orcutt, “[h]e couldn’t remember 
ever in his life feeling more like his father – not like his father’s son but like his father” 
(306). In a manner that suggests the delayed recurrence of a previously unacknowledged 
trauma, the Swede is made acquainted with a wounded sense of Jewish historical 
marginality – the experience of his father – that had been otherwise unfamiliar to him 
prior to this moment. This growing sensitivity to his Jewish origins is made further 
evident when an old school pal, Bucky Robinson, enumerates for Orcutt the Swede’s 
personal history of athletic success: “seeing everything he would ordinarily prefer to 
hide behind a modest demeanor being revealed so passionately to Orcutt by Bucky was 
more pleasurable than he might have imagined, almost like the satisfaction of a desire he 
personally knew nothing about – a desire for revenge” (312). The Swede’s 
overwhelming urge to act upon “a desire he personally knew nothing about” in this 
instance mirrors the paradoxical notion of trauma as something that is unregistered to the 
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conscious mind, and yet which appears uncannily familiar at the same time. Earlier in 
the novel Zuckerman had begged the question of the Swede:  
   
Where was the Jew in him? You couldn’t find it and yet you knew it was there. Where was the 
irrationality in him? (20)  
   
Yet despite “[a]ll that he had eliminated to achieve his perfection,” the “striving” and 
“ambivalence” (20) which Zuckerman associates with the hyphenated experience of 
Jewish-Americans find hidden traces in the growing sense of incompleteness and anger 
that the Swede experiences in the company of Orcutt.  
    
Filial Disobedience: Paternity and Masculinity in Crisis  
   
The Swede’s determination to abandon his Jewish heritage involves a trauma that 
he is forced to agonisingly re-live in ways other than this latent hostility to Orcutt. In 
rejecting his ethnic past, the Swede commits an act of transgression against his father’s 
authority that is re-visited through a broader crisis of masculinity and paternity in Roth’s 
novel. At one stage of the novel, the Swede begins to contemplate how his daughter’s 
political violence may have originated in his own decision to defy his father’s warning 
by marrying Dawn, a Catholic woman. Recalling a “secret baptism” (390) for Merry that 
was carried out against the stern caveats of his father, the Swede ponders how this 
moment of filial disobedience may have instigated his family’s tragic plight: “[p]erhaps 
everything bad that ever happened to Merry, not excluding the worst thing that happened 
to her, had originated then and there” (390). There is an absurdly superstitious element 
to this thought that Merry’s New Left extremism might be linked back to her baptism as 
a Catholic. However, this passage establishes a symbolic connection between the 
Swede’s aberration of the law of the father and his own loss of paternal authority over 
his daughter. Merry’s act of terrorism is explained in this instance as an unconscious 
repetition of an earlier trauma of inconceivable transgression or departure. This 
connection between the Swede’s defiance of his father and the chaos that later shatters 
his pastoral sense of family and home forms part of a broader theme in American 
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Pastoral, which links the social unrest and moral permissiveness of the sixties to a rapid 
decline in patriarchal authority. As I have already indicated, the Swede perceives the 
growing laxity and ill-discipline among his African-American workers as a childlike 
disregard for inherited codes of patriarchal authority and “workmanship.” He finds 
further horror at this inversion of filial loyalty in the New Left rhetoric of Rita, which he 
describes as an expression of “infantile egoism” and “Kid Mayhem” (146). During the 
dinner party discussion on the popularisation and widespread release of the pornographic 
movie, Deep Throat, Lou climaxes his long and meandering tirade on the connection 
between the decline in American industry and the rise in social disorder and public 
immorality by stating: “[l]et me tell you who goes to those movies: riffraff, bums and, 
kids without adult supervision” (350).  
 
The decline in paternal authority and social cohesion that Lou so despondently 
outlines, however, can also be attributed to the assault on masculinity and tradition 
which is carried out at Newark Maid. The history of Newark Maid is scattered with 
tensions between an artisan ideal of masculinity and capitalist processes of emasculated 
or infantilised labour that find embodiment in the Swede’s growing sense of self-
division in the novel. As I have suggested earlier, the lessons in manhood that the Swede 
recalls learning on the factory floor and through the instruction of his father are 
ambiguously framed by his child-like fascination for the responsibilities of work and 
fatherhood. Throughout the novel, his pastoral outlook appears to assume a level of 
infantile fantasy that runs counter to his self-image as someone who was “fully charged 
up with purpose … with a grown man’s aims and ambitions” (192). The Swede’s “rage 
to be ‘mature’” (192) as an adolescent spawned for him day-dreams of becoming a 
responsible husband and father. In a pre-emptive counter to the possibility that such 
projected “yearnings” might be considered as those of “a child, vain and spoiled,” the 
Swede reasons to himself: “[i]f he was a child, it was only insofar as he found himself 
looking ahead into responsible manhood with the longing of a kid gazing into a candy-
store window” (192). This paradoxical collocation of “responsible manhood” and child-
like fantasy is further highlighted by the Swede’s longing to return, following the trauma 
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of Merry’s bomb, to the “once upon a time, back when the union of beautiful mother and 
strong father and bright, bubbly child rivalled the trinity of the three bears” (413). This 
fairytale sense of pastoral romance is also located by the Swede’s identification with the 
myth of Johnny Appleseed, described by him as “one of those kid things you keep in 
your mind no matter how old you get” (315). What these various examples help to 
demonstrate is how Lou’s heavily weighted notion of masculinity, when passed onto the 
Swede, eventually undergoes a similar crisis of emasculation and infantilism to that 
which the workers at Newark Maid have had to endure.  
   
The Swede’s rather infantile view of manhood involves a repressive ideal of 
Dawn as both homemaker and beauty queen. The narrative explains how his adolescent 
ambition about one day fathering a daughter was accompanied by a vision of “the 
child’s adoring mother … standing by the stove, preparing their dinner” (190). This 
construction of ideal femininity is eventually torn asunder by Dawn, who recalls with 
outrage their earlier courtship when she was Miss New Jersey:  
   
You wouldn’t leave me be! Every time I looked up, there was my boyfriend, gaga because I was some 
ridiculous beauty queen! You were like some kid! You had to make me into a princess (178)  
   
The Swede’s desire to play the responsible and caring patriarch finds an even greater 
sense of failure in his inability to assert paternal control over Merry. As an only 
daughter, Merry signals an awkward gap in the patri-linear notions of work and 
manhood that he espouses. In his role as her father, the Swede is incapable of providing 
Merry with the same sternness of paternal rule that was issued to him by Lou. His 
reluctance to use force or aggression in dealing with Merry’s increasingly extreme 
behaviour forms part of a broader, largely unconscious, unwillingness by the Swede to 
adopt the heavy burden of his father’s mantel. Unlike Lou, he is not moulded in the 
same fashion as one of those “rough-hewn,” “slum-reared Jewish fathers” (11) of the 
previous generation. On discovering Dawn’s is having a sexual affair with Orcutt, the 
Swede fantasises about “vaulting his father” (412) and abandoning his appointed role as 
a patriarch: “[t]hey are dealing now with an irresponsible person … with someone who 
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does not care” (371). Inextricably tied to his desire to escape the obligations which 
accompany his firmly conditioned notion of masculinity is a vision that the Swede has of 
his father’s death: “if, as a result, his father dropped dead, well, they’d just have to bury 
him ... bury him deep in the ground” (369). The Swede expresses here his unconscious 
desire to “bury” his father and, thereby, free himself of the weight of inherited 
expectations. American Pastoral dramatises the Swede’s struggle between being a son 
and a father; an irresponsible, dreaming child and a sober, duty-bound man. Trapped 
between the demanding paternal authority of Lou and the violent filial rejection of 
Merry, the Swede is traumatised by an inability to uphold the patriarchal line of 
succession in his roles as both son and father:  
   
Birth, succession, the generations, history - utterly improbable. He had seen that we don’t come from one 
another, that it only appears that we come from one another (418)   
   
              Timothy Parrish argues that the crisis of paternity involved in the Swede’s 
refusal to heed Lou’s counsel results in the tragedy which blights his post-ethnic 
pastoral. For Parrish, the punishment meted out to the Swede as a result of this 
aberration of the law of the father reflects Zuckerman’s sorrow and guilt over his own 
disavowal of Jewish origins in earlier novels. According to him, both the Swede and, to 
an even greater extent, Merry are depicted as hopelessly stranded in the novel from the 
historically grounded sense of identity that originates from Lou, the Jewish Ur-father. 
Their barren, rootless attempts at self-transformation in the novel, he claims, mirror 
Zuckerman’s ultimately doomed and costly efforts to reject his origins and create the 
self anew: “[a]fter years of writing art that rebels against the father and the version of 
Jewish identity he represents, Zuckerman’s narrative performances give way here to 
Swede’s exhaustion of identity” (2005b, 147). In reading American Pastoral thus, 
Parrish suggests “that Roth in his late phase is distancing himself from the postmodern 
decentering of the self that has been one of the hallmarks of his fiction” (140).  
 
I would partially agree with Parrish’s argument. Roth most definitely does 
explore the anguished experience of trauma in Zuckerman’s conflicted sense of origins 
 165
through the story of the Swede. However, American Pastoral does not involve a simple 
restoration of the father as a corrective to the postmodern “exhaustion of identity” in 
earlier Zuckerman novels. In my last two chapters, I have discussed how questions of 
the father, the ‘real’ or origin throughout Roth’s fiction have been subject to a 
paradoxical mixture of rejection and fidelity, departure and return. The code of the father 
as an externally authoring or originating presence is indeed challenged and subject to 
artistic reinvention by Zuckerman and other figures in Roth’s work. As I have indicated 
elsewhere, however, the ‘betrayed’ or transgressed authority of the father continues to 
maintain a certain residual influence on these characters. For instance, Zuckerman’s 
constant mining of his original fallout with his father throughout his writing suggests the 
manner in which this unremitting conflict or trauma has both drawn him away from and 
back towards the paternal source or origin. As a result of this persistent antagonism with 
the father and other external embodiments of the ‘real’ in Roth’s fiction, it cannot be 
suggested that his work has involved an outright “postmodern decentering” of notions of 
referential origin in favour of unbounded acts of creative (self-) transformation. 
American Pastoral does not significantly re-evaluate these tensions between self-
authorship and paternal authority, but continues to explore their creative implications 
within a broader context of Zuckerman’s sense of national origins in post-war America. 
By examining how the Swede’s unconscious desire to shed himself of his father’s 
overbearing influence clashes with his ideal of “responsible manhood,” I would suggest 
that Zuckerman finds a means of re-tracing the unfinished sense of traumatic conflict at 
the heart of his own life as both a man and author. Zuckerman’s narrative remarks upon 
the Swede’s growing awareness of the actual rift between him and the father to whom he 
had always been so loyal suitably highlight these correlations in the lives of both Roth’s 
narrator and protagonist: “[o]pposing the father is no picnic and not opposing the father 
is no picnic – that’s what he was beginning to discover” (387).  
 
In ways that resemble Parrish’s argument, Hutchinson finds in this novel a 
somewhat uncomplicated restoration of the father, ignoring what I would argue is the 
more fissured and contradictory experience of origins that lies at the heart of Roth’s 
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fiction. As I have already noted, he sees American Pastoral as a lament for the “robust 
New Deal liberalism of the father” over the “weak” and “devitalised” adaptation of such 
political values by the son. Lou’s enraged outbursts against both the Nixonian Right and 
the New Left inspired upheavals of the sixties in the novel are cited by Hutchinson as 
evidence of his support for the greater “majoritarian emphasis” (126) of the New Deal. 
According to Hutchinson, Lou’s traditionalist views on the relationship between 
manufacturing and social cohesion in America reveal his virile commitment to a broader 
public vision over the more privatised longings of the Swede, who, “enfolded away in 
pastoral isolation” (135), represents an emasculated liberal “politics of disengagement” 
(126). He contends that the Swede is far too passive to effectively confront the 
challenges which Merry and her generation pose to progressive liberal ideas about the 
shared community of interests that exists among American citizens. By contrast, Lou’s 
“‘strong’ liberalism champions a morally premised commitment to ‘intervention’” (126) 
in dealing with such a significant threat to the liberal vision of American society as a 
cooperative commonwealth. Of particular note in Hutchinson’s discussion of American 
Pastoral are his comments about how “the subversion of previously stable cultural 
values” during the sixties “is yet another indicator of broader socio-political crisis” (133) 
for Lou. He suggests that the nightmarish world of civil disorder and moral disarray 
lurking within America – no more so evident than in the de-industrialising wasteland of 
Newark – which Lou so greatly despairs over is “representative of social atomization on 
a massive scale” (133). As the ultimate source of patriarchal authority in the novel, 
Lou’s appeal to values of “family” and “community” (133) in the face of the widespread 
social fragmentation that faces America in the sixties thus indicates for Hutchinson the 
fading cry of an older liberal vision of the common good. However, I would argue that 
rather than being evocative of the Rooseveltian sense of civic spirit that prevailed prior 
to the late sixties, Lou’s comments upon how the decline of industry in Newark has led 
to steep levels of social decay and moral laxity appear to be far more consonant with the 
new conservative attitudes toward culture and economy which began to emerge during 
this period.  
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As I have already indicated, Lou offers a broad assessment of how a collapse in 
once sturdy values of “workmanship” and patriarchy among Americans, with all their 
attendant emphasis upon social responsibility, lie at the root of the economic and moral 
torpor which has so devastated Newark. This narrative of gross cultural decline elides 
the causal relationship that I have been showing exists between the aggressive pursuit of 
his family’s business interests and the social malaise that so upsets Lou. The “litany” of 
[t]axes, corruption, and race” (24) that he repeats at different intervals in the novel in 
order to explain why manufacturing vanished so rapidly from Newark is indicative of 
Lou’s overall determination to exculpate his own role as a baron of industry from any 
responsibility for the unexpected changes that occurred in social life during the sixties. 
Not only is his indictment of taxes typical of rightist economic arguments against 
Federal measures for re-distributing the private wealth of businesses, but his despairing 
attitude toward the subject of race in the novel fails, as I have already pointed out, to 
show any progressive understanding of the relationship between socio-economic 
disenfranchisement and racial divisions in America. Rather than explaining the swift de-
industrialisation of Newark and the catastrophic upheavals that accompany it in terms of 
specific economic motives for profit, Lou blames such events on a perceived decline in 
social authority and the reluctance of the national government to adapt quicker to the 
needs of industry. Such an explanation of the social divisions caused by the changing 
industrial landscape of Newark in exclusive terms of eroding cultural values and 
government restrictions on capital is clearly resonant of the New Right ethos that I have 
outlined earlier in this chapter.  
 
Lou’s markedly rightist attitude finds further evidence in his efforts to explain 
the financial need for industries to leave Newark and avail of cheaper labour abroad 
during this period. Presenting business as some form of unwitting victim to changing 
social and economic conditions, he unapologetically defends the necessity for tearing 
apart of the New Deal and liberal consensus spirit of partnership between manufacturers 
and labour unions: 
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The union rate on piecework ran a lot of people out of business or offshore … Our downfall was that we 
never could compete with overseas. We hastened it because there wasn’t some good judgment on either 
side. But it could not be saved regardless. The only thing that could have stopped it – and I was not for 
this, I don’t think you can stop world trade and I don’t think you should try – but the only thing that could 
have stopped it is if we put up trade barriers (346)   
   
As Lou points out, the various New Deal accords between labour and capital interests 
that had provided the foundation for a golden age in American industry – during which 
Lou’s Newark Maid rose to prominence – are subject to strain and eventual collapse, 
once the exigencies of profit and the demands of unions begin to diverge in the sixties. 
Although he considers himself to be a firm supporter of Rooseveltian liberalism, Lou 
responds to these changes in economic conditions by virulently defending key 
conservative ideas in favour of the free movement of world trade against labour or 
government efforts to re-organise capitalism. Hutchinson describes Lou as a firm 
opponent of a New Right philosophy which claimed that, by the late sixties: “values 
such as self-reliance, the work ethic, and the cult of the ‘self-made man’ had been 
undermined by a New Deal order that had outlived its usefulness” (129). However, Lou 
himself is equally participative in this onslaught against the more regulatory and 
protective approach to capitalism within progressive liberal thought; what Hutchinson 
calls its “commitment to ‘intervention.’” Lou’s somewhat laissez-faire attitude toward 
what he calls “world trade” is complemented by the manner in which his virtuous ideal 
of disciplined “workmanship” supersedes any broader understanding of the economic 
and social plight of labour (and race) in the novel. I would argue that Roth’s novel thus 
examines how the problems of the Swede’s notion of consensus merely make more 
pronounced certain contradictions inherent to the progressive values of his father. It is 
this profound sense of liberalism’s failure to wield control over the (socio-economic) 
forces driving American history that provides an important context to Roth’s novel, 
rather than any sense of restorative nostalgia for the epic heights of the New Deal. 





“Nothing lasts, and yet nothing passes”: Confronting the Impasse of Race and 
Ethnicity in The Human Stain 
 
 In The Human Stain, Zuckerman sets out to recount the highly complex 
biography of his late friend, Coleman Silk. The narrative is, by and large, stimulated by 
the surprising revelation made to Zuckerman that a grave secret lay at the centre of 
Coleman’s life. While attending the latter’s funeral, Zuckerman is made aware that Silk 
was in fact African-American by birth and that his racial origins had been concealed to 
the wider world by his single minded decision, made some fifty years earlier, to ‘pass’ as 
a white man. This phenomenon of ‘passing’ is one that has a long history within the 
African-American experience of slavery and racism.29 Coleman’s determined 
commitment to disguise himself as white is, from its inception at least, fully consonant 
with this social tradition. His initial act of passing is made during a post-war period in 
which American society was still structured hierarchically along racial lines. Silk’s 
sister, Ernestine, makes clear to Zuckerman how “Coleman was a part of his time,” 
explaining that: “[he] couldn’t wait to go through civil rights to get to his human rights, 
and so he skipped a step” (327). However, Zuckerman’s brief friendship with Silk 
develops in the late 1990s when the acutely historical incentives motivating Coleman’s 
efforts to hide his origins have been largely supplanted by the more self-empowering 
and protective racial categorisations of identity politics. The two men become 
acquainted following an incident in which the aged Coleman – by now a successful 
Dean of Greek Classical Literature at Athena College – has been accused of using a 
pejorative epithet to describe two African-American students whom he has never met 
and whose racial identities, as a result, are unknown to him. Despite arguing that his use 
of the word “spooks” was intended as a jocular means of calling into doubt the corporeal 
existence of two students who had never attended his class, Coleman incurs the zealous 
                                                 
29In her essay on The Human Stain, Patrice Rankin has mentioned how: “[p]assing is a strong trope, both 
a historical reality and one of America’s most abiding literary motifs” (101). As a novelistic theme, 
passing finds a rich heritage in such diverse works as Nella Larsen’s Passing and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. It is from such literary examples that Roth draws a significant part of his inspiration 
for The Human Stain. 
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wrath of the politically correct faculty members at Athena College. Having been accused 
of racism, he departs from his academic post in a pique of rage. Determined to enlist 
help in writing an autobiography that will prove both a personal defence and a 
retributive form of vengeance against his accusers, Coleman calls on Zuckerman, the 
local writer who is himself somewhat in ‘hiding’ or seclusion from the greater social 
world.  
 
 The damning accusation made against Coleman for his unwitting use of a racist 
term becomes a focus through which Roth dramatises various tensions in the 
relationship between race and subjectivity in The Human Stain. In contrast to the racially 
sensitive language of political correctness by which he stands judged, Coleman’s earlier 
act of passing is largely presented by Zuckerman in terms of the liberating possibilities 
afforded by its self-determining notion of subjectivity. Zuckerman thus explores in 
Coleman’s tangled biography a novel variation on the conflicts between prescribed 
notions of social origins and acts of self-authorship that have coloured his own life and 
writing in the past. Unwilling to accept the notion of a degraded racial identity – as it is 
both assigned by white dominated society and internalised by his African-American 
environment of family and community – the young Coleman’s desire to pass as white 
finds expression through a universal humanist language that considers the “individual as 
real apart and beyond the social determinants defining him” (333). By contrast, the code 
of political correctness that the aged Coleman is deemed to have transgressed is 
regimented by a heightened awareness of how racial differences mark an unalterable 
condition of subjectivity. According to Elaine Ginsberg, “both the process and the 
discourse of passing interrogate the ontology of identity categories and their 
construction” (4) in such a way that de-legitimises any strict notion of racially 
determined subjectivity. She suggests that: “[i]n its interrogation of the essentialism that 
is the foundation of identity politics, passing has the potential to create a space for 
creative self-determination and agency” (16). In a manner which compares somewhat 
with Ginsberg’s argument, Roth counterpoises the historically disjunctive phenomena of 
passing and political correctness as a means of dramatising the harried struggle between 
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creative acts of autogenesis and the notion of an inescapable origin that has defined both 
Coleman and Zuckerman’s personal histories. However, in contrast to how Ginsberg 
prioritises the values of “creative self-determination” over identity politics, Roth’s text 
finds no clear resolution or synthesis for its dialectical struggle between ideas of self-
reinvention and social determinism. I wish to demonstrate how Coleman’s desire to 
create the self anew is placed in dialogic tension with a certain impassable trauma of 
class and race in The Human Stain. In turn, I will look at how such a conflict finds 
important parallels in the life of Roth’s narrator. By exploring the complications and 
limitations involved in Coleman’s attempt at self-authorship, I would suggest that 
Zuckerman finds yet another means of rehearsing the painful conflict involved in his 
own efforts to reinvent his Jewish origins and, thereby, assert his authorial pre-eminence 
over influences external to (and competing with) his writing.  
 
By thus examining how various conflicts between notions self-making and 
socially constructed identity – what Coleman describes as his determined battle not to 
“let the big they impose its bigotry on you any more than you can let the little they 
become a we and impose its ethics on you” (108) – operate in the novel, I will explore 
the manner in which Roth engages with contemporary cultural debates over political 
correctness and identity politics. As my previous chapter already discusses, certain 
efforts to regulate how marginal subjectivities are understood and spoken about within 
contemporary America have helped to somewhat undermine and erode traditional liberal 
concepts of the shared sense of social and cultural belonging that unites the nation’s 
wide diversity of people. As people like Todd Gitlin and George Packer have helped to 
outline, the language of commonalities and cultural universality is today being 
monopolised by more right-wing concepts of the asocial and self-determining individual. 
The Human Stain dramatises certain challenges that the popularised growth of localised 
notions of cultural difference within American life bring to the more transcendent idea 
of a shared and inalienable sense of (deracinated) human potential to which Coleman 
and, to a similar but lesser extent, Zuckerman have each aspired in the past. Roth’s novel 
thus locates itself at the centre of recent tensions between broad encompassing ideas of a 
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common national polity – as they are separately framed by both Rooseveltian liberalism 
and the new conservative Right in America – and more recalcitrant notions of how 
American cultural experience is fragmented and sectionalised according to distinct 
categories such as race and gender. 
 
Political Correctness and Cultural Divisions in Late-century America 
 
 The academic setting of Athena College for Roth’s examination of political 
correctness in The Human Stain is highly significant. The heightened attention given to 
the plights of marginal subjects in American cultural life since the sixties – described 
varyingly under the rubrics of “political correctness” and “identity politics” – has found 
leading proponents within academic circles, most notably among humanities 
departments. Some commentators have noted how the radical sensibility that took root 
among the New Left during the late sixties has since migrated into academia, where 
former activists (now turned academics) have attempted to use the university and its 
curricula as sites for effecting both institutional and wider cultural change.30 For 
example, universities like Berkeley have developed an affirmative action approach to 
their admissions policies in order to ensure a wider proportion of attendance from 
marginalised groups at their institutions.31 Academics have also been influential in 
shaping and implementing the use of a politically correct lexicon that seeks to defend the 
dignity of various vulnerable sections of society from the “socially accepted Sadism” 
(Rorty 1998, 83) of previous derogatory labels. Perhaps the most profound changes 
effected by these new attitudes toward empowering traditionally oppressed groups 
within America are the challenges that have been made within curricula to the 
construction and interpretation of notions of cultural tradition. This has involved a re-
examination of canonical notions of cultural heritage, bringing about changes in the 
selection of what areas of the past – which texts and whose histories – are prioritised for 
                                                 
30 For example, George Packer has noted that, since the sixties: “[t]he radical desire to change society has 
been satisfied by an alchemical process known as ‘neo-Marxism,’ which has turned politics into the 
struggle over the syllabus” (282).  
31 For a somewhat critical treatment of Berkeley’s admissions’ policy, see D’Souza p.24 – 58. 
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study. By attempting to include previously unattended experiences and voices from 
outside the established literary Canon, for example, a more fragmentary sense of the 
cultural past is developed that brings into question the legitimacy of any unified and 
stable idea of ‘Culture’ or ‘Tradition.’ In addition, certain scholars have undertaken a re-
evaluation of already canonised texts, in an effort to discuss how such integral 
components of the dominant literary tradition have been informed by previously 
overlooked issues such as race, gender and sexual orientation.  
 
In attempting to thus complicate certain cohesive and prevailing notions of 
culture tradition, the proponents of this form of scholarship assert that “[w]hat is 
supported by PC [political correctness] is a ‘politics of difference’” (Min Choi and 
Murphy, 131). As the following number of pages will demonstrate, it has been widely 
noted that the various movements behind political correctness and identity politics have 
borrowed from post-sixties theories of difference and deconstruction in their efforts to 
challenge notions of established power and cultural dominance. However, detractors 
among both conservatives and traditional left-liberals have found objection with the 
fragmented vision of humanity and culture that shapes identity politics. Such critics 
argue that the concept of difference put forth by what has been called the “cultural Left” 
(Rorty 1998, 79) becomes, paradoxically, absolutist to the extent that a shared language 
of compromise (or even disputation) is rejected in favour of a discourse which is tailored 
solely to the sensitivities and ambitions of a particular viewpoint. What critics of identity 
politics on both the Left and Right share is an insistence upon the importance – 
somewhat different according to their separate political agendas – of a common cultural 
tradition in which a complete and universal vision of humanity can be gauged.  
 
 As I have mentioned in my previous chapter, the development of a New Right 
sensibility since the 1960s has grown in opposition to leftist movements from the same 
period that have sought to question fixed and neutral assumptions about cultural 
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orthodoxy and social authority.32 For instance, Peter Collier and David Horowitz balk at 
what they see as the horrifying manner in which the sixties “made society into a 
collection of splinter groups, special interest organizations and newly minted 
‘minorities,’ whose only common belief was that America was guilty and 
untrustworthy” (19). This ascription of a language of hostile separatism to post-sixties’ 
identity politics is typical of conservative efforts to see it as aberrant to “some kind of 
eternal or universal principle” (Min Choi and Murphy, 22). Dinesh D’ Souza stands at 
the forefront of this assessment of political correctness, seeing it as a militant attack 
upon any kind of objective truth value in the name of ‘special interest’ factions. He 
describes how academic proponents of identity politics, having been “weaned on the 
assorted ideologies of the late 1960s” (17), went on to lead a “victim’s revolution [that] 
is transforming what is taught, both inside and outside the American university 
classroom” (14). As part of their effort to arrest a perceived slide into cultural chaos, 
conservative critics have come to defend canonical notions of higher culture against 
contemporary efforts at revision. Refusing to entertain the challenges to epistemological 
notions of unity and objectivity within post-structural theories of difference, 
conservatives criticise strategies of political correctness and identity politics as narrow 
and factional attempts to regulate cultural knowledge. By contrast, they claim to uphold 
a disinterested cultural viewpoint that preserves important values of aesthetic expression, 
independent thought and free speech against the ideological prescriptions of the cultural 
Left.33   
 
In terms of literary criticism, conservatives have virulently opposed the manner 
in which gendered, race-centred or any other such contemporary political readings of 
                                                 
32 Jung Min Choi and John Murphy stress that: “[t]he [conservative] foes of PC argue that it is pushing 
today’s society to the brink of chaos. They contend that this is because credence is given to ‘relativism,’ as 
a result of a persistent attack on objectivity, positive science, and uniform cultural standards” (19). 
33 This more conservative defence of notions of intellectual autonomy and free speech against the 
advances of politically correct thought is best demonstrated by D’Souza’s assessment of the introduction 
of speech codes – designed to protect vulnerable identities from prejudice – on many elite American 
campuses: “Censorship regulations at several colleges today are restrictive enough that a typical policy at 
the University of Connecticut interprets as ‘harassment’ all remarks that offend or stigmatize women or 
minorities” (9). 
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literature set out to defile the transcendent and timeless values of canonical texts for 
matters of biased sectional expediency. An early figurehead for this struggle to preserve 
cultural order and authority by defending the literary Canon, Allan Bloom warned 
against the burgeoning protest for change within curricula at universities during the late 
sixties: “in order to admit all these specialties into the curriculum and give them equal 
status as they demand, all sense of unity and hierarchy has to be abandoned” (352). For 
Bloom, “[t]he quest [of knowledge] can never be for diversity but must be for” 
something more universal and eternal: “the truth about the highest good and the end of 
life” (363). “What our students most want and need,” he argued, “is training in a few 
books in the great tradition which gives them models for the serious, rather than the 
sham, universality, books which ... provide not only an intellectual education but also a 
moral education insofar as they involve the reader’s concerns with living the good life” 
(360). Echoing Bloom’s concerns, John Ellis bemoans how the conjunction of post-
structural theory and identity politics within contemporary literary studies has developed 
a mixture of “tribal chauvinism and resentment” (23) that seek “to reject Western 
society” (26). He goes on to discuss what he labels the “monotony and irrelevance” (47) 
of a “one-note criticism” that has “a fixed agenda and predetermined set of [political] 
concerns” (46). According to Ellis, such forms of “totalitarian criticism” (57) seek to 
conflate the literary text with ideology, thus removing literature from its more elevated 
role as a marker of the universal “essence of human situations” (40). Conservative critics 
thus locate in the cultural Left’s approach to canonical understandings of culture and 
tradition a peculiar mixture of fragmented differences and oppressive totalities; post-
structural relativism and an austere “conformity to preferred ideological positions” 
(D’Souza, xiv).34  
 
                                                 
34 Collier and Horowitz’s unremitting chagrin toward the changes wrought in academic curricula since the 
sixties provides yet another example of this conservative position: “Leftists have brought a postmodern 
Dark Age to higher education – “deconstructing” objective truths to pave the way for chic academic 
nihilism; creating a curriculum of contempt for American history and culture; and transforming many 
classrooms into chambers of inquisition and indoctrination” (7).  
 176
 My previous chapter already outlines, albeit briefly, how certain left-liberal 
thinkers have also criticised what they deem to be the urgent efforts of the politically 
correct to separate the local or marginal from mainstream American culture, without 
reconstructing any alternative vision for collective social or political action out of the 
fragmentary units of cultural identity that remain. Despite their similar point of attack, 
such leftists and liberals obviously do not share in the Right’s idea of a relationship 
between timeless cultural values and a conservative form of social order. In contrast, 
these commentators criticise the post-structural emphasis upon “the infinite distance 
which separates us from the other” (Rorty 1998, 97) as a purblind rejection of what is 
best about the Western cultural tradition: namely the potential for left or liberal forms of 
historical progress that inhere in traditional Enlightenment values and concepts. The 
radical post-structural logic of identity politics is, therefore, deemed by some to have 
rendered mute the possibilities for collective political mobilisation by seeing all liberal 
and leftist discourses of praxis in terms of “a colonialist smothering – an ideology to 
rationalize white male domination” (Gitlin 1995, 100). Robert Hughes describes how the 
post-structuralist suspicion that all notions of centred and integrated knowledge are 
repressively logocentric has left little room for any new constructions of political ideas 
or agents: “all you had left was language … with pervasive systems of repressive 
undecidability written everywhere in the surrounding culture, but no means of 
overcoming it” (63). Elsewhere, Eric Foner mentions how “[t]he same telescoping of the 
personal and political that widened the experience of individual freedom for so many 
Americans [during the sixties] also contributed to a growing estrangement from formal 
politics, and, indeed, from any notion of a common civil life” (305) in the post-sixties 
period. In opposition to this post-structuralist end-game in which the “only common 
condition worth thinking about was the impossibility of commonality” (Gitlin 1995, 
102), the more traditionalist voices among liberals and leftists argue that notions of the 
oppressed margin can find alleviation within the progressive discourses of liberalism and 
the Left in America. Preferring to see Western Enlightenment tradition as a “many-
celled edifice” rather than some oppressive “monolith,” Robert Hughes, for instance,  
has argued that: “[f]or the past two hundred years, the victims of oppression have always 
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been able to find a transforming and strengthening vision within the literature and 
thought of Europe” (128).35 
 
In terms of the literary Canon, left-liberal critics have warned against any blind 
usurpation of tradition that replaces once favoured texts with a new set of books by 
authors who originate outside of what has been considered mainstream Western or 
American culture. According to this viewpoint, cultural leftist efforts to radically 
disfigure the literary Canon carry a potentially restrictive agenda that values works of 
literature according to the efficacy of their political, moral or “therapeutic” (Hughes, 90) 
merit.36 Hughes, for example, argues that the Western Canon is not predicated upon – as 
the cultural Right might proudly claim and the politically correct Left defiantly scorn – 
any static or reified “hierarchy of Timeless Values … [that it maintains] against the 
vicissitudes of the present” (93). Instead, for Hughes, “the history of literature is one of 
continuous inclusion and subversion” (94) that suitably demonstrates the very pluralism 
– marked out by tensions between dominance and oppression – that has so fascinates the 
cultural Left. In this sense, already established canons of literary history can be re-
appropriated from their conservative cultural usage by the Right as a means of 
understanding how various struggles between centre and margin, power and subjection 
have been ongoing in Western culture. Henry Louis Gates has shown a similar concern 
                                                 
35 Of course, I am fully aware that progressive notions of left and liberal can vary greatly, and are indeed 
often at odds with each other. Hughes’s claim that identity politics has “weakened and in some areas 
broken the traditional American genius for consensus, for getting along by making up practical 
compromises to meet real social needs” (16) represents a conventional liberal stance that is much different 
to, for instance, Fredric Jameson’s Marxist opposition to post-structuralism. In Postmodernism or, the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Jameson argues that postmodernism – what he calls “the substitute for 
the sixties and the compensation for their political failure” – has provided “a crucial test of what is left of 
our capacity to imagine change at all” (xvi). Unlike Hughes, Jameson does not hark backwards to “some 
older and more transparent national space” (Jamexon, 54) that exists beyond the inchoate debris of 
postmodern culture. Instead, he explores the possibility of achieving a more radical leftist “breakthrough 
to some as yet unimaginable new mode of representing [late capitalism] … in which we may again begin 
to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle 
which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion” (54).   
36 “The quarrel over the Canon reflects the sturdy assumption that works of art are or ought to be 
therapeutic … This happens, or is supposed to happen, because the writer, whether it’s Plato or Alice 
Walker, becomes a “role-model” for the reader. If you read Evelyn Waugh before you read Franz Fanon 
you may become a racist (if white), or (if black) suffer an attack of the bends through sudden 
decompression of self-esteem” (Hughes, 90).  
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with some contemporary approaches to studying African-American literature and 
culture. In their rush “to critique the essentialism implicit in notions of a common or 
universal American heritage,” he argues, certain scholars have indulged in their own 
separatist “mode of [racial] essentialism” (107). Declaring his partial “agree[ment] with 
those conservatives who have raised the alarm about our students’ ignorance of history,” 
Gates insists that the study of canon formations are important for understanding how 
such selective processes of constructing cultural tradition have helped, at varying stages 
of the past, to legitimise the marginalisation and outright exclusion of African-
Americans from the dominant culture: “[o]nce we understand how they arose, we no 
longer see literary canons as objets trouves washed up on the beach ... we can begin to 
appreciate their ever-changing configuration in relation to a distinctive institutional 
history” (109-10). Elsewhere, Gerald Graff insists that canons are not unitary and 
hermetically self-enclosed, but are formed in “dialogic relation” (60) to a variety of 
contesting cultural voices and modes of expression. According to him, these many 
points of conflict help us to understand how dominant literary traditions are created in 
tension with, rather than in complete separation from, more liminal forms of cultural 
experience: “[t]he point would be neither to deify nor to debunk Western culture, but to 
put it into relation to the forces challenging it” (68).  
 
 As the above citation from Gates suggests, there is a certain overlap in left-
liberal and conservative criticisms of the way in which identity politics has attempted to 
dismantle the idea of a literary Canon. Certain left-liberals also share with those on the 
Right a dismay with the manner in which the politically correct binary of oppressed 
margin and dominant centre creates a rigid (logo-centric) moral absolutism all of its 
own. Robert Hughes’s argument that marginal or vulnerable cultural identities have 
become encased by the sensitivities of a “culture of complaint” in which historical 
“grievance [is] elevated into automatic sanctity” (16), for example, shares deep 
resonances with D’Souza’s similar appraisal of how political correctness has produced a 
“victim culture.” However, the more progressive notion of the dominant Western 
tradition as heterogeneous and open to internal (and external, as Graff suggests) re-
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evaluation works in opposition to the Right’s attempt to monopolise the canonical past – 
literary or otherwise – by claiming it as a bulwark of certain conservative notions of 
social order and cultural universality. As my last chapter pointed out, the growing to 
prominence of identity politics among the post-sixties’ Left has given rise to a situation 
in which “conservatives were picking up and claiming for their side the very concepts, 
valuable ones, that their left-wing opponents were busy discarding – merit, objectivity, 
universalism” (Packer, 307). Unlike the overriding progressive belief in redressing 
issues of historical suffering and inequality, conservative ideas of commonality are 
based upon a radical economic and political concept of individual self-determination. 
The New Right’s doctrine of economic libertarianism, as I have suggested previously, 
has opposed both older methods of Rooseveltian reform and the more recent claims of 
identity politics with a transcendent “notion of the individual as fundamentally asocial 
and ahistorical” (Thompson, 12). In my discussion of The Human Stain that follows this 
brief discussion on the debates surrounding identity politics, I will explore in greater 
detail the ways in which Coleman’s claim to a universal humanist concept of the self “as 
real apart and beyond the social determinants defining him” might intersect with this 
conservative notion of unfettered individualism. By presenting the complex ways in 
which Coleman’s decision to pass beyond the confines of his race is compromised and 
frustrated in the text, I will examine how Roth approaches both conservative notions of 
cultural order and politically correct concepts of difference. In turn, I will also look at 
what the novel has to say about left-liberal ideas of American cultural identity. 
  
 As the previous few pages suggest, identity politics has simultaneously 
engendered a radical critique of cultural totalities, while also being labelled as rigid and 
prescriptive by its detractors. For both right-wing conservatives and old-fashioned 
Rooseveltian liberals, the post-structuralist (lack of) foundation for the cultural politics 
of the post-sixties Left appears to offer an irreconcilable polarisation of tradition, 
objective knowledge and a restraining centre on the one hand, with a radically 
multiplying sense of difference and the endless subversion of a common culture on the 
other. Yet according to certain of its proponents, identity politics does not necessarily 
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involve an exhaustive logic of either accepting or rejecting the dominant culture, but has 
been merely construed in such absolutist terms by those eager to dismiss it. In an effort 
to bridge the gap between the anti-foundationalist philosophy of cultural leftists and 
those left-liberals who insist that concerted political action relies upon a sense of cultural 
commonality and objectively established values, Min Choi and Murphy assert that: 
“questioning the traditional a priori status of common knowledge is not the same as 
doubting the possibility of shared information” (150). A politics of difference, in this 
sense, does not have to degenerate into narrow marginal perspectives, but serves “PCers 
to understand common knowledge to emerge from direct encounters between persons, 
which are constantly shifting and developing” (Min Choi and Murphy, 150). By offering 
a sense of the “shifting and developing” conditions of interaction between different 
social groups, such an argument would appear to re-introduce the notion of a shared – 
albeit somewhat provisional and revisable – historical situation. This argument shares 
some degree of resonance with the way in which people like Hughes, Graff, Gates and 
Rorty all suggest that sharp cultural differences can, in fact, find suitable recognition and 
expression within a broader sense of shared humanity or culture. Such claims, as I have 
shown, suppose that subjects on the periphery can participate in and prosper from a more 
universalising vision of common political action.37  
 
By contrast, Stanley Fish insists that no underlying foundation or notion of “the 
common” (244) can be located beneath the post-structural logic of identity politics: “it is 
all embattled ground and no less so when it is labeled as ‘common’ ground” (246). For 
Fish, all narratives and positions are “challengeable, partisan, conflictual, differential,” 
meaning that notions of difference themselves “cannot be privileged … without turning 
them into the kind of normative and transcendental standards to which they are 
                                                 
37 For example, Rorty discusses the partial achievements of the cultural Left in helping to eradicate the 
various forms of social “stigma” (1998, 91) associated with race and other equally marginal experiences. 
He  goes on to argue that such limited successes can be augmented by a positive interaction between 
politically correct advocates and the traditional politics of “the old reformist Left” (91). In order to achieve 
this idea of a coalition between the old and new strands of leftist action and thought, Rorty claims that: 
“the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old 
reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even 
at the cost of talking less about stigma” (91).  
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putatively opposed” (248). For instance, he criticises what he sees as Gerald Graff’s 
reification of the conflicts within Western tradition. “By making difference into a new 
‘common’ ground,” he explains, “Graff succeed[s] only in evading the lesson of its 
irreducibility” (248). This radical sense of ever-fissuring difference – “it is difference all 
the way down” (247) – in his argument is somewhat tempered by Fish’s claim that the 
“poststructuralist characterization of the normative as a local rather than a transcendental 
realm … is not an assault on ethics but an account of the conditions – textual and 
revisable, to be sure – within which moments of ethical choice are always and genuinely 
emerging” (251). At first glance, this concept of ethical judgement might appear to re-
introduce a provisional notion of the “common” into Fish’s argument. At the same time, 
he is keen to insist that any such ethical position is always based upon a highly transient 
and “revisable” notion of historical co-ordinates: “if values and standards are themselves 
historical products, fashioned and refashioned in the crucible of discussion and debate, 
there is no danger of their being subverted because they are always and already being 
transformed” (264). The ever rapid changes and shifting positions involved in this 
textual idea of history – a history formed by “the crucible of discussion and debate” 
rather than by inert material forces – are very much at odds with the more concrete sense 
of a common tradition cited by people like Rorty, Hughes and Gitlin. In this way, Fish’s 
determination not to let difference hypostasise as “common” would appear to set him 
radically at odds with those left-liberals who appeal to a usable American tradition of 
collective political action.  
 
The “persecuting spirit” of Identity Politics in The Human Stain 
 
Zuckerman describes the heightened sensibility of political correctness at Athena 
College as a form of narrow doctrine, in which certain vindictive urges to demonise 
others as politically “incorrect” are sanctioned by a virulent sense of moral 
righteousness. He refers to the zeal among Coleman’s academic colleagues to blame and 
punish him over the “spooks incident” as an example of “America’s oldest communal 
passion, historically perhaps its most treacherous and subversive pleasure: the ecstasy of 
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sanctimony” (2). This sense of a “persecuting spirit” (2) pervading national life finds a 
far greater context for Zuckerman in President Clinton’s impeachment trial and the 
moral outrage directed against him over his sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky. Seeing 
a lamentable correlation in how both Coleman and Clinton have become victims to an 
American cultural environment in which people are “eager to enact the astringent rituals 
of purification” (2), Zuckerman seems to share in Robert Hughes’s assessment of the 
enforcement of politically correct codes as a “process [that] is akin to the old American 
religious one of shunning and shaming” (Hughes, 51). This prevailing sense in which 
“life, in all its shameful impurity, once again confounded America” (3) finds yet further 
evidence for Zuckerman in the atmosphere of gossip and prejudice that surrounds 
Coleman’s sexual affair with Faunia Farley, a janitor at Athena College. In particular, 
Delphine Roux, a jealous and vindictive former colleague who led the charges of racism 
against him, accuses Coleman of manipulating “an abused, illiterate woman half your 
age” (38). The alacrity with which Delphine positions herself as the defender of 
vulnerable womanhood in this instance is linked to her role in the novel as a determined 
academic proponent of identity politics. Delphine’s eagerness to label Coleman as both a 
racist and a chauvinist forms part of her wider efforts to locate him as an example of the 
Ur-oppressor: the historically dominant white male to which her morally charged sense 
of political radicalism finds its point of attack.  
 
 In fierce opposition to the cultural and moral prescripts by which Clinton and 
Coleman are judged, Zuckerman repeatedly expresses a radical scepticism toward our 
ability to know people in such absolute terms. By insisting that “our understanding of 
people must always be at best slightly wrong” (22), he admonishes those who have 
sought to vilify Coleman and Clinton for indulging in what he calls a “purity binge” (2). 
There is an obvious irony in how Zuckerman’s assertion that “[t]he things you know you 
don’t know” (209) is set in opposition to the rigid moral fervour of Athena’s brand of 
identity politics. In many ways, his sense of epistemological indeterminacy is more 
typical of post-structural theories of difference that seek to liberate the marginal subject 
from oppressive notions of the centre, while the cultural leftist thought of academics 
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such as Delphine appears as ideologically intransigent and essentialist. Unlike the more 
determinist language of race and gender that Delphine wields, the anti-foundational 
claim that we “don’t know” anything for certain serves to bolster a creative idea of the 
self as its own author in The Human Stain, unanswerable to external notions of authority 
or origin. Over the many stages of Roth’s literary development and most particularly in 
the Zuckerman texts, this quest for self-authorship is relentlessly pitted against a 
restrictive sense of inherited Jewish identity. As my introduction suggests, Roth’s Jewish 
protagonists often set out to disown their localised ethnic allegiances in favour of the 
more liberating notions of individual self-possession that they discover in broader values 
of American democratic culture and high-literary tradition. Interestingly, this struggle 
between inherited origins and the self-determining subject in Roth would appear to 
reverse the claims made by certain post-structural critics about how far-reaching and 
dominant notions of literary and national culture work to stifle and oppress cultural 
differences. Figures such as Portnoy and Zuckerman are inhibited and frustrated – not 
empowered – by their sense of marginal and parochial beginnings as American Jews. By 
contrast, the more universal sense of cultural belonging that they seek elsewhere proffers 
a greater amount of self-liberation for these characters. Coleman’s act of passing in The 
Human Stain is carried out with a similar hope of exploring the more expansive and 
unexplored territory of the private self that lies beyond his pre-assigned social role as an 
African-American. In this way, the personal and aesthetic quest to escape his origins and 
recreate himself anew that Zuckerman undertook in novels such as The Ghost Writer and 
The Counterlife finds important parallels in the biography that he constructs for 
Coleman. 
 
Yet as I will illustrate later in this chapter, Roth’s novel carefully examines how 
notions of the self as blissfully free from any determining origin or politically correct 
categorisation are almost as equally “wrong” as Delphine’s authoritative claims about 
gendered and racial identities. Coleman’s effort to acquire a greater sense of the self as it 
exists beyond the pre-determined assignations of race involves its own myth of personal 
origins. Such a vaunted ambition for an absolute form of self-knowledge and self-
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possession contradicts Zuckerman’s assertion that we cannot know anything for certain 
about either ourselves or others. Through the story that he weaves in The Human Stain, 
Zuckerman explores how certain inerasable experiences of ethnicity, race and class have 
worked to frustrate both his own and his protagonist’s efforts to perceive their adult lives 
as being completely separated from the social context of their upbringing. Such a 
complex examination of Coleman and Zuckerman’s longings for complete ownership of 
the self is highly consistent with Roth’s earlier explorations of Jewish social identity. As 
my introduction discusses, the various journeys of accession into the myth of 
deracinated and self-determining subjectivity that many of Roth’s characters make are, 
ultimately, frustrated by a residual sense of a wounded or marginalised Jewish 
experience. It is in this particular manner that the idea of a common and universal 
cultural inheritance that transcends more parochial experiences of Jewish belonging is 
made highly problematic in Roth’s fiction. Through the distinct parallels that enmesh the 
stories of both Zuckerman and Coleman Silk in The Human Stain, Roth explores the 
manner in which this highly complex and divided sense of Jewish-American identity 
impacts upon arguments about commonality and difference in recent cultural debates in 
America. Roth’s notion of inescapable origins is not mechanically deterministic or 
essentialist, but functions as an inassimilable trauma of marginalised social identity that 
compromises – as well as motivates – the individual’s desire for self-reinvention. This 
paradoxically self-divided idea of an ethnic or racial heritage that is outright rejected by 
the individual subject and yet holds a persistent and insurmountable influence over him 
is thus sharply contrasted with the authoritarian and prescriptive language of identity 
politics articulated by Delphine and her cohort at Athena.  
   
 Zuckerman’s statements about the epistemological gap that exists within our 
sense of what is ‘real’ about both the self and others thus hold clear significance for the 
notion of self-authorship which unites him, symbolically, with Coleman. This radical 
doubt over his understanding of the “facts” also has serious implications for 
Zuckerman’s narrative efforts to author a credible account of the unreliable details that 
make up his knowledge of Coleman’s biography. Self-conscious of his role as a highly 
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partial witness to the events and circumstances that have shaped Coleman’s life, 
Zuckerman reflects upon the role that his literary imagination has served in bringing his 
now deceased friend back into (narrative) life: 
 
For better or worse, I can only do what everyone does who thinks that they know. I imagine. I am forced 
to imagine (213)  
  
This declaration of his narrative intention to “imagine” a biography for Coleman recalls 
similar statements made in American Pastoral about having “dreamed a realistic 
chronicle” of the Swede’s life. Both examples encapsulate the much repeated argument 
in other Roth novels about the inaccessibility of the facts beyond their translation into 
imagined or fictionalised forms. Zuckerman’s assessment that we suffer from a paucity 
of any ‘real’ knowledge of things lends credence to the notion that he refrains in earlier 
novels about how literature serves as a surrogate for the ultimately unknowable reaches 
of life.  
 
For Zuckerman, literature affords a possibility for re-imagining reality and, 
thereby, liberating life from the deadening facts and moral certainties involved in 
Delphine’s censorious language of political correctness. Having been shown the letter 
sent to Coleman in which Delphine accuses him of “sexually exploiting” (38) Faunia, 
Zuckerman examines how it uses the words “[e]veryone knows” (209) to transform its 
narrow agendas of gender politics and personal vendetta into a claim to universally 
accepted knowledge. In doing so, he reflects upon the wider idea of epistemological 
doubt that concerns him as a writer: 
 
“Everyone knows” is the invocation of the cliché and the beginning of the banalization of experience, and 
it’s the solemnity and the sense of authority that people have in voicing the cliché that’s so insufferable. 
What we know is that, in an unclichéd way, nobody knows anything … All that we don’t know is 
astonishing. Even more astonishing is what passes for knowing (209)  
 
According to Zuckerman, it is fiction that serves to combat the reductive and aggressive 
economy of the “cliché.” The radical sense of doubt implied by the fact that “nobody 
knows anything” permits an imaginative openness to varying and countervailing 
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narrative speculations on people and events. Such a creative willingness to explore what 
is merely probable or possible is stifled by the “[e]veryone knows” language with which 
Delphine efforts to excise “the jumble, the mayhem, the mess” (3) from life. The 
unpolished and impure aspects of contingency and indeterminacy that she refuses to 
countenance, however, are central to Zuckerman’s concept of how both the self and 
writing are somewhat unmoored from pre-fixed notions of the ‘real’ or origin.   
 
Zuckerman’s concept of how writing and self-authorship are correlated by the 
contradictory knowledge that “nobody knows anything” finds added relevance in the 
notion of secrecy which runs throughout The Human Stain. His fictional re-telling of 
Coleman’s story is engendered by a fascination with the hidden elements of subjectivity 
that litter his friend’s past – his suspicion that “somewhere there’s a blank in him” (213). 
The challenge to knowledge that is posed by such secrecy has dual implications in terms 
of both Coleman’s identity and Zuckerman’s narrative. The “blank” in his efforts to 
locate Coleman as a narrative subject marks out the uncertain space between fact and 
fiction that, somewhat paradoxically, engenders Zuckerman’s richly speculative account 
of Silk’s life. For Coleman, meanwhile, it is by keeping secret his origins that he is able 
to explore the creative possibilities of selfhood that lie beyond his identity as an African-
American subject. The “concept of life as something whose purpose is concealed” (333) 
that he reads into Coleman’s passing, therefore, finds favour with Zuckerman’s narrative 
insistence that all assumed forms of knowledge are fundamentally dissonant and 
incomplete; fictional variations on the ‘real.’ By making “his disguise my subject … 
[and] the proper presentation of his secret my problem to solve” (45), therefore, 
Zuckerman finds in Coleman’s history a suitable location for exploring the aesthetic 
relationship between personal acts of self-transformation and the writer’s mode of 
reinventing life. Yet as this chapter proceeds, it will explore certain complications 
involved in these concepts of disguise and secrecy. I wish to examine how Coleman’s 
hidden or repressed origins are revealed and re-visited during certain moments of crisis 
that make uncertain his liberated sense of post-racial identity. Furthermore, I will also 
look at how Coleman’s ordeal is paralleled by Zuckerman’s failed attempts to disguise 
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or make secret his own narrative presence in the American trilogy. Despite his efforts to 
free his art from certain autobiographical conflicts in these texts, the mixture of longing 
and anguished frustration that has marked Zuckerman’s life as a Jewish-American 
subject continues to be made palpably evident in The Human Stain. Just like Coleman, 
then, Zuckerman’s efforts to ‘pass’ over the complications of his marginal origins for 
greater purposes of creative (self-) invention are subject to a clear degree of frustration.    
 
Zuckerman’s intimate awareness of the fact that our epistemological and 
narrative claims upon experience are highly provisional and ultimately eschewed carries 
a double bind which threatens to reverse the creative possibilities permitted by its exilic 
notion of the ‘real.’ In one sense, he lionises fiction as a necessary supplement for our 
inhibited knowledge of the facts. According to this viewpoint, literature redeems a rich 
and multivalent sense of the (aesthetic) potentialities from a reality that is otherwise 
denuded of any clear form of meaning. At the same time, Zuckerman can also be seen in 
the novel to experience the void in our understanding of ‘real’ life as a dangerous 
vanishing point for his creative endeavours. This precarious tension between rampant 
literary invention and nullifying silence finds expression through the dramatic interplay 
between Eros and Thanatos that propels Zuckerman’s writing both in this novel and 
throughout the series of Roth texts in which he appears. Zuckerman’s authorship of 
events in The Human Stain registers an erotic longing to creatively transform what is 
known about the self and others in a way that surpasses the deadening endgames of 
“everyone knows” and “nobody knows.” Yet this creative urge is (de-)centred upon an 
epistemology – “nobody knows” – that continually suggests a sense of thanatological 
nullity. This idea of how the secret or unknowable details of Coleman’s life both 
stimulate Zuckerman’s literary ambition and yet constantly elude his grasp finds a useful 
insight in Frank Kermode’s The Genesis of Secrecy. Exploring in detail the fraught 
relationship between secrets and narrative interpretation, he describes “secrecy [as] … 
the source of the interpreter’s pleasures, but also of his necessary disappointment” (xi). 
Such a difficult sense of how ‘real’ facts are both revealed and yet remain somewhat 
hidden finds clear parallels, as I will go on to discuss, with the paradoxical structure of 
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trauma as an event that has occurred, but which is still not fully assimilated to 
consciousness. Furthermore, the sense of personal liberation that the novel locates in the 
notion of the self as unknown and without a fixed origin also involves an idea of 
subjectivity as always, in some way, incomplete and therefore lacking a fully 
individuated sense of autonomy. I will outline below how the aesthetic and erotic 
possibilities that Zuckerman locates in Coleman’s idea of the self as a tabula rasa, 
unconditioned by social forces, conflict with a certain traumatic experience of death or 
non-being which haunts his efforts to embody a new post-racial identity of white 
masculinity. In as much as the profound gap in his knowledge of actual details and facts 
both fuels and threatens to silence Zuckerman’s imaginative reconstruction of events, 
Coleman’s hidden origins represent a lack or secret that – although allowing him to 
creatively explore a life that is markedly other to his originally assigned social identity – 
comes to stand for his very status as an incomplete or racially marked white man.   
 
Writing as a Form of “competition with death” 
 
Having departed from his post at Athena College amid a torrent of rage at the 
accusations of racism made against him, Coleman befriends Zuckerman in an effort to 
get the “professional writer” (11) to tell his story. By doing so, he hopes to achieve the 
sense of moral vindication that his own struggle to explain the incident leading to his 
resignation, in a memoir entitled Spooks, has failed to manage. Explaining how “it 
required something like a feat of magic for me to stay awake” (18) when listening to 
Coleman’s monomaniacal sense of injustice, Zuckerman is initially unenthusiastic about 
his new acquaintance. However, his attention is eventually arrested by the unexpected 
revelation of the sexual affair that Coleman is carrying out with Faunia, a woman who is 
thirty five years his junior. By re-evoking a deeply buried past life – “the oldest adult 
Coleman there ever was” – in which “his considerable talent for conscientiousness was 
spent garnering pleasure alone” (20), Silk’s renewed sexual voracity supplies evidence 
to Zuckerman’s overreaching claim that our knowledge of others is fundamentally 
inhibited by a sense of something hidden or unknown. As in previous Roth novels, the 
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erotic in this instance tests and broadens our limited understanding of the “facts,” 
undercutting all pretensions to any authentic or coherent notions of the self and others. 
According to Zuckerman, it is the “contaminant of sex” that inaugurates “the falseness, 
the dissembling, the dual being, the erotic professionalism” (37) by which any innocent 
and unitary forms of self-knowledge are made to appear inadequate. Through his 
fascination with the “transgressive audacity” (37) of Coleman’s unlikely erotic 
adventure, Zuckerman explores how desire is something that both registers and attempts 
to overcome a particular experience of lack (Thanatos/“nobody knows”). As I will 
discuss at greater length below, Coleman’s efforts to overcome the harsh limitations of 
being socially excluded or absented as a member of a marginalised race are motivated 
by an erotic urge to explore the libidinal possibilities of “the raw I with all its agility” 
(108). In this sense, desire is not linked to static and completed notions of identity for 
Zuckerman, but maps out a complex relationship between a thanatological notion of lack 
(emasculation) and an erotic longing for presence (virility).  
 
Before discussing how issues of sexual desire and death are connected in 
Coleman’s self-authoring act of passing, I will first of all focus upon the way in which 
Zuckerman’s narrative account of events in the novel is engendered by similar tensions 
between Eros and Thanatos. Derek Parker Royal has already highlighted some of the 
“narrative implications surrounding death” (2006, 127) in The Human Stain. Through 
his reading of several key passages in the novel, Royal has made clear how Zuckerman 
ruminates upon mortality as marking the ultimate existential experience of futility or 
meaninglessness. According to him, Zuckerman’s particular mode of fiction is a 
powerfully erotic force aimed against the thanatological fact that, in the end, “nobody 
knows” anything for certain. This idea of a stay against death within the narrative is 
described, correctly I would argue, by Royal as a “transitory moment” (2006, 131) that 
is unable to affect any transcendent or permanent means of redemption from the 
vertiginous knowledge of the void. Standing at Coleman’s graveside, Zuckerman makes 
this relationship between writing (as erotic longing) and Thanatos clear by describing 
how the novel we are now reading was begun as an aesthetic process of “entering into 
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professional competition with death” (338). The connection between desire and fiction 
as counter-drives to death is made further evident by Zuckerman’s vicarious sense of 
involvement in the sexual affair between Faunia and Coleman. I will explore in further 
detail below Zuckerman’s various ruminations upon how sex acts as a means of gaining 
a temporary reprieve from the misunderstandings and sense of loss that attend both their 
lives. In many ways, Zuckerman’s growing narrative obsession with Coleman and the 
latter’s renewed form of erotic longing in old age has the effect of re-awakening his own 
dormant sense of sexual/aesthetic desire. What he calls his “deliberately altered … 
relationship to the sexual caterwaul” (36-37), undertaken by means of his “experiment in 
radical seclusion” (44), is unexpectedly disrupted by Zuckerman’s friendship with and 
artistic interest in Coleman. Having been “danced … right back into life” (45) by 
Coleman, Zuckerman is once again stirred, albeit vicariously, by the world of 
desire/fiction and all the “misleading and contradictory meanings” (37) that are involved 
in its erotic confrontation with death.  
 
In as much as I borrow somewhat from his angle of focus, my discussion aims to 
diverge in important ways from Royal’s. He does allude to the “uneasy commingling of 
Eros and Thanatos” (2006, 130) in the novel’s treatment of how literature and sex afford 
only a temporary suspension of our knowledge that “nothing lasts” (The Human Stain, 
52). However, I would argue that Royal fails to fully explore the contradictory 
interdependence between death and desire that runs throughout Roth’s body of work, 
and which finds particular dramatisation within numerous passages of the novel in 
question. An example of how this close proximity between death and desire is marked 
out in The Human Stain is evidenced by a scene in which Zuckerman – describing 
himself as “play[ing] the part of the walk-on, an extra” (51) – directs his narrative gaze 
as a larger frame for the spectacle of Coleman watching Faunia at work, milking cows 
on a dairy farm. In a scene that is distinguished by its visceral and sexual imagery, 
Zuckerman describes how the unvanquished libidinal yearning of the aged Coleman 
marks a suspension of limits – namely of aging and death – by recalling “the injunction 
upon us … not merely to endure but to live” within “the enigma” of “the pointless 
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meaningfulness of living” (52). Recalling this episode after its two protagonists have 
been killed, Zuckerman highlights its significance as a stay against the concrete 
limitations and ultimate futility of existence:    
 
all was recorded as real by tens of thousands of minute impressions. The sensory fullness, the copiousness, 
the abundant – superabundant – detail of life, which is the rhapsody. And Coleman and Faunia, who are 
now dead, deep in the flow of the unexpected, day by day, minute by minute, themselves details in that 
superabundance. 
     Nothing lasts, and yet nothing passes, either. And nothing passes just because nothing lasts (52) 
 
Zuckerman’s vicarious form of narrative desire is displayed by the way in which the text 
seems to join with the enclosed and atemporal world of erotic enjoyment that Faunia and 
Coleman inhabit. To an extent, this passage affects a quasi-utopian atmosphere through 
which both Zuckerman’s writing and his protagonists appear to find a means of 
transcendence from mutable existence. However, in mentioning the irredeemable fact 
that Coleman and Faunia “are now dead,” Zuckerman reminds us of how the eternal 
present of the “superabundant” into which his narrative has placed the lovers is made 
perishable by their eventual demise. His summation that “nothing passes just because 
nothing lasts” provides an interesting way of understanding Zuckerman’s aesthetic mode 
in The Human Stain. The paradox of the crystallised scene which never quite lasts, yet 
also does not pass away into oblivion characterises Zuckerman’s creative effort to rescue 
his literary subjects (Coleman and Faunia) from death. While agreeing with Royal’s idea 
of the “transitory moment” established by libidinal and aesthetic impulses in Roth’s 
novel, I wish to add to it by making more clear how Zuckerman’s erotic urge to 
imaginatively reconstruct the facts of Coleman’s story is continually haunted by the 
indeterminate chaos of the thanatological void over which he writes.  
 
What I have discussed elsewhere as Zuckerman’s erotic mode of impersonation 
finds a particularly expansive reach in The Human Stain. This approach to writing works 
to breathe life into people and events which are otherwise made alien to him, either by 
the falsity of rumour (“everyone knows”) or the incomprehension that attends the failure 
of our efforts to gain full knowledge of them (“nobody knows”). The novel is littered 
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with examples in which Zuckerman draws attention to the fluidity of his dialogic 
technique. For example, he refers to how his ventriloquism of the deceased Faunia 
developed by means of his having “picked up the sassy vibrations of that straight-out 
talk that was hers” (338). The many vocal disguises of his fiction allow Zuckerman to 
thus inhabit other lives and plumb their otherwise secretive depths. The confounding and 
potentially debilitating awareness that “there really is no bottom to what is not known” 
(315) has the paradoxical effect of nurturing in Zuckerman an almost illimitable desire 
for exploring the possibilities presented by fiction. However, this sense of the 
creative/erotic pleasures afforded by writing in opposition to notions of death and 
unknowing is set against his acute awareness of the thanatological limitations affixed to 
his narrative means of detailing ‘real’ lives and experiences.  
 
Zuckerman’s sense of ambivalence and uncertainty as author in the text is 
demonstrated by the manner in which he is drawn to Coleman and Faunia’s sexual 
courtship. Zuckerman’s fascination with the affair between them is underwritten by 
certain anxieties about his role as the parasitical writer who seeks to unearth some 
fictional possibilities from the private and secret lives of others. At times, Zuckerman 
can be seen to inhabit a dual role as both the artist who preserves in his fiction the 
transcendent moment of the lovers’ erotic union, as well as serving as a kind of intrusive 
onlooker to their intimate privacy. It is important to note that all scenes of sexual 
intimacy between Coleman and Faunia are re-constructed in the novel by Zuckerman, 
who does not have direct access to events, but for whom such moments act as important 
examples of the metaphorical relationship between Eros and fiction as counter-drives to 
death. There is a preserving impulse at work in the way that his narrative seeks to 
capture and, in some way, make immutable the lovers’ momentary rejection of time and 
loss. Yet as the literary voyeur, Zuckerman in a way makes mutable this erotic scene by 
re-introducing it to the narrative time and form of fiction, with all the sense of 
provisional meaning that it implies in The Human Stain.  
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This suggestion that Zuckerman’s fiction has a certain destructive or corruptive 
effect – as well as a life-affirming and redemptive purpose – is underlined by 
comparisons that are made between him and the figure of Lester Farley as stalkers who 
prey upon and violate Coleman and Faunia’s intimacy. Farley is a traumatised Viet Nam 
veteran and the separated husband of Faunia. His obsessive jealousy leads him to spy 
upon Faunia and Coleman in a manner that implies a constant threat of violence toward 
them both. While he attempts to identify his narrative role with the erotic sense of 
renewal that Coleman and Faunia’s affair represents, Zuckerman also suggests a certain 
kinship between himself and Lester as destructive interlopers. In a passage that begins 
with the intention of presenting Coleman’s “head-on confrontation with Farley” (63), 
Zuckerman indicates the ambiguous position that he, as narrator, inhabits in relation to 
the lovers: “[a]s I reconstruct it, Coleman, so as to be certain that no one was spying on 
the house, was himself in and out the front door and the back door and the kitchen door 
some six or seven times in the hours after Faunia’s arrival” (63). Somewhat self-
incriminatingly, Zuckerman alludes here to how his artistic viewpoint has been imposed 
upon a scene in which Coleman is described as seeking to keep the prying gaze of 
others, particularly Les, at bay. Instead of dealing with the incident between both men 
“head-on” in his narrative, Zuckerman employs a certain artistic license by deferring the 
action and devoting a lengthy passage to his own improvised and completely fictional 
ruminations upon Coleman’s private thoughts:  
 
It was time to yield, to let this simple craving be his guide … Learn, he told himself, before you die, to 
live beyond the jurisdiction of their enraging, loathsome, stupid blame (64) 
 
By impersonating Coleman and imaginatively inhabiting his inner reflections, 
Zuckerman brings his deceased friend temporarily into existence in a way that places 
him at an elusive distance from “all this ridiculous antipathy he and Faunia had aroused” 
(64). However, by exteriorising within the narrative what he sees as Coleman’s 
internalised desire to escape the judgment of others, Zuckerman has in many ways 
violated that protective space of secrecy and sexual “craving” in which Silk and Faunia 
have sought refuge.  
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As an agent of destruction and violence in the novel, Les Farley not only 
torments Coleman and Faunia’s erotic union, but he also comes to represent a 
thanatological counterforce within Zuckerman’s narrative account. Following Coleman 
and Faunia’s deaths, Zuckerman’s thoughts become dominated by his suspicion that it 
was Les who murdered the two lovers. However, his attempts to incorporate Les and his 
suspected actions within the narrative lead to a certain faltering of the fictional prowess 
that Zuckerman has demonstrated in his treatment of other, equally unknown lives in the 
novel. While standing at Coleman’s graveside and contemplating the horror of his 
friend’s death, Zuckerman speaks of Farley in terms of his being both a literal and 
narratological misfit: “I couldn’t go myself because of Les Farley … he muscled on 
undisturbed, uncharged with any crime, manufacturing that crude reality all his own, a 
brute being colliding with whomever he liked however he liked for all the inner reasons 
that justified anything he wanted to do” (315). Les is presented here as a type of 
competing author, whose “crude reality” proves recalcitrant to Zuckerman’s more 
speculative attempts at re-fashioning experience within writing. Zuckerman longs to 
redress what he sees as the gross injustice of Coleman’s sudden and suspicious death by 
seeking to “put Les Farley away for the rest of his life” (308). His ensuing efforts to 
uncover the circumstances of what actually happened to Coleman and Faunia signal a 
sort of impotent frustration in his desire to transform and re-locate (“put away”) Les 
within the still evolving narrative. Unable to deal with the unsatisfactory lack of 
information available, Zuckerman begins, uncharacteristically, to look for closure and 
certainty with regards to the events surrounding Coleman’s demise. He describes at one 
stage how he became subject to the “foolish illusion” held by “the expectation of 
completion” (315) in his efforts to place “Farley as primary cause” (294) of Coleman’s 
death. Numerous references are made in the narrative to Zuckerman’s sleuth-like 
fascination with the fact that “[t]oo much truth was still concealed” (315) about the 
events leading to Coleman and Faunia’s fatal car crash. He goes on to describe himself 
as behaving like “an amateur detective” (295) in search of possible “evidence” (302) that 
might make Les “legally accountable” (301) for his actions. Earlier associations between 
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Zuckerman’s role as writer and that of a spy or stalker are recalled by this image of him 
as a kind of popular fiction detective. As with the previous comparisons made between 
him and Les as intruders upon Coleman and Faunia’s intimacy, Zuckerman makes us 
further aware in this instance of how the redemptive function of fiction as a quest for 
meaning in opposition to death is also underwritten by a destructive instinct to purge life 
of its hidden depths and secrets. As an embodiment of the thanatological drive toward 
death and destruction, Les thus represents a particularly troubling source of 
epistemological uncertainty in the novel, against which Zuckerman’s imaginative efforts 
to reconstruct ‘real’ events as fiction are faced by a harrowing sense of futility.   
 
The confrontation between Zuckerman as creative author and Les as murderer – 
one in which I have attempted to show how the writer’s role becomes inflected by the 
death and violence that Farley represents – is best demonstrated in the novel’s final 
scene, where both men meet face to face. Having taking an inadvertent detour on his 
way to visit Silk’s sister, Ernestine, Zuckerman’s narrative attention becomes re-directed 
by his having stumbled upon the sight of Les ice-fishing on a frozen lake. Although 
filled with apprehension about his own safety, Zuckerman explains how he became 
drawn on by an obsession to travel “all the way across the ice to get my look at 
Coleman’s killer” (346). The literal dangers involved in confronting Les are doubled by 
the manner in which he acts as hostile to Zuckerman’s efforts to explore him as a 
potential subject for his fiction. Described as “ninety percent opaque and unreadable and 
ten percent alarmingly transparent” (347), Les is reticent in response to the numerous 
questions that Zuckerman directs at him. Refusing to reveal any details of his well-
guarded personal life, Les rebuffs the writer’s prying effort to transform ‘real’ lives and 
events into fiction. However, the aura of secrecy in which Les has shrouded himself also 
serves to intensify Zuckerman’s aesthetic desire to probe into his hidden depths: 
  
The fact of him drew me on … This was not that way of thinking that is fiction writing. This was the thing 
itself … Here he is. That’s all it had to do with it. That and my fear (349-50) 
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As a lifeless “fact,” Les is much like the ‘real’ that Zuckerman’s fiction contends with. 
He represents the coming into proximity of literary opportunity and nihilistic despair – 
life-affirming desire and death – as a result of writing’s displacement from “the thing 
itself.” Suspecting that he is being played with by someone fully aware of his role as 
“the author” (349) who cannibalises the secrets and private experiences of others, 
Zuckerman suggests that Les is merely “[n]eedling me” (356) with his terse and cutting 
remarks. In this sense, Les’s refusal to reveal much about himself or to impart with any 
incriminating secret works as a thanatological counter-manipulation to Zuckerman’s 
desire for some kind of authorial dominance over the facts surrounding Coleman’s life 
and death. The encounter between the two men ends when Zuckerman’s frustrated 
efforts to explore what lies beneath Les’s many layers of secrecy are finally balked by a 
sense of horror at the personal and professional dangers involved: “[c]ompletely bested, 
I’d begun backing away” (259). 
 
However, Les does in fact furnish Zuckerman with “a secret of his that is even 
bigger than the secret of this pond” (352). This comes in the form of a disclosure about 
his post-traumatic stress as a Viet Nam War veteran. Zuckerman explains how, in 
confessing his trauma, Les is consciously “telling me a war story … [t]o carry away as 
‘the author’” (352). Reading back through the novel retrospectively, it can be seen how 
Zuckerman does actually employ this information in the passages that deal with Les. 
Even more significant in terms of the overall structure of the novel, the contradictory 
knowledge that “nothing passes just because nothing lasts” defining Zuckerman’s 
narrative can be understood in terms of the psychological experience of trauma as an 
event which has already occurred and been completed, but has yet to fully ‘pass’ into 
conscious existence for its survivor. Zuckerman’s idea of an epistemological gap in our 
experience of the ‘real’ can be said to work as a paradoxical trauma at the heart of his 
writing, in so much as it designates a form of missing knowledge or unknown event that 
becomes repeatedly re-visited and re-interpreted through the imaginative ruminations of 
fiction. Les’s function as a representative of the death-drive, working in opposition to 
Zuckerman’s role as author, can be better understood in light of his traumatic war 
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experiences. Haunted by having “no way to prevent the past from building back up,” Les 
is helpless against the sense of temporal dislocation by which the traumatic events that 
he has endured are repeated and relived by him: “instead of it all being behind him, it 
was in front of him” (74). Unlike Zuckerman, therefore, Les does not gain any sense of 
stimulation from this traumatically split manner in which people and events are both 
unknowable and yet almost endlessly reproducible as distorted narrative variations of 
what is ‘real.’ Instead, he seeks to put an end to the horror with which his traumatic 
(non-) experiences are numerously re-enacted.  
 
Parallel Modes of Authorship: Passing and Writing 
 
It is important to think critically about how the claim that “nothing passes just 
because nothing lasts” (italics added) functions not just in terms of Zuckerman’s literary 
style, but also in relation to questions of social identity and passing that The Human 
Stain addresses. The relationship between Eros and writing that I have outlined above 
finds added significance through the way in which Zuckerman explores Coleman’s 
passing as a libidinal act of self-authorship. Reflecting upon how Coleman’s “art was 
being a white man” (345), Zuckerman expresses at numerous points in the narrative his 
view of Silk’s passing as a brave act of creative ingenuity. He is particularly fascinated 
by the “the elixir of the secret” (135) that drives Coleman’s attempt at self-authoring. 
Zuckerman explains how the “gift to be secretive” (135) ushers Coleman into a 
liberating sphere in which his life is no longer governed by the determinants of race, but 
where instead the possibilities for creative self-transformation appear almost endless: 
“it’s like being fluent in another language – it’s being somewhere that is constantly fresh 
to you” (136). There are obvious parallels being made here between the euphoric levels 
of self-liberation involved in Coleman’s passing and Zuckerman’s own sense of 
authorial prowess. “The sliding relationship with everything” (108) involved in 
Coleman’s self-propelled passage from the African-American “we” (108) into “the 
boundless, self-defining drama of the pronouns we, they, and I” (109), for example, 
mirrors the fluid dialogic movement between voices and positions upon which 
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Zuckerman’s fictional account of events is structured in the novel. The “beautiful 
calibration of his deceit” (334-5) by which Coleman’s “heroic conception of his life” 
(335) came to be realised thus holds clear comparisons for Zuckerman with his own 
narrative technique of impersonation and self-disguise. As my argument develops, I will 
look closer at the ways in which Coleman’s defiant act of imposture is linked to 
Zuckerman’s efforts as a writer to imaginatively insert himself into the lives of other 
people and, thereby, conceal his own presence as a subject within the text. In particular, 
I will examine how Coleman’s passing is inextricably bound in The Human Stain with 
Zuckerman’s longing to liberate his fiction from the autobiographical conflicts 
surrounding his Jewish-American origins.   
 
Zuckerman metaphorically relates passing to writing as an erotic urge for 
potency and self-control, working in opposition to the death-like hypostases of 
“everyone knows” and “nobody knows.” He explains how Coleman’s burning ambition 
for self-determination is comparable to the yearning for the “delights of sexual rapacity” 
that inaugurated Achilles’ “brutal quarrel” (5) in Greek epic literature: 
 
It has to do with more than just being blissfully free. It’s like the savagery in The Illiad, Coleman’s 
favourite book about the ravening spirit of man (335) 
 
The liberating sense of disguise that Coleman finds in “the power and pleasure ... [of] 
being counterconfessional” (100) finds resonance in Zuckerman’s comments about the 
self-transforming effects of sexual desire. Zuckerman explains how the life of solitude 
and ascetic discipline which he has embraced in later life marks his attempt to overcome 
the hectic levels of self-reinvention and creative disguise that accompanied his 
experiences of erotic longing in the past: “I couldn’t meet the cost of its clamouring 
anymore, could no longer marshal the wit, the strength, the patience, the illusion, the 
irony, the ardour, the egoism, the resilience … the falseness, the dissembling, the dual 
being” (37). In a later passage, he uses remarkably similar language to describe the 
imperative to impersonate and reinvent the self that was necessitated by Coleman’s 
secret act of passing. Having at one stage considered confessing the secret of his origins 
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to his wife, Iris, Coleman relents by recalling the sense of heroic “battle” (179) that his 
life’s great pretence involves. Coleman’s momentary wish to reveal his true racial 
identity is described as an example of a “childishly sentimental” urge “to shed entirely 
one’s mistrust, one’s caution, one’s self-mistrust, to think that one’s difficulties have 
come to an end, that all complications have ceased to be ... to surrender the diligence, the 
discipline, the taking the measure of every last situation” (179).  
 
The analogues between sexual desire and creative modes of impersonation that 
are made in The Human Stain recall the relationship between the erotic and the aesthetic 
in earlier Zuckerman novels, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis. Throughout 
the American trilogy, however, Zuckerman has sought to escape the complications and 
vulnerable sense of mutability that desire has previously brought to his life and writing. 
Yet although he claims to have totally renounced personal forms of longing, Coleman’s 
story provides Zuckerman with an appealing display of the yearning to impersonate and 
re-create the self that was so evidently central to both his art and his personal existence 
in novels such as The Anatomy Lesson and The Counterlife. Similar to his near obsessive 
narrative interest in the sexual affair between Coleman and Faunia, Zuckerman enjoys a 
sense of vicarious pleasure by paying witness to the erotic and aesthetic urges that are 
involved in Silk’s act of secrecy and disguise. In this sense, it is possible to trace how 
aspects of Zuckerman’s erotic longing have not quite fully abated in the novel, despite 
his stout claims to have abandoned all involvement in the “sexual caterwaul.” I will 
return to the broader implications of this observation later, in an effort to understand 
how and for what reasons Zuckerman has attempted to keep his personal desires hidden 
or secret through the act of writing about others in The Human Stain. By exploring the 
manner in which his dormant erotic impulses are re-ignited by Coleman’s story, I will 
look at the wider literary significance of how Zuckerman’s libidinal presence re-emerges 
within the text.  
 
In ways that are similar to my own argument, Derek Parker Royal also points out 
some of the correlations made by Zuckerman between his own concept of literary 
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authorship and Coleman’s bold commitment to autogenesis. Royal locates a certain 
shared sense of creative freedom in both men’s symbolic experiences of death. Just as 
Zuckerman’s fictional imagination works within the empty space left by the realisation 
that “nobody knows anything,” Royal points out how Coleman re-creates his identity ex 
nihilo, following the passing into death of his African-American self: “with the negation 
of identity comes the possibility of subject re-creation” (2006, 138). My own 
examination of the text highlights some of the partial merits of this argument. However, 
I would contend that Royal falls short by failing to deal with the ambivalence that 
Thanatos brings to the shared sense of libidinal yearning which motivates both Coleman 
and Zuckerman’s creative acts of (self-) authorship. In what follows, I will explore how 
Coleman’s erotic urge to transcend the obstacles of his race finds a thanatological barrier 
in certain aspects of his abandoned origins that refuse to fully pass away, thereby 
exerting pressure on his “masterly performance” (335) as a self-authored subject. By 
arguing thus, I wish to counter Royal’s observation that The Human Stain “gets to the 
heart of Philip Roth’s (post-modern) project of signifying American identity, ethnic or 
otherwise” (2006, 138).  
 
Of course, Royal is not the only scholar to have read The Human Stain as an 
example of Roth’s “post-modern” interest in the ability of the contemporary American 
subject to escape his or her social origins and re-define the self in new and more 
expansive terms. Francoise Kral, for instance, suggests that in Roth’s novel “identity is 
interstitial; it is found at the point of juncture for different categories of gender, class, 
and culture” (48) For Kral, this obscuring of the borders that traditionally exist between 
separate social “categories” allows for a sort of postmodern exploration of new and 
highly mutational identity formations: “a negotiation between different existing 
definitions, which, in turn, forms a new one and contributes to an infinite spectrum of 
identities, thus calling for new interpretative patterns that should prove able to take 
account of the fluidity, the complexity, and the provisionality of identity” (54). Mark 
Maslan has also indicated the ways in which Coleman’s “passing reveals the 
performative nature of supposedly natural categories of identity” (381). He goes on to 
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suggest that the act of “escaping the confines of purportedly natural identities” is 
achieved in Roth’s novel by simply “performing them differently” (381). Maslan 
reserves criticism, however, for what he sees as Roth’s decision to locate Coleman’s 
“performative” act of passing within a wider notion of “historical commonality” (381) 
by linking it to a distinctly American tradition of individualism and self-fashioning. By 
making Coleman’s rejection of an assigned racial identity as “merely the precondition 
for embodying a national one” (381), according to Maslan, Roth goes some way to re-
inscribing yet another, even more encompassing notion of “natural” or historically 
inherited identity. 
 
As my previous chapters have already suggested, Roth does not endorse any 
outright postmodern rejection of the past and its stifling traditions in favour of some 
notion of the self as an endlessly revisable narrative or performative text. Instead, I 
would contend that ideas of cultural origins or social categorisation (Jewish or 
otherwise) in Roth’s fiction are treated with far more ambivalence than the arguments of 
Royal, Kral and Maslan might suggest. I have already mentioned above how Zuckerman 
locates liberating notions of impersonation or performativity in Coleman’s passing. This 
attitude is fully consonant with Zuckerman’s overall rejection, throughout different 
novels, of the concept of “natural being” (The Counterlife, 320) or fixed origins in 
favour of creative acts of disguise and self-reinvention. However, as I have been 
suggesting throughout this thesis, the overriding will to create the self anew in Roth’s 
fiction is not exercised in any complete separation from more stifling notions of the 
‘real’ or origin. Instead, the desire for self-mastery is engendered by a necessary tension 
with those external pressures that set out to repress such longings in the first place. In 
other words, efforts to re-define the self and escape the weight of the familial and ethnic 
past in Roth’s work are, in a highly contradictory sense, both restrained and given 
impetus by certain experiences of assigned social identity. For example, at the end of 
The Counterlife, Zuckerman suggests that it is the ancient Jewish ritual of male 
circumcision which, paradoxically, acts as a sort of defining ‘origin’ for the will to 
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impersonate and reinvent oneself beyond a given sense of historical beginnings or 
identity: 
 
circumcision gives the lie to the womb-dream of life in the beautiful state of innocent prehistory, the 
appealing idyll of living “naturally,” unencumbered by man-made ritual. To be born is to lose all that. The 
heavy hand of human values falls upon you right at the start, marking your genitals as its own. Inasmuch 
as one invents one’s meanings, along with impersonating one’s selves, this is the meaning I propose for 
that ritual (323) 
 
One does not live “naturally” precisely as a result of the “man-made ritual[s]” of history. 
To seek self-liberation by inventing “one’s meanings” and “one’s selves,” therefore, is a 
direct response to being ensnared by the pre-defined rituals and markings of history. 
While Kral suggests that Coleman’s passing involves just such a “negotiation” of 
“existing definitions,” I would argue that Roth lays greater stress on the deep historical 
limits of self-reinvention than she does. Through a further exploration of the limits of 
Coleman’s passing, I will illuminate upon the extent to which very much ‘real’ social 
forces have clashed with his efforts to re-conceive the “facts” of his existence. As I have 
briefly mentioned when discussing Royal’s argument, this sense of an obstacle 
frustrating Coleman’s erotic desire for self-possession is represented symbolically as a 
thanatological experience of death or non-being.        
 
Before discussing the ways in which Coleman’s orgasmic “trajectory outward” 
(135) in search of an unfettered notion of the self is curbed by certain symbolic moments 
of death, I wish to briefly return to the idea of trauma as an experience which renders the 
subject incomplete and dissolute. Coleman’s African-American origins serve as a form 
of trauma that is inassimilable to his concept of himself as a self-defining individual. 
Determined “not [to] allow his prospects to be unjustly limited by so arbitrary a 
designation as race” (120), Coleman goes in search of an asocial idea of the self that will 
help to repress all knowledge of his traumatic origins: “[a]ll he’d ever wanted, from 
earliest childhood on, was to be free: not black, not even white – just on his own and 
free” (120). However, I wish to show how Coleman’s racial past is not completely 
departed from by his act of passing, but works like a trauma in the way that it recurs as 
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something that demands his reluctant attention. There is an obvious example of this 
experience of unconscious return in the incident that precipitates Coleman’s departure 
from Athena College. His unwitting use of a racially loaded term, “spooks,” works as an 
example of what Freud called the uncanny: “that class of the frightening which leads 
back to what is known of old and long familiar” (“The Uncanny,” 930). Elsewhere, 
Coleman’s submerged past comes back to haunt him when he berates his lawyer, Nelson 
Primus, by referring to his “smug fucking lily-white face” (81). In this particular 
instance, Coleman repeats a pejorative statement used against him by his brother Walter, 
following his decision to pass as white some fifty years earlier. As in the case of 
Zuckerman, Coleman demonstrates here the extent to which he has internalised the harsh 
rebuke against his perceived betrayal of family and racial loyalties. It is after this 
incident with Primus that Coleman begins to contemplate “[h]ow one is revealed or 
undone by the perfect word … the right word uttered spontaneously, without one’s ever 
having to think” (84). From this reflective position, he undergoes a lengthy reverie upon 
his African-American origins, which forms the basis of the “Slipping the Punch” 
chapter.  
 
This notion of Coleman’s racial heritage as a trauma that cannot be easily 
overcome or passed over places a damaging curb on notions, entertained within the 
novel, of subjectivity as a mode of ultimate self-possession. Most tellingly, Coleman’s 
abandoned origins find a delayed expression in the form of an irrepressible and 
discomforting surplus that lurks within his post-racial identity as a white man. By 
drawing upon contemporary debates on the formation of “whiteness” in American 
culture and history, I hope to show in the remarks that follow how Coleman’s self-
created identity in The Human Stain fits a model of white subjectivity that predicates 
itself upon a rejection of race as a perturbing marker of what is “non-white.” By 
following this line of argument, I aim to highlight the manner in which Coleman is made 
to experience a sense of racial anxiety by means of his relationship with Faunia, whose 
alien and non-white social existence forces him to re-visit the trauma of his own racial 
past. It is in this way, I would contend, that Roth’s novel explores how Coleman’s 
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daring attempt to “spring the historical lock” (335) of his assigned racial identity is 
ensnared by the “stranglehold of history” (336). 
 
Theories on the Construction of Whiteness 
 
In his study Colored White: Transcending the Racial Past, David Roediger 
suggests that certain post-racial theories in contemporary America are based upon 
deeply encrypted cultural notions about the racial neutrality of white identity. Roediger 
opposes the claims of the “colorblind right” (2002, 13) which suggest that the benefits of 
middle-class prosperity in America are non-specific to race and, therefore, accessible to 
everyone. He argues that this conservative “‘race is over’ stance ignores existing 
inequalities … [by] declaring race to be utterly malleable” (2002, 14). Rather than 
permitting a radical sense of upward social mobility, according to Roediger, such an idea 
of post-racial equality actually reinforces racial hierarchies by making a long-held ideal 
of the racially uninflected white subject into the aspiring model for American citizenship 
and belonging. He traces the historical lineage of racially blanched concepts of 
whiteness in America to nineteenth century ideologies of slavery, in which the 
independent and self-determining white subject was contrasted with its servile and 
dependent racial other. Roediger emphasises how this ideal of the free white individual 
was underwritten by distinctly masculine notions of economic independence and 
democratic enfranchisement. By contrast, race was linked to enslaved and emasculated 
conditions of economic dependency and social immiseration. However, as Roediger 
makes clear, the link between race and servility was not always made exclusive to issues 
of “colour” and African-American slavery. He goes on to highlight how certain 
immigrant and industrial working class communities in the 19th century, who were as yet 
to achieve a level of economic self-sufficiency or socio-political status worthy of the 
free white American male, became labelled as wage dependent and impoverished “non-
white” people: “ideas of freedom for the mass of white males developed in tandem with 
notions and practices that ensured that those who were not white could not pursue 
happiness effectively in political, social, and economic realms” (2002, 123). Roediger 
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suggests that it is this markedly racial (and gendered) configuration of whiteness that 
continues to find currency in the conservative ideal of post-racial citizenship. While 
claiming to envision an end to racial hierarchy by marking the privileges of whiteness as 
open to all, it works to consign those who are still outside the sphere of middle-class 
success as socially degraded and unworthy non-white subjects. Karen Brodkin has 
referred to this as a “core constitutive myth,” in which the attainment of whiteness as an 
economically and culturally privileged position stands as a pre-requisite for American 
social inclusion: “[i]n this myth, the alternatives available to nonwhite and variously 
alien ‘others’ has been either to whiten themselves or to be consigned to an animal-like, 
ungendered underclass unfit to exercise the prerogatives of citizenship” (24). Like 
Roediger, Brodkin discusses how this prevailing notion of citizenship has developed out 
of an historical “construction of the American working class as ‘of color’ and outside the 
circle of national belonging” (23).  
 
According to both Brodkin and Roediger, the contrast between whiteness as ideal 
and non-whiteness as abject has been sharpened by prominent stereotypes that link race 
and class to certain forms of moral and cultural aberration. Remarking upon the way in 
which a degraded notion of “preindustrial permissiveness [was] imputed to African-
Americans” (2007, 106) during slavery, Roediger has discussed how bourgeois virtues 
of industrious individualism and moral self-control became attributed to ideas of 
whiteness in the same period: “the white working class, disciplined and made anxious by 
fear of dependency, began during its formation to construct an image of the Black 
population as ‘other’ – as embodying the preindustrial, erotic, careless style of life the 
white worker hated and longed for” (2007, 14). Equally for Brodkin, the historical 
construction of “socially sanctioned whiteness” (41) was predicated upon a rejection of 
certain perceived notions of moral laxity and licentiousness that were ascribed to the 
non-white subject: “[w]hen immigrants were seen as a necessary part of that working 
class which did the degraded and driven labor, they were constructed with stereotypes of 
blackness – stupid, shiftless, sexual, unable to defer gratification” (71).  
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In these studies, what is made evident is how a particular ideal of “American 
citizens [as] white and middle-class” (Brodkin, 23) – with its emphasis on the virtues of 
a strong, disciplined and independent form of masculine individualism – is based upon a 
racially sensitive notion of whiteness that consigns those who lie outside its borders as 
undeserving non-whites. Roediger and Brodkin explain that while these ideas about 
whiteness originate in earlier constructions of race and slavery, they have helped to form 
an American middle-class ideal of independence and freedom that is still very much 
prevalent. Those non-whites who fall short of this ideal have not always necessarily 
been defined by the physical denotations of race or “colour,” but may in fact be poor or 
working class “whites” whose socially marginal position leaves them lying anxiously 
outside of the  benefits of whiteness. In this way, race and class become intertwined and 
blurred, where the racial subject is marked by economic disadvantage and the experience 
of poverty is posited as an inherent characteristic of the de-natured non-white. In what 
follows, I hope to show how Coleman Silk in The Human Stain finds that in order to 
pass as a non-racial subject he must reconstruct his identity along the lines of this 
prevailing concept of whiteness. I will pay particular focus upon how Coleman’s 
acquired sense of white subjectivity is later made uncertain by his affair with Faunia. I 
will suggest that, as a member of a marginalised underclass, Faunia reacquaints 
Coleman with the trauma of non-white social exclusion which he had earlier abandoned 
along with his African-American origins.   
 
Being “co-opted”: Coleman’s Passing and the Limits of Self-authorship 
 
The very much real dangers involved in his act of passing require that Coleman 
conceals his origins within an exterior of whiteness. The phallic energy associated with 
the unrestrained potential of “the raw I” thus becomes quickly dampened by another 
version of the stifling “we” or “they” from which he had originally sought escape. 
Despite early pretensions to being an artist and living a Bohemian lifestyle in Greenwich 
Village, Coleman’s new life as a white man following the war soon loses its aesthetic 
reach. Instead, he is “co-opted” (110) by a model of white identity that demands 
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obedience to certain forms of middle-class respectability: “the pleasure of being 
conventional unconventionally, but that wasn’t really the idea” (110). The de-eroticising 
effect of living within “the protection of the walled city that is convention” (335) is 
evidenced by the dangers that sex poses for Coleman’s act of self-concealment. It is in 
his sexually vibrant relationship with Steena Palson that the young and resolutely free-
spirited Coleman first encounters the possibility of his African-American origins being 
exposed. Having misread one of the poems that she writes about him as making use of 
the word “negro” (112), he frets over the dangers of being “found out” as a result of the 
intimacy that sex involves: “[i]n that anarchic crazy place, how much of me is being 
seen, how much of me is being discovered?” (113). It is while visiting a white prostitute 
that Coleman’s racial identity is actually uncovered, as a result of which he is violently 
removed from a brothel. Although he manages to escape any further consequences that 
might have arisen from this particular incident, such a worrying moment of exposure 
underlines his need to vigilantly conceal his true origins. In contrast to his initial sense 
of erotic adventure and ambition, therefore, a deeply calculated sense of social 
conformity and sexual propriety begins to shape Coleman’s efforts to hide his racial 
lineage and pass as white: “a life of little, if anything excessive on the surface because 
all the excess goes into the secret” (335).  
 
As I have been suggesting, Eros is tied to an aesthetic notion of the self as 
lacking any fixed social origin in The Human Stain. However, this idea of desire is 
always underpinned by a notion of death and impermanence that makes transient its 
potential moments of libidinal fulfilment. In one sense, Eros represents a liberating and 
creative notion of self-mastery (potency) in Roth’s novel. At the same time, this concept 
of the individual as unconditioned by broader historical forces is based upon an idea of 
the self as somewhat amorphous and lacking any clearly formed sense of social identity 
(impotence). As the previous paragraph suggests, Coleman’s erotic longing to author 
and control his own personal destiny is inscribed by a thanatological sense of lack or 
incoherence that is potentially detrimental to his highly individuated identity as a white 
man. Having concealed himself within the sober and de-eroticised conventions of 
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middle class conventions for most of his adult life, Coleman is re-introduced to “the 
perpetual state of emergency that is sexual longing” (32) in his affair with Faunia. As a 
result, he is returned to the life of libidinal excess that he had earlier led “before the 
serious things took over completely” (25). In this way, Coleman’s late sexual adventure 
has a double and contradictory effect: while it provides him with a liberating and life-
sustaining sense of erotic pleasure, it also marks a chaotic and indeterminate space of 
desire in which his rigorous disguise of whiteness is threatened by a sense of lack or 
incompletion.  
 
As he suggests at certain stages of the narrative, Coleman is somewhat aware of 
how the restorative power of his sexual affair with Faunia risks bringing chaos and death 
to the more permanent social benefits that are guaranteed by his sense of white middle-
class identity: “I know that there’s no insurance that you can buy on this … the thing 
that’s restoring you can wind up killing you” (35). Faunia brings Coleman into close 
proximity with a world that is marked as socially abject in contrast to his life of middle-
class respectability. Identified at one stage as being part of a degraded “subspecies” 
(164), Faunia is presented as lacking the sense of coherent identity and individual 
autonomy that might mark her as white. Her turbulent existence on the social margins is 
described by Coleman’s lawyer, Nelson Primus, as “everything that is the antithesis of 
your own way of life” (157). In trying to make Coleman realise the dangers involved in 
“Lester Farley’s wild grievance” (78), Primus insists upon making clear the threat that 
Faunia’s underclass status poses to his client:  
 
Faunia Farley is not from your world. You got a good look last night at the world that’s shaped her … a 
world where nobody’s ruthlessness bothers to cloak itself in humanitarian rhetoric (80) 
 
Described as being devoid of “rash compulsions” (78) or any “incriminating impurity” 
(79), Primus represents the rational and de-eroticised world of whiteness in which all 
forms of abjection and disorder are excised. By angrily referring to him as “lily-white” 
Coleman unconsciously highlights the sense of race – in terms of a racially neutralised 
idea of whiteness – involved in the ideal of “professional reward and bourgeois success” 
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(79) that Primus is trying to uphold by advising him. Despite this tone of defiance, 
however, the affair with Faunia causes Coleman much anxiety by re-acquainting him 
with his own hidden origins as a racially marked subject. In this way, while providing a 
momentary form of transcendent ecstasy that places the lovers outside “[a]ll the social 
ways of thinking” (229), Coleman’s affair with Faunia also threatens to re-introduce him 
to the trauma of his prior exclusion from the social register of whiteness. 
 
Read in the context of Brodkin and Roediger’s arguments, the relationship 
between ideas of white and non-white in The Human Stain is quite often situated by 
perceptions of class. For example, Nelson Primus attributes Les’s dangerous violence to 
the fact that he “works on the road crew” (76). Elsewhere, Faunia’s coarse and 
unsentimental manner is described in ways that relate her violent and sexually brutalised 
history to her economic status. For example, Coleman explains to Zuckerman how she 
has “the laugh of a barmaid who keeps a baseball bat at her feet in case of trouble … the 
coarse, easy laugh of a woman with a past” (35). Faunia’s degraded social position as a 
member of an American underclass works in thanatological tension with the erotic 
function that she performs for Coleman. The sense of pleasure and stimulation that he 
and Zuckerman both share in watching Faunia working at the dairy farm is contrasted by 
the manner in which she later speaks about the same scene. While Zuckerman expounds 
upon the “stupefying power” of “an enamored old man watching at work the cleaning 
woman-farmhand who is secretly his paramour” (51), Faunia later de-eroticises this 
image by asserting the sense of economic struggle and social displacement that it 
involves: “the dairy farm is a lot of fucking work, to you it sounds great and to you it 
looks great, Faunia and the cows, but coming on top of everything else it breaks my 
fucking hump” (227). Faunia repeatedly makes clear to Coleman why the restorative 
effect of sex cannot completely suspend “the matter-of-factness of [their] being 
separated by unsurpassable social obstacles” (47). Her determination to dispel any 
delusions about their erotic courtship is re-stated during another scene, where she dances 
at the request of the watching Coleman. Undergoing what is described as a “formal 
transfer of power” (227), the dance moves from being an act controlled and authored by 
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Coleman’s male gaze into an erotic ritual in which Faunia makes clear to him the 
paradoxical interplay between desire and loss. She attempts to show him how sex 
affords only a temporary respite – “[t]hat slice out of time” (229) – from their social 
differences and problems, cancelling out briefly what she derisively calls “[e]verything 
the wonderful society is asking” (229). While desirous of its sense of euphoric release, 
she holds no illusions about the possibility of eternalising the erotic moment – “the 
indulgence of the fantasy of forever” (236) – which she shares with Coleman. In this 
manner, Faunia is keen to remind him of how the painful experiences of her economic 
struggle and class status persist outside of the exhilarating moment of their erotic union:  
 
Last night? It happened. It was nice. It was wonderful. I needed it too. But I still have three jobs. It didn’t 
change anything. That’s why you take it when it’s happening, because it doesn’t change a thing (235) 
 
While Coleman’s “greedy fascination appropriates” (51) the image of Faunia 
milking the cows, a later scene of him secretly watching her during a break from her 
second job as an Athena College janitor has a much different effect. In this particular 
instance, “his vantage point” (157) affords no sense of an erotic spectacle. Instead, his 
idealisation of Faunia as a “Voluptas [who] makes virtually anything you want to think 
come true” (157) is corrupted by a jarring realisation of her social (and racial) otherness. 
While watching Faunia sitting on the grass and joking with one of the male janitors, 
Coleman ponders how: “without him to take her cues from, she took cues instead from 
the gruffest example around, the coarsest, the one whose human expectations were the 
lowest and whose self-conception the shallowest” (157). This unexpected moment in 
which he is forced to clearly witness the extent of Faunia’s debased social status brings 
into considerable doubt Coleman’s erotically charged sense of being in authorial control 
of both himself and his surroundings. Outside of her role as his “Voluptas,” Faunia no 
longer “takes her cues” from Coleman’s instruction, but instead appears to be shaped by 
a particular social environment in which his “white” notion of self-authorship is 
glaringly absent. Coleman’s class (and racial) anxieties over Faunia’s social background 
are made clearly evident by “this scene of no great moment on the lawn back of North 
Hall [which had] exposed him at last to the underside of his own disgrace” (157). 
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Immediately following this moment of horrid realisation, he calls his estranged son, Jeff, 
to tell him that “my affair with this woman is over” (171). Contrary to the actual 
explanation which he gives for this decision, Coleman contemplates privately that it 
might be solely “[b]ecause she works as a janitor” (171). This “scene of no great 
moment” is in fact an important one of delayed traumatic awareness for Coleman. By 
being suddenly made aware of the full extent of Faunia’s lowly social position, Coleman 
is once again faced by the harrowing spectre of non-white marginality that he had 
previously left behind in his determination to pass as a white man.  
 
As I have been suggesting, Faunia represents the abject elements of excess or 
incalculable remainder to the supposed racially neutral idea of whiteness with which 
Coleman has identified. In contrast to Coleman’s intermittent bouts of apprehension and 
revulsion over her non-white status, Faunia appears to willingly embrace her marginal 
social position. On discovering after her death that Faunia was originally born into 
wealth and also that she left behind a written diary, Zuckerman describes how she 
disguised herself as lower class and feigned illiteracy in order to pass in the opposite 
direction to Coleman: from a privileged social background to a degraded condition of 
non-whiteness. Her willingness to become declassed and ‘un-whitened’ marks a 
performance in social disguise that was designed “to spotlight the barbaric self befitting 
the world” (297). In language that echoes Zuckerman’s claims about the “shameless 
impurity” of life, Faunia articulates the idea of an inherent “human stain” (242) from 
which Roth’s novel takes its title. Her description of a ‘fallen’ or ‘stained’ humanity 
involves abject images (often bodily) of surplus and imperfection that cannot cohere 
with the pristine and de-eroticised notion of the self contained within Coleman’s concept 
of whiteness: 
 
we leave a stain, we leave a trail, we leave our imprint. Impurity, cruelty, abuse, error, excrement, semen – 
there’s no other way to be here … The stain that precedes disobedience, that encompasses disobedience 
and perplexes all explanation and understanding. It’s why all the cleansing is a joke (242) 
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In contrast to Coleman and Faunia, Les is unable to pass in either direction as white or 
non-white. The experience of war has not had the desired effect of confirming his heroic 
participation in American society. Instead of gaining esteemed recognition for his 
military service, Les finds that he is made into an alien and undesirable figure by his 
involvement in the Viet Nam War: “[w]hen he comes home the first time everybody 
says that he isn’t the same person and that they don’t recognise him … they’re all afraid 
of him” (64). Despite going “back [to Viet Nam] a second time to finish the goddamn 
job” (64), Les is unable to breach the traumatic rupture between his war experiences and 
domestic life back home. In contrast with the wilful sense of being doubled or under 
disguise that Coleman and Faunia demonstrate, Les is rooted to the injurious past and 
unable to find a means by which to pass back into society. He embodies an irreversible 
and insurmountable experience of trauma that makes impossible his longing to regain 
the coherence and balance enjoyed by the younger, “easygoing Les, who didn’t know 
what it meant to feel hopeless” (64-5). Les, therefore, represents most harshly the horror 
and confusion of the traumatic condition of American non-white exclusion in Roth’s 
novel. 
 
 The different ways in which Coleman’s “passionate struggle for singularity” 
(108) in the novel is compromised by the imperative to become whitened suggests the 
stark social limitations involved in his historically transcendent concept of the self as 
existing outside of the “color line.” The complex exploration of issues of racial origins 
and passing in Roth’s novel, therefore, clearly challenges what Roediger calls the 
“colorblind right” and its universalising assumptions about the asocial context of the 
individual. The stentorian concept of Coleman as “the greatest of the great pioneers of 
the I” (108) would indeed appear to share clear resonances with contemporary 
conservative ideas about the individual’s relative freedom from concepts of socio-
historical determination. However, I would like to suggest how his initial decision to 
pass is actually rooted in the heightened levels of social mobility and cultural inclusion 
in America that found expression in the mid-century era of liberal consensus.  
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Although Coleman, we are told, “wanted to be a poet or a playwright far more 
than to study for a degree, the best way he could think to pursue his goals without 
having to get a job to support himself was by cashing in on the GI Bill” (110). Restricted 
by social and economic constraints in exploring further the sense of aesthetic ambition 
that at first motivates his great attempt at self-authorship, Coleman’s meteoric rise 
within the whitened world of bourgeois success and respectability – first as a scholar and 
then as an academic – is largely facilitated by what Karen Brodkin has described as “one 
of the most revolutionary post war programs” (38) of liberal reform: the GI Bill. Brodkin 
highlights the important contribution of the GI Bill to the sense of middle class “upward 
mobility” (41) and national belonging that the post-war climate of liberal consensus 
extended to Jewish-Americans and other European ethnic sub-groups, who had up until 
this period been largely excluded from the economic and cultural benefits of whiteness 
in America. Placing particular emphasis on the way in which the GI Bill undertook to 
finance the education of de-mobilised servicemen, she remarks upon how such 
important legislative provisions “were decidedly not extended to African-Americans or 
women of any race” (42). Brodkin’s analysis of how the GI Bill and other opportunities 
within the age of liberal consensus helped to fashion “a lowering of [the] racial barriers” 
(41) that had kept American Jews marginalised from mainstream national culture up to 
this point thus throws Coleman’s passing into an important contextual light. As I have 
outlined in my last chapter, the markedly liberal democratisation of American life after 
World War Two provided a great sense of social and economic possibility in the 
personal lives of Jewish characters such as Zuckerman and, to a far greater extent, the 
Swede. Likewise, for Ira and Zuckerman in I Married a Communist, popular progressive 
ideas about American history and the plight of the “common man” allowed them to 
discover a more expansive and liberating notion of cultural origins beyond their more 
marginal beginnings as ethnic Jews. Coleman’s decision to attenuate his act of passing 
by disguising himself as a secular Jew in The Human Stain, therefore, marks an effort to 
avail of the vastly increased sense of social opportunity that arose among this newly 
whitened ethnic group following the war. By hiding his racial origins within a social 
identity that is erstwhile shedding its historical association with a “deficient African 
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American culture” (Brodkin, 151), Coleman would appear to have fully taken note of his 
father’s insight into the astute assimilative qualities of the Jewish community: “Jews … 
were like Indian scouts, shrewd people showing the outsider his way in, showing the 
social possibility, showing an intelligent colored family how it might be done” (The 
Human Stain, 97). 
 
 I will discuss a little later on, in relation to issues of literary tradition, how 
Coleman’s passing as Jewish/white provides a focus through which Zuckerman ponders 
to what extent he and his generation of American Jews have been defined by their 
whitening: the suppression of an historical experience of racial otherness.38 As in the 
case of the Swede, who is reluctantly made to realise a sense of Jewish historical 
exclusion in American Pastoral, the trauma of Coleman and, by extension, Zuckerman’s 
non-white origins in The Human Stain calls into question notions of deracinated 
subjectivity or American cultural commonality that underwrote the democratic ideal of 
widespread middle class prosperity after World War Two. Michael Thompson has 
interestingly traced a certain continuity of thought between the starkly contrasting 
politics of the progressive liberal tradition and the new American Right by showing how 
both share a lineage with the nineteenth century liberal values of individual liberty and 
democratic capitalism. He points out how the universalising ideal of social mobility and 
self-advancement that was fostered by the heightened moment of progressive liberal 
belief at mid-century “has given rise to and maintains certain aspects of the new 
conservative impulse in American politics” (11). According to this analysis, broader 
values of middle class whiteness would appear to find common instances of hegemonic 
appeal in the separate epochs of what Brodkin highlights as the post-war era of liberal 
consensus and Roediger suggests is the contemporary moment of right-wing 
conservative monopoly. In this sense, what I have been suggesting is the particular form 
of inspiration and opportunity that post-war liberal values give to Coleman’s ambition to 
                                                 
38 Brodkin explains how Jews became white by means of “showing how similar Jewish culture was to 
bourgeois cultural ideals and upon differentiating Jewish culture from a depraved and unworthy African 
American culture” (150). 
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abandon his racial origins could be deemed to take on aspects of a more right-wing 
attitude toward individual freedom and post-racial citizenship, once placed in a later 
end-of-century context.  
 
As I have been arguing, The Human Stain disentangles the racial and class 
prejudices that lie beneath whitened concepts of cultural universality and individual 
autonomy, whether they be of the spirit of post-war liberalism or part of a more 
contemporary conservative ideology. However, despite the manner in which Roth’s text 
exhumes the class and racial divisions buried within such notions of a common 
American identity, it does not look favourably upon what it presents as the rigid 
ideological prescripts of Delphine and her politically correct allies. I would suggest that, 
as in American Pastoral where certain repressed experiences of race and gender were 
related to a particular trauma of labour, Roth’s exploration of the relationship between 
class and non-white experience in The Human Stain goes beyond the purely cultural pre-
occupations of identity politics. In many ways, by showing how Coleman’s concealed 
experience of racial origins are re-invoked by Faunia’s lowly socio-economic status, 
Roth’s novel would appear to share with Rorty and other more traditionalist liberals a 
sense in which material issues of class and social power cut across exclusively cultural 
and gendered understandings of suffering and marginality.  
 
In this regard, I would strongly resist Walter Benn Michaels’ assessment of how 
Roth’s fiction treats issues of Jewish marginality. In his reading of The Plot against 
America, Michaels criticises Roth for “activating a certain nostalgia for anti-Semitism” 
(296) that fails to register sympathy with the inequalities of race and class in 
contemporary America. He sees Roth’s novel as sharing in a discourse of identity 
politics that, in failing to tackle the “money line” as part of the “color line” (293), only 
succeeds in obscuring the problems of poverty and social discrimination which underlie 
American historical experiences of ethnicity and race. For Michaels, Roth’s novel is 
preoccupied by “issues that render economic inequality either irrelevant or invisible or 
both” (298). However, as I have argued by recourse to contemporary debates on 
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whiteness, Roth’s interest in Jewish identity is inextricably tied to contemporary issues 
of both race and class in The Human Stain. As my reading of American Pastoral has 
already suggested and my discussion on The Plot against America will further highlight, 
Roth’s later fiction has shown an avid interest in the ways in which experiences of 
ethnicity and race have been aligned with or sidelined from the progressive liberal 
narrative that dominated mid-century America. What Roth outlines in these three texts 
as the particular limitations of ethnic and racial assimilation into mainstream American 
culture that this spirit of liberal nationalism involved are inextricable with persisting 
economic questions of labour and class. 
 
Passing and the Literary Canon 
 
Coleman’s idea of himself as an individual who is not formed by the social 
conditions of his race is directly connected to his education in the great works of 
Western literature. Canonical texts – particularly the Greek classics that he has spent his 
life studying and teaching – serve as the main source of inspiration from which he comes 
to align himself with certain universal humanist values over any separate sense of 
identity and tradition peculiar to his African-American origins. Coleman’s decision to 
escape his racial heritage is described in the text as the result of a desire “to be no longer 
circumscribed and defined by his father” (107). However, the inalienable sense of 
freedom from his distinct racial background that Coleman discovers in the wider cultural 
world of high-literature stems largely from his father’s strong pedagogical influence. As 
one who inculcates among his children a firm sense of the “tremendous advantages of 
intellect” (102), Clarence Silk disapproves of the young Coleman’s boxing club as a 
place that “was for slum kids, for illiterates and hoodlums bound for the gutter or jail” 
(97). By contrast, Clarence stresses the merits of education as the means by which 
Coleman can establish himself among “the topmost ranks of Negro society … someone 
people would forever look up to” (102). Education is thus linked to a vaunted idea of 
self-advancement and respectability – what the Silk’s evince by their role as a “model 
Negro family” (86) – which Coleman’s father sees as the pinnacle of achievement within 
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a racially divided society. Refusing to allow the disadvantages of race to exclude him 
and his family from attaining a high standard of cultural knowledge, Silk senior’s 
steadfast attitude to self-improvement through education is designed to challenge what 
he describes as the historical “presumption of intellectual inferiority” (103) underlying 
racism in America. 
 
His father thus imparts to Coleman an appreciation for a canonical notion of 
Western literary heritage – “[i]n the Silk family they had read all the old classics” (93) – 
that can be shared equally among all mankind and which surpasses socio-historically 
imposed ideas of segregation or racial “inferiority.” Ross Posnock, for instance, suggests 
that “Mr. Silk is a Duboisian figure who dwells in the deracialized ‘kingdom of culture’” 
(2006, 205). However, the values of racial pride and self-respect that Clarence invokes 
in the novel mark an acutely practical awareness of the actual social divisions and 
restrictions caused by race in America. By contrast, Coleman discovers in the supra-
racial idea of high-cultural tradition that he inherits through his father a significant 
motivating factor in his decision to pass as white and, thereby, escape his paternal 
origins as an African-American. As Zuckerman explains, it was his father’s “powers of 
speech [that] had inadvertently taught Coleman to want to be stupendous” (107). The 
actual moment of epiphany in which Coleman decides to reinvent himself is traced back 
to the inspiration that he receives when reading from his father’s favourite 
Shakespearean play: 
 
“What can be avoided / Whose end is purposed by the mighty gods?” Lines also from Julius Caesar, 
quoted to him by his father, and yet only with his father in the grave did Coleman at last bother to hear 
them – and when he did, instantaneously to aggrandize them. This had been purposed by the mighty gods! 
Silky’s freedom. (107-8) 
 
This passage encompasses a contradictory mixture of both defiance and obeisance 
toward paternal authority that is typical of Roth’s interest in the fraught relationship 
between fathers and sons. In a manner that reflects Zuckerman’s youthful desire in The 
Ghost Writer to abandon his “unliterary origins” for the broader sense of cultural 
inheritance that he finds in great works of literature, Coleman’s decision to author his 
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own future involves a rejection – made more possible by his father’s death – of his 
familial origins as an African-American. Yet despite the sense of filial rejection involved 
in Coleman’s passing, his decision to re-fashion the self along lines that are not 
restricted by the social barriers of race marks an effort to “aggrandize” the particular 
lessons in humanist thought by which his father has instructed him to become an 
intellectual equal to white people.  
 
Described as an ambitious and ardent academic disciple of French post-
structuralist theory, Delphine Roux takes a scythe to the “engendered language” (191) of 
what she labels Coleman’s “so-called humanist approach to Greek tragedy” (193). In 
keeping with her overall language of political correctness, Delphine’s de-centred 
feminist approach to literary criticism is presented in the novel as somewhat militant and 
didactic. Firmly opposed to the “parochial ideological concerns” (191) of this 
“prescribed method” (184) of criticism, Coleman is interested in what he sees as the 
more fundamental and universal lessons to be garnered from Greek literature. For him, 
the politico-cultural agenda of Delphine and others marks an insular means of closing 
off the possibilities for disinterested thought and, thereby, de-intellectualising criticism 
and debate. At one stage in the text, Delphine tries to defend a female student who tells 
Coleman that she found certain Greek tragedies on his course “degrading to women” 
(184). For Coleman, Delphine’s eagerness to encourage narrow gendered readings 
among students represents “one of the best ways to close down their thinking before it’s 
even had a chance to begin to demolish a single one of their brainless likes” (192). 
Throughout The Human Stain, various other voices express similar concerns over the 
broader sense of cultural decline that is taking place as a result of this recent onslaught 
against humanist scholarship and its intellectual principles. For example, Coleman’s 
sister Ernestine links what she sees as a wide scale collapse in standards of cultural 
knowledge to a declining appreciation for the pedagogical values that were instilled 
among the Silk children by their father. Talking with Zuckerman at Coleman’s funeral, 
she explains that: “[t]oday the student asserts his incapacity as a privilege … [t]here are 
no more criteria Mr. Zuckerman, only opinions” (330-31). It is to this same sense of an 
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immutable standard of learning that Coleman appeals in opposition to Delphine’s more 
relativist view of education and literary criticism. Defending the pressing need for 
canonical erudition among a generation of students who “are intellectually barren” 
(191), he argues that: “[t]o read two plays like Hippolytus and Alcestis, then to listen to a 
week of classroom discussion on each, then to have nothing to say about either of them 
other than that they are ‘degrading to women,’ isn’t a ‘perspective,’ for Christ’s sake … 
[i]t’s just the latest mouthwash” (192). Yet despite the apparent lack of sympathy in text 
for Delphine and her localised approach to questions of literature and subjectivity, 
Roth’s novel also subjects Coleman’s brand of scholarship – what Delphine sees as 
Coleman’s pretension to having “no perspective other than the purely disinterested 
literary perspective” (191) – to various troubling moments of fissure. As I have been 
suggesting, the transcendent humanist values that Coleman discovers through his 
reading of canonical literary texts are central to the deracinated concept of “white” 
subjectivity which comes to define his act of passing. However, in so much as Faunia’s 
non-white status brings Coleman’s whitened sense of himself as a post-racial subject 
into a certain level of disarray in the novel, his affair with her also casts doubt over the 
profound and immutable concept of life that he finds in works of classical Greek 
literature.  
 
As one whose accession into white America has been achieved by means of his 
success as a student and educator, Coleman finds further evidence of Faunia’s social 
marginality in her inability to read and write. Illiteracy leaves Faunia devoid of the sense 
of intellectual agency with which Coleman has authored his own (white) identity. At one 
stage in the text, Coleman is asked by his daughter Lisa, who is exasperated by her 
struggle to teach dyslexic children, “[w]hat do you do with the kid who can’t read?” 
(161). When he hears this question, Coleman’s thought are re-directed immediately 
toward Faunia: 
 
Well, what he did with the kid who couldn’t read was to make her his mistress. What Farley did was to 
make her his punching bag. What the Cuban did was to make her his whore, or one among them – so 
Coleman believed more often than not (161) 
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Faunia’s intellectual disability helps to illustrate for Coleman why she has remained 
passive to exploitation and brutality: “[b]een waiting for the next thing to happen all her 
life” (162). Her lack of any decisive sense of individual self-mastery (whiteness) is 
placed in sharp contrast with the way in which Coleman’s concept of himself as an 
autonomous and self-integrated subject is directly linked to his literary education. 
However, Faunia’s intimate sense of the thanatological incompletion and uncertainty in 
life – described by Zuckerman as her means of “trumping learning by a knowledge that 
is stronger and prior” (297) – threatens to dissolve the intellectual and cultural means by 
which Coleman comes to define his sense of whiteness. By re-awakening him to the 
erotic potential “of all he has missed by going in the opposite direction” (164), the affair 
with Faunia exposes Coleman to a more anarchic form of experience that cannot be 
framed by the neatly ordered concept of life which he had previously gleamed from his 
reading of Greek literature: 
 
To live in a way that does not bring Philoctetes to mind. He does not have to live like a tragic character in 
his course … As is. Sans language, shape, structure, meaning – sans the unities, the catharsis, sans 
everything. More of the untransformed unforeseen. And why would anyone want more? (170) 
 
Declaring “convention unendurable,” Coleman embraces the radical estrangement from 
his white middle class world that he discovers in “the obligation to subject my life to 
hers and its vagaries” (171). The “truancy” and “strangeness” (171) that he finds in 
Faunia’s life, therefore, thwart Coleman’s desire for complete authorial control over his 
own existence. The sense of “structure” and “unities” that Greek literature has furnished 
to his understanding of life has been blown apart by the “vagrancy” (171) implicit to 
Faunia’s heightened (erotic) awareness that death and impermanence undercut all 
pretensions to absolute knowledge and self-possession.    
 
Throughout The Human Stain, Zuckerman locates various examples of this 
disordering gap between the lessons of Coleman’s humanist understanding of literature 
and his actual lived experiences. Like Peter Tarnopol, Murray Ringold and Zuckerman 
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himself, Coleman is made to realise that the contingent and unknowable aspects of ‘real’ 
life refuse to conform to his literary “model of reality” (My Life as a Man, 194). Instead, 
he is forced to understand that “outside the classical tragedy of the fifth century B.C., the 
expectation of completion, let alone of a just and perfect consummation, is a foolish 
illusion for an adult to hold” (The Human Stain, 315). These conflicts within Coleman’s 
exalted idea of literary tradition are mirrored by certain divisions in Zuckerman’s role as 
author-narrator in The Human Stain. As I have already illustrated, Zuckerman’s 
narrative interrogates how Coleman, Faunia and Les are all secretly or openly inflected 
by a traumatic experience of non-white social abjection. Yet despite his fascination with 
such marginal experiences, Zuckerman reveals nothing of the particular sense of lack or 
conflict at the heart of his own hyphenated divisions as a Jewish-American subject in 
this novel. Instead, he assumes a position of the detached and self-abnegating literary 
author, personally removed from the lives and events that populate The Human Stain. As 
the narrative interpreter of events, Zuckerman is identifiable in the novel through the far-
reaching statements that he makes about the gaps in our knowledge of the “facts”; what 
he outlines as the thanatological frustrations that subtend all desire for meaning and self-
presence. Yet by finding particular evidence for such broad-sweeping proclamations 
through the conflicting sense of personal possibility and limitation (Eros and Thanatos) 
that defines Coleman’s passing, Zuckerman attempts to deflect attention from the similar 
levels of yearning and frustration which marked his own biographical experiences in 
novels such as The Anatomy Lesson and The Counterlife. Having been made painfully 
aware of the brutal self-divisions that have attended his involvement in the “sexual 
caterwaul,” Zuckerman attempts to withdraw from the confusion involved in the 
relationship between erotic longing and thanatological loss. By estranging himself from 
“the rush of the world,” he has sought “a rich, full solitary existence” (44) in which 
personal forms of desire/narrative are renounced in service of an erotically neutral and 
disinterested engagement with the formal and abstract problems of his craft. 
 
Through exile and solitude, therefore, Zuckerman seeks “to organize the silence” 
by exchanging the preoccupations of the self and stimulations of social life for an 
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impersonal commitment to the traditions of literary work: “to find sustenance in people 
like Hawthorne, in the wisdom of the brilliant deceased” (44). Just as Coleman sought 
within the humanist idea of tradition a version of the self that is not marked by his racial 
origins, Zuckerman finds within the literary past a form of cultural inheritance that 
appears to transcend the particularities of his biographical conflicts as a Jewish-
American subject. By thus assuming the role of the depersonalised and objective writer 
in the style of Lonoff, Zuckerman commits his own secret act of passing. As one who 
conceals the conflicts and disunities of a personal history beneath his guise as a 
disembodied and asocial aesthete, the aesthetically mobile Zuckerman “passes” through 
the lives of others and adopts their speech as his own. Yet although his own story 
remains unspoken throughout the novel, the traumatic impact of his ethnic origins upon 
Zuckerman’s life and literary career can be traced via his vicarious interest in Coleman’s 
passing. In other words, it is possible to locate Zuckerman’s repeatedly frustrated desire 
to overcome his Jewish-American past as something that is displaced within or passed 
through Coleman’s story. Faunia’s remarks about how “all the cleansing is a joke” 
because of the irredeemable fact that “we leave a stain” or “imprint” finds particular 
resonance here. Zuckerman has sought a form of “cleansing” in later life through his 
renunciation of “every last professional yearning and social delusion” (43). Yet despite 
his efforts to remove himself as a desiring subject from the scene of writing, the “stain” 
left by Zuckerman’s highly erotic mode of authorship is evidenced by his obsessive 
desire to understand his own traumatic experiences through the comparable struggles 
that have beset Coleman. As I have suggested earlier, Zuckerman’s description of 
Coleman’s act of passing as a feat that was achieved by rejecting paternal guidance and 
discovering a separate sense of the self within a humanist concept of literary tradition 
marks a clear reprisal of his own youthful struggle to transcend the authority of his 
Jewish father. In this sense, it is possible to read in this novel the hidden story of how 
Zuckerman, like Coleman, is traumatically divided and doubled: he is both at one and 
the same time a literary aesthete who is impersonally committed to the high traditions of 
his art, and a Jewish-American writer who is fixated by the complexities involved in his 
ethnic experience. These close parallels between Coleman and Zuckerman can be 
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understood in relation to the idea of trauma witness that I have discussed in previous 
chapters. Just as Coleman is forced to confront the marginal social circumstances of his 
own secret past in Faunia’s non-whiteness, Zuckerman re-acknowledges the hidden 
trauma of his Jewish-American origins in the story of Silk’s passing. 
 
Trajectories Outward and Inward: Zuckerman’s Irreconcilable Self-divisions 
 
What I have been outlining as the antagonism which lies at the heart of notions 
of canonical tradition and cultural identity in The Human Stain has sparked an equally 
conflicting level of debate among readers. Mark Shechner, for example, finds a “parallel 
to the Stalinism of I Married a Communist” in what he disparagingly calls Delphine’s 
“French-fried Feminism” (2003, 196). Her “petulant and opaque interpretations of 
literature,” Shechner explains, represent “the intransigent party line of the historically 
aggrieved and theoretically armored subaltern” who sets out to viciously defile the 
“broad and tolerant humanism” (196) of Coleman. In stark contrast to this assessment, 
Brett Ashley Kaplan critiques what she calls the “neoconservative” politics of characters 
in the novel who oppose political correctness and set out “to mock the opening up of the 
canon to ‘others’” (2005, 173). In this rather pointed way of reading the various 
reactions to identity politics in Roth’s text, she goes on to suggest that “in The Human 
Stain’s paradoxically liberally-inflected neoconservative view, political correctness 
prevents racial reconciliation by insisting on stifling categorization” (173). Shechner and 
Kaplan’s polarised views tend to overlook what I have been suggesting are the 
ambiguities with which Roth’s novel treats deracinated universal concepts of cultural 
identity and literary tradition. In their separate ways, they both read Roth’s novel as an 
uncomplicated and outright defence of humanist tradition against its subversion by the 
cultural Left.    
 
In ways that find some degree of resonance with my own argument, David 
Tenenbaum provides a greater awareness of the complex manner in which issues of race 
and whiteness inform Roth’s text. He argues that “Coleman Silk hopes to find in 
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Faunia’s own sense of [social] degradation a refuge from his drive to overcome the 
stigma of his race” (36). Yet despite suggesting that Coleman “takes a certain comfort in 
abandoning the white hegemony and the façade that merely epitomizes his shame” (46), 
Tenenbaum asserts that Silk’s search for “acceptance of his [racial] identity” from 
Faunia is highly problematic: “to be forgiven by a woman who has resigned herself to 
the nether regions of social progress hardly seems a suitable consolation for all that he 
must sacrifice in the name of such a specious integrity” (49). Although Roth certainly 
does not advocate any facile notion of the positive or liberating aspects of non-white 
identity in The Human Stain, I would suggest that Tenenbaum’s argument fails to fully 
explore the manner in which Coleman’s affair with Faunia calls into question the very 
relationship between ideas of whiteness and “social progress.” Furthermore, Tenenbaum 
claims that the manner in which Coleman seeks to relinquish the “pursuit of perfection” 
involved in his passing as white marks an abandonment of his once cherished humanist 
standards of excellence in culture and thought: “a capitulation to the emptiness of 
American values” (49). By arguing thus, he would appear to ignore the ways in which 
The Human Stain’s exploration of social experiences of non-whiteness and class 
interrogate the notion of disinterested and immutable standards involved in Coleman’s 
humanist brand of scholarship.  
 
Explaining that “passing is actually a salient instance of self-imposed 
purification, a subjection of the core self to a disciplinary project of control and subtlety” 
(2006, 203), Ross Posnock’s assessment of “the limits and illusion of freedom” (193) 
involved in Coleman’s efforts to become white would also appear to intersect with 
aspects of my own argument. However, Posnock refuses to see the shortcomings of 
Coleman’s passing in any social context of race or class. Instead, he suggests that Roth 
finds “Coleman’s individualism wanting” (214) because of how it demonstrates a rather 
strained and socially restricted example of “man’s propensity for play, for mimicry and 
invention” (193). In contrast to these rigid aspects of “Coleman’s project of self-
making” (213), Posnock claims that the erotic affair with Faunia opens Silk to a more 
fluid space of creativity and self-reinvention in which “the reign of absolutes and the 
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routine of convention” (215) are constantly dissolved. He completely dismisses any 
notion that either the longing for a totalised form of self-mastery evidenced by 
Coleman’s passing or Faunia’s contrasting lack of a sense of “proprietary and protected 
individualism” (216) may be understood in the light of historical experiences of race and 
whiteness. His refusal to entertain such questions of social identity in The Human Stain 
is consistent with Posnock’s assertion that in Roth’s works of fiction: “the force of the 
unsocialized and the force of literature are symbiotic, and both release us from bondage 
to the correct and approved” (18). As my previous references to Posnock make clear, 
such a sentiment is indicative of his overall argument that Roth’s modernist-formalist 
style of writing completely scorns politically correct approaches to literary criticism and 
cultural identity.  
 
Jennifer Glaser examines certain tensions in the text between what she calls 
“multicultural” (1466) notions of identity politics and the “concept of passing as 
performative in a way that de-essentializes subjects and their relation to race” (1469). 
She refers to the non-white cultural history of American Jews and the ways in which 
“Roth taps into this liminal Jewish racial heritage” (1471) in The Human Stain. In doing 
so, Glaser explores the extent to which Roth (she does not really mention Zuckerman) 
finds in the limits of Coleman’s passing a refracted means of looking at how his own 
cultural ascent to the status of the deracinated writer, freed from the specific cultural 
inflections of his ethnic heritage, “occasion[ed] a loss” (1471). She suggests that: 
“[a]lthough it would seem that Roth’s use of passing is meant to challenge the prevalent 
discourse of multiculturalism, his exercise of the trope also emphasizes his own 
anxieties about his decision to pass as ‘a writer’ rather than ‘a Jewish writer’” (1471). 
By arguing thus, Glaser claims that “Roth transforms his novel from a mere critique of 
the imperative to write as a black or a Jew into a more characteristically ambivalent 
document” (1475). She informs us that, although “Roth harshly critiques political 
correctness” (1474) in The Human Stain, he provides us with “a new kind of 
multicultural literature, a literature situated at the intersection of races rather than in a 
system of racial binaries” (1476). Glaser concludes her essay by explaining that “while 
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the novel is a critique of multicultural politics, it is also Roth’s attempt to write himself 
into the multicultural canon” (1476).  
 
Glaser’s assessment of Roth’s novel as an “ambivalent document” clearly 
reflects aspects of my own argument about the tensions between universal humanist 
values and de-centred notions of subjectivity in The Human Stain. I would suggest, 
however, that her idea about how Roth is writing a “new kind of multicultural literature” 
involves a certain elision of the searing conflicts which exist for Coleman and 
Zuckerman between their commitments to a historically transcendent notion of literary 
culture and the traumatic social experiences of race and ethnicity that still haunt them. 
By insisting that “The Human Stain is a prototypically American narrative” about “the 
limits of self-fashioning” (1476), Glaser would appear to neatly re-inscribe Roth’s novel 
into an existing national tradition. For instance, in arguing that the problems of ethnic 
and racial heritages in the text may be understood as emblematic of the overriding 
conflicts “at the heart of the nation’s symbolic imagery” (1476), she fails to examine the 
extent to which experiences of class and non-white social exclusion have rendered 
doubtful the notion of full American citizenship for certain characters in The Human 
Stain. According to Glaser, therefore, Roth’s new brand of “multicultural” literature – 
“situated at the intersection of races” – would appear to prioritise what Stanley Fish calls 
the notion of a “common” American experience over the manner in which certain 
politically correct positions tend to fortify a rigid and exclusionary “system of racial 
binaries.”  
 
There are, of course, obvious merits to the suggestion that Roth is interested in 
the ways in which the experiences of marginal ethnic and racial subjectivities can be 
assimilated within the broader reaches of national life and established notions of literary 
tradition. As this thesis has repeatedly indicated, Roth’s characters have always pursued 
a “trajectory outward” from their parochial Jewish beginnings and toward wider notions 
of deracinated cultural identity. In particular, Zuckerman has sought to reinvent himself 
by escaping from his “unliterary origins” and finding a new sense of belonging in the 
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greater cultural heights marked out by the literary past. I have already indicated how this 
desire to escape the peculiarities of his ethnic heritage continues to find expression in 
The Human Stain through the manner in which Zuckerman assumes a position as the 
detached and disinterested literary interpreter of events in the life of Coleman Silk. Yet 
despite this yearning to escape “the agitation of the autobiographical,” the fraught 
conflicts and erotic strivings surrounding Zuckerman’s life-long battle to unfetter 
himself and his art from the narrow restraints imposed by his Jewish origins are re-
inserted into the text through his examination of the trauma of non-white subjectivity 
and class that interrupts Coleman’s attempt to author his own destiny. Zuckerman’s 
struggle in the later trilogy to write in a way that renders mute the traumatic conflicts at 
the heart of his personal biography as an American Jew thus continues to find a certain 
level of frustration in The Human Stain. As I have discussed at considerable length 
throughout this thesis, it is this inability to wield complete authorial mastery over the 
“facts” surrounding his social and familial origins that lies at the heart of Zuckerman’s 
aesthetic. Despite his many efforts to emulate the “paleface” standards of Lonoff’s 
impersonal mode of writing, Zuckerman’s conflicts with aspects of ‘real’ life produce a 
“redface” literature in which his self-divided sense of ethnic affiliation continues to be of 
utmost relevance.  
 
 This sense of a relentlessly raging conflict in Roth’s writing between 
disinterested notions of aesthetic autonomy and extra-literary aspects of Jewish cultural 
identity completely undermines conservative notions about literature as something that 
transcends the prosaic particularities of its historical context. I have already suggested 
the ways in which contemporary rightist concepts of cultural universality are called into 
considerable question in The Human Stain by Roth’s exploration of the forms of 
limitation and social exclusion involved in post-racial ideas of whiteness and citizenship. 
Yet despite this resistance to historically transcendent notions of cultural identity and 
literary tradition, Roth’s fiction is equally antagonistic toward suggestions that it might 
be defined by the narrow limits of his Jewish origins. As I have suggested earlier, the 
politically correct ideas about social identity and literary criticism voiced by Delphine in 
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The Human Stain are dismissed as an authoritarian reduction of the erotic and creative 
sense of autonomy that Coleman and Zuckerman seek to discover in more expansive, 
humanist notions of cultural heritage. The irreconcilable divisions over issues of Jewish 
origins and authorial freedom in Roth’s “redface” fiction, therefore, resist the contrasting 
forms of essentialist thinking about identity and literature that have been put forth by 
both the cultural Left and the New Right in America since the late sixties.  
 
However, it remains to be discussed whether the unremitting experience of 
traumatic self-division in Roth’s treatment of Zuckerman as the hyphenated, Jewish-
American author can find greater consonance with the more democratically assimilative 
and fluidly re-negotiable notions of a common cultural heritage put forth by progressive 
liberal thinkers like Rorty and Hughes. Unlike the somewhat uncompromising notions of 
historically transcendent individualism bred by conservative ideologues in recent times, 
American liberalism since Roosevelt has shown a pragmatic approach to understanding 
and dealing with certain forms of historical exclusion and inequality existing within 
democratic capitalism. In true progressive fashion, this brand of liberalism aims to 
ultimately achieve a somewhat egalitarian ideal of national community that will be 
inclusive of all American citizens. Yet in contrast to what they see as the impatient and 
utopian demands of revolutionaries on the Left, American liberals have adopted a more 
practical and gradualist approach to levelling out the gaping inconsistencies between 
their projected vision for the future and currently existing social divisions. This 
contradictory blend of progressive idealism and acute pragmatism shaping the 
Rooseveltian trend of liberalism has thus held forth an exalted concept of universal 
cultural belonging that inevitably falls short in the face of prevailing conditions. At the 
same time, it continually strives to expand the boundaries of national inclusion to those 
on the margins of American life by its steady and gradual pursuit of social reform. 
Anthony Hutchinson has appealed to this liberal idea of society as constantly in 
transition toward a better, more progressive state of existence in order to illustrate 
Roth’s disdain for the cultural Left in The Human Stain. For Hutchinson, Roth’s 
opposition to Delphine’s restrictive concept of marginal cultural identity as a “more or 
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less a fixed category” (160) is made on behalf of a notion of the self as fluid and 
transformable which reflects progressive liberal attitudes toward social change. He 
describes this liberal idea of subjectivity as one in which “the ‘identity’ of individuals 
and social groups is … seen as contingent and malleable – a product, primarily, of 
unequal economic relations that has in the past and can continue to be in the future 
reshaped by egalitarian political movements” (160). Although recognising the “limits” 
of “Silk’s liberal-individualist project of self-sovereignty” (158), Hutchinson locates in 
Coleman’s passing a welcome defiance of the entrenched and separatist notions of 
cultural origins that are inscribed by the theories and codes of political correctness. It is 
Coleman’s rejection of any core or ‘original’ identity based upon his racial background 
in favour of a more “contingent and malleable” understanding of the self, according to 
Hutchinson, that registers Roth’s loyalty to the progressive liberal model for cultural 
assimilation and self-advancement that dominated American life at mid-century. 
 
Hutchinson does not discuss in any significant depth the manner in which 
Zuckerman’s attempts to overcome his ethnic past is correlated with Coleman’s act of 
racial passing. Despite this fact, it is possible to test Hutchinson’s argument about Roth’s 
support for a certain liberal idea in which subjectivity is tied to changing levels of social 
progress by reading it in the context of Zuckerman’s conflicted sense of Jewish cultural 
identity, both in The Human Stain and elsewhere. As this thesis has repeatedly 
underlined, while Roth’s fiction recognises the inerasable trauma of Jewish historical 
exclusion from the centre of American life for figures like Zuckerman, such an 
experience also engenders an undiminished longing for departure from those painfully 
limiting origins through acts of self-reinvention and processes of cultural assimilation. In 
this sense, the desire to re-locate oneself within broader ideas of mainstream culture is as 
much dependent upon as it is in tension with restraining notions of ethnic exclusivity or 
marginality in Roth’s fiction. What this conflicted and paradoxical cycle of departure 
from and return to the traumatic site of origins achieves in the Zuckerman novels is to 
invoke the sense of an endlessly continuing, albeit always incomplete, passage of 
migration towards a wider notion of cultural belonging that exists beyond the confines of 
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his Jewish family home. In certain ways, this sense of being in constant transit between a 
confining world of Jewish origins and the more expansive territories of national and 
literary culture is reflective of the gradational process of assimilation that Hutchinson 
locates in progressive liberal politics. However, the crippling experience of reversal that 
Zuckerman’s lingering sense of Jewish historical suffering brings to this migration from 
the margins to the centre of mainstream culture demonstrates how the desire for absolute 
assimilation or self-transformation is always hopelessly doomed in Roth’s fiction. 
Instead of moving on a simple “trajectory outward,” Zuckerman is perpetually forced 
backward and inward upon the various conflicts that are involved in his thwarted efforts 
to shed himself of his Jewish past.  
 
While the phallic urge toward authorial mastery and creative self-reinvention is 
the dominating factor in Zuckerman’s project of writing and Coleman’s passing in The 
Human Stain, neither man is able to fully overcome the impotent sense of being already 
marked or authored as a liminal and incomplete (racial) subject. Throughout the 
American trilogy, figures such as Zuckerman, Ira, the Swede and Coleman all find in 
different ways a liberating sense of inclusion in the overriding spirit of progressive 
idealism that had given tremendous buoyancy to national life at mid-century. Yet for 
each of these characters, the trauma of his marginal origins ultimately contributes to the 
shattering of his sense of belonging to such a universalising and deracinated notion of 
‘American-ness.’ The subject of Faunia and her non-white social status in The Human 
Stain, particularly as it reflects upon both Coleman and Zuckerman’s marginal origins, 
provides a telling example of the eventual shortcomings involved in this once dominant 
liberal ideal of an inclusive American commonwealth. Although the values and 
conventions of whiteness provide Coleman with a means of passing beyond the 
historical limitations of his racial origins, they also mark a highly exclusionary model of 
American social and cultural inclusion for those who have as yet to pass themselves into 
this world of white middle class citizenship.  
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I have earlier mentioned how Faunia’s notion of the “human stain” de-idealises 
the “fantasy of purity” (242) involved in Coleman’s whiteness. What this chapter has 
tried to illustrate is how both Delphine’s de-centred code of political correctness and the 
universalising model of white identity to which Coleman subscribes each involve their 
own “fantasy of purity.” For Zuckerman, the prescriptive and proscriptive language of 
identity politics threatens to stifle the erotic quest to transform what is ‘original’ or ‘real’ 
about the self that is central to both his own sense of aesthetic purpose and Coleman’s 
desire for self-authorship. At the same time, the notion of absolute self-mastery that is 
registered by the highly conventional guise of whiteness which Coleman adopts involves 
a similar negation of erotic desire. Like the Swede’s pastoral or Murray’s dispassionate 
moralising, Coleman’s whiteness suggests a form of being complete or “intact” in which 
the creative desire to stretch the limits of what is ‘real’ has reached a stasis or plenum. In 
other words, Coleman’s performance as a highly conventional white man is neutralised 
of the earlier sense of thanatological uncertainty (“nobody knows) that not only defined 
his experience as a racially marked subject, but which had given impetus to his burning 
desire for self-reinvention and impersonation in the first place. His erotic ambition to 
imaginatively re-draw the boundaries of the self, therefore, finds yet another form of 
thanatological contraction and limitation in the ideal of middle class citizenship with 
which Coleman comes to identify. This suffocating sense of subjectivity as completely 
formed and shorn of future possibilities for transformation is equally mirrored for 
Zuckerman in Delphine’s rigid concept of the historically oppressed victim. Both means 
of conceptualising identity represent notions of “purity” in which the highly mutable, yet 
creative aspects of erotic intensity that have characterised Zuckerman’s writing and his 
efforts at self-authorship are removed or “cleans[ed].” By contrast, the notion of the 
inerasable and impure “stain” in the novel is related to certain experiences of self-
division and thwarted desire that attend the inassimilable trauma of Zuckerman’s Jewish 
origins. In this regard, Roth is interested in the play of creative (erotic) possibilities and 
thanatological frustrations that define Zuckerman’s repeated efforts to escape his Jewish 
family home and find a new origin within wider notions of cultural tradition. It is this 
sense of an endlessly incomplete passage of assimilation into mainstream cultural life – 
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as opposed to the apparently smooth transition from margin to centre involved in 
Coleman’s passing from non-white to white – that shapes Roth’s creative exploration of 




























The End as Beginning and the Beginning as End: the Unfinished Cycle of Trauma 
in The Plot against America and Exit Ghost 
 
 The narrative of crisis and disillusionment in twentieth century American 
liberalism that so interests Roth in the American trilogy finds symbolic moments of 
‘beginning’ and ‘end’ in The Plot against America and Exit Ghost respectively. The Plot 
against America provides an interesting look back at the epic heights achieved by the 
modern liberal dream of nationhood under Roosevelt’s New Deal. Exit Ghost, by 
contrast, takes us forward to the Bush/Kerry election of 2004 and an American scene in 
which the once vibrant spirit of liberal progress that had so dominated the nation at mid-
century has been all but completely vanquished. In The Plot against America, the 
progressive climate of the New Deal Era is evoked by blissful memories of childhood 
origins for its narrator, “Philip Roth.” For the aged and decrepit Zuckerman of Exit 
Ghost, the ravages wrought upon him by sexual impotence and other such intimations of 
death reflect a steady evisceration of the once virile and unified sense of a national 
corpus that had been at the centre of Rooseveltian ideas about America as a collective 
commonwealth. In this sense, both of these novels could be said to offer a glimpse into 
the vast contrasts in the fortunes of progressive liberalism over a period of seventy years, 
marking out the devastating extent to which this formerly ascendant brand of national 
idealism has been shunted to the sidelines of political and cultural life in America at the 
beginning of the twenty first century. Placed together in this particular way, The Plot 
against America and Exit Ghost offer an interesting sense of the broad historical 
narrative of crisis and decline within modern liberalism that has already been partly re-
traced by the novels of the American trilogy.  
 
In the concluding discussion that follows, I wish to explore how this ostensible 
sense of an historical chronology in the American liberal narrative since Roosevelt, 
moving from heroic beginnings to tragic ends, is attenuated by the paradoxical 
experience of trauma in Roth’s fiction. As I have already outlined in previous chapters, 
trauma is experienced in terms of disjunctive moments of re-enactment that never quite 
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reclaim the horrifying experience in its entirety, but through which the traumatised 
subject continues to repeatedly revisit the bewildering event in the hope of some day 
making it ‘real’ or comprehensible. As an event that persistently defies full 
understanding, therefore, trauma marks an experience which never quite begins and yet, 
at the same time, refuses to reach an end for the distraught victim. Both of the novels 
under study in this chapter adequately demonstrate how this sense of chronological 
distortion works in Roth’s fiction. In particular, each book highlights how the ambitious 
forward trajectories mapped out by notions of historical progress and liberating forms of 
self-transformation are interrupted by the unending manner in which Roth’s narrators 
find themselves both seeking departure from and a return to certain ‘original’ moments 
of unassimilated or traumatic experience.  
 
In The Plot against America, Philip’s secure and compact world of childhood 
origins in Roosevelt’s America is subject to great upheaval by the “unforeseen” 
recurrence of a past trauma to which he is completely oblivious and thus hopelessly 
unprepared for. This sense of an unhealed wound relates back to the harrowing 
experiences of social exclusion that afflicted his parents’ generation of American Jews, 
but which appeared to be erased from the collective memory as a result of the 
assimilatory opportunities afforded to ethnic minorities by the New Deal. Looking back 
on these troubling childhood experiences from a distance of over sixty years, Philip’s 
memoir of events suggests how this moment of crisis and breakdown in his once assured 
sense of belonging to America continues to leave him scarred and bewildered. Still 
traumatised, he is rooted to a childhood past that he is unable to fully restore to all its 
pristine glory, before his unified sense of being both Jewish and American under 
Roosevelt began to fissure and come apart. Nor, for that matter, can he abandon his 
tarnished world of home and nation for a newly minted sense of origins. In Exit Ghost, 
Zuckerman continues to discuss how his hermetic form of isolation has served as an 
attempt to leave behind the traumatic experience of living in a dis-jointed world in 
which his political idealism and literary aspirations have been subject to bitter dispute 
and frustration. However, by once more re-entering the turbulence of daily existence in 
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New York City on the eve of the 2004 Presidential Election, Zuckerman is forced to 
realise that the more youthful conflicts and disappointments from which he has sought 
refuge in later life are still remarkably fresh and unresolved in old age.  
 
In both of these novels, as in each volume of the American trilogy, the sense of 
political expectations and social opportunities that had been enshrined by values of 
progressive liberalism in America between the 1930s and 1960s are subject to a 
catastrophic sense of traumatic reversal and disillusionment. These shared experiences 
of trauma find no satisfactory completion or end for Roth’s protagonists, but continue to 
be rehearsed and replayed by each of them in a desperate effort to make their personal 
sense of involvement with American history more understandable. This notion of history 
as a trauma that is constantly re-enacting itself in the present and reaching beyond into 
the unlived future unites the historically separated experiences of Philip in The Plot 
against America and Zuckerman in Exit Ghost.  Philip’s fabled moment of heightened 
beginnings is subject to an early and crippling experience of “unforeseen” shock that 
finds distinct reverberations through Zuckerman’s more jaded sense of having endured a 
lifetime of being exasperated and at odds with the ways in which American political and 
cultural life has developed since mid-century. In other words, both Philip’s happy 
recollections of his childhood origins during the New Deal and Zuckerman’s intimations 
of death and futility in 2004 are actually united by a shared cycle of repeating trauma 
within modern American liberalism that appears to exist in a continuous and unceasing 
fashion which defies clearly separable and chronological coordinates of origin or end. 
The end-of-days despair over the failure of progressive liberalism to wrest the nation 
from the populist ideology of the Right in Exit Ghost thus marks an uncanny repetition 
of the trauma that scars the glorious epoch of Rooseveltian origins evoked by Philip’s 





The “unfolding of the unforeseen”: the Crisis of New Deal Optimism in The Plot against 
American  
   
The Plot against America takes for its subject a counterfactual historical scenario 
which envisages the defeat of Roosevelt in the 1940 Presidential election by the 
isolationist and Nazi sympathiser, Charles Lindbergh, who, instead of taking America 
into war, signs a peace accord with Hitler’s Germany. Roth’s novel charts the 
bewildering changes to family life experienced by his protagonist, 9 year old “Philip 
Roth,” amid escalating fears within the broader Jewish community over the Lindbergh 
Administration’s hinted overtures to residual feelings of anti-Semitism in America. In an 
interview following its publication, Roth explains the strategy behind his novel’s 
counterfactual technique:  
   
Orwell imagined a huge change in the future with horrendous consequences for everyone; I tried to 
imagine a small change in the past with horrendous consequences for a relative few. He imagined a 
dystopia, I imagined a uchronia (“The Story Behind The Plot against America”) 
   
The narrative is structured around the recollections of an aged Philip, who recalls how 
the safe environs of his childhood world were made gradually more perilous by a 
growing atmosphere of fear and discord that was offset within his home and community 
by the emergence to power of Lindbergh. The hysteria bred by a sense of imminent 
displacement from the mainstream of American life among the Jews of Newark’s 
Summit Avenue under Lindbergh’s reign is sharply contrasted with idyllic memories of 
Philip’s family setting during Roosevelt’s Presidency. In this way, calamitous historical 
events in The Plot against America take the form of Philip’s Edenic Fall from a state of 
childish innocence to an understanding of the contingency and mutability of life within 
“the unfolding of the unforeseen” (113).  
   
              What the imagined nightmare of a Lindbergh Presidency offers Roth is a means 
by which to investigate the core Rooseveltian foundations of Philip’s childhood sense of 
origins, once they have been subject to the strain and conflicts engendered by an alien 
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environment. The anguished experience of reversal that Roosevelt’s defeat brings to 
Philip’s childhood romance with America involves a shattering of the happy unity 
between both his national and familial sense of belonging. As in previous works, 
growing tensions between a parochial sense of Jewish ethnic allegiance and wider 
notions of American cultural belonging for Philip in The Plot against America are 
dramatised in terms of a declining faith in paternal authority and a symbolic break from 
the protective confines of home. Perhaps more so than in his other novels, however, 
Roth accentuates the crippling experience of loss and pain involved in the dwindling 
sense of parental assurance and guidance for the still very young Philip. However, the 
sense of great sorrow incurred as a result of Philip’s traumatic ordeal in the novel is 
attended by early signs of his growing aesthetic sensibility, the full maturation of which 
can be witnessed in the memoir that he provides us with more than sixty years later. 
Therefore, in ways that signal a variation on a recurring thematic in Roth’s literature, the 
painful break with familial origins is directly linked to the creative birth of the self as 
author in The Plot against America.  
   
Similar to the Weequahic section of Newark that Zuckerman recalls in American 
Pastoral, Philip’s childhood neighbourhood in The Plot against America is described as 
an idyllic environment, buoyed by the rewards of successful Jewish assimilation into the 
mainstream of American life. Like the Swede, Philip is the Jewish-American Adam who 
is born free from the weight of historical suffering experienced by his grandparents and 
parents. Innocently removed from the struggles and privations of the past, Philip lives 
happily within the paradisiacal environment of Summit Avenue where the “very gutters 
gushed with the elixir of life” (209). This joyous haven is described in the novel as the 
hard won achievement of parents, whose memories of their harsh social experience as 
the children of marginalised Jewish immigrants made them eager to protect their own 
offspring from the ravages of historical suffering. Bess and Herman Roth’s 
determination “to contain the uncertainty and the anxiety and the anger and operate 
according to the dictates of reason” (300) has sheltered Philip from any knowledge of 
the reversals and uncertainties associated with their own past. The “child’s peacetime 
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illusion of an eternal, unhounded now” (225) that Philip recalls from his pre-Lindbergh 
life thus takes on aspects of what Bakhtin described as “the valorized past of beginnings 
and peak times” (19). This epic notion of origins is underlined by the self-integrated 
image of a community whose inhabitants “were very similar people at the core” (219). 
The seemingly uncomplicated acculturation into American society by his parents and 
their fellow second generation Jews on Summit Avenue thus bears no visible trace of the 
difficult marginality or hyphenated self-divisions indicative of Jewish-American 
subjectivity elsewhere in Roth’s fiction: “[t]heir being Jews issued from being 
themselves, as did their being American” (220).  
 
The material and psychological benefits of such a smooth form of cultural 
integration for Jewish-Americans is inextricably linked to the figure of Roosevelt and 
the principles of the New Deal in The Plot against America. As I will outline in more 
detail below, the language of the New Deal proffered a vision of socio-economic 
security and national cultural unity that promised to usher the American people out of 
the historical calamity of the Great Depression. It fostered an optimistic spirit of national 
renewal and values of collective co-operation, in an attempt to legislate against the 
future possibility of a similar socio-economic catastrophe. Much like the post-war liberal 
consensus that succeeded it, the progressive ideal of guaranteed future security which 
the Roosevelt Administration offered to American citizens was structured upon various 
“balancing acts” (Cooney, 1995 xv) that sought to reasonably harmonise sources of 
economic and social conflict in America. Related to the notion of “economic morality” 
(Second Inaugural Speech, paragraph 11) by which Roosevelt “determined to make 
every American citizen the subject of his country’s interest and concern” (paragraph 29) 
was an ideal of social inclusiveness that encouraged an acceptance of and respect toward 
America’s many people of different ethnic origins. In The Plot against America, Philip’s 
childhood is defined by certain ideas and tropes that characterise key values of the New 
Deal vision of compromise between conflicting social and economic forces in America. 
Roosevelt is fictionalised as a benevolent, avuncular figurehead for the American 
“common man” in the text, whose broadcasts over the radio are delivered in a 
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personalised tone that provides a welcoming balm of re-assurance to the greater public, 
most particularly the Jews of Summit Avenue. However, the rational ideas of historical 
progress that underwrite the Roth family’s assured sense of full American citizenship in 
the novel is made suddenly uncertain, once Roosevelt is defeated by the more aloof and 
taciturn Lindbergh, “the rugged individualist” (30).  
 
Whereas Philip describes “that huge endowment of personal security that I had 
taken for granted as an American child of American parents” (7) before Roosevelt’s 
electoral defeat, it is “perpetual fear” (1) that dominates his experiences subsequent to 
the arrival of Lindbergh onto the stage of political history. The anxiety and horror that 
lay behind “two years of helplessly absorbing every rumour … [and] never being able to 
justify either their alarm or their composure with hard fact” (244) for Philip’s 
community in the novel is never fully matched by the outcome of events. Following only 
two years as President, Lindbergh literally disappears from the historical scene. With his 
vice-President disgraced, Roosevelt is re-instated to executive power and leads America 
into war against the Axis nations. Yet as Roth himself has mentioned, it is the crippling 
fear of persecution expressed by the Newark Jews, rather than any actual act of 
oppression or exclusion made by the Lindbergh Administration, which serves as the 
primary focus of the novel: “[w]hat matters in my book isn’t what he [Lindbergh] does 
… but what American Jews suspect, rightly or wrongly, that he might be capable of 
doing given his public utterances” (“The Story Behind The Plot against America”). I 
will explore in more detail below how the anxieties that arose among Philip’s parents 
and their neighbours by the presence of Lindbergh in The White House recall an earlier 
trauma of Jewish social exclusion in America, which appeared to have been completely 
buried by their sense of unhindered accession into wider national life under Roosevelt. 
Despite the triumphal moment of Jewish acculturation into the American mainstream 
outlined by Philip’s blissful childhood memories in the novel, The Plot against America 
investigates how such a dormant and unfinished trauma is horrifyingly re-visited in the 
moment of profound historical crisis offset by Lindbergh’s Presidency. 
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Before discussing further The Plot against America, I wish to offer a brief 
outline of how historians have assessed the New Deal as not just the cornerstone of 
modern American liberalism, but as the troubled site of contradictions and tensions upon 
which that very liberal vision of a progressive social compact between different 
sectional interests would become torn apart in later decades. According to many 
commentators, New Deal efforts to protect the wider public welfare against the 
vicissitudes of a laissez faire market through a rational state organisation of the economy 
did help to foster a greater sense of material and psychological security among 
Americans in this period. David Kennedy, for example, mentions how “security was the 
leitmotif of virtually everything the New Deal attempted” (365). Similarly, Wendy Wall 
has discussed how “President Roosevelt and his New Dealers” helped to promote the 
notion of “an ‘American Way’ built around the twin pillars of majoritarian democracy 
and economic security for all Americans” (6). Michael Szalay has argued that the New 
Deal witnessed the birth of a radically new concept of the liberal subject based upon 
ideas of collective “Social Security [that] made the state not an instrument of co-
ordinated economic planning but rather a system of exchange essentially compensatory 
for human experience” (2). Yet as Szalay’s reference to a Keynesian “system of 
exchange” between the market and the state suggests, this drive toward some form of 
material security for all citizens – which would later morph into a notion of mass 
prosperity during the post-war liberal consensus – was made somewhat unstable by 
contradictions between the New Deal’s interest in re-stimulating American capitalist 
values of individual initiative and its more left-leaning notions about public welfare and 
the protection of labour.  
 
Various people have discussed how the New Deal’s “abundant promiscuities, 
inconsistencies, contradictions, inconstancies, and failures” (Kennedy, 364-5) originated 
from these overriding tensions in its outlook between capitalist individualism and state 
corporatism; divisive economic competition and government assured security. Richard 
Hofstadter, for example, provided an early assessment of the New Deal as “a series of 
improvisations, many adopted very suddenly, many contradictory” (327). For Alan 
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Brinkley, the “New Deal [was] a confusing amalgam of ideas and impulses – a program 
that seemed to have something in it to please everyone except those who sought a 
discernible ideological foundation for it” (18). Elsewhere, Robert Edsforth has described 
how “Roosevelt was trying to lift the psychological burden that American individualism 
imposed on the poor,” while, at the same time, “paving the way for reform in the 
capitalist system that would prevent a future depression” (53). According to Terry 
Cooney, the New Deal was characterised by a “desire to move in more than one 
direction, to have it both ways, to live with or to resolve contradictions” (1995, xiv). He 
provides an interesting examination of the “balancing acts” by which such New Deal 
policies as public work relief “aspired to defend the traditional emphasis on individual 
responsibility as much as to escape its harsher implications” (50). As my earlier 
discussions of the problems facing American liberalism after World War Two have 
suggested, such contradictions and tensions within the Rooseveltian liberal model would 
become increasingly exacerbated during later periods.  
   
In a decidedly leftist stance that exemplifies how a later generation would come 
to criticise and abandon the liberal compromises established by Roosevelt, historian 
Barton J. Bernstein’s argues that the New Deal provided an ultimately hollow vision of 
radical hope. He describes the Rooseveltian promise of great social and economic 
change as one in which: “marginal men trapped in hopelessness were seduced by 
rhetoric, by the style and movement, by the symbolism of efforts seldom reaching 
beyond words” (35-6). The highly persuasive forms of “rhetoric” and “symbolism” that 
Bernstein critically refers to in this instance were highly instrumental to the New Deal’s 
populist notions of cultural integration and commonweal spirit. Described by Cooney as 
“unifying metaphors” (2005, 197), the various images of mass co-operation that the 
Roosevelt Administration employed in defending the plight of the “common man” were 
expressed also in terms of a cultural togetherness between the nation’s diverse social and 
ethnic groups, many of which had inhabited a marginal space in American life prior to 
this point. Cooney explains how “the presence of different groups and values in 
American culture became evidence of a unifying national commitment, and, by 
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extension, ameliorative treatment of conflicts among the parts verified the presence of an 
enlightened understanding of the whole” (98).  
 
As I have already been indicating, Roth’s novel draws upon this ideal of 
common cultural purpose in his portrayal of an idyllic Jewish community in The Plot 
against America, before the arrival onto the political scene of Lindbergh. Myron 
Scholnick explains that “Jews gained a desperately needed feeling of acceptance as 
steadfast partners in a popular struggle for national redemption” (19) under the New 
Deal. Yet in a manner that has important echoes for Roth’s novel, Scholnick stresses that 
such a moment of assimilation for American Jews was not without its trials and 
uncertainties. He mentions how certain forms of “extremist reaction to that reform 
movement [the New Deal]” were accompanied by “the greatest outburst of anti-
Semitism the nation had yet experienced” (2). Roth’s novel not only explores how such 
a glaring inconsistency to the liberal notion of a united Republic under Roosevelt 
existed, but also looks ahead to other similar divisions that would come to tear asunder 
the mid-century myth of national consensus and accord. As Wendy Wall argues, the idea 
of a unifying national spirit has since become subject to many bitter contesting notions 
about cultural life in America. She explains that “[c]ompeting attempts to define core 
American values” by both “[p]roponents and critics of affirmative action, abortion 
restrictions, gay marriage, welfare and immigration reform, and a host of other issues” 
(12) in contemporary public debates have witnessed the fracturing of any dream of 
common cultural understanding. It is this disintegration of the liberal version of a 
collectively shared American dream, as the previous chapters to this thesis attest, which 
has provided an important historical context for Roth’s fiction.    
   
Cooney has mentioned how the New Deal’s populist celebration “of a country 
disparate and diverse in nature became a proclamation of common loyalty to the nation’s 
traditional political ideals” (1995, 173). Similarly, Lawson has argued that the “ideal of 
a cooperative commonwealth” was, in part, fostered by an “effort to link day-to-day 
living with myth and historical destiny” (137). It is this sense of democratic inheritance 
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and progressive historical destiny in America that is made precarious for Philip’s family 
by events in The Plot against America. The uneasy coalition of diverse social groups 
involved in the New Deal’s unifying cultural vision is explored by tensions that arise 
between the Roths’ claim to a sense of American historical entitlement and their 
growing exposure to anti-Semitism while on a family vacation to Washington. Philip 
explains how this quasi-pilgrimage to the shrines of American democratic grandeur in 
the Capital is designed by his parents “to convince Sandy and me ... that nothing had 
changed other than that FDR was no longer in office” (5). By way of dramatising the 
tensions that become exposed in the Roth family’s conflicting experience as both 
mainstream Americans and marginalised Jews under Lindbergh’s tenure as President, 
the narrative of their trip to Washington is infused by a sharpened sense of dialogic 
conflict. In one sense, Philip’s impressions of the various totemic symbols of American 
democratic prowess demonstrate the seductive quality of a heroic national history to a 
child whose stamp collection – celebrating great American figures and places – 
represents “nine tenths of his knowledge of the world” (67). By contrast, the family’s 
stay in Washington heightens their growing fears of social exclusion, as evidenced by 
two separate incidences in which the vociferously patriotic and pro-Roosevelt Herman is 
made subject to anti-Semitic epithets. The contrasting attitudes of Philip’s parents help 
to dramatise the family’s nervous ambivalence about their continued sense of inclusion 
in the national culture. The vitality of Herman’s enthusiasm for their tour of Washington 
and what it represents in terms of their identity as Americans is tempered by Bess’s 
many bouts of anxiety regarding the family’s immediate safety. Breaking down with 
worry at one stage, much to the bewilderment of Philip who has been buoyed by his 
father’s patriotic optimism, she explains to her children: “it isn’t like living in a normal 
country anymore” (59).  
 
The various symbols of national history that Washington contains become 
contested sites upon which the Roth family discover a fractured sense of both their 
membership in and displacement from a triumphal American lineage. For example, on 
first looking at the Lincoln Memorial, Philip describes “the sculpted face ... [as] the face 
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of God and the face of America all in one” (63). He goes on to explain how “there was 
no defense, for either an adult or a child, against the [monument’s] solemn atmosphere 
of hyperbole” (63). However, Philip’s wondrous sense of historical pride and belonging 
soon gives way to dread as his father’s vocal support for Roosevelt and the New Deal is 
met with a hostile response from another man standing nearby, who labels Herman “a 
loudmouth Jew” (65). Immediately following this incident, Philip recalls how “it was 
impossible to [longer] feel the raptures of patriotism turning me inside out” (66) that he 
had experienced just moments earlier. The uncertainty that Philip begins to experience in 
relation to his American birthright is best expressed by a line that he delivers on 
recalling the vista from the Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument: “[i]t was 
the most beautiful panorama I’d ever seen, a patriotic paradise, the American Garden of 
Eden spread before us, and we stood huddled there, the family excluded” (66). It is only 
when told that Martha Washington was the first woman to appear on a stamp, referring 
him back to the America that he knows as a philatelist, that Philip feels “all the 
complications of our being a Jewish family in Lindbergh’s America simply vanished” 
(74). He describes the similarities between this resumed sense of confidence in his 
identity as an American and “the way I felt in school when, at the start of an assembly 
program, you rose to your feet and sang the national anthem, giving it everything you 
had” (74). However, the various explicit acts and suggested hints of prejudice that the 
Roth family are subject to while in Washington indicate that such patriotic fervour may 
be no more than the product of a “hyperbole,” which works to disguise the sharp sense 
of cultural and ethnic divisions beneath their growing fears of exclusion from the centre 
of American life.  
   
New Deal attempts to protect the material interests and restore the psychological 
confidence of the American “common man” following the catastrophic upheavals of the 
Depression involved a concerted valorisation of the virtues and dignity of work over the 
purely financial considerations of profit. In his First Inaugural Address, Roosevelt 
encapsulates this idea by warning that: “[t]he joy and moral stimulation of work no 
longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits” (“First Inaugural 
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Address, paragraph 7). As Cooney points out, this elevation of economic labour to a 
form of spiritual pursuit invoked historical myths of the frontier, out of which were 
drawn “a presumably characteristic American affinity for hard work and self-reliance” 
(1995, 181). Work performs as a keystone to the world constructed by Philip’s parents in 
The Plot against America, acting as a passport in the cultural migration of second-
generation Jewish immigrants into a broader experience of what it means to be 
American. As Philip explains: “[i]t was work that identified and distinguished our 
neighbors for me far more than religion” (3). However, the New Deal’s uncomplicated 
and universalised concept of work as a heroic American cultural value – the means of 
not just material, but also moral well-being – elided a certain amount of the usual 
economic antagonisms between labour and capital. As I have discussed at length in 
chapter two, this politically neutralised ideal of labour finds distinct echoes through the 
connections made between factory labour and artisan manufacturing by Lou and the 
Swede in American Pastoral. Such an uncontested notion of work reflects the New Deal 
struggle to balance legislation that protected the rights of American labour with efforts at 
encouraging the capitalist spirit of “energetic individualism” (Cooney, 1995 185), 
deemed necessary for economic revival during the Depression. As an important 
foundation to the blissful life secured for Philip by his parents, this New Deal ideology 
of work becomes exposed to its underlying contradictions and limitations, once 
historical events begin to make his childhood world uncertain.  
   
The way in which core New Deal values of work are made subject to strain in the 
novel is evidenced by Herman’s refusal at one stage to accept the prospect of a lucrative 
job promotion, out of fear that the requirement to re-locate his family to a non-Jewish 
neighbourhood might involve exposing them to anti-Semitic prejudices. Although the 
prospect of Herman becoming a branch assistant manager is described by Philip as 
something “that, above all, would answer a Depression family’s yearning for a tiny 
margin of financial security,” his parents balk at the potential dangers of moving away 
from Summit Avenue and into a “Gentile working-class town” (8). Philip describes how 
his father’s well rehearsed platitudes about how hard work and initiative act as the 
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guarantors of American democratic advancement are made vulnerable by this fearful 
decision not to accept his greatest financial opportunity yet:  
   
At the dinner table, my father would reiterate to his young sons time and again, “If anybody asks ‘Can you 
do this job? Can you handle it?’ you tell ‘em ‘Absolutely.’ By the time they find out that you can’t, you’ll 
already have learned, and the job’ll be yours. And who knows, it just might turn out to be the opportunity 
of a lifetime.” Yet over in New York he had done nothing like that (11)  
   
Later in the novel, after having resisted the efforts of Lindberg’s Office of American 
Absorption to make the family relocate among the wider Gentile population, Herman is 
eventually forced to leave his job. As a result, he becomes declassed from his role as a 
white-collar insurance salesman to one of manual labourer at his brother, Monty’s 
wholesale firm. Herman’s new “blue collar” routine of “slugging down his shot” of 
alcohol and sleeping at inordinate times leaves Philip “dumbfounded … by the abrupt 
decline in my father’s vocational status” (238). By the end of the novel, Herman’s 
vaunted New Deal concept of the moral relationship between hard work and self-
advancement suffers its final humiliation when Monty decides to sack him. Monty’s 
unsentimental mode of competitive entrepreneurialism brings to light the contradictions 
involved in his and Herman’s shared, second generation immigrant attitude to work as 
the ultimate means of self-improvement in America. In an effort to delineate these 
tensions, Philip outlines the differences between his father and his uncle:  
   
it was enough for him [Herman] to make something (rather than everything) of himself and to do so 
without wrecking the lives around him. My father was born to contend but also to protect, and to inflict 
damage on an enemy didn’t make his spirits soar as it did his older brother’s (123)  
 
Herman embodies a Rooseveltian ideal in which his self-interests are mutually beneficial 
with the material well-being of others. As one of “the brutal entrepreneurial machers” 
(123), Monty, by contrast, holds an attitude to work and personal profit that is far more 
aggressively self-seeking. In contrast with the reasoned liberal impulses by which 
Herman attempts to reform Philip’s wayward cousin, Alvin, Monty approaches the 
problem of their errant nephew with the aggression of “[b]ullies [who] love to 
summarize” (152). Far less considerate than his brother about the various disadvantages 
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and setbacks that have shaped Alvin’s behaviour, Monty reminds him bluntly that there 
“is nothing you have earned” (152).  
   
Such contested divisions within this seemingly coherent ideal of work as the 
means of social opportunity and individual achievement in America find further 
evidence during the fractious dinner table debates between Herman and Alvin. These 
arguments are focused around Alvin’s future and the opportunity that is afforded to him 
by working as a personal driver for Abe Steinheim, a local construction mogul. Whereas 
Herman brandishes Steinheim with the heroic epithets of “colourful,” “exciting” and 
“genius” (46), Alvin sees him as “a bully,” “a swindler” and “without a friend in the 
world” (47). Arguing, we are told, “not like a member of the National Association of 
Manufacturers but as a devotee of Roosevelt’s New Deal” (47), Herman sees 
Steinheim’s success as the deserved product of hard endeavour. By contrast, Alvin – 
who is labelled a Marxist by Herman and, therefore, seen by his uncle as contrary to the 
compromising sprit of the New Deal – insists that “avarice” and “staggering arrogance” 
(47) lie at the heart of Steinheim’s business accomplishments. Yet, in an ironic twist, it 
is Alvin who later comes to embody this notion of capitalism as underhand and driven 
by egotistical self-interest, much anathema to Herman’s Rooseveltian ideal of a system 
of fair play and honest toil. It is his transformation from being the family’s ethical 
consciousness into the role of “sharpie” or petty crook that makes Alvin attractive as a 
protégé to Steinheim. In this sense, he comes to display what Mr. Patimkin in “Goodbye, 
Columbus” saw as the businessman’s “need [for] a little of the gonif in you” (67). This 
connection between thievery and business is made complete by the novel’s close, when 
Alvin develops completely, via the nefarious dealings of organised crime in 
Philapelphia, into the role of legitimate and successful businessman.  
   
Throughout the novel, Philip reflects upon a family environment in which his 
parents regulated against the experiences of fear and uncertainty that had pervaded their 
own childhood world of immigrant hardship. He describes how his father’s “relentless 
passion ... brought to the struggle against setback and disappointment” was reinforced by 
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his mother’s efforts “to hold our world together as calmly and sensibly as she could” 
(40). In many ways, Bess and Herman’s dedication to “patiently reasoning” (47) the 
outcome of events reflects on the micro-level of family and local community the wider 
progressive faith of the New Deal in the ability of people to shape and steer their lives 
along rationally forecasted and ameliorative lines. However, the contagion of fear bred 
among the Summit Avenue Jews by Lindbergh’s Presidency works to tear down the 
“sheltering wall of legal assurances standing between them and the derangements of a 
ghetto” (338). The nervous reaction of the Roth family and their neighbours to this 
“unforeseen” crisis thus marks a reversal in the hopeful sense of historical progression 
by which American Jews had come to identify fully with the wider nation under 
Roosevelt. Such a “malignant transformation” (57) gives rise in Roth’s novel to the 
demotic underside of Roosevelt’s reassuring declaration that: “the only thing we have to 
fear is fear itself – nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyses needed 
efforts to convert retreat into advance” (First Inaugural Address, paragraph 1). Amid this 
atmosphere of growing collective alarm, the cautious rationalism and observed pieties 
that once governed the Roth household are superseded by various manifestations of 
angst and febrile emotionalism. For the unsuspecting Philip, such incidents bring about a 
cataclysmic and traumatising end to his once cosseted world of childhood innocence.  
   
The horrifying changes brought to Philip’s secure and peaceful environment by 
wider historical events finds evidence in Herman’s uncharacteristic turn towards 
physical aggression in the novel, in a hopeless effort to restore his dwindling sense of 
authority at home. Philip recalls with anguish how his father struck him in retaliation for 
attending the cinema newsreel which his parents had forbidden him to watch, for fear 
that the news events about Lindbergh would further unnerve the increasingly worried 
child: “for the first time ever, [he] wallops me, without restraint, across the face” (203). 
Such an unexpected outburst of violence finds an even more alarming example when the 
persuasive mode of reasoning by which Herman attempts to guide Alvin in the right 
direction gives way to frustration and anger. Having witnessed his father violently attack 
his cousin, Philip explains that:  
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I’d had no idea my father was so well suited for wreaking havoc or equipped to make that lightning-quick 
transformation from sanity to lunacy that is indispensable in enacting the unbridled urge to destroy. Unlike 
Uncle Monty he preferred never to speak of the ordeal of a Jewish tenement kid on Runyon Street before 
World War One (293)   
   
Following the brawl that ensues between Herman and Alvin, Philip describes the sense 
of “abashment” that his father experiences “over everything he’d mismanaged and badly 
misjudged, including the improbable violence that had smashed to bits, along with our 
coffee table, that lifelong barrier of rigid rectitude that had stood between his harsh 
upbringing and his mature ideals” (301). In an environment of intensifying fear and 
uncertainty, Herman feels increasingly incapable of guiding and protecting those he 
loves. The forceful brand of “lecturing and hectoring love” (296) that he had wielded as 
the authoritative, yet caring, patriarch gives way to disappointment and rage In this way, 
Herman’s “mature” liberal principles of peacefully resolving differences through 
strength of reason are torn asunder by the re-surfacing of certain irrational instincts for 
anxiety and frustration that relate back to the buried experiences of the Jewish immigrant 
past.  
 
The disillusioning sense of reversal in his parents’ efforts to rationally construct 
a life for Philip that is free from the psychological strife associated with their own past 
experiences of social exclusion as American Jews is compounded by Bess’s numerous 
bouts of emotional crisis throughout the novel. Philip recalls with great sadness how her 
function as the maternal protector “who performed each day in methodical opposition to 
life’s unruly flux” (341) is made redundant by the capricious turn of events during 
Lindbergh’s Presidency:  
   
What it came down to for the child who was watching her being battered about by the most anguishing 
confusion (and who was himself quaking with fear) was the discovery that one could do nothing right 
without also doing something wrong, so wrong, in fact, that especially where chaos reigned and 
everything was at stake, one might be better off to wait and do nothing - except that to do nothing was also 
to do something (340-1)  
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The peculiar circumstances surrounding the advent to power of Lindbergh thus signal a 
disabling reversal in the highly assured sense of social and cultural advancement within 
Philip’s Jewish community under Roosevelt. As a result of the various calamitous events 
in the novel, the Roth family are re-acquainted with the trauma of Bess and Herman’s 
long abandoned, “ghetto” origins as the children of marginalised Jews. Although the 
meticulous manner in which his parents sheltered Philip from any knowledge of this 
trauma was fundamental to his blissful childhood experience, it also left him hopelessly 
unprepared for the devastating impact of events surrounding Lindbergh’s Presidency. 
With a still raw sense of disappointment, the aged Philip reflects upon how the world of 
protection and safety that his parents provided for him had amounted to nothing more 
than: “a cunning deception perpetrated to soften us up with rational expectations and 
foster nonsensical feelings of trust” (353).  
    
Sexual desire is largely absent from Philip’s pre-pubescent world of childhood 
innocence. However, as that idyllic environment becomes subject to various forms of 
distraught emotion, there are indications of the sexual knowledge to which the child 
Philip will become eventually aware. Having witnessed his father’s violent attack on 
Alvin, the aged narrator reflects that: “[p]rior to that night, it would have been as 
impossible for me to imagine him beating someone up … as to imagine him atop my 
mother” (294). By its very absence, erotic desire lingers on the margins of Philip’s 
narrative as an imminent adjunct to the world fraught by anguish and fear that is 
developing before him. As my previous chapters have highlighted, this idea of the 
relationship between desire and traumatic experiences of loss or suffering is central to 
Roth’s fiction. The shattering experience of trauma that is visited upon Philip’s 
paradisiacal sense of childhood finds an important example in the case of his cousin 
Alvin, who, having lost a leg while fighting for Canadian forces against the Nazis, 
returns to live once more with the Roth family. On returning home, Alvin’s amputee 
condition is worsened by the added emotional deformities of regret and rage that render 
him unrecognisable to the spirited political idealist who defied not just fascism and 
Lindbergh’s policy of isolationism, but the stern and protective warnings of Philip’s 
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father by going to war. The nurse who attends Alvin on his journey back to Newark 
attempts to explain to Philip and his brother, Sandy – “two protected children entirely 
ignorant of the bitterness of loss” (130) – the reason for their cousin’s considerable 
change in mood and behaviour. To Sandy’s question regarding the object of Alvin’s new 
sense of outrage, she replies: “[a]t what people get angry at – at how things turn out.” 
(130). When Philip discovers Alvin masturbating in the cellar of the family home, the 
suggested link between loss and sexual longing in the novel finds its most pointed 
expression. Although he “didn’t [as yet] know what masturbation was” (148), Philip 
intuitively makes a connection between his cousin’s bewildered rage over the loss of his 
leg and the unfamiliar act. On discovering Alvin’s ejaculated semen on the cellar wall, 
Philip remarks: “I imagined it was something that festered in a man’s body and then 
came spurting from his mouth when he was completely consumed by grief” (148).   
 
Alvin’s return furthers the growing experience of bewilderment and unease 
wrought by the sudden and horrifying changes in Philip’s ordered sense of the world. 
Described by his older narrating self as being “yet altogether too young to know the 
potential of a rage of one’s own” (24), Philip is perplexed by his cousin’s 
unrecognisably altered state. Philip’s discomfort with these changes is exacerbated by 
the news that he will have to share his bedroom with Alvin and the hideous “stump” left 
by the amputation of his leg from just below the knee. Such close proximity to the 
emotionally and physically scarred Alvin strikes fear in Philip, who, in recalling the 
early stages of his cousin’s return, explains that: “I hadn’t as yet had to look at the stump 
and could pretend I didn’t know it was there” (136). However, Philip’s initial horror 
with Alvin’s injury soon diminishes as he begins to act as an aid by helping him dress 
his wound. Philip’s growing familiarity and fascination with the grotesque stump 
coincides with his exposure to the various upheavals that are having a catastrophic effect 
upon his secure sense of home and community. As the root cause of why Alvin has 
become so “crazily agitated” (136), his amputated leg works as a metaphor for the 
psychological experience of trauma that wreaks havoc upon Philip’s childhood in The 
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Plot against America. On first glimpsing the scar left by his cousin’s wound, Philip 
explains that:  
   
What I saw was what the word “stump” describes: the blunt remnant of something whole that belonged 
there and once had been there (136)  
   
This image of the stump evokes the notion of trauma as a moment of overwhelming 
suffering that appears to have had an unregistered or “blunt” impact on its victim, but 
yet which also renders the traumatised subject with an incomprehensible sense of loss 
and disintegration. Looking closely at the wound, Philip describes how the “skin was 
rounded off softly at the abbreviated end as though it were nature’s handiwork and not 
the result of a trying sequence of medical amputations” (136). This minute fascination 
with Alvin’s injury suggests that, like the paradoxical structure of trauma, the painful 
experience of loss involved in the amputation is both elided and yet made visible at the 
same time by the physical lineaments of the scar.  
 
Philip begins to obsess over Alvin’s amputated limb, in an attempt to overcome 
the traumatic impact that it has brought upon his home and the lives within it. With the 
assistance of his mother, he devises various aids and schemes to facilitate Alvin’s 
handicap and help him “forget about his prosthesis” (145). However, Philip’s 
determination to overcome this new and frightening experience of loss by restoring not 
just Alvin, but his own world of family and home to its original state of integrity proves 
futile. The various harrowing events by which his once secure world is torn apart thus 
comprise an irreversible or insurmountable trauma for Philip, who finally develops a 
“rage of one’s own” by the novel’s close. In particular, the inadvertent role that he plays 
in the deportation of Seldon Wishnow and his mother to Kentucky, as part of 
Lindbergh’s Homestead 42 initiative for assimilating Jews among the wider Gentile 
populace, continues to be a cause of irresolvable and painful regret for the aged Philip. 
Having relayed the story of Mrs. Wishnow’s death at the hands of an anti-Semitic mob 
in Kentucky, he recalls with biting sorrow and remorse how: “I did it … [t]hat was all I 
could think then and all I can think now” (336). 
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Roth’s text is suffused by examples of how the young Philip becomes exposed to 
various disputatious voices and contrasting speech patterns, once his unified idea of the 
world is made subject to the discordant effects of Lindbergh’s Presidency. Throughout 
the book, he demonstrates a growing sensitivity to and fascination with differences in 
syntax and intonation that contrast with the usual speech rhythms of a home-life, in 
which “hardly anyone in the vicinity spoke with an accent” (4). For example, following 
Sandy’s return from Kentucky as a volunteer for Lindbergh’s Just Folks Program, Philip 
is struck by the accentuation of “the drawl and the twang” (92) newly acquired by his 
older brother. Partly mesmerised by this “extraordinary … regional accent” (92), Philip 
also appears to be unnerved by “that concoction of English … [that] wasn’t what we 
natives of New Jersey spoke” (93). This ambivalence towards the alien dialect and 
accent newly acquired by his older brother reflects the bitter conflict in Philip’s home 
between his father and Sandy over the latter’s involvement in Just Folks. Sandy’s 
changing speech thus combines lyrical appeal with a frightening challenge to his father’s 
authority for Philip. His ambivalent attitude toward Sandy’s unfamiliar style of speech 
finds echoes in Philip’s reaction to Alvin’s “new ostentatious way of talking” (289), 
following the latter’s transformation from anti-Nazi socialist to petty hoodlum. Despite 
the fact that Alvin’s “new vocabulary … clearly pained my parents to hear” (289), Philip 
explains how he was seduced by the illicit style of his cousin’s rhetoric: “I couldn’t wait 
to sound like a hard guy myself by repeating the amazing expression at school along 
with the extensive medley of slang that Alvin now used just for the word ‘money’” 
(289). The young boy’s desire to mimic Alvin’s speech and, thereby, transgress the 
borders of what his parents might consider appropriate is reflective of what I have earlier 
discussed as Roth’s broader interest in fiction as a form of impersonation and betrayal. 
Philip demonstrates a similar excitement in imitating the speech of his new Italian 
neighbour, Mr. Cucuzza: “his accent was so enjoyable to hear that when I was alone I 
sometimes pretended that the way he talked was the way I talked too” (283). The great 
pleasure that Philip takes from such acts of mimicry resounds in the overall structure of 
a narrative which re-inscribes the plethora of diverse and contesting voices that he was 
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exposed to as a child. Yet, as I have been suggesting, the thrill of listening to these 
different voices is accompanied by experiences of dread and fear over the breakdown of 
Philip’s known sense of the world. The transformations in Alvin’s dialect, for example, 
can be traced to the conflicts between him and Herman that have helped shatter the Roth 
family’s sense of cohesion. Similarly, Mr. Cucuzza’s presence on Summit Avenue is the 
result of an enforced relocation by Lindbergh’s Office of American Absorptions, as part 
of its broader efforts to manufacture a cultural mix between Jews and Gentiles.  
   
Witnessing first hand the various familial disputes that occur in the aftermath of 
Lindbergh’s election, Philip is beleaguered by the extent to which the language of 
authoritative elders, both at home and in the Jewish community at large, is suddenly 
made questionable and exposed to disharmony. Such a conflict of authority is suitably 
dramatised by the visit to the Roth home of the pro-Lindbergh Rabbi Bengelsdorf, 
affianced to Philip’s Aunt Evelyn. Bengelsdorf is a noted and erudite figure among the 
Jews of Summit Avenue, who Philip describes as having spoken “so softly that at times 
you had to hold your breath to hear how learned he was” (103). However, his 
proselytising for Lindbergh’s Office of American Absorption is met by a robust, albeit 
less articulate, counter argument from Philip’s father. At one point, Philip presents this 
clash of opinions by imagining Evelyn’s contemptuous reaction to her “shallow brother-
in-law [, who] dared to oppose with his piddling vocabulary a scholar who could talk in 
ten languages” (110). Philip acts as the ventriloquist here, assuming the voice of his 
socially ambitious aunt in a way that is consistent with her unsympathetic portrayal 
throughout the novel. However, in recalling the eloquence of the Rabbi’s speech, Philip 
partly shares in Evelyn’s deference toward Bengelsdorf as a figure of intellectual 
authority: “[a] pouring forth of sentences as informed as these had never before occurred 
at our dining table or probably anywhere on our block” (111). On one level, Philip 
appears to maintain a fondness for his father’s more vernacular and democratically toned 
defiance of Lindbergh’s propaganda in this particular scene. Yet there is also a 
suggestion that the young auditor is, in part, convinced by Bengelsdorf’s argument that 
Newark Jews should openly embrace the cultural opportunities provided by the Office of 
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American Absorption. As a result of this warring incident between these two towering 
figures of Jewish patriarchal authority, the young and highly impressionable Philip is left 
anxiously confused and self-divided:  
   
I had to put on my one tie and my one jacket to impress the very rabbi who helped to elect the president 
whose friend was Hitler. How could I not be confused, when our disgrace and our glory were one and the 
same? Something essential had been destroyed and lost (107-8)  
   
Philip’s familiarisation with the different arguments and viewpoints of an increasingly 
divided household eventually begins to erode his loyal acquiescence to the authority of 
his father: “[s]ince what Uncle Monty said to him about Lindbergh was exactly what 
Rabbi Bengelsdorf had told him - and what Sandy was secretly saying to me - I began to 
wonder if my father knew what he was talking about” (125). By “trying not to stop 
believing in my father as well as in the Democrats and FDR” (126), Philip attempts to 
stem the emerging gulf of voices that oppose Herman. However, he is ultimately unable 
to find refuge from the trauma that events surrounding Lindbergh’s Presidency inflict 
upon the secure childhood world that had been underwritten by his father’s Rooseveltian 
convictions.   
     
The Plot against America has been read by some commentators as expressive of 
a sentimental pining for the lost world of Jewish immigrant origins that Roth had so 
railed against in earlier works. For example, Timothy Parrish argues that, “since 
American Pastoral, Roth’s sympathy lies with the father’s point of view” (3). In terms 
of The Plot against America, he explains that: “[t]he narrator of this Philip Roth novel 
seems closer to the perspective of Zuckerman’s Jewish foils in Zuckerman Bound than 
he does to the Zuckerman of those works” (2005b, 97). Similarly, David Herman 
suggests that:  
 
Roth’s early books present the Jewish parents as sometimes hysterical, even comic, people with values to 
be reacted against, to be left behind. Here, they are right (77)   
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J.P. Steed also contributes to this debate, claiminging that “[w]hereas in nearly all – if 
not all – Roth’s previous novels there has been a great deal of animosity expressed 
toward traditional Jewishness, often represented by (negatively) stereotypical Jewish 
parents, Roth seems to have revered the polarities in this new novel” (145). However, I 
would argue that such assessments fail to address how notions of origin, Jewish or 
otherwise, are subject to a paradoxical experience of trauma and fracture in Roth’s work. 
There is, as in American Pastoral, a clear tone of nostalgia invoked by Philip’s 
childhood memories in The Plot against America. Yet by contrast, the harrowing 
experience of loss that Philip is subject to in the novel is accompanied by his growing 
awareness of the limited purview of the Jewish family upbringing that had provided him 
with so much protection and security prior to Lindbergh’s rise to power. Whereas once 
he had enjoyed a child’s innocent sense of invulnerability under the joint auspices of 
FDR’s “protective republic” and the home life regulated by “ferociously responsible 
parents” (301), the older Philip now looks back on such a glorious period with some 
degree of regret as being the result of nothing more than a “cunning deception.”  
 
As he becomes alarmed by the rising sense of insecurity within the world that 
had been so clearly defined for him by his parents, the young Philip expresses a growing 
desire to escape his family surroundings. This marks an urge to abandon the inherited 
trauma of his origins as the son of second generation, Jewish-American parents. Such a 
desire for liberation from his increasingly vulnerable and restrictive sense of Jewish 
home life is symbolised by Philip’s attempted escape to the Catholic orphanage that 
occupies a space on the outskirts of his known world of Summit Avenue:  
   
I wanted nothing to do with history. I wanted to be a boy on the smallest scale possible. I wanted to be an 
orphan (232)       
   
Similar to how it functions in I Married a Communist, the figure of the orphan in The 
Plot against America works as a metaphor for Philip’s growing loss of faith in the 
authority of his father. Described as “a rescuer” for whom “orphans were his specialty,” 
Herman Roth outlines to his son the perils involved in being without the protection of 
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parents: “[w]itness, he would tell you, what happened to Alvin … [m]otherless and 
fatherless you are vulnerable to manipulation, to influences - you are rootless and you 
are vulnerable to everything” (358). Yet despite his father’s warning, Philip is, in many 
ways, made “rootless” and “vulnerable to everything” alien and threatening by the 
irreversible catastrophe that events surrounding Lindbergh’s Presidency bring to his 
once idyllic sense of home. As I have suggested, this painful experience of lost 
innocence and traumatised origins exposes Philip to the wide range of conflicting voices 
that populate his narrative memoir of events. For Philip, many of these alien forms of 
expression and argument seriously threaten to impugn the abiding rule of Herman and 
his New Deal inspired values in the Roth family home. In his growing desire to hear and 
then mimic these new and exciting forms of speech, he is in ways betraying his father’s 
presumed position of authority over his son. Therefore, in as much as the declining 
authority of his parent’s highly protective values of liberal reasoning in the novel brings 
about considerable anguish and regret for him, it also ushers Philip into a greater sense 
of the possibilities for knowledge and expression that lie beyond the well-ordered 
universe of his home. In similar ways to how he explores the relationship between 
fathers and sons in the Zuckerman novels, there is a symbolic connection made by Roth 
in The Plot against America between the waning of paternal authority and the aspiring 
or burgeoning writer’s growing awareness of the creative possibilities of (self-) 
authorship. 
 
Despite this sense of the literary author’s separation from his Jewish origins, 
however, Philip’s memoir still fixates upon the dreadful experiences of fear and anguish 
that brought about such a break from home in the first place. It is this paradoxical 
experience of the past as a trauma that he wishes to abandon, and yet obsessively returns 
to, that defines Philip’s relationship with the world of his parents in the novel. At one 
stage, the child’s narrative consciousness, reflecting upon the bounteous splendour that 
is Summit Avenue, remarks that “[n]othing would ever get me to leave here” (207). 
Such affectionate words of attachment to home stand in contrast to those of Evelyn, 
who, in trying to encourage Philip to embrace the proposed removal of the Roth family 
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into the non-Jewish American heartland by the Office of American Absorption, asks 
him: “[d]o you want to sit on the front stoop of Summit Avenue for the rest of your life, 
or do you want to go out into the world like Sandy did and prove that you are as good as 
anyone?” (217). Philip’s eventual departure away from his parochial Jewish beginnings 
and into the wider world of writing is haunted by a sense of a lingering and unfinished 
trauma. By re-visiting in his narrative the painful site of origins from which he has 
sought liberation, Philip demonstrates the peculiarly fractured manner in which he (and 
Roth) has in fact remained rooted to the world of parents and Jewish community life into 
which he was born. This paradoxical experience of Jewish subjectivity as a trauma that 
engenders departure and return, refusal and recognition for Philip is characterised by his 
description of Alvin as someone whose many acts of rebellion against his elders resulted 
in a form of behaviour that had an uncanny resemblance to those whom he wished to 
defy:  
   
That’s the tyranny of the problem. Trying to be faithful to what he’s trying to be rid of. Trying to be 
faithful and trying to get rid of what he is faithful to at the same time (298)  
   
This circuitous sense of conflict describes the central aesthetic dilemma in Roth’s 
writing in relation to notions of the father, origin or ‘real.’ As I have been illustrating 
throughout this thesis, Roth’s writing constantly seeks to transcend or “get rid of” what 
is considered ‘real’ or original by transforming it into fiction. At the same time, the 
many accusations of betrayal and falsification hurled at a character like Zuckerman for 
his attempts to reinvent life as fiction demand that he remains in some way tied or 
“faithful” to those very “facts” which he has sought to escape through his art. Philip’s 
memoir in The Plot against America, therefore, further dramatises the sense of Jewish 
family origins as an “amiable irritant” within Roth’s ongoing exploration of ideas of 
literature and self-authorship. Furthermore, as in the novels of the American trilogy, the 
traumatic notion of Jewish subjectivity explored in this novel also serves as a means of 
fracturing the liberal political concept of national belonging/origins that Philip had once 
believed to be fully consummate with his ethnic heritage. 
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“A book about knowing where to go for your agony and then going there for it”39 
 
In Exit Ghost, Zuckerman temporarily emerges out of the self-imposed exile 
from day to day social existence that he had endured in the novels of the American 
trilogy. Visiting New York to undergo a medical procedure that he hopes will cure him 
of the incontinence suffered as a result of prostate cancer, Zuckerman finds himself 
“putting a foot back in” (14) to the greater public world that he had turned his back on in 
these previous works: “I had a moment not unlike Rip Van Winkle’s when, after having 
slept for twenty years, he came out of the mountains and walked back to his village 
believing he’d merely been gone overnight” (14-15). Much like in I Married a 
Communist, American Pastoral and The Human Stain, Zuckerman explains in Exit 
Ghost how his steadfast commitment to an impersonal mode of literature, while living 
alone in the Berkshires, has allowed him to overcome the painful traumas that had 
previously marked both his private life and his writing. By “ceas[ing] to inhabit not just 
the great world but the present moment” (1), he claims to have found a means by which 
to liberate both his fiction and himself from the harried tribulations caused by his prior 
involvements with ‘real’ life: “by paring and paring and paring away, I found in my 
solitude a species of freedom that was to my liking much of the time” (58-59). However, 
Zuckerman’s return to New York has the effect of casting him back into the turbulent 
fray of erotic desire and thanatological anguish that had so coloured his life and writing 
prior to the American trilogy. In as much as his exclusive commitment to the 
disinterested pursuit of literary goals while living in isolation has afforded him a degree 
of transcendence from the corporeal and contingent aspects of life outside of writing, 
Zuckerman is “reembodied” (279) by his decision to re-enter the maelstrom of 
contemporary American life in Exit Ghost. He describes how, by once again finding 
“desirable the manifold relations that make for a rich, full life” (58), he was abandoning 
the serenity of living in exile from the greater social world and re-entering “[i]nto the 
mutability again” (166). Although he has sought refuge from the afflictions of mutable 
existence through an exalted ideal of literature as an immutable order of life, Zuckerman 
                                                 
39 From Exit Ghost, page 41. 
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and his art prove to be hopelessly tied to the less elevated and transient experiences of 
the self, the body and desire in this novel.  
      
The figure of E.I. Lonoff assumes an important presence in Exit Ghost as the 
ascetic literary master who has cast a spectral shadow over Zuckerman’s efforts in later 
life to withdraw from “the agitation of the autobiographical” and write in a purely 
disinterested fashion. Lonoff’s literary influence is brought into particular focus by the 
figure of Richard Kliman in Exit Ghost. Having arranged with Jamie Logan and Billy 
Davidoff – two young literary aspirants and earnest liberal opponents of George W. 
Bush – to swap his mountain-top cabin in New England for their Upper East Side 
apartment in Manhattan, Zuckerman is introduced by them to Kliman. Like Jamie and 
Billy, he is another ambitious young writer, who is seeking to make his mark on the 
world of American literature by undertaking the difficult and unprecedented task of 
writing Lonoff’s biography. Seeking both Zuckerman’s insight and approval, Kliman 
tells him how he wishes to expose the unknown fact that “Lonoff kept a great secret 
from his early years” (47) in the proposed biography. According to Kliman, Lonoff’s 
tautened and highly impersonal style of writing was shaped by a profound desire to 
escape a shameful and deeply buried secret from his personal life.  
 
This repressed biographical knowledge relates, Kliman claims, to Lonoff’s 
involvement in an incestuous affair with a half-sister, carried out when he was a very 
young man. “The hiding was the catalyst for his genius” (47), he explains to Zuckerman. 
As well as soliciting the support of Zuckerman, Kliman sets out to harass the aged and 
chronically infirm Amy Bellette – the young Jewish princess who acted as Lonoff’s 
assistant in The Ghost Writer – in an attempt to wrest from her a copy of Lonoff’s 
unfinished novel, written while the two were living as lovers in Florence. Having got his 
hands on the first half of the manuscript from Amy, Kliman sets out to prove that the 
uncharacteristically expansive and uncontrolled narrative shape of Lonoff’s unfinished 
final work can be made attributable to his deeply buried knowledge of having committed 
incest. He postulates how the great tensions between Lonoff’s “laconic brand” (22) of 
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short story writing and the hidden scandal that lay concealed beneath his life of ascetic 
self-discipline became exacerbated and exposed during his arduous struggle to write in a 
longer and suppler prose style. In arguing thus, Kliman describes Lonoff’s failure to 
achieve artistic mastery over his late foray into the novel as evidence of “a great writer’s 
reckoning with the crime that intimidated him every day of his life” (272).  
 
Telling Amy that he is the “biographer’s obstacle” (156), Zuckerman is 
determined to protect the aesthetic integrity of Lonoff’s impersonal style of literature 
from the “dirt-seeking snooping” (102) of Kliman. In his outrage at Kliman’s sensational 
claims, Zuckerman lumps him with the “moralist prigs” and “feminist scolds” that help 
to make up what he calls the many “lice of literature” (288). He comes to view his battle 
with him in eschatological terms as a struggle to uphold certain high-literary principles 
of disinterestedness and creative excellence over what he claims are cheap efforts to 
reduce fiction to some biographical or social context: “[m]astering him was my last 
obligation to literature” (252). In this manner, Zuckerman virulently espouses the 
formalist belief by which Lonoff argues elsewhere in Exit Ghost that “serious fiction 
eludes paraphrase” (183). This determination to protect the autonomous space of 
aesthetic creativity against biographical “fantasies of the author extrapolated from 
fiction” (254) finds important resonances, Zuckerman explains, with his own earlier 
struggles to defend himself against the “denunciation of my first published stories as 
sinister manifestations of ‘Jewish self-hatred’” (170). Yet as I have established at several 
different stages in this thesis, Zuckerman’s efforts to parry this “excoriating indictment” 
(171) have merely served to re-calibrate his attachments to the ethnic origins from which 
he has sought to liberate himself as the uncompromising author of serious fiction. His 
narrative efforts to escape from and reinvent the “facts” are, somewhat paradoxically, 
motivated by the various outside pressures and voices of “indictment” which seek to 
inhibit his sense of authorial autonomy. I have suggested before how this self-
perpetuating and circuitous conflict between life and literature in Zuckerman’s writing 
renders him both tied to and separated from the world of the ‘real’ or origin. As the 
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character of Shuki informs him in The Counterlife, his fiction is “disproportionately 
engaged by the spectacle of what morally repels you, of your antithesis” (157).  
 
His battle with Kliman in Exit Ghost further highlights how this key, yet 
painfully self-dividing antagonism has remained unresolved within Zuckerman’s 
writing. His efforts to defend Lonoff’s principles of authorial “anonymity” (45) over 
Kliman’s biographical claims draw him back into the confusing and troubling mire of 
tensions between ‘real’ life and literature that he has sought to escape by living and 
writing in oblivion to the world existing beyond the page. Zuckerman seeks to discredit 
Kliman’s biographical reading of Lonoff by making fully clear “the impenetrable line 
dividing fiction from reality” (267). Yet in doing so, his authorial focus is drawn back 
over that sacral “line” and returned to the point of conflict between literature and extra-
literary issues of biographical or ‘real’ life. In the very act of challenging the mooted 
biography of Lonoff, therefore, Zuckerman comes to resemble Kliman as one who is 
engrossed by matters that are extraneous to the inner workings of art. Kliman thus serves 
as both an antagonist and a double for Zuckerman, highlighting the schizoid quality of 
the latter’s literary style: a mode of fiction that is both tied to and yet which seeks to 
transcend the mutable and prosaic facts of daily life. 
 
On first meeting Zuckerman, Kliman explains to him that “I’m trying to do no 
more or less than you did” (44) by writing about Lonoff. Although fully cognisant that 
what he is attempting to write is “not fiction” (44), Kliman draws comparison between 
how both he and the more youthful Zuckerman of The Ghost Writer have each sought to 
use the personal life of Lonoff as a subject for their writing. In response to Zuckerman’s 
accusation that the younger man indulges in “just about the lowest of literary rackets” by 
“snooping” (102) around in Lonoff’s private history, Kliman insists that both of them 
share the same sense of literary interest in the highly personal details of other lives: 
 
And the savage snooping calling itself fiction? … I’m not doing anything other than what you do. What 
any thinking person does. Curiosity is nurtured by life (102)   
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Kliman suggests here that Zuckerman’s fiction cannibalises ‘real’ situations and lives in 
a way that is comparable to his own biographical approach to reading Lonoff’s work. 
Yet in contrast to Kliman’s narrow outline of the authorial context for Lonoff’s work, 
Zuckerman views literature as a fluid and ruminative mode of transforming actual facts 
into fiction. Following her defence of Kliman’s ambition to write about Lonoff’s private 
life, Zuckerman attempts to explain to Jamie the sharp and important distinctions 
between literature and literary biography: “[t]here’s the not-so that reveals the so – that’s 
fiction; and there’s the not-so that just isn’t so – that’s Kliman” (120). This idea of “the 
not-so that reveals the so” is suggestive of the high-formalist concept of the unique 
mode of knowledge and experience that is peculiar to literature, and which undermines 
simplistic efforts to find a linear connection between the literary work and life existing 
outside the text. This New Critical style argument finds a clear delineation in a 
posthumous letter written by Lonoff against “cultural journalism” (182) that Amy shows 
to Zuckerman. Invoking the formalist dictum that the reader should “[l]ook inward at the 
story only” (184), Lonoff castigates popular journalistic modes of criticism for their 
application of “phony ethical issues” (182) to great works of the literary imagination. 
There is a clear similarity for Zuckerman between the “not-so that just isn’t so” of 
Kliman’s planned biography and Lonoff’s idea of “the lazy journalist’s fiction” (183) 
that enacts a “[s]ensationalist cultural vandalism” (184) upon the rarefied and uniquely 
aesthetic value of important works of literature. Zuckerman exclaims that “[a]ny 
biographical treatment [of Lonoff] would be largely imaginary – in other words, a 
travesty” (45). In doing so, he makes a fine, yet very significant distinction between his 
own high-literary concept of literature as a singular means of reinventing the ‘facts’ and 
what he sees as the more vulgar style of fiction by which Kliman claims to unearth the 
truth about Lonoff’s biography. 
 
Kliman’s pivotal role in Exit Ghost can be understood in light of what Peter 
Brooks might call the “textual erotics” of Roth’s fiction, where narrative desire is 
incessantly driven by its constant awareness of potential death or closure. Kliman’s 
belief that he has uncovered an indubitable biographical truth grounding the literary 
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output of Lonoff represents a thanatological form of destructive “vandalism” to 
Zuckerman’s concept of fiction as its own separate realm of existence. Yet as I have 
shown, Zuckerman’s efforts to breathe fictional life into the world of stale and 
prescriptive facts is continuously stimulated by a potentially self-nullifying desire for 
collision with such crude forms of certainty as that put forth by Kliman about Lonoff. In 
the same way that he is both drawn to and repelled by notions of the ‘real’ external to his 
fiction, therefore, Zuckerman’s desire for creative mastery over the raw details of life is, 
at one and the same time, both challenged with impotence and restored to vitality by the 
thanatological threat posed by Kliman. As a result of this dual role that Kliman performs 
as adversary and accomplice in Zuckerman’s authorship of events in Exit Ghost, there 
are various contradictory moments of close comparison and sharp contrast made 
between them both in the novel. In such instances, Zuckerman, as the highly 
biographical literary author, is both set at odds with and yet also made comparable to 
Kliman, the author of literary biography. As I will suggest below, this ambiguous 
relationship between Zuckerman and Kliman in Exit Ghost is situated upon a rotating 
axis of desire and death that is central to Roth’s notion of the connection between fact 
and fiction, the personal and aesthetic, body and text.  
 
Zuckerman’s resurgent desire to confront the overlapping mixture of personal 
and literary challenges posed by the world of extra-literary ‘facts’ on his visit to New 
York is signalled by a momentary re-awakening of his previously defunct libido in the 
novel. Although his impotence is not reversed in any way, what Zuckerman calls “the 
ghost of my desire” (66) is stirred by the figure of Jamie Logan in Exit Ghost. This faint 
sense of sexual revival in the company of Jamie is linked to Zuckerman’s renewed 
longing to be among the chaotic and mutable world of ‘real’ life in New York: 
“[w]hatever the force prying me back open at seventy-one – whatever the force that had 
sent me down to New York … was quickly gathering its strength in the presence of 
Jamie Logan” (36-37). Wracked by impotent frustration, Zuckerman never gets to enjoy 
any physical sexual encounter with Jamie in the novel. The “ghost” of his libidinal 
yearning does, however, find expression through a detached and disembodied act of 
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writing in which Zuckerman dramatises an imagined intimacy between both of them. An 
evolving dialogue that he entitles He and She, this piece of writing indicates the 
significant relationship between the erotic drive and the art of fiction for Zuckerman. He 
explains how He and She involves an aesthetic mode of desire that is impossible to 
satisfy in ‘real’ or visceral terms, but which, as a paradoxical result of its very 
insatiability, is driven toward a relentless expansion and heightening of its creative act of 
longing: 
 
this scene of dialogue unspoken recorded what hadn’t been done and was an aid to nothing, alleviated 
nothing, achieved nothing, and yet, just as on election night, it had seemed terribly necessary to write the 
instant I came through the door, the conversations she and I don’t have more affecting even than the 
conversations we do have, and the imaginary “She” vividly at the middle of her character as the actual 
“she” will never be (147) 
 
The endless potential for improvisation and creative re-working that “the imaginary 
‘She’” holds is intensified by the fact that the ‘real’ Jamie is ultimately unattainable to 
the impotent and eviscerated old man, Zuckerman. Aware of the agonising frustrations 
involved in such inexorable (literary) pursuit of an ever elusive object of desire, 
Zuckerman asks: “isn’t one’s pain quotient shocking enough without fictional 
amplification, without giving things an intensity that is ephemeral in life and sometimes 
even unseen?” (147). Yet despite his description of He and She as “an improvisation 
best aborted and left to die” (146), he goes on to appraise it as an example of the life-
affirming urge to reinvent and illuminate upon lived existence that literature so richly 
nurtures, albeit never fully sates: “[f]or some very, very few that amplification, evolving 
uncertainly out of nothing, constitutes their only assurance, and the unlived, the surmise, 
fully drawn in print on paper, is the life whose meaning comes to matter most” (147). 
 
Again, a parallel can be drawn here between Zuckerman’s idea of fiction as a 
superlative mode of “unlived” existence and Lonoff’s similar concept of literature as 
something that transcends quotidian social and domestic reality. Yet although 
Zuckerman’s writing is situated at a fictional remove from lived experience, it takes 
root, paradoxically, from within a moment of unrelenting conflict with the world of 
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‘real’ things. Unlike the purely disinterested literary figure that Lonoff cuts, Zuckerman 
is both embodied by libidinal desire and yet also an impotent exile from the world of 
sexual striving. The mixture of erotic pleasure and thanatological pain that engenders 
Zuckerman’s garrulous and proliferate exploration of the ‘real’ within fiction is 
something that runs contrary to Lonoff’s tautened and disciplined style of short story 
writing. Zuckerman explains to Amy how “the novelist’s passion for amplification was 
just another form of excess that ran counter” to Lonoff’s “own special gift for 
condensation and reduction” (23). By contrast, he describes how the aesthetic crisis that 
plagued Lonoff’s last five years resulted from the uncharacteristic “waywardness” of his 
decision to “escape th[e] imprisoning regimen” of the isolated writer and “to take as his 
mate a charming, intelligent, adoring young woman half his age” (21). As in 
Zuckerman’s own fiction, sexual desire is related to the formal “waywardness” or 
“amplification” that debilitates Lonoff’s late effort to write as a novelist. Amy recounts 
to Zuckerman how Lonoff’s attempt to work in longer prose was marked by a sense of 
frustration with its incoherent form: 
 
He said, ‘It’s boring. It’s endless. It has no shape. No design.’ I said, ‘None that you can impose. It will 
impose its own design.’ ‘When? When I’m dead?’ (194) 
 
This aggravating tussle between Lonoff’s efforts to impose authorial control and the  
tendency for novelistic material to “impose its own design” mirrors the interplay of 
libidinal thrust and frustrated impotence that defined Zuckerman’s plight throughout the 
Zuckerman Bound collection and The Counterlife. In the American trilogy, Zuckerman 
attempts to renounce desire and the distractions of life outside of literature, in an effort 
to live by similar means as Lonoff once did and, by doing so, emulate his form of 
controlled and disinterested literary style. Yet, as I Married a Communist, American 
Pastoral and The Human Stain all highlight, Zuckerman’s desire to engage with the 
traumas of social existence in America is never fully vanquished by his self-imposed 
exile from the world, but merely displaced through the biographies of his protagonists in 
each work. His decision to re-engage with the larger world beyond writing – re-
discovering what he calls “[t]he impulse to be in it and of it” (1) – in Exit Ghost sees 
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Zuckerman, once more, embody in person the fraught struggle between erotic desire and 
thanatological frustration that characterises his “fictional amplification” of lived 
existence.  
 
While he is stirred by what he calls the most “worldly in-the-world place” (279) 
of New York in this novel, Zuckerman also expresses a wish to resume the isolated life 
of ascetic self-denial through which he had: “set out to minimize the loss [suffered from 
impotence] by struggling to pretend that desire had naturally abated” (67). It is this sense 
of wanting to be both embodied and disembodied – present in the world and absent from 
it – that continues to leave Zuckerman’s writing and personal life crippled by divisions 
throughout Exit Ghost. Nowhere are the personal and aesthetic vagaries caused by his 
revived determination to be in erotic/literary “collision” (280) with ‘real’ life more 
evident than in his conflict with Kliman: 
 
I had to find out whether what they were saying about Lonoff was true. Don’t ask me why I had to. I 
didn’t know. And the nonsensical character of my quest didn’t stop me … Once around with the passions 
wasn’t enough? Once around with the unknowable wasn’t enough? Into the mutability again? (165-6) 
 
In contrast to this sense of “mutability” and uncertainty associated with Zuckerman’s 
fictional efforts to understand “unknowable” life, Lonoff’s ideal of literature as an 
immutable order of existence is one that seeks to transcend the corporeal and transient 
matters of death and desire. While Zuckerman’s fictional efforts to imaginatively 
transform the facts surrounding both his and other lives are linked to traditionally 
embodied ideas of the ‘real,’ the biographical self and desire, Lonoff’s more immutable 
aesthetic concept is tied to notions of a “posthumous existence” (221) in Exit Ghost. In a 
passage from He and She, the character of Zuckerman quotes for Jamie a line from 
Keats’s last letter: “‘I have an habitual feeling of my real life having past,’ he said, ‘and 
that I am leading a posthumous existence’” (221). Keats’ idea of literature and the 
literary artist as existing beyond the corpus of “real life” not only encapsulates Lonoff’s 
disinterested mode of writing, but also helps to explain the reasons behind Zuckerman’s 
determination to protect the latter’s “posthumous” reputation as a writer from damning 
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discoveries about his lived biography. By contrast, Zuckerman’s writing involves a 
mutually overlapping relationship between the ‘real’ and a fictional notion of the extra-
real; between the biographical and impersonal aestheticism. In this sense, his fiction is 
divided between notions of mutability and immutability, corporeality and posthumous 
life. Despite his efforts to “pull the plug on the[se] contradictions” (69) by living and 
writing in monastic seclusion, a la Lonoff, Exit Ghost demonstrates the self-lacerating 
effect that Zuckerman’s desire to inhabit and aesthetically engage with the ‘real’ world 
existing beyond the pages of literature continues to have on him as both a writer and a 
man.  
 
The mixture of erotic longing and thanatological dread that shapes Zuckerman’s 
visit to New York is largely bred by his confrontation with Kliman over Lonoff’s 
aesthetic legacy. He explains how this conflict with Kliman has had a comparable effect 
to that of Jamie in helping to restore his dormant ambition to engage on both a 
professional and personal level with the transient scene of contemporary American life: 
 
Back in the drama, back in the moment, back into the turmoil of events! … There is the pain of being in 
the world, but there is also the robustness. When was the last time I had felt the excitement of taking 
someone on? Let the intensity out! Let the belligerent out! ... both Kliman and Jamie having the effect of 
rousing the virility in me again (103) 
 
There is further evidence here of how Zuckerman finds in the external world of 
biographical and ‘real’ life facts both a dangerous impediment to and a fertile basis for 
his particular literary mode of reinventing reality. Kliman’s claims about the relationship 
between literature and its authorial context provide a valuable expression of the 
“intractable” and antagonistic world of the ‘real’ against which Zuckerman’s erotic 
narrative “intensity” is typically aroused: “[a] resuscitating breath of the old contention 
luring me into the old role” (103). At the same time, the revived sense of “virility” that 
his clash with Kliman invokes is foreshadowed by a thanatological experience of “pain” 
and mortality. Ironically, it is by defending the autonomous space of Lonoff’s fiction 
against the invasive encroachments of Kliman’s biography that Zuckerman is lured away 
from his own isolated life of creative detachment and back toward the chaotic maelstrom 
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of libidinal desire and painful uncertainty which had characterised his life and writing in 
earlier novels. 
 
 By way of emphasising the similarities that cut across the antagonism between 
both men, the “robustness” and erotic energy that define Zuckerman’s efforts to bring a 
sense of “fictional amplification” to events in Exit Ghost are made comparable, at 
certain stages of the novel, to Kliman’s (distinctly opposing) attempts to reduce the 
meaning of Lonoff’s spiralling and incomplete last work to some core biographical 
origin. Zuckerman explains to Jamie his dislike of Kliman as one who lacks the 
“sobriety” for handling “serious” literary matters and whose obstinate determination to 
write a sensationalised account of Lonoff’s life reflects an unconsidered and emotional 
penchant for “audacity, defiance, and highjinks” (116). Yet when Jamie defends 
Kliman’s ambitions to write the controversial biography by suggesting that “[h]e’s 
drawn to daring ventures,” Zuckerman reminisces to himself: “[d]aring ventures … I had 
gorged on them” (120). Elsewhere, he makes comparisons between himself and Kliman 
as examples of “[t]he Jew at his most buoyant, capable of a calm relationship with 
nothing and no one” (253). Drawing a portrait of this frenzied and confrontational 
Jewish figure from such archetypes as Lenny Bruce and Abbie Hoffman, Zuckerman 
elaborates that: 
 
for all I knew, Kliman was the last of the agitators and affronters. I had been out of contact with anyone 
like him for a long time. I had been out of contact with a lot of things for a long time, and not just with the 
resistance of vital beings but with having either to enact the role of myself or to parry fantasies of the 
author extrapolated from fiction by the most naïve readers – a stale labor from whose tedium I had also 
disengaged. For I had been something of an affronter once too (253-4) 
 
Kliman embodies the memories of the self, before prostate cancer and his withdrawal 
from the greater social world, as a “vital being” that buoy Zuckerman’s partially 
renewed sense of sexual and aesthetic desire in Exit Ghost. Yet, in circular fashion, he 
also represents a virile young competitor who threatens to pulverise Zuckerman’s idea of 
fiction as an unending and incommensurable desire for re-imagining the ‘real’: “I 
foresaw only defeat should I persist in colliding with this impostor’s aims and the 
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vitality and ambition and tenacity and anger that fuelled them” (274). Despite his 
avowed literary stance, Zuckerman’s obsession with matters of the ‘real,’ the self and 
desire renders him ultimately incapable of being more like Lonoff, the self-effacing and 
asexual aesthete, and less like Kliman, the “snooping” and erotically charged 
biographer. In self-tortured fashion, Zuckerman is both Lonoff and Kliman – protagonist 
and antagonistic – in Exit Ghost. He is both disinterestedly removed from life outside of 
literature and, at the same time, erotically transfixed by his efforts to transform what is 
‘real’ into fiction. 
 
 Zuckerman determines to discredit Kliman by finding a source within literary 
history which will explain the uniquely creative and “unautobiographical” (200) impetus 
behind Lonoff’s unfinished novel. Telling Amy that “I cannot write Manny’s biography, 
but I can write the biography of that book” (199-200), Zuckerman proceeds to argue that 
Lonoff employed the “unprovable conjectures” drawn by “renegade scholars” (200) 
about an incestuous relationship between Nathaniel Hawthorne and his sister, Elizabeth, 
as the inspiration for his unfinished novel. Zuckerman explains to Amy how Lonoff 
“laid claim to these conjectures about Hawthorne and his beautiful, enchanting older 
sister” as a “story” that “opened his predicament out for him and enabled him to leave 
the personal behind” (200). Yet by arguing thus, Zuckerman reveals a complex narrative 
framing in which he tries to connect himself to Lonoff as a “wholly unautobiographical 
writer” (200) who exploits, for fictional purposes, the uncertain facts surrounding the 
‘real’ lives of others: 
 
‘Fiction for him [Lonoff] was never representation. It was rumination in narrative form. He thought, I’ll 
make this my reality.’ While, in fact, I was thinking in much the same vein: I’ll make this reality mine. 
Amy’s, Kliman’s, everyone’s. And for the next hour I proceeded to, effulgently arguing its logic until I 
had come to believe it myself (200-01) 
 
Just as he would have Amy believe that Lonoff used the scandal surrounding 
Hawthorne’s private life as his “objective correlative,” Zuckerman himself subjects the 
drama surrounding Kliman’s biographical study to “the fluctuations of the novelist’s 
mind,” by which he “puts everything in motion … [and] makes everything shift and 
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slide” (200). In many ways, therefore, his imaginative account of what motivated 
Lonoff’s final work marks Zuckerman’s attempt to claim a shared lineage between them 
both as writers for whom fiction does not originate in any positivist notion of experience 
lying outside of the text, but which instead involves a purely literary “rumination” upon 
what is ‘real.’ However, Zuckerman’s unique counter-fiction to Kliman’s biography 
involves yet another means of appropriating and re-inventing the lived and distinctly 
private experiences of others. Contrary to Kliman, Zuckerman insists that by “mak[ing] 
this reality mine” the lives of people such as Amy, Lonoff and Hawthorne are only ever 
known to him as imagined literary subjects, rather than in terms of biographical truths or 
facts. At the same time, there is also a sort of admission to guilt in the above cited 
passage by which Zuckerman reveals how he is, in ways that might also resemble 
Kliman, borrowing for his own authorial benefit from the personal ordeals of others. 
Somewhat ironically, in his efforts to protect Lonoff’s privacy against Kliman’s 
parasitical “snooping,” Zuckerman also (albeit in terms of literary speculation rather 
than a biographical assumption of fact) intrudes upon the very notion of authorial 
anonymity that he sets out to defend in the first place. In this fashion, his constant 
mining of the uncertainties and fictional possibilities of ‘real’ life is shadowed by a 
certain blurring of the distinctions between fiction and biography in Zuckerman’s 
writing.  
 
Zuckerman’s fractured sense of wanting to be both engaged by and disengaged 
from a greater sense of social involvement in Exit Ghost is contextualised by various 
moments of trauma that have wreaked havoc upon the wider national experience since 
mid-century. Like Rip Van Winkle, he has returned from his mountain-top slumber to 
find a scene of active political enthusiasm among the American polity. Arriving back to 
New York on the eve of the Bush/Kerry Presidential election of 2004, Zuckerman is 
invited by Jamie and Billy to watch the results of the vote with them at their apartment. 
The young couple’s fervent disdain for the Bush Administration and how “[a]ll their 
intolerance focuses on a liberal society” (81-82) is contrasted with Zuckerman’s 
apparent indifference to current political events. Much to the incredulity of his earnest 
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young companions, he claims to have no knowledge whatsoever of the recent 
Presidential race. Explaining how he has “served … [his] tour as exasperated liberal and 
indignant citizen” (36), Zuckerman declares a complete sense of personal detachment 
from the ongoing travails of American politics: “I don’t want to register an opinion, I 
don’t want to express myself on the ‘issues’” (37). “[A] one time creature of intensive 
responsiveness who’d over the preceding decade tautened himself into a low-keyed 
solitary” (43), Zuckerman explains how his gradual recoil from all matters relating to 
American public life has allowed him to overcome “the cluster of extreme historical 
shocks” (97) that have fractured his once spirited sense of liberal idealism. In an attempt 
to justify his radical disengagement from broader issues of national politics and culture, 
he elaborates upon the mixture of confusion, despair and anger which events such as the 
Vietnam War and Watergate had aroused in him: 
 
I was familiar with the theatrical emotions that the horrors of politics inspire. From the 1965 
transformation into a Vietnam hawk of the peace candidate Lyndon Johnson until the 1974 resignation of 
all-but-impeached Richard Nixon, they were a staple in the repertoire of virtually everyone I knew. You’re 
heartbroken and upset and a little hysterical, or you’re gleeful and vindicated for the first time in ten years, 
and your only balm is to make theater of it (94-95) 
 
What is clear in this passage is how Zuckerman links the “horrors” of historical events to 
the ludicrous “theater” of the post-war scene, in which any ‘real’ or knowable sense of a 
shared public life that was once set forth by the progressive-liberal vision of America 
has now been completely shattered. This unnerving sense of public life as “theater” is 
evoked elsewhere by the experience of the “indigenous American berserk” that 
Zuckerman re-visits in American Pastoral, or the comparably “haywire country” that he 
struggles to fathom in Zuckerman Unbound. The succession of defeats and failures that 
have destroyed the once robust liberal dream of America provide a pointed historical 
focus for the painful mixture of erotic longing and thanatological loss that accompanies 
being in the world of ‘real’ social attachments for Zuckerman. As a result, on his arrival 
back to New York he makes a determined effort “not … to collide with all this 




The traumatic sense of political disillusionment that Zuckerman determines to 
evade finds an embodiment in the figure of Jamie, who sees the potential of a Bush 
victory as a final death-knell for American liberalism: “it’ll be the end of the road for a 
whole way of political life” (81). In contrast to her expressions of shock and outrage at 
Bush’s eventual re-election, Zuckerman maintains a certain disaffected poise: “I was 
merely onlooker and outsider now … the public drama did not intrude on me” (95). 
Refusing to share her distraught sense of concern over the terminal decline of 
progressive political values in an America under Republican rule, Zuckerman tries to 
reassure Jamie by explaining that: 
 
It’s a flexible instrument we’ve inherited … It’s amazing how much punishment we can take (82) 
 
No longer pained or angered by the same sense of betrayal that earlier historical events 
had on his political ideals, Zuckerman contemplates telling Jamie that “[i]f in America 
you think like you do, nine times out of ten you fail” (86). In thus considering to himself 
how he might assuage Jamie’s increasing sense of doom over Bush’s defeat of Kerry, 
Zuckerman reveals further how the repeating pattern of historical traumas that he has 
already lived through have left him seemingly deadened to political dismay or outrage:  
 
I thought to say, It’s bad, but not like waking up the morning after Pearl Harbor was bombed. It’s bad, but 
not like waking up the morning after Kennedy was shot. It’s bad, but not like waking up the morning after 
Martin Luther King was shot … I thought to say, We have all been through it (86) 
 
This self-protective and benumbing attitude of resignation to the ritual shocks of 
history is juxtaposed to the more raw sense of injury that afflicts the much younger 
Jamie and Billy. Their difficult arrival at the “hard realization that they could not will 
this country back into being the Rooseveltian stronghold it had been some forty years 
before they were born” (86-87) marks for the aged and world weary Zuckerman merely 
one more variation on an increasingly redundant theme of liberal disbelief with the 
shortcomings of American political and cultural life. As he points out, Jamie and Billy 
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represent a liberal outlook that is becoming increasingly isolated from the American 
masses. While it might see itself in superior moral and intellectual terms to Bush’s 
Republican Party, such a liberal position functions as a hollow shell of the populist 
Rooseveltian movement that it wishes to invoke: 
 
For all their sharpness and articulateness and savoir-faire … they’d had no idea who the great mass of 
Americans were, nor had they seen so clearly before that it was not those educated like themselves who 
would determine the country’s fate but the scores of millions unlike them and unknown to them who had 
given Bush a second chance, in Billy’s words, “to wreck a very great thing” (87)    
 
This damning image of contemporary liberalism as ineffectual and detached from the 
wider American public calls to mind certain Republican accusations against liberals  for 
being elitist and patronising in their over-protective efforts to regulate the lives of the 
masses. Jamie and Billy’s political beliefs thus represent for Zuckerman the flayed and 
eviscerated remnants of an older New Deal model for social and cultural progress that 
had once been so vigorously attuned to the aspirations and needs of common 
Americans.40  
   
 Yet despite this suggestion that the younger couple’s chagrin with current 
national events represents a rather toothless brand of liberalism for Zuckerman, there is 
also a suggestion in the novel that he continues to share in their particular politics of 
grief. As I have discussed, Zuckerman appears to view Jamie’s horrified reaction to the 
Presidential election results as a redundant and ineffectual cry of liberal outrage. 
However, there is also a suggestion in the novel that her reaction to Bush’s re-election 
does not necessarily mark a stale re-hashing of previous ailments, but may instead form 
part of a still raw and unfinished cycle of traumatic repetition within the American 
liberal experience. When thinking about highlighting to her how the particular form of 
political disillusionment she is experiencing is not unique but has a long and tiresome 
lineage, Zuckerman suddenly realises that: “[a]ll the things I thought to tell her would 
                                                 
40 For example, George Packer bemoans this manner in which American liberalism has lost its previous 
sense of purpose within national life. Instead, he explains, liberalism has “becom[e] known as the creed of 
the weak, the soft, the guilt-ridden, the hyperintellectual, the privileged, the out-of-touch, the hypocritical 
– all those who don't want to see the world as it really is” (300). 
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likely strike her as cant … [s]he wanted to wake up the morning after George Bush had 
been shot” (86). The fervid emotional outpouring with which Jamie bemoans that “this 
country is a haven of ignorance” (84) in some ways brings to the surface the painful 
sense of an earlier trauma against which the aged Zuckerman is now determined to 
remain immunised. As much as he attempts to ease the traumatic impact of Bush’s 
victory on her by explaining that “[w]e have all been through it,” she, in turn, acts as a 
fresh reminder of his buried sense of liberal despair.  
 
Using the images of a car crash and a burning building as metaphors, Zuckerman 
clearly signals this sense of a shared knowledge of trauma through which both he and 
Jamie are connected: “[s]he was looking at me … the way somebody being helped from 
a burning building or freed from a car crash looks at you, as though as an observer you 
might have something to say that could account for the catastrophe that’s altered 
everything” (86). Although claiming that he is “merely an onlooker,” Zuckerman is in 
fact re-connected with the “public drama” to which he believes himself to be now 
invulnerable by his role as witness to the trauma of Jamie’s suffering. Through this 
participative act of witnessing, as I have outlined in my introduction, the spectator to 
traumatic events shares somewhat in the victim’s traumatised reaction to what has 
happened. Therefore, as a seemingly impassive bystander to Jamie’s anguish and 
bewilderment, Zuckerman is, paradoxically, re-connected to his own submerged feelings 
of “rage about how much worse it all was than you thought and the sorrow over how far 
your country had sunk” (87). In this way, his despair over certain events in American 
history remains part of a trauma that he both tries to discard and yet which continues to 
demand his attention. It is this ambiguous sense of being both within and outside of the 
greater life of American ‘reality’ that defines Zuckerman’s tortured self-divisions not 




As the novel draws to a close, Zuckerman indicates how the dangers posed to 
Lonoff’s legacy by Kliman’s biographical claims may potentially foreshadow similar 
problems of misreading or misappropriation in relation to his own work:  
 
Once I was dead, who could protect the story of my life from Richard Kliman? Wasn’t Lonoff his literary 
steppingstone to me? And what would my “incest” be? How will I have failed to be the model human 
being? (275) 
 
It is clear both here and throughout the novel that Zuckerman is trying to protect the 
aesthetic autonomy of literary fiction from ideas or influences that are extraneous to its 
internal structures of creativity. However, as I have shown, suggestions made by Kliman 
that a personal trauma lies concealed at the heart of Lonoff’s literature also become a 
kind of “steppingstone” through which Zuckerman himself re-explores the excruciating 
and inescapable conflicts in his own writing between the fictional and the ‘real’; the 
impersonal and the biographical; the desiring, decaying body and the “posthumous,” 
immutable value ascribed to notions of high literature. Just as he finds a means of 
disinterring older, buried experiences of personal grief through acting as a witness to 
Jamie’s dismay over the state of American political values, Zuckerman’s determination 
to contest Kliman’s idea of a hidden trauma beneath Lonoff’s life of aesthetic 
detachment serves, ironically, as a useful way to explore the confusion and pain that has 
attended his own life as a writer. Whereas he expresses a fear that Kliman will turn his 
attention next to “[m]y great, unseemly secret” (275), Zuckerman is in fact constantly 
flaunting the autobiographical conflicts that underwrite his work. However, unlike 
Kliman’s notion of a secret that might fully explain the relationship between Lonoff’s 
(or Zuckerman’s) life and work outright, this idea of an unfinished and, ultimately, 
incomprehensible trauma in Zuckerman’s life and writing refers to an experience that 
cannot be clearly known or made ‘real,’ but which is repeatedly re-visited by an 
expansive and proliferate process of “fictional amplification.”  
 
 Throughout this discussion, I have clearly indicated how the circular repetition of 
trauma in Zuckerman’s torn affiliations to both an exalted ideal of literature and the far 
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more prosaic facts of ‘real’ life have made him comparable, at different stages, to the 
irreconcilably polarised figures of Lonoff and Kliman. At one stage, he describes how 
Kliman closely reflects aspects of himself as the young writer who so boldly defended 
his role as literary author against the “excoriating indictment” of his father and other 
Jewish elders. Comparing himself to Kliman as one who has sought “the approval of the 
adults you clandestinely set about to defile” (99), Zuckerman reveals a glimpse of the 
complex and self-punishing introversion that lies at the heart of the many conflicts in his 
own writing. The ambiguous desire to both “defile” and seek “approval” that Zuckerman 
locates in Kliman’s brash determination to tarnish the hallowed aura surrounding 
Lonoff’s myth of literary genius is resonant of his own complex ties to the latter. In the 
arduous process of defending Lonoff’s austere literary principles against the malignant 
“muck raking” of Kliman, as I have pointed out, Zuckerman himself betrays those very 
standards of disinterestedness and aesthetic autonomy that he sets out to uphold. 
Ironically, this combination of affiliation and disavowal is repeated, as I have shown in 
earlier chapters, by Zuckerman’s peculiar sense of continued attachment to the world of 
his father and Jewish origins that he so flagrantly rejected in favour of the authority of 
Lonoff and his ideas about literature. In this profoundly dizzying way, Zuckerman is 
both “affronter” and defender, son and father, Kliman and Lonoff.   
 
 By the end of Exit Ghost, Zuckerman is finally balked in his efforts to tackle the 
thanatological threat to literary creativity that he finds in Kliman. He compares the youth 
and vigour of Kliman as “an unpredictable force bent on dominating me” (253) to his 
own unfavourable condition as “an exhausted escapee … from the coarse-grained world, 
eviscerated by impotence and in the worst state of his life” (269). There are comparisons 
here between the sense of a personal and aesthetic threat that Zuckerman senses from 
Kliman, as a “hulking, muscular figure” who was “forty three years younger than me” 
(103), and the portent of violence that emanates from Les at the end of The Human 
Stain. Zuckerman’s self-abandoning declaration that “I was on a tear, and nothing could 
have inspired me more than the risk I was taking” (103) by challenging Kliman’s 
biographical study of Lonoff recalls the mixture of intrigue and fear evoked in him by 
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the sight of Les out fishing on the frozen lake. In Kliman and Les, the author is 
confronted by figures who present both a potentially rich source of authorial possibility 
and the violent vanishing point of his attempts to write about ‘real’ life. By the novel’s 
end, Zuckerman flees New York and abandons his desire “to resume residence there 
reembodied, to take on all the things I’d decided to relinquish – love, desire, quarrels, 
professional conflict” (279). The unceasing cycle of death and desire that attends his 
efforts to inhabit and write about mutable existence proves an overwhelming ordeal for 
the aged and decaying Zuckerman, who seeks personal and artistic refuge once more by 
returning to his life of ascetic solitude in the Berkshires: “I was back where I needed 
never be in collision with anyone or be coveting anything or go about being someone, 
convincing people of this or that and seeking a role in the drama of my times” (280). Yet 
even “with all of them in New York having vanished from sight,” Zuckerman is still 
drawn to the fractious, erotic relationship between writing and lived experience – 
between being embodied within the world and writing as a detached or disembodied 
artist – that has characterised the fictional dialogue of He and She: 
 
I sat down at the desk by the window, looking out through the gray light of a November morning, across a 
snow-dusted road onto the silent, wind-flurried waters of the swamp … and, from that safe haven … wrote 
the final scene of He and She (280) 
 
Although back living as an exile from the turbulent fray of events in New York, 
Zuckerman is still unable to relinquish his obsession with the pulsating life of ‘real’ 
people and events. Even as it is retreating into an ever-diminishing horizon, his (missed) 
encounter with Jamie is revived and intensified by the erotic process that is involved in 
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